"On the morning of the 15th my forces were again in motion. My troops at this period were sorely in need of shoes, clothing, and food. We had had issued to us no meat for several days, and little or no bread; the men had been forced to subsist princ.i.p.ally on green corn and green apples. Nevertheless, they were in high spirits and defiant as we contended with the advanced guard of McClellan on the 15th and forenoon of the 16th. During the afternoon of this day I was ordered, after great fatigue and hunger endured by my soldiers, to take position near the Hagerstown turnpike, in open field in front of the Dunkard church. General Hooker"s corps crossed the Antietam, swung round with its front on the pike, and about an hour before sunset encountered my division. I had stationed one or two batteries on a hillock in a meadow, near the edge of a corn-field, and just by the pike. The Texas Brigade had been disposed on the left, and that of Law on the right. We opened fire, and a spirited action ensued, which lasted till a late hour in the night. When the firing had in a great measure ceased, we were so close to the enemy that we could distinctly hear him ma.s.sing his heavy bodies in our immediate front.
"The extreme suffering of my troops for want of food induced me to ride back to General Lee, and request him to send two or more brigades to our relief, at least for the night, in order that the soldiers might have a chance to cook their meager rations. He said that he would cheerfully do so, but he knew of no command that could be spared for the purpose; he, however, suggested that I should see General Jackson, and endeavor to obtain a.s.sistance from him. After riding a long time in search of the latter, I finally discovered him alone, lying upon the ground asleep by the root of a tree. I aroused him, and made known the half-starved condition of my troops; he immediately ordered Lawton"s, Trimble"s, and Hays"s brigades to our relief. He exacted of me, however, a promise that I would come to the support of these forces the moment I was called upon. I quickly rode off in search of my wagons that the men might prepare and cook their flour, as we were still without meat; unfortunately, the night was then far advanced, and, although every effort was made in the darkness to get the wagons forward, dawn of the morning of the 17th broke upon us before many of the men had time to do more than prepare the dough. Soon, thereafter, an officer of Lawton"s staff dashed up to me, saying, "General Lawton sends his compliments, with the request that you come at once to his support." "To arms!" was instantly sounded, and quite a large number of my brave soldiers were again obliged to march to the front, leaving their uncooked rations in camp.
"Not far distant in our front were drawn up, in close array, heavy columns of Federal infantry; not leas than two corps were in sight to oppose my small command, numbering approximately two thousand effectives. However, with the trusty Law on my right, in the edge of the wood, and the gallant Colonel Wafford in command of the Texas Brigade on the left, near the pike, we moved forward to the a.s.sault.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming odds of over ten to one against us, we drove the enemy from the wood and corn-field back upon his reserves, and forced him to abandon his guns on our left. This most deadly combat raged till our last round of ammunition was expended.
The First Texas Regiment had lost in the corn-field fully two thirds of its number; and whole ranks of brave men, whose deeds were unrecorded save in the hearts of loved ones at home, were mowed down in heaps to the right and left. Never before was I so continually troubled with fear that my horse would further injure some wounded fellow-soldier lying helpless upon the ground. Our right flank, during this short but seemingly long s.p.a.ce of time, was toward the main line of the Federals, and, after several ineffectual efforts to procure reenforcements and our last shot had been fired, I ordered my troops back to Dunkard church for the same reason which had previously compelled Lawton, Hays, and Trimble to retire (a want of cartridges). Upon the arrival of McLaws"s division we marched to the rear, renewed our supply of ammunition, and returned to our position in the wood near the church, which ground we held till a late hour in the afternoon, when we moved somewhat farther to the right and bivouacked for the night. With the close of this b.l.o.o.d.y day ceased the hardest-fought battle of the war."
The following account of Colonel Taylor, in his "Four Years with General Lee," is more comprehensive, embracing the other forces besides Hood"s brigade:
"On the afternoon of the 16th, General McClellan directed an attack by Hooker"s corps on the Confederate left--Hood"s two brigades--and during the whole of the 17th the battle was waged, with varying intensity, along the entire line. When the issue was first joined, on the afternoon of the 16th, General Lee had with him less than eighteen thousand men, consisting of the commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, the two divisions of Jackson, and two brigades under Walker. Couriers were sent to the rear to hurry up the divisions of A. P. Hill, Anderson, and McLaws, hastening from Harper"s Ferry, and these several commands, as they reached the front at intervals during the day, on the 17th, were immediately deployed and put to work.
Every man was engaged. We had no reserve.
"The fighting was heaviest and most continuous on the Confederate left. It is established by Federal evidence that the three corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner were completely shattered in the repeated but fruitless efforts to turn this flank, and two of these corps were rendered useless for further aggressive movements. The aggregate strength of the attacking column at this point reached forty thousand men, not counting the two divisions of Franklin"s corps, sent at a late hour in the day to rescue the Federal right from the impending danger of being itself destroyed; while the Confederates, from first to last, had less than fourteen thousand men on this flank, consisting of Jackson"s two divisions, McLaws"s division, and the two small divisions, of two brigades each, under Hood and Walker, with which to resist their fierce and oft-repeated a.s.saults. The disproportion in the center and on our right was as great as, or even more decided than, on our left."
In the "Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p.
368, General Sumner testifies as follows:
"General Hooker"s corps was dispersed; there is no question about that. I sent one of my staff-officers to find where they were, and General Rickets, the only officer he could find, said that he could not raise three hundred men of the corps. There were troops lying down on the left, which I took to belong to Mansfield"s command. In the mean time General Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of his corps had also been thrown into confusion."
The testimony of General McClellan, in the same report, Part I, p.
441, is to the same effect:
"The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss had been so great, and there was so much disorganization in name of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day, especially as I was sure of the arrival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about fifteen thousand men. As an instance of the condition of some of the troops that morning, I happen to recollect the returns of the First Corps. General Hooker"s, made on the morning of the 18th, by which there were thirty-five hundred men reported present for duty. Four days after that, the returns of the same corps showed thirteen thousand five hundred."
On the night of the 19th our forces crossed the Potomac, and some brigades of the enemy followed. In the morning General A. P. Hill, who commanded the rear-guard, was ordered to drive them back. Having disposed his forces, an attack was made, and, as the foe ma.s.sed in front of General Pender"s brigade and endeavored to turn his flank, General Hill says, in his report:
"A simultaneous daring charge was made, and the enemy driven pell-mell into the river. Then commenced the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the tale. By their own account, they lost three thousand men killed and drowned from one brigade alone. Some two hundred prisoners were taken."
General McClellan states, in his official report, that he had in this battle, in action, 87,164 men of all arms.
The official reports of the commanding officers of our forces, made at the time, show our total effective infantry to have been 27,255.
The estimate made for the cavalry and artillery, which is rather excessive, is 8,000. This would make General Lee"s entire strength 35,255.
The official return of the Army of Northern Virginia, on September 22, 1862, after its return to Virginia, and when the stragglers had rejoined their commands, shows present for duty, 36,187 infantry and artillery; the cavalry, of which there is no report, would perhaps increase these figures to 40,000 of all arms.[65]
The return of the United States Army of the Potomac on September 20, 1862, shows present for duty, at that date, of the commands that partic.i.p.ated in the battle of Sharpsburg, 85,930 of all arms.[66]
The loss of the enemy at Boonsboro and Sharpsburg was 14,794.[67]
[Footnote 62: To these remarks Colonel W. H. Taylor adds the following note: "Colonel Venable, one of my a.s.sociates on the staff of General Lee, says in regard to this matter: "This is very easily explained.
One copy was sent directly to Hill from headquarters. General Jackson sent him a copy, as he regarded Hill in his command. It is Jackson"s copy, in his own handwriting, which General Hill has. The other was undoubtedly left carelessly by some one at Hill"s quarters." says General McClellan, "Upon learning the contents of this order, I at once gave orders for a vigorous pursuit."--(General McClellan"s testimony, "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 440.)]
[Footnote 63: Report of General R. E. Lee.]
[Footnote 64: "Advance and Retreat," by J. B. Hood, p. 41.]
[Footnote 65: Taylor"s "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 66: Official return from Adjutant-General"s office, United States Army. "Report of Committee on Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 492.]
[Footnote 67: Ibid., p. 42.]
CHAPTER x.x.xVI.
Efforts of the Enemy to obtain our Cotton.--Demands of European Manufacturers.--Thousands of Operatives resorting to the Poor-Rates.--Complaint of her Majesty"s Secretary of State.--Letter of Mr. Seward.--Promise to open all the Channels of Commerce.-- Series of measures adopted by the United States.--Act of Congress.-- Its Provisions.--Its Operation.--Unconst.i.tutional Measures.-- President Lincoln an Accomplice.--Not authorized by a State of War.--Case before Chief-Justice Taney.--His Decision.--Expeditions sent by the United States Government to seize Localities.--An Act providing for the Appointment of Special Agents to seize Abandoned or Captured Property.--The Views of General Grant.--Weakening his Strength One Third.--Our Country divided into Districts, and Federal Agents Appointed.--Continued to the Close of the War.
A cla.s.s of measures was adopted by the Government of the United States, the object of which was practically and effectually to plunder us of a large portion of our crop of cotton, and secure its transportation, to the manufacturers of Europe. The foreign necessity for our cotton is represented in these words of her Majesty"s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on May 6, 1862, when speaking of the blockade of our ports:
"Thousands are now obliged to resort to the poor-rates for subsistence, owing to this blockade, yet her Majesty"s Government have not sought to take advantage of the obvious imperfections of this blockade, in order to declare it ineffective. They have, to the loss and detriment of the British nation, scrupulously observed the duties of Great Britain to a friendly state."
The severity of the distress thus alluded to was such, both in Great Britain and France, as to produce an intervention of the Governments of those countries to alleviate it. Instead, however, of adopting those measures required in the exercise of justice to the Confederacy, and which would have been sustained by the law of nations, by declaring the blockade "ineffective," as it really was, they sought, through informal applications to Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State for the United States, to obtain opportunities for an increased exportation of cotton from the Confederacy. This is explained by Mr. Seward in a letter to Mr. Adams, the Minister at London, dated July 28, 1862, in which he writes as follows:
"The President has given respectful consideration to the desire informally expressed to me by the Governments of Great Britain and France for some farther relaxation of the blockade in favor of that trade. They are not rejected, but are yet held under consideration, with a view to ascertain more satisfactorily whether they are really necessary, and whether they can be adopted without such serious detriment to our military operations as would render them injurious rather than beneficial to the interests of all concerned."
In the same letter Mr. Seward had previously said:
"We shall speedily open all the channels of commerce, and free them from military embarra.s.sments; and cotton, so much desired by all nations, will flow forth as freely as heretofore. We have ascertained that there are three and a half millions of bales yet remaining in the region where it was produced, though large quant.i.ties of it are yet unginned and otherwise unprepared for market. We have instructed the military authorities to favor, so far as they can consistently with the public safety, its preparation for and dispatch to the markets where it is so much wanted."
It has been stated elsewhere in these pages that "it became apparent that by some understanding, express or tacit, Europe had decided to leave the initiative in all actions touching the contest on this continent to the two powers just named (Great Britain and France), who were recognized to have the largest interest involved." By the preceding extracts the demands of the Governments of Great Britain and France for increased facilities, by which to obtain a greater supply of cotton, are evident; at the same time the determination of the Government of the United States to fulfill those demands is apparent, although it placed itself under the necessity of fitting out some military expeditions against those portions of our territory where it was supposed the foraging for cotton would be likely to meet with the greatest success.
By reference to the series of measures adopted by the Government of the United States to secure possession of our cotton, it will be seen that it was inaugurated as early as July 13, 1861. This was within ten days after the commencement of the first and extra session of Congress, under the Administration of President Lincoln. It is scarcely credible that that Government, at so early a day, foresaw the pressing demand from Europe for cotton which would ensue a year later. Yet it would seem that we must suppose such to have been its foresight, or else conclude that the first of these measures was the inauguration of a grand scheme for the plunder of our cotton-crop, to enrich whomsoever it might concern.
The act of the United States Congress of July 13, 1861, above mentioned, was ent.i.tled "An act to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purposes." Under the "other purposes" the important features of the act are contained. Section 5 provides that--
"when said insurgents claim to act under the authority of any State or States, and such claim is not disclaimed or repudiated by the persons exercising the functions of government in such State or States, or in the part or parts thereof in which said combination exists, or such insurrection suppressed by said State or States, then and in such case it may and shall be lawful for the President, by proclamation, to declare that the inhabitants of such State, or any section or part thereof, where such insurrection exists, are in a state of insurrection against the United States, and thereupon all commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citizens thereof and the citizens of the rest of the United States shall cease, and be unlawful, so long as such condition of hostility shall continue; and all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming from said State or section into the other parts of the United States, and all proceeding to such State or section, by land or water, shall, together with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same, or conveying persons to or from such State or section, be forfeited to the United States: _Provided, however_, That the President may, in his discretion, license and permit commercial intercourse with any such part of said State or section, the inhabitants of which are so declared in a state of insurrection, in such articles, and for such time, and by such persons, as he, in his discretion, may think most conducive to the public interest; and such intercourse, so far as by him licensed, shall be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
And the Secretary of the Treasury may appoint such officers at places where officers of the customs are not now authorized by law, as may be needed to carry into effect such licenses, rules, and regulations."
It was provided in Section 9 as follows:
"Proceedings on seizures for forfeitures, under this act, may be pursued in the courts of the United States in any district into which the property so seized may be taken, and proceedings inst.i.tuted."
It will be seen, by reference to the provisions of this section, that the President of the United States was authorized to issue his proclamation, declaring the inhabitants of any of our States, or of a portion of any one of them, to be in insurrection, and thereupon all commercial intercourse became unlawful, and was required to cease, and all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, on the way to, or from, the State or part of a State, were forfeited to the United States, together with the vessel, or vehicle, in which they were conveyed. Two effects follow this proclamation: first, the cessation of all commercial intercourse with the citizens of the United States; second, the forfeiture of all goods _in transitu_. When this condition has been reached, the act then authorizes the President, in his discretion, by license, to reopen the trade in such articles, and for such time, and by such persons, as he may think most conducive to the public interest. The articles of trade were to be chiefly cotton and tobacco; the time during which it might be continued was evidently so long as it could be used for the purpose in view; the persons were those who would most skillfully advance the end to be accomplished; and the public interest was the collection and transportation of the cotton to the European manufacturers.
One may search the Const.i.tution of the United States in vain to find any grant of power to Congress, by which it could be authorized to pa.s.s this act; much less to find any authority conferred upon the President to approve the act, or to justify him in a violation of the oath he had taken to support and maintain the provisions of the Const.i.tution. Congress was guilty of a most flagrant usurpation by the pa.s.sage of the act, and the President, instead of being a check upon their unconst.i.tutional measures, for which object the veto power was granted to him, became, by his approval, an accomplice in their usurpation. For nothing is more evident than that it is one of the powers reserved to the States to regulate the commercial intercourse between their citizens, to the extent even of the establishment of inspection and quarantine regulations. The former of these is a benefit to commerce, and the latter, in some special cases, only r.e.t.a.r.ds it temporarily, to secure the health of a community.
Neither did a state of war authorize the Government of the United States to interfere with the commercial intercourse between the citizens of the States, although under the law of nations it might be so justified with regard to foreign enemies. But this relation it persistently refused to concede to the Confederate States or to their citizens. It constantly a.s.serted that they were its subjects, in a state of insurrection; and, if so, they were equally ent.i.tled to the provisions of the Const.i.tution for their protection as well as to its penalties. Still less could the Government make an absolute forfeiture of the goods seized, as has already been shown when treating of the Confiscation Act.
But that a state of war did not enlarge the powers of the Government, as was a.s.sumed by this act, was expressly decided by Chief-Justice Taney, in a case that arose under this act. The Secretary of the Treasury issued the regulations for trade, as the act a.s.sumed the power to authorize him to do, in the section presented on a previous page. One Carpenter neglected or refused to obtain the permit required, and his goods were seized. He contested the right of seizure, and the Chief-Justice gave a decision at Baltimore, in May, 1863.
He said:
"If these regulations had been made directly by Congress, they could not be sustained by a court of justice, whose duty it is to administer the law according to the Const.i.tution of the United States. For from the commencement of the Government to this day it has been admitted on all hands, and repeatedly decided by the Supreme Court, that the United States have no right to interfere with the internal and domestic trade of a State. They have no right to compel it to pa.s.s through their custom-houses, nor to tax it. This is so plainly set forth in the Const.i.tution, that it has never been supposed to be open to controversy or question. Undoubtedly, the United States authorities may take proper measures to prevent trade or intercourse with the enemy. But it does not by any means follow that they disregard the limits of all their own powers as prescribed by the Const.i.tution, or the rights and powers reserved to the States and the people.
"A civil war, or any other, does not enlarge the powers of the Federal Government over the States or the people beyond what the compact has given to it in time of war. A state of war does not annul the tenth article of the amendment to the Const.i.tution, which declares that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Const.i.tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Nor does a civil war, or any other war, absolve the judicial department from the duty of maintaining with an even and firm hand the rights and powers of the Federal Government, and of the States, and of the citizens, as they are written in the Const.i.tution, which every judge is sworn to support. Upon the whole the Court is of opinion that the regulations in question are illegal and void, and that the seizure of the goods of Carpenter, because he refused to comply with them, can not be sustained. The judgment of the District Court must, therefore, be reversed, and the goods delivered to the claimant, his agent, or proctor."