CHAPTER XVIII.
General Buell"s March.--Object of General Johnston.--His Force.-- Advance from Corinth.-Line of Battle.--Telegram.--The Time of the Battle of Shiloh.--Results of the First Day"s Battle.--One Encampment not taken.--Effects.--Reports on this Failure.--Death of General Johnston.--Remarks.
General Buell, who was to make a junction with General Grant, deemed it best that his army should march through by land, as it would facilitate the occupation of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad through north Alabama, where General Mitch.e.l.l had been a.s.signed.
Accordingly, Buell commenced his march from Nashville on March 15th, with a rapid movement of cavalry, followed by a division of infantry, to seize the bridges. The bridge over Duck River being destroyed, it was the 31st before his army crossed. His advance arrived at Savannah on Sat.u.r.day, April 5th, and our attack on Grant at Pittsburg Landing was made on the next day, the 6th of April. The advance of General Buell antic.i.p.ated his orders by two days, and likewise the calculations of our commanders.
It had been the object of General Johnston, since falling back from Nashville, to concentrate his army at Corinth, and fight the enemy in detail--Grant first, and Buell afterward. The army of General Polk had been drawn back from Columbus. The War Department ordered General Bragg from Pensacola, with his well-disciplined army, to the aid of Johnston. A brigade was sent by General Lovell from Louisiana, and Chalmers and Walker were already on the line of the Memphis and Charleston road with considerable commands. These forces collected at Corinth, and to them were added such new levies as the Governors had in rendezvous, and a few regiments raised in response to General Beauregard"s call. General Bragg, in a sketch of the battle of Shiloh, thus speaks of General Johnston"s army:
[Picture of General Braxton Bragg]
"In a period of four weeks, fragments of commands from Bowling Green, Kentucky, under Hardee; Columbus, Kentucky, under Polk; and Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans, under Bragg, with such new levies as could be hastily raised, all badly armed and equipped, were united at and near Corinth, and, for the first time, organised as an army.
It was a heterogeneous ma.s.s, in which there was more enthusiasm than discipline, more capacity than knowledge, and more valor than instruction. Rifles, rifled and smooth-bore muskets--some of them originally percussion, others hastily altered from flint-locks by Yankee contractors, many with the old flint and steel--and shot-guns of all sizes and patterns, held place in the same regiments. The task of organizing such a command in four weeks, and supplying it, especially with ammunition, suitable for action, was simply appalling. It was undertaken, however, with a cool, quiet self-control, calling to his aid the best knowledge and talent at his command, which not only inspired confidence, but soon yielded the natural fruits of system, order, and discipline."
This force, about forty thousand of all arms, was divided into four corps, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, and Brigadier-General Breckinridge. General Beauregard was second in command under General Johnston. General Beauregard says, "A want of general officers needful for the proper organization of divisions and brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together, and other difficulties in the way of effective organization, delayed the movements until the night of April 2d."
About one o"clock on the morning of April 3d preliminary orders were issued to hold the troops in readiness to move at a moment"s notice, with five days" provisions and a hundred rounds of ammunition. The orders for march and battle were issued in the afternoon. At that time General Hardee led the advance, the Third Corps, from Corinth, by the northernmost route, known as the Ridge road. Bivouacking that night on the way, he arrived next morning at Mickey"s, a house about eighteen miles from Corinth and four or five miles from Pittsburg.
The Second Corps, under Bragg, marched by the direct road to Pittsburg through Monterey, which it reached about 11 A.M. on the 4th, and bivouacked that night near Mickey"s in the rear of Hardee"s corps. The First Corps, under General Polk, consisted of two divisions, under Cheatham and Clark. The latter was ordered to follow Hardee on the Ridge road at an interval of half an hour, and to halt near Mickey"s, so as to allow Bragg"s corps to fall in behind Hardee, at a thousand yards" interval, and form a second line of battle.
Polk"s corps was to form the left wing of the third line of battle; and Breckinridge"s reserve the right wing. The other division of Polk, under Cheatham, was on outpost duty, at and near Bethel, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, about as far from Mickey"s as Corinth was.
He was ordered to a.s.semble his forces at Purdy, and pursue the route to Monterey. He effected his junction on the afternoon of the 5th, and took position on the left wing of Polk"s corps. Breckinridge"s reserve corps moved from Burnsville early on April 4th, by way of Farmington toward Monterey, distant fourteen miles. It did not effect its junction with the other corps until late on the afternoon of Sat.u.r.day the 5th, being delayed by the rains on Friday and Sat.u.r.day.
At daylight on the 5th Hardee moved, and by seven o"clock was sufficiently out of the way to allow Bragg to advance. Before ten o"clock Hardee"s corps had reached the outposts and developed the lines of the enemy. The corps was immediately deployed into line of battle about a mile and a half west of Shiloh church, where Lick Creek and Owl Creek approach most nearly, and are about three miles apart. Gladden"s brigade, of Bragg"s corps, was on the right of Hardee"s corps, which was not sufficiently strong to occupy the whole front. This line extended from creek to creek. Before seven o"clock Bragg"s column was in motion, and the right wing of his line of battle formed about eight hundred yards in the rear of Hardee"s line.
But the division on the left was nowhere to be seen. Even as late as half-past twelve the missing column had not appeared, nor had any report from it been received. General Johnston, "looking first at his watch, then glancing at the position of the sun, exclaimed: "This is not _war_! Let us have our horses!" He rode to the rear until he found the missing column standing stock-still, with its head some distance out in an open field. General Polk"s reserves were ahead of it, with their wagons and artillery blocking up the road. General Johnston ordered them to clear the road, and the missing column to move forward. There was much chaffering among those implicated as to who should bear the blame... . It was about four o"clock when the lines were completely formed--too late, of course, to begin the battle then." [13]
The road was not clear until 2 P.M. General Polk got Clark"s division of his corps into line of battle by four o"clock; and Cheatham, who had come up on the left, promptly followed. Breckinridge"s line was then formed on Polk"s right. Thus was the army arrayed in three lines of battle late Sat.u.r.day afternoon.[14]
The purpose of General Johnston to attack promptly is evinced in the correspondence already introduced; it is further shown in his telegram of April 3d, as follows:
"To the PRESIDENT, _Richmond._
"General Buell in motion, thirty thousand strong, rapidly from Colombia by Clifton to Savannah. Mitch.e.l.l behind him, with ten thousand. Confederate forces forty thousand; ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg.
"Division from Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville, converging to-morrow, near Monterey, on Pittsburg.
"Beauregard second in command, Polk the left, Bragg the center, Hardee the right wing, Breckinridge the reserve.
"Hope engagement before Buell can form junction." [15]
On the 6th of April I sent a telegram as follows:
"GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON: Your dispatch of yesterday received. I hope you will be able to close with the enemy before his two columns unite."
[Map: Battle of Shiloh Part II]
Though much inquiry has been made, I have not been able to recover that dispatch "of yesterday" the 4th. It was anxiously sought because, in cipher (private between us), he explained distinctly his plan of battle, as the previous one had his proposed order of march.
It was in every respect important to attack at the earliest moment after the advance of Buell"s command became known. Every delay diminished the chances of surprising the enemy, and increased the probability of his being reenforced. Had the attack been made a day sooner, not only would Buell"s army have been absent, but there would have been no prospect of their timely arrival; and who can measure the moral effect this would have produced? It would be useless to review the controversies as to who was responsible for the confusion and consequent detentions on the march, the evil of which might have been greater if the vigilance of the enemy had been equal to his self-sufficiency.
War has been called a fickle G.o.ddess, and its results attributed to chance. The great soldier of our century said, "Fortune favors the heavy battalions"; but is it not rather exact calculation than chance which controls the events of war, and the just determination of the relation of time, s.p.a.ce, and motion in the application of force, which decides the effective weight of battalions? Had the battle of Shiloh opened a day sooner, it would have been better; had it been postponed a day, to attack then would have been impracticable. Had the several columns moved on different roads, converging toward the field of battle, the movements of some could not have been obstructed by others, so that the troops would have been in position and the battle have been commenced on Sat.u.r.day morning. The programme and purpose of General Johnston appear from his dispatch of the 3d, and from the disappointment evinced by him at the failure of a portion of the command to be present on the field on the morning of the 5th (Sat.u.r.day), as he expected.
General Bragg, in a monograph on the battle of Shiloh, says:
"During the afternoon of the 5th, as the last of our troops were taking position, a casual and partly accidental meeting of general officers occurred just in rear of our second line, near the bivouac of General Bragg. The Commander-in-Chief, General Beauregard, General Polk, General Bragg, and General Breckinridge, are remembered as present. In a discussion of the causes of the delay and its incidents, it was mentioned that some of the troops, now in their third day only, were entirely out of food, though having marched with five days" rations. General Beauregard, confident our movement had been discovered by the enemy, urged its abandonment, a return to our camps for supplies, and a general change of programme. In this opinion no other seemed fully to concur; and when it was suggested that "the enemy"s supplies were much nearer, and could be had for the taking," General Johnston quietly remarked, "Gentlemen, we shall attack at daylight to-morrow." The meeting then dispersed upon an invitation of the commanding general to meet at his tent that evening. At that meeting a further discussion elicited the same views, and the same firm, decided determination. The next morning, about dawn of day, the 6th, as the troops were being put in motion, several generals again met at the camp-fire of the general-in-chief.
The discussion was renewed. General Beauregard again expressing his dissent; when, rapid firing in the front indicating that the attack had commenced, General Johnston closed the discussion by remarking: "The battle has opened, gentlemen; it is too late to change our dispositions." He prepared to move to the front, and his subordinates promptly joined their respective commands, inspired by his coolness, confidence, and determination. Few men have equaled him in the possession and display, at the proper time, of these great qualities of the soldier."
The results of the first day of the famous battle thus began are very summarily presented in the following brief report of General Beauregard:
"At 5 A.M., on the 6th instant, a reconnoitering party of the enemy having become engaged with our advanced pickets, the commander of the forces gave orders to begin the movement and attack as determined upon, except that Trabue"s brigade of Breckinridge"s division was detached and advanced to support the left of Bragg"s corps and line of battle then menaced by the enemy; and the other two brigades were directed to advance by the road to Hamburg to support Bragg"s right; and at the same time Maney"s regiment of Polk"s corps was advanced by the same road to reenforce the regiment, of cavalry and battery of four pieces, already thrown forward to watch and guard Grier"s, Tanner"s, and Borland"s Fords of Lick Creek.
"Thirty minutes after 5 A.M., our lines and columns were in motion, all animated evidently by a promising spirit. The front line was engaged at once, but advanced steadily, followed in due order, with equal resolution and steadiness, by the other lines, which were brought successively into action with rare skill, judgment, and gallantry by the several corps commanders, as the enemy made a stand with his ma.s.ses rallied for the struggle for his encampments. Like an Alpine avalanche our troops moved forward, despite the determined resistance of the enemy, until after 6 P.M., when we were in possession of all his encampments between Owl and Lick Creeks but one; nearly all of his field-artillery, about thirty flags, colors, and standards, over three thousand prisoners, including a division commander (General Prentiss), and several brigade commanders, thousands of small-arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage, and munitions of war, and a large amount of means of transportation, all the substantial fruits of a complete victory--such, indeed, as rarely have followed the most successful battles, for never was an army so well provided as that of our enemy.
"The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the shelter of the heavy guns of his iron-clad gunboats, and we remained undisputed masters of his well-selected, admirably provided cantonments, after our twelve hours of obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from them and the contiguous covert, but only by the sustained onset of all the men we could bring into action."
There are two words in this report which, if they could have been truthfully omitted, it would have been worth to us the surrender of all "the substantial fruits of a complete victory." It says: "Our troops moved forward, despite the determined resistance of the enemy, until after 6 P.M., when we were in possession of all his encampments between Owl and lick Creeks _but one_." It was that "one" encampment that furnished a foothold for all the subsequent reenforcements sent by Buell, and gave occasion for the final withdrawal of our forces; whereas, if that had been captured, and the "waters of the Tennessee"
reached, as General Johnston designed, it was not too much to expect that Grant"s army would have surrendered; that Buell"s forces would not have crossed the Tennessee; but with a skillful commander, like Johnston, to lead our troops, the enemy would have sought safety on the north bank of the Ohio; that Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri would have been recovered, the Northwest disaffected, and our armies filled with the men of the Southwest, and perhaps of the Northwest also.
Let us turn to reports and authorities. The author of "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston" says:
"Of the two armies, one was now an advancing, triumphant host, with arm uplifted to give the mortal blow; the other, a broken, mangled, demoralized mob, paralyzed and waiting for the stroke. While the other Confederate brigades, which had shared most actively in Prentiss"s capture, were sending back the prisoners and forming again for a final attack, two brigades, under Chalmers and Jackson, on the extreme right, had cleared away all in front of them, and, moving down the river-bank, now came upon the last point where even a show of resistance was made. Being two very bold and active brigadiers, they at once closed with the enemy in their front, crossing a deep ravine and difficult ground to get at him. Here Colonel Webster, of Grant"s staff, had gathered all the guns he could find from batteries, whether abandoned or still coherent, and with stout-hearted men, picked up at random, had prepared a resistance.
Some infantry, similarly const.i.tuted, had been got together; and Ammen"s brigade, the van of Nelson"s division of Buell"s corps, had landed, and was pushing its way through the throng of pallid fugitives at the landing to take up the battle where it had fallen from the hands of Grant and Sherman. It got into position in time to do its part in checking the unsupported a.s.saults of Chalmers and Jackson."
General Chalmers, describing this final attack in his report, says:
"It was then about four o"clock in the evening, and, after distributing ammunition, we received orders from General Bragg to drive the enemy into the river. My brigade, together with that of Brigadier-General Jackson, filed to the right and formed facing the river, and endeavored to press forward to the water"s edge; but in attempting to mount the last ridge we were met by a fire from a whole line of batteries, protected by infantry and a.s.sisted by sh.e.l.ls from the gunboats."
In a subsequent memorandum General Chalmers writes:
"One more resolute movement forward would have captured Grant and his whole army, and fulfilled to the letter the battle-plan of the great Confederate general, who died in the belief that victory was ours... ."--("The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," p. 637.)
Brigadier-General Jackson, in his report, says:
"My brigade was ordered to change direction again, face toward Pittsburg, where the enemy appeared to have made his last stand, and to advance upon him, General Chalmers"s brigade being again on my right, and extending to the swamp of the Tennessee River. Without ammunition, and with only their bayonets to rely on, steadily my men advanced under a heavy fire from light batteries, siege-pieces, and gunboats. Pa.s.sing through the ravine, they arrived near the crest of the opposite hill, upon which the enemy"s batteries were, but could not be urged farther without support. Sheltering themselves against the precipitous sides of the ravine, they remained under this fire for some time. Finding an advance without support impracticable, remaining there under fire useless, and believing that any further forward movement should have been made simultaneously along our whole line, I proceeded to obtain orders from General Withers, but, after seeing him, was ordered by a staff-officer to retire. This order was communicated to me as coming from General Beauregard."
General Hardee, who commanded the first line, says in his report:
"Upon the death of General Johnston, the command having devolved upon General Beauregard, the conflict was continued until near sunset, and the advance divisions were within a few hundred yards of Pittsburg, where the enemy were huddled in confusion, when the order to withdraw was received. The troops were ordered to bivouac on the field of battle."
General Polk"s report says:
"We had one hour or more of daylight still left, were within one hundred and fifty to four hundred yards of the enemy"s position, and nothing seemed wanting to complete the most brilliant victory of the war but to press forward and make a vigorous a.s.sault on the demoralized remnant of his forces."
General Gilmer, the chief engineer of the Confederate States Army, in a letter to Colonel William Preston Johnston, dated September 17, 1872, writes as follows:
"It is my well-considered opinion that if your father had survived the day he would have crushed and captured General Grant"s army before the setting of the sun on the 6th. In fact, at the time your father received the mortal wound, advancing with General Breckinridge"s command, the day was ours. The enemy having lost all the strong positions on that memorable field, his troops fell back in great disorder on the banks of the Tennessee. To cover the confusion, rapid fires were opened from the gunboats the enemy had placed in the river; but the shots pa.s.sed entirely over our devoted men, who were exultant and eager to be led forward to the final a.s.sault, which must have resulted in a complete victory, owing to the confusion and general disorganization of the Federal troops. I knew the condition of General Grant"s army at the moment, as I had reached a high, projecting point on the bank of the river, about a mile above Pittsburg Landing, and could see the hurried movements to get the disordered troops across to the right bank. Several thousand had already pa.s.sed, and a confused ma.s.s of men crowded to the landing to get on the boats that were employed in crossing. I rode rapidly to General Bragg"s position to report what I had seen, and suggested that, if he would suspend the fire of his artillery and marshal his infantry for a general advance, the enemy must surrender. General Bragg decided to make the advance, and authorized me and other officers to direct the commanders of the batteries to cease firing.
"In the midst of the preparations, orders reached General Bragg from General Beauregard directing the troops to be withdrawn and placed in camp for the night--the intention being to resume the contest in the morning. This was fatal, as it enabled General Buell and General Wallace to arrive on the scene of action; that is, they came up in the course of the night. Had General Beauregard known the condition of the enemy as your father knew it when he received the fatal shot, the order for withdrawal would certainly not have been given, and, without such order, I know the enemy would have been crushed." [16]
To General Gilmer"s opinion as a scientific engineer, a soldier of long experience, and a man of resolute will as well as calm judgment, the greatest respect will be accorded by those who knew him in the United States Army, as well as his a.s.sociates in the Confederate Army.