The torpedoes were made of the most ordinary material generally, as, beer-barrels fixed with conical heads, coated within and without with rosin dissolved in coal-tar; some were made of cast-iron, copper, or tin; and gla.s.s demijohns were used. There were three essentials to success, viz., the sensitive fuse-primer, a charge of sixty pounds of gunpowder, and actual contact between the torpedo and the bottom of the vessel.
There were one hundred and twenty-three of these torpedoes placed in Charleston Harbor and Stono River. It was blockaded by thirteen large ships and ironclads, with six or seven storeships, and some twenty other vessels. The position of each one was known, and they could be approached within a half-mile, which made it easy to attack, destroy, or disperse them at night by floating torpedoes, connected together by twos by a rope one hundred and thirty yards long, buoyed up and stretched across the current by two boats, which were to be dropped in ebbing tide, to float down among the vessels. This plan, says General Rains, was opposed by General Gilmer, of the engineer corps, on the ground that "they might float back and destroy our own boat."
One was sent down to go in the midst of the fleet, and made its mark.
An act of devoted daring was here performed by Commander W. T.
Gla.s.sell, Confederate States Navy, which claims more than a pa.s.sing notice. While the enemy was slowly contracting his lines around Charleston, his numerous ships of war kept watch-and-ward outside of the harbor. Our few vessels, almost helpless by their defective engines, could effect little against their powerful opponents. The New Ironsides, the pride of their fleet, lay off Morris"s Island.
This Gla.s.sell resolved to attack with a steam-launch carrying a torpedo spar at the bow. With an engineer, pilot, and fireman, he steered for the Ironsides under cover of a hazy night. As he approached, he was hailed by the lookout, and the next moment struck the Ironsides, exploding the torpedo about fifteen feet from the keel. An immense volume of water was thrown up, covering the little boat, and, pieces of timber falling in the engine, it was rendered entirely unmanageable, so as to deprive Commander Gla.s.sell of the means of escape on which he had relied. A rapid fire was concentrated upon him from the deck of the ship, and there remained no chance except to attempt an escape by swimming ash.o.r.e. To secure liberty to his country, he risked and lost his own, and found, for the indignity to which he was subjected, compensation, inasmuch as the famous New Ironsides was long rendered useless to the enemy.
One hundred and one torpedoes were planted in Roanoke River, North Carolina, after a flotilla of twelve vessels had started up to capture Fort Branch. The torpedoes destroyed six of the vessels and frustrated the attack.
Every avenue to the outworks or to the city of Mobile was guarded by submarine torpedoes, so that it was impossible for any vessel drawing three feet of water to get within effective cannon-range of the defenses. Two ironclads attempted to get near enough to Spanish Fort to take part in the bombardment. They both struck torpedoes, and went to the bottom on Apalachie bar; thenceforward the fleet made no further attempt to encounter the almost certain destruction which they saw awaited any vessel which might attempt to enter the torpedo-guarded waters. But many were sunk when least expecting it.
Some went down long after the Confederate forces had evacuated Mobile. The Tec.u.mseh was probably sunk, says Major-General D. H.
Maury,[56] on her own torpedo. While steaming in lead of Farragut"s fleet she carried a torpedo affixed to a spar, which projected some twenty feet from her bows; she proposed to use this torpedo against the Tennessee, our only formidable ship; but, while pa.s.sing Fort Morgan, a shot from that fort cut away the stays by which the torpedo was secured; it then doubled under her, and, exploding fairly under the bottom of the ill-fated ship, she careened and sank instantly in ten fathoms of water. Only six or eight of her crew of a hundred or more were saved. The total number of vessels sunk by torpedoes in Mobile Bay was twelve, viz., three ironclads, two tinclads, and seven transports. Fifty-eight vessels were destroyed in Southern waters by torpedoes during the war; these included ironclads and others of no mean celebrity.
[Footnote 53: See "Annual Cyclopaedia," 1861, p. 536.]
[Footnote 54: "The Story of the Confederate Ship Virginia," by William Norris, Colonel Signal Corps, Confederate Army.]
[Footnote 55: See "Torpedo Warfare," "North American Review,"
September-October, 1878.]
[Footnote 56: Southern Historical Society Papers, January, 1877.]
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Naval Affairs (continued).--Importance of New Orleans.--Attack feared from up the River.--Preparations for Defense.--Strength of the Forts.--Other Defenses.-The General Plan.--Ironclads.-- Raft-Fleet of the Enemy.--Bombardment of the Forts commenced.-- Advance of the Fleet.--Its Pa.s.sage of the Forts.--Batteries below the City.--Darkness of the Night.--Evacuation of the City by General Lovell on Appearance of the Enemy.--Address of General Duncan to Soldiers in the Forts.--Refusal to surrender.--Meeting of the Garrison of Fort Jackson.--The Forts surrendered.--Ironclad Louisiana destroyed.--The Tugs and Steamers.--The Governor Moore.-- The Enemy"s Ship Varuna sunk.--The McRae.--The State of the City and its Defenses considered.--Public Indignation.--Its Victims.-- Efforts made for its Defense by the Navy Department.--The Construction of the Mississippi.
New Orleans was the most important commercial port in the Confederacy, being the natural outlet of the Mississippi Valley, as well to the ports of Europe as to those of Central and Southern America. It was the depot which, at an early period, had led to controversies with Spain, and its importance to the interior had been a main inducement to the purchase of Louisiana. It had become before 1861 the chief cotton-mart of the United States, and its defense attracted the early attention of the Confederate Government. The approaches for an attacking party were numerous. They could through several channels enter Lake Pontchartrain, to approach the city in rear for land-attack, could ascend the Mississippi from the Gulf, or descend it from the Northwest, where it was known that the enemy was preparing a formidable fleet of iron-clad gunboats. In the early part of 1862, so general an opinion prevailed that the greatest danger to New Orleans was by an attack from above, that General Lovell sent to General Beauregard a large part of the troops then in the city.
At the mouth of the Mississippi there is a bar, the greatest depth of water on which seldom exceeded eighteen feet, and it was supposed that heavy vessels of war, with their armament and supplies, would not be able to cross it. Such proved to be the fact, and the vessels of that cla.s.s had to be lightened to enable them to enter the river.
In that condition of affairs, an inferior fleet might have engaged them with a prospect of success. Captain Hollins, who was in command of the squadron at New Orleans, and who had on a former occasion shown his fitness for such service, had been sent with the greater part of his fleet up the river to join the defense there being made.
Two powerful vessels were under construction, the Louisiana and the Mississippi, but neither of them was finished. A volunteer fleet of transport-vessels had been fitted up by some river-men, but it was in the unfortunate condition of not being placed under the orders of the naval commander. A number of fire-rafts had been also provided, which were to serve the double purpose of lighting up the river in the event of the hostile fleet attempting to pa.s.s the forts under cover of the night, and of setting fire to any vessel with which they might become entangled.
After pa.s.sing the bar, there was nothing to prevent the ascent of the river until Forts Jackson and St. Philip were reached. These works, constructed many years before, were on opposite banks of the river.
Their armament, as reported by General Lovell, December 5, 1861, consisted of--Fort Jackson: six forty-two-ponders, twenty-six twenty-four-pounders, two thirty-two-pounder rifles, sixteen thirty-two-pounders, three eight-inch columbiads, one ten-inch columbiad, two eight-inch mortars, one ten-inch mortar, two forty-pounder howitzers, and ten twenty-four-pounder howitzers. Fort St. Philip: six forty-two-ponders, nine thirty-two-pounders, twenty-two twenty-four-pounders, four eight-inch columbiads, one eight-inch mortar, one ten-inch mortar, and three field-guns.
General Duncan reported that, on the 27th of March, he was informed by Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, commanding Forts Jackson and St.
Philip, of the coast-defenses, which were under his (General Duncan"s) command, that the enemy"s fleet was crossing the bars, and entering the Mississippi River in force; whereupon he repaired to Fort Jackson. After describing the condition of the forts from the excess of water and sinking of the entire site, as well as the deficiency of guns of heavy caliber in the forts, he proceeds:
"It became necessary in their present condition to bring in and mount, and to build the platforms for, the three ten-inch and three eight-inch columbiads, the rifled forty-two-pounder, and the five ten-inch seacoast mortars recently obtained from Pensacola on the evacuation of that place, together with the two rifled seven-inch guns temporarily borrowed from the naval authorities in New Orleans.
It was also found necessary to repair the old water-battery to the rear of and below Fort Jackson, which had never been completed, for the reception of a portion of these guns, as well as to construct mortar-proof magazines, and sh.e.l.l-rooms within the same."
One of the seven-inch rifled guns borrowed from the navy was subsequently returned, so that, when the forts were attacked, the armament was one hundred and twenty-eight guns and mortars.
The garrisons of Forts Jackson and St. Philip were about one thousand men on December 5, 1861; afterward, so far as I know, the number was not materially changed.
The prevailing belief that vessels of war, in a straight, smooth channel, could pa.s.s batteries, led to the construction of a raft between the two forts which, it was supposed, would detain the ships under fire of the forts long enough for the guns to sink them, or at least to compel them to retire. The power of the river when in flood, and the drift-wood it bore upon it, broke the raft; another was constructed, which, when the drift-wood acc.u.mulated upon it, met a like fate. Whether obstructions differently arranged--such as booms secured to the sh.o.r.es, with apparatus by which they could be swung across the channel when needful, or logs such as were used, except that, being unconnected together, but each separately secured by chain and anchor, they might severally yield to the pressure of the driftwood, sinking, so as to allow it to pa.s.s over them, and, when relieved of the weight, rising again--or whether other expedient could have been made permanent and efficient, is a problem which need not be discussed, as the time for its application has pa.s.sed from us.
The general plan for the defense of New Orleans consisted of two lines of works: an exterior one, pa.s.sing through the forts near the month of the river, and the positions taken to defend the various water approaches; nearer to the city was the interior line, embracing New Orleans and Algiers, which was intended princ.i.p.ally to repel an attack by land, but also, by its batteries on the river-bank, to resist approach by water. The total length of the intrenchments on this interior line was more than eight miles. When completed, it formed, in connection with impa.s.sable swamps, a very strong line of defense. At the then high stage of the river, all the land between it and the swamps was so saturated with water, that regular approaches could not have been made. The city, therefore, was at the time supposed to be doubly secure from a land-attack.
In the winter of 1861-"62 I sent one of my aides-de-camp to New Orleans to make a general inspection, and hold free conference with the commanding General. Upon his return, he reported to me that General Lovell was quite satisfied with the condition of the land-defenses--so much so as to say that his only fear was that the enemy would not make a land-attack.
Considered since the event, it may seem strange that, after the fall of Donelson and Henry, and the employment of the enemy"s gunboats in the Tennessee and c.u.mberland, it was still generally argued that the danger to New Orleans was that the gunboats would descend the Mississippi, and applications were made to have the ship Louisiana sent up the river as soon as she was completed.
The interior lines of defense mounted more than sixty guns of various caliber, and were surrounded by wide and deep ditches. On the various water approaches, including bays and bayous on the west and east sides of the river, there were sixteen different forts, and these, together with those on the river and the batteries of the interior line, had in position about three hundred guns.
One ironclad, the Louisiana, mounting sixteen guns of heavy caliber, though she was not quite completed, was sent down to cooperate with the forts. Her defective steam-power and imperfect steering apparatus prevented her from rendering active cooperation. The steamship Mississippi, then under construction at New Orleans, was in such an unfinished condition as to be wholly unavailable when the enemy arrived. In the opinion of naval officers she would have been, if completed, the most powerful ironclad then in the world, and could have driven the enemy"s fleet out of the river and raised the blockade at Mobile. There were also several small river-steamers which were lightly armed, and their bows were protected so that they could act as rams and otherwise aid in the defense of the river; but, from the reports received, they seem, with a few honorable exceptions, to have rendered little valuable service.
The means of defense, therefore, mainly relied on were the two heavy-armed forts, Jackson and St. Philip, with the obstruction placed between them: this was a raft consisting of cypress-trees, forty feet long, and averaging four or five feet at the larger end.
They were placed longitudinally in the river, about three feet apart, and held together by gunwales on top, and strung upon two two-and-a-half-inch chain cables fastened to their lower sides. This raft was anch.o.r.ed in the river, abreast of the forts.
The fleet of the enemy below the forts consisted of seven steam sloops of war, twelve gunboats, and several armed steamers, under Commodore Farragut; also, a mortar-fleet consisting of twenty sloops and some steam-vessels. The whole force was forty-odd vessels of different kinds, with an armament of three hundred guns of heavy caliber, of improved models.
The bombardment of the forts by the mortar-fleet commenced on April 18th, and, after six days of vigorous and constant sh.e.l.ling, the resisting power of the forts was not diminished in any perceptible degree. On the 23d there were manifest preparations by the enemy to attempt the pa.s.sage of the forts. This, as subsequently developed, was to be done in the following manner. The sloops of war and the gunboats were each formed in two divisions, and, selecting the darkest hour of the night, between 3 and 4 A.M. of the 24th, moved up the river in two columns. The commanders of the forts had vainly endeavored to have the river lighted up in antic.i.p.ation of an attack by the fleet.
In the mean time, while the fleet moved up the river, there was kept up from the mortars a steady bombardment on the forts, and these opened a fire on the columns of ships and gunboats, which, from the failure to send down the fire-rafts to light up the river, was less effective than it otherwise would have been. The straight, deep channel enabled the vessels to move at their greatest speed, and thus the forts were pa.s.sed.
Brigadier-General J. K. Duncan, commanding the coast defenses, says, in his report of the pa.s.sing of Forts Jackson and St. Philip by the enemy"s fleet:
"The enemy evidently antic.i.p.ated a strong demonstration to be made against him with fire-barges. Finding, upon his approach, however, that no such demonstration was made, and that the only resistance offered to his pa.s.sage was the antic.i.p.ated fire of the forts--the broken and scattered raft being no obstacle--I am satisfied that he was suddenly inspired, for the first time, to run the gantlet at all hazards, although not a part of his original design. Be that as it may, a rapid rush was made by him in columns of twos in echelon, so as not to interfere with each other"s broadsides. The mortar-fire was furiously increased upon Fort Jackson, and, in dashing by, each of the vessels delivered broadside after broadside, of shot, sh.e.l.l, grape, canister, and spherical case, to drive the men from our guns.
"Both the officers and men stood up manfully under this galling and fearful hail, and the batteries of both forts were promptly opened at their longest range, with shot, sh.e.l.l, hot shot, and a little grape, and most gallantly and rapidly fought, until the enemy succeeded in getting above and beyond our range. The absence of light on the river, together with the smoke of the guns, made the obscurity so dense that scarcely a vessel was visible, and, in consequence, the gunners were obliged to govern their firing entirely by the flashes of the enemy"s guns. I am fully satisfied that the enemy"s dash was successful mainly owing to the cover of darkness, as a frigate and several gunboats were forced to retire as day was breaking. Similar results had attended every previous attempt made by the enemy to pa.s.s or to reconnoiter when we had sufficient light to fire with accuracy and effect."
The vessels which pa.s.sed the fort anch.o.r.ed at the quarantine station about six miles above, and in the forenoon proceeded up the river.
Batteries had been constructed where the interior line of defense touched both the right and the left bank of the river. The high stage of the river gave to its surface an elevation above that of the natural bank; but a continuous levee to protect the land from inundation existed on both sides of the river. When the ascending fleet approached these batteries, a cross-fire, which drove two of the vessels back, was opened upon it, and continued until all the ammunition was exhausted. The garrison was then withdrawn-casualties, one killed and one wounded. The regret which would naturally arise from the fact of these batteries not having a sufficient supply of ammunition is modified, if not removed, by the statement of the highly accomplished and gallant officer, Major-General M. L. Smith, who was then in command of them. He reported:
"Had the fall of New Orleans depended upon the enemy"s first taking Forts Jackson and Philip, I think the city would have been safe from an attack from the Gulf. The forts, in my judgment, were impregnable as long as they were in free and open communication with the city.
This communication was not endangered while the obstruction existed.
The conclusion, then, is briefly this: While the obstruction existed, the city was safe; when it was swept away, as the defenses then existed, it was within the enemy"s power."
On the other hand, General Duncan, whose protracted, skillful, and gallant defense of the forts is above all praise, closes his official report with the following sentence: "Except for the cover afforded by the obscurity of the darkness, I shall always remain satisfied that the enemy would never have succeeded in pa.s.sing Forts Jackson and St.
Philip." The darkness to which he referred was not only that of night, but also the absence of the use of the means prepared to light up the river. As further proof of the intensity of the darkness, and the absence of that intelligent design and execution which had been claimed, I will quote a sentence from the report of Commodore Farragut: "At length the fire slackened, the smoke cleared off, and we saw to our surprise that we were above the forts."
On the 25th of April the enemy"s gunboats and ships of war anch.o.r.ed in front of the city and demanded its surrender. Major-General M.
Lovell, then in command, refused to comply with the summons, but, believing himself unable to make a successful defense, and in order to avoid a bombardment, agreed to withdraw his forces, and turn it over to the civil authorities. Accordingly, the city was evacuated on the same day. The forts still continued defiantly to hold their position. By a.s.siduous exertion the damage done to the works was repaired, and the garrisons valiantly responded to the resolute determination of General Duncan and Colonel Higgins to defend the forts against the fleet still below, as well as against that which had pa.s.sed and was now above. On the 26th Commodore Porter, commanding the mortar-fleet below, sent a flag-of-truce boat to demand the surrender of the forts, saying that the city of New Orleans had surrendered. To this Colonel Higgins replied, April 27th, that he had no official information that New Orleans had been evacuated, and until such notice was received he would not entertain for a moment a proposition to surrender the forts. On the same day General Duncan, commanding the coast-defenses, issued the following address:
"SOLDIERS OF FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP: You have n.o.bly, gallantly, and heroically sustained with courage and fort.i.tude the terrible ordeals of fire, water, and a hail of shot and sh.e.l.l wholly unsurpa.s.sed during the present war. But more remains to be done. The safety of New Orleans and the cause of the Southern Confederacy--our homes, families, and everything dear to man--yet depend upon our exertions. We are just as capable of repelling the enemy to-day as we were before the bombardment. Twice has the enemy demanded your surrender, and twice has he been refused.
"Your officers have every confidence in your courage and patriotism, and feel every a.s.surance that you will cheerfully and with alacrity obey all orders, and do your whole duty as men and as becomes the well-tried garrisons of Forts Jackson and St. Philip. Be vigilant, therefore, stand by your guns, and all will yet be well.
"J. K. DUNCAN,
"_Brigadier-General, commanding coast-defenses._"
Not less lofty and devoted was the spirit evinced by Colonel Higgins.