Dahlgren now commenced his retreat. To increase the chances of escape, the force was divided, he leading one party in the direction of King and Queen County. The home guard of the country turned out against the raiders, and, being joined by a detachment from the Forty-second Battalion of Virginia Cavalry and some furloughed cavalry-men of Lee"s army, surprised and attacked the retreating column of Dahlgren, killed the leader, and captured nearly one hundred prisoners, with negroes, horses, etc.
On the body of Dahlgren was found an address to his officers and men, another paper giving special orders and instructions, and one giving his itinerary, the whole disclosing the unsoldierly means and purposes of the raid, such as disguising the men in our uniform, carrying supplies of oak.u.m and turpentine to burn Richmond, and, after releasing their prisoners on Belle Isle, to exhort them to destroy the hateful city, while on all was impressed the special injunction that the city must be burned, and "Jeff Davis and Cabinet killed."
The prisoners, having been captured in disguise, were, under the usages of war, liable to be hanged as spies, but their protestations that their service was not voluntary, and the fact that as enlisted men they were subject to orders, and could not be held responsible for the infamous instructions under which they were acting, saved them from the death-penalty they had fully incurred. Photographic copies of the papers found on Dahlgren"s body were taken and sent to General Lee, with instructions to communicate them to General Meade, commanding the enemy"s forces in his front, with an inquiry as to whether such practices were authorized by his Government, and also to say that, if any question was raised as to the copies, the original paper would be submitted. No such question was then made, and the denial that Dahlgren"s conduct had been authorized was accepted.
Many sensational stories, having not even a basis of truth, were put in circulation to exhibit the Confederate authorities as having acted with unwarrantable malignity toward the deceased Colonel Dahlgren.
The fact was, that his body was sent to Richmond and decently interred in the Oakwood Cemetery, where other Federal soldiers were buried. The enormity of his offenses was not forgotten, but resentment against him ended with his life. It was also admitted that, however bad his preceding conduct had been, he met his fate gallantly, charging at the head of his men when he found himself inextricably encompa.s.sed by his foe.
Custer and Kilpatrick, who were to cooperate with him in the expedition, especially the first-named, manifested a saving degree of "that rascally virtue," as Charles Lee, of Revolutionary memory, called it. After the feeble demonstration upon some parked artillery which has been described, he fancied that he heard the roaring of cars coming with reenforcements, and retreated, burning the bridges behind him--a precaution quite in vain, as there were none there to pursue him.
Kilpatrick, followed as above stated by Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, who hung close upon his rear, finally reached the defenses of Richmond. There, out of respect to the field artillery he encountered, he turned off to cross the Chickahominy, and that night he was routed by the cavalry command of our gallant cavalier General Wade Hampton. Thus ended the combined movement with which Northern papers had regaled their readers by announcing as made "with instructions to sack the rebel capital."
During the first week in May, Major-General B. F. Butler landed at Bermuda Hundred with a considerable force, and moved up so as to cut the telegraph line and reach by a raiding party the railroad at Chester, between Richmond and Petersburg. General Ransom, then in command of the defenses at Richmond and those of Drury"s Bluff, with a small force, attacked the advance of General Butler, and after a sharp skirmish compelled him to withdraw.
Meantime, because of the warning which Stuart had sent, General Ransom was summoned to Richmond to resist an impending a.s.sault by General Sheridan on the outer works north of the city. Taking the two disposable brigades of Gracie and Fry and a light battery, he hastened forward, arriving at the fortifications on the Mechanicsville Turnpike; just in time to see a battery of artillery, then entirely unsupported, repulse the advance of Sheridan. During the night the clerks and citizens, under General G. W. Custis Lee, had formed a thin line along part of the fortifications on the west side of the city. As the day advanced, Oracle"s brigade was thrown in front of the works and pressed forward to feel Sheridan; but it was regarded as worse than useless with two small brigades to engage in an open country many times their number of well-appointed cavalry, Sheridan showed no purpose to attack, but withdrew from before our defenses, and the two brigades returned to the vicinity of Drury"s Bluff--the approach on the south side of James River, by forces under General Butler, being then considered the most imminent danger to Richmond.
After the battle of the Wilderness, on May 4th and 5th, as hereafter narrated, General Grant moved his army toward Spottsylvania Court-House, and General Lee made a corresponding movement. At this time Sheridan, with a large force of United States cavalry, pa.s.sed around and to the rear of our army, so as to place himself on the road to Richmond, which, in the absence of a garrison to defend it, he may have not unreasonably thought might be surprised and captured.
Stuart, our most distinguished cavalry commander--fearless, faithful Stuart--soon knew of Sheridan"s movement, perceived its purpose, and, with his usual devotion to his country"s welfare, hastily collected such of his troops as were near, and pursued Sheridan. He fell upon Sheridan"s rear and flank at Beaver Dam Station, where a pause had been made to destroy the railroad, some cars, and commissary"s stores, and drove it before him. The route of the enemy being unmistakably toward Richmond, Stuart, to protect the capital, or at least to delay attack, so as to give time to make preparation for defense, made a _detour_ around Sheridan, and by a forced march got in front of him, taking position at a place called Yellow Tavern, about seven or eight miles from Richmond. Here, with the daring and singleness of purpose which characterized his whole career, he decided, notwithstanding the great inequality between his force and that of his foe, to make a stand, and offer persistent resistance to his advance. The respective strength of the two commands, as given by Colonel Heros von Borke, chief of General Stuart"s staff, was, Stuart, eleven hundred; Sheridan, eight thousand. While engaged in this desperate service, General Stuart sent couriers to Richmond to give notice of the approach of the enemy, so that the defenses might be manned.
Notwithstanding the great disparity of force, the contest was obstinate and protracted, and fickle Fortune cheered our men with several brilliant successes. Stuart, who in many traits resembled the renowned Murat, like him was always a leader when his cavalry charged. On this occasion he is represented when he was wounded to have been quite in advance, to have fired the last load in his pistol, and to have been shot by a fugitive whom he found cowering under a fence, and ordered to surrender. The "heavy battalions" at last prevailed, our line was broken, and our chieftain, though mortally wounded, still kept in his saddle, invoking his men to continue the fight.[94] Our gallant chieftain was brought wounded into Richmond, a n.o.ble sacrifice on the altar of duty.
Long accustomed to connect him only with daring exploits and brilliant successes, there was much surprise and deeper sorrow when the news spread through the city. Admired as a soldier, loved as a man, honored as a Christian patriot, to whom duty to his G.o.d and his country was a supreme law, the intense anxiety for his safety made us all shrink from realizing his imminent danger. When I saw him in his very last hours, he was so calm, and physically so strong, that I could not believe that he was dying, until the surgeon, after I had left his bedside, told me he was bleeding inwardly, and that the end was near.
Grant"s plan of campaign, as now revealed to us, was to continue his movement against Lee"s army, and, if, as experience had taught him, he should be unable to defeat it and move directly to his objective point, Richmond, he was to continue his efforts so as to reach the James River below Richmond, and thus to connect with the array under General Butler, moving up on the south side of the James. The topography of the country favored that design. The streams in the country in which he was operating all trended toward the southeast, and his change of position was frequently made under cover of them.
Butler, in the mean time, was ordered with the force of his department, about twenty thousand, reenforced by Gilmer"s division of ten thousand, to move up to City Point, there intrench, and concentrate all his troops as rapidly as possible. From this base he was expected to operate so as to destroy the railroad connections between Richmond and the South. On the 7th of May he telegraphed that he had "destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of Lee"s army."
At this time Major-General Robert Ransom, as before mentioned, was in command at Richmond, including Drury"s Bluff. His force consisted, for the defense of both places, of the men serving the stationary or heavy artillery, and three brigades of infantry--Hunton"s at Chapin"s Bluff, and Barton"s and Gracie"s for field service. To these, in cases of emergency, the clerks and artisans in the departments and manufactories, were organized, to be called out as an auxiliary force when needed for the defense of the capital It was with this field force that Ransom, as has been related, moved upon Butler, and drove him from the railroad, the destruction of which he had so vauntingly announced.
A few days thereafter he again emerged from his cover, but this time changed his objective point, and, diverging from the south bank of the James River, moved toward Petersburg, and reached the railroad at Port Walthal Junction, where he encountered some of General Beauregard"s command, which had been ordered from Charleston, and was driven from the railroad and turnpike. The troops ordered from Charleston with General Beauregard had, by May 14th, reached the vicinity of Drury"s Bluff. In connection with the works and rifle-pits on the bluff, which were to command the river and prevent the ascent of gunboats, an intrenched line had been constructed on a ridge about a mile south of the bluff, running across the road from Richmond to Petersburg. This ridge was higher than the ground on which the fort was built, and was designed to check an approach of the enemy from the south, as well as to cover the rear of the fort.
In the afternoon of the 14th I rode down to visit General Beauregard at his headquarters in the field. Supposing his troops to be on the line of intrenchment, I pa.s.sed Major Drury"s house to go thither, when some one by the roadside called to me and told me that the troops were not on the line of intrenchment, and that General Beauregard was at the house behind me.
My first question on meeting him was to learn why the intrenchments were abandoned. He answered that he thought it better to concentrate his troops. Upon my stating to him that there was nothing then to prevent Butler from turning his position, he said he would desire nothing more, as he would then fall upon him, cut him off from his base, etc.
According to my uniform practice never to do more than to make a suggestion to a general commanding in the field, the subject was pressed no further. We then pa.s.sed to the consideration of the operations to be undertaken against Butler, who had already advanced from his base at Bermuda Hundred. I offered, for the purpose of attacking Butler, to send Major-General Ransom with the field force he had for the protection of Richmond. In addition to his high military capacity, his minute knowledge of the country in which they were to operate made him specially valuable. He reported to General Beauregard at noon on the 15th, received his orders for the battle which was to occur the next day, and about 10 P.M. was, with a division of four brigades and a battery of light artillery, in position in front of the breastworks. Colonel Dunovant, with a regiment of cavalry not under Ransom"s orders, was to guard the s.p.a.ce between his left and the river, so as to give him information of any movement in that quarter. General Whiting, with some force, was holding a defensive position at Petersburg. General Beauregard proposed that the main part of it should advance and unite with him in an attack upon Butler wherever he should be found between Drury"s and Petersburg. To this I offered distinct objection, because of the hazard during a battle of attempting to make a junction of troops moving from opposite sides of the enemy; and proposed that Whiting"s command should move at night by the Chesterfield road, where they would not probably be observed by Butler"s advance. This march I supposed they could make so as to arrive at Drury"s by or soon after daylight. The next day being Sunday, they could rest, and, all the troops being a.s.signed to their positions, could move to make a concerted attack at daylight on Monday. He spoke of some difficulty in getting a courier who knew the route and could certainly deliver the order to General Whiting. Opportunely, a courier arrived from General Whiting, who had come up the Chesterfield road. He then said the order would have to be drawn with a great deal of care, and that he would prepare it as soon as he could. I arose to take leave, and he courteously walked down the stairs with me, remarking as we went that he was embarra.s.sed for the want of a good cavalry commander. I saw in the yard Colonel Chilton, a.s.sistant adjutant and inspector-general, and said, "There is an old cavalry officer who was trained in my old regiment, the First Dragoons, and who I think will answer your requirements," Upon his expressing the pleasure it would give him to have Colonel Chilton, I told him of General Beauregard"s want, and asked him if the service would be agreeable to him. He readily accepted it, and I left, supposing all the preliminaries settled. In the next forenoon Colonel Samuel Melton, of the adjutant and inspector-general"s department, called at my residence and delivered a message from General Beauregard to the effect that he had decided to order Whiting to move by the direct road from Petersburg, instead of by the Chesterfield route, and, when I replied that I had stated my objections to General Beauregard to a movement which gave the enemy the advantage of being between our forces, he said General Beauregard had directed him to explain to me that upon a further examination he found his force sufficient; that his operations, therefore, did not depend upon making a junction with Whiting.
On Monday morning I rode down to Drury"s, where I found that the enemy had seized our line of intrenchments, it being unoccupied, and that a severe action had occurred, with serious loss to us before he could be dislodged. He had crossed the main road to the west, entering a dense wood, and our troops on the right had moved out and were closely engaged with him. We drove him back, frustrating the attempt to turn the extreme right of our line. The day was wearing away, a part of the force had been withdrawn to the intrenchment, and there was no sign of purpose to make any immediate movement. General Beauregard said he was waiting to hear Whiting"s guns, and had been expecting him for some time to approach on the Petersburg road. Soon after this, the foe in a straggling, disorganized manner, commenced crossing the road, moving to the east, which indicated a retreat, or perhaps a purpose to turn our left and attack Fort Drury in rear. He placed a battery in the main road and threw some sh.e.l.ls at our intrenchment, probably to cover his retiring troops. General Ransom, in an unpublished report, says that, at the time he received the order of battle, General Beauregard told him, "As you know the region, I have given you the moving part of the army, and you will take the initiative." He further states that at dawn of day he moved to the south of Kingsland Creek, formed two lines with a short interval, and at once advanced to the attack. A dense fog suddenly enveloped him, so as to obscure all distant objects. Moving forward, the skirmishers were quickly engaged, and the fighting was pressed so vigorously that by sunrise he had captured a brigade of infantry, a battery of artillery, and occupied about three quarters of a mile of the enemy"s temporary breastworks, which were strengthened by wire interwoven among the trees in their front; this was not effected, however, without considerable loss in killed and wounded, and much confusion, owing to the denseness of the fog. General Ransom"s report continues:
"Having no ammunition-wagons and requiring replenishment of infantry cartridges, and knowing that delay would mar the effect of the success gained, I sent instantly to Beauregard, reporting what had happened, and asked that Ransom"s brigade might come to me at once, so that I might continue the pressure and make good the advantage already gained."
He then describes the further delay in getting ammunition, and his renewal of the request for Ransom"s brigade, which he had organized and formerly commanded, but, instead of which, two small regiments were sent to him, the timely arrival of which, it is to be gratefully remembered, enabled him to repulse an advance of the enemy. It would be neither pleasant nor profitable to dwell on the lost opportunity for a complete victory, or to recount the possible consequences which might have flowed from it. On the next morning, our troops moved down the river road as far as Howlett"s, about three or four miles, but saw no enemy. The "back door" of Richmond was closed, and Butler "bottled up."
Soon after the affair at Drury"s Bluff, General Beauregard addressed to me a communication, proposing that he should be heavily reinforced from General Lee"s army, so as to enable him to crush Butler in his intrenchments, and then, with the main body of his own force, together with a detachment from General Lee"s army, that he should join General Lee, overwhelm Grant, and march to Washington. I knew that General Lee was then confronting an army vastly superior to his in numbers, fully equipped, with inexhaustible supplies, and a persistence in attacking of which sufficient evidence had been given.
I could not therefore expect that General Lee would consent to the proposition of General Beauregard; but, as a matter of courteous consideration, his letter was forwarded with the usual formed endors.e.m.e.nt. General Lee"s opinion on the case was shown by the instructions he gave directing General Beauregard to straighten his line so as to reduce the requisite number of men to hold it, and send the balance to join the army north of the James.
[Footnote 94: Address of Major H. B. McClellan before Army of Northern Virginia a.s.sociation.]
CHAPTER XLVI.
General Grant a.s.sumes Command in Virginia.--Positions of the Armies.--Plans of Campaign open to Grant"s Choice.--The Rapidan crossed.--Battle of the Wilderness.--Danger of Lee.--The Enemy driven back.--Flank Attack.--Longstreet wounded.--Result of the Contest.--Rapid Flank Movement of Grant.--Another Contest.-- Grant"s Reenforcements.--Hanover Junction.--The Enemy moves in Direction of Bowling Green.--Crosses the Pamunkey.--Battle at Cold Harbor.--Frightful Slaughter.--The Enemy"s Soldiers decline to renew the a.s.sault when ordered.--Loss.--Asks Truce to bury the Dead.--Strength of Respective Armies.--General Pemberton.--The Enemy crosses the James.--Siege of Petersburg begun.
It was in March, 1864, that Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, having been appointed lieutenant-general, a.s.sumed command of the armies of the United States. He subsequently proceeded to Culpeper and a.s.sumed personal command of the Army of the Potomac, although nominally that army remained under the command of General Meade. Reenforcements were gathered from every military department of the United States and sent to that army.
On May 3d General Lee held the south bank of the Rapidan River, with his right resting near the mouth of Mine Run and his left extending to Liberty Mills, on the road from Gordonsville to the Shenandoah Valley. Ewell"s corps was on the right, Hill"s on the left, and two divisions of Longstreet"s corps, having returned from East Tennessee, were encamped in the rear near Gordonsville. The army of General Grant had occupied the north bank of the Rapidan, with the main body encamped in Culpeper County and on the Rappahannock River.
While Grant with his immense and increasing army was thus posted, Lee, with a comparatively small force, and to which few reenforcements could be furnished, confronted him on a line stretching from near Somerville Ford to Gordonsville. To Grant was left the choice to move directly on Lee and attempt to defeat his army, the only obstacle to the capture of Richmond, and which his vast means rendered supposable, or to cross the Rapidan above or below Lee"s position. The second would fulfill the condition, so imperatively imposed on McClellan, of covering the United States capital; the third would be in the more direct line toward Richmond.
Of the three he chose the last, and so felicitated himself on his unopposed pa.s.sage of the river as to suppose that he had, un.o.bserved, turned the flank of Lee"s army, got between it and Richmond, and necessitated the retreat of the Confederates to some point where they might resist his further advance. So little could he comprehend the genius of Lee, that he expected him to be surprised, as appears from his arrangements contemplating only combats with the rear-guard covering the retreat. Lee, dauntless as he was sagacious, seized the opportunity, which the movement of his foe offered, to meet him where his artillery would be least available, where his ma.s.sive columns would be most embarra.s.sed in their movements, and where Southern individuality and self-reliance would be specially effective. Grant"s object was to pa.s.s through "the Wilderness" to the roads between Lee and Richmond. Lee resolved to fight him in those pathless woods, where mind might best compete with matter.
Providence held its shield over the just cause, and heroic bands hurled back the heavy battalions shattered and discomfited, as will be now briefly described.
In order to cross the Rapidan, Grant"s army moved on May 3d toward Germania Ford, which was ten or twelve miles from our right. He succeeded in seizing the ford and crossing. The direct road from this ford to Richmond pa.s.sed by Spottsylvania Court-House, and, when Grant had crossed the river, he was nearer than General Lee to Richmond.
From Orange Court-House there are two nearly parallel roads running eastwardly to Fredericksburg. The one nearest the river is called the "Stone Turnpike," and the other the "Plank-road." The road from the ford to Spottsylvania Court-House crosses the Old Stone Turnpike at the "Old Wilderness Tavern," and, two or three miles farther on, it crosses the plank-road.
As soon as Grant"s movement was known, Lee"s troops were put in motion. Swell"s corps moved on the Stone Turnpike, and Hill"s corps on the plank-road, into which Longstreet"s force also came from his camp near Gordonsville. Ewell"s corps crossed Mine Run, and encamped at Locust Grove, four miles beyond, on the afternoon of the 4th. On the morning of the 5th it was again in motion, and encountered Grant"s troops in heavy force at a short distance from the Old Wilderness Tavern, and Jones"s and Battle"s brigades were driven back in some confusion. Early"s division was ordered up, formed across the pike, and moved forward. It advanced through a dense pine-thicket, and, with other brigades of Rodes"s division, drove the enemy back with heavy loss, capturing several hundred prisoners and gaining a commanding position on the right. Meantime, Johnson"s division, on the left of the pike, and extending across the road to Germania Ford, was heavily engaged in front, and Hays"s brigade was sent to his left to partic.i.p.ate in a forward movement. It advanced, encountered a large force, and, not meeting with the expected cooperation, was drawn back. Subsequently, Pegram"s brigade took position on Hays"s left, and just before night an attack was made on their front, which was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy. During the afternoon there was hot skirmishing along the whole line, and several attempts were made by the foe to regain the position from which he had been driven. At the close of the day, Ewell"s corps had captured over a thousand prisoners, besides inflicting on the enemy very severe losses in killed and wounded. Two pieces of artillery had been abandoned and were secured by our troops.
A. P. Hill, on the 4th, with Heth"s and Wilc.o.x"s divisions of his corps, moved eastwardly along the plank-road. They bivouacked at night near Verdiersville, and resumed their march on the 5th with Heth in advance. About 1 P.M. musketry firing was heard in front; the sound indicated the presence of a large body of infantry. Kirkland"s brigade deployed on both sides of the plank-road, and the column proceeded to form in line of battle on its flanks. Hill"s advance had followed the plank-road, while Ewell"s pursued the Stone turnpike.
These parallel movements were at this time from three to four miles apart. The country intervening and round about for several miles is known as the "Wilderness," and, having very little open ground, consists almost wholly of a forest of dense undergrowth of shrubs and small trees. In order to open communication with Ewell, Wilc.o.x"s division moved to the left, and effected a junction with Gordon"s brigade on Ewell"s extreme right. The line of battle thus completed extended from the right of the plank-road through a succession of open fields and dense forest to the left of the Stone turnpike. It presented a line of six miles, and the thicket that lay along the whole front of our army was so impenetrable as to exclude the use of artillery save only at the roads. Heth"s skirmishers were driven in about 3 P.M. by a ma.s.sive column that advanced, firing rapidly. The straggle thus commenced in Hill"s front continued for two or three hours unabated. Heth"s ranks were greatly reduced, when Wilc.o.x was ordered to his support, but the b.l.o.o.d.y contest continued until night closed over our force in the position it had originally taken. This stubborn and heroic resistance was made by the divisions of Heth and Wilc.o.x, of Hill"s corps, fifteen thousand strong, against the repeated and desperate a.s.saults of five divisions--four divisions of Hanc.o.c.k"s and one of Sedgwick"s corps, numbering about forty-five thousand men. Our forces completely foiled their adversaries, and inflicted upon them most serious loss.[95] During the day the Ninth Corps of the enemy under General Burnside, had come on the field. The third division of Hill"s corps, under General Anderson, and the two divisions of Longstreet"s corps, did not reach the scene of conflict until dawn of day on the morning of the 6th. Simultaneously the attack on Hill was renewed with great vigor. In addition to the force he had so successfully resisted on the previous day, a fresh division of the enemy"s Fifth Corps had secured position on Hill"s flank, and cooperated with the column a.s.saulting in front. After a severe contest, the left of Heth"s division and the right of Wilc.o.x"s were overpowered before the advance of Longstreet"s column reached the ground, and were compelled to return. The repulsed portions of the divisions were in considerable disorder. General Lee now came up, and, fully appreciating the impending crisis, dashed amid the fugitives, calling on the men to rally and follow him.
"The soldiers, seeing General Lee"s manifest purpose to advance with them, and realizing the great danger in which he then was, begged him to go to the rear, promising that they would soon have matters rectified. The General waved them on with some words of cheer." [96]
The a.s.sault was checked.
Longstreet, having come up with two divisions, deployed them in line of battle, and gallantly advanced to recover the lost ground. The enemy was driven back over the ground he had gained by his a.s.sault on Hill"s line, but reformed in the position previously held by him.
About mid-day an attack on his left flank and rear was ordered by Longstreet. For this purpose three brigades were detached, and, moving forward, were joined by General J. R. Davis"s brigade, which had been the extreme right of Hill"s line. Making a sufficient _detour_ to avoid observation, and, rushing precipitately to attack the foe in flank and reverse while he was preparing to resist the movement in his front, he was taken completely by surprise. The a.s.sault resulted in his utter rout, with heavy loss on that part of his line.
Preparations were now made to follow up the advantages gained by a forward movement of the whole line under General Longstreet"s personal direction. When advancing at the head of Jenkins"s brigade, with that officer and others, a body of Confederates in the wood on the roadside, supposing the column to be a hostile force, fired into it, killing General Jenkins, distinguished alike for civil and military virtue, and severely wounding General Longstreet. The valuable services of General Longstreet were thus lost to the army at a critical moment, and this caused the suspension of a movement which promised the most important results; and time was thus afforded to the enemy to rally, reenforce, and find shelter behind his intrenchments. Under these circ.u.mstances the commanding General deemed it unadvisable to attack.
On the morning of the 6th the contest was renewed on the left, and a very heavy attack was made on the front, occupied by Pegram"s brigade, but it was handsomely repulsed, as were several subsequent attacks at the same point. In the afternoon an attack was made on the enemy"s right flank, resting in the woods, when Gordon"s brigade, with Johnson"s in the rear and followed by Pegram"s, succeeded in throwing it into great confusion, doubling it up and forcing it back some distance, capturing two brigadier-generals and several hundred prisoners. Darkness closed the contest. On the 7th an advance was made which disclosed the fact that Grant had given up his line of works on his right. During the day there was some skirmishing, but no serious fighting. The result of these battles was the infliction of severe loss upon the foe, the gain of ground, and the capture of prisoners, artillery, and other trophies. The cost to us, however, was so serious as to enforce, by additional considerations, the policy of Lee to spare his men as much as was possible.
A rapid flank movement was next made by Grant to secure possession of Spottsylvania Court-House. General Lee comprehended his purpose, and on the night of the 7th a division of Longstreet"s corps was sent as the advance to that point. Stuart, then in observation on the flank, and ever ready to work or to fight as the one or the other should best serve the cause of his country, dismounted his troopers, and, by felling trees, obstructed the roads so as materially to delay the march of the enemy. The head of the opposing forces arrived almost at the same moment on the 8th; theirs, being a little in advance, drove back our cavalry, but in turn was quickly driven from the strategic point by the arrival of our infantry. On the 9th the two armies, each forming on its advance as a nucleus, swung round and confronted each other in line of battle.
The 10th and 11th pa.s.sed in comparative quiet. On the morning of the 12th the enemy made a very heavy attack on Ewell"s front, and broke the line where it was occupied by Johnson"s division. At this time and place the scene occurred of which Mississippians are justly proud. Colonel Tenable, of General Lee"s staff, states that, on the receipt of one of the messages from General Rodes for more troops, he was sent by General Lee to bring Harris"s Mississippi brigade from the extreme right; that General Lee met the brigade and rode at its head until under fire, when a round shot pa.s.sed so near to him that the soldiers invoked him to go back; and when he said, "If you will promise me to drive those people from our works, I will go back," the brigade shouted the promise, and Colonel Venable says:
"As the column of Mississippians came up at a double quick an aide-de-camp came up to General Rodes with a message from Ramseur that he could hold out only a few minutes longer unless a.s.sistance was at hand. Your brigade was thrown instantly into the fight, the column being formed into line under a tremendous fire and on very difficult ground. Never did a brigade go into fiercer battle under greater trials; never did a brigade do its duty more n.o.bly." [97]
A portion of the attacking force swept along Johnson"s line to Wilc.o.x"s left, and was checked by a prompt movement on that flank.
Several brigades sent to Ewell"s a.s.sistance were carried into action under his orders, and they all suffered severely. Subsequently, on the same day, some brigades were thrown to the front, for the purpose of moving to the left and attacking the flank of the column which broke Ewell"s line, to relieve the pressure on him, and recover the part of the line which had been lost. These, as they moved, soon encountered the Ninth Corps, under Burnside, advancing to the attack.
They captured over three hundred prisoners and three battle-flags, and their attack on the enemy"s flank, taking him by surprise, contributed materially to his repulse.
Taylor, in his "Four Years with General Lee," says that Lee, having detected the weakness of "the salient" occupied by the division of General Edward Johnson, of Ewell"s corps, directed a second line to be constructed across its base, to which he proposed to move the troops occupying the angle. Suspecting another flank movement by Grant, before these arrangements were quite completed, he ordered most of the artillery at this portion of the lines to be withdrawn so as to be available. Toward dawn on the 12th, Johnson, discovering indications of an impending a.s.sault, ordered the immediate return of the artillery, and made other preparations for defense. But the unfortunate withdrawal was so partially and tardily restored, that a spirited a.s.sault at daybreak overran that portion of the lines before the artillery was put in position, and captured most of the division, including its brave commander.
The above mentioned attacking column advanced, under cover of a pine-thicket, to within a very short distance of a salient defended by Walker"s brigade. A heavy fire of musketry and artillery, from a considerable number of guns on Heth"s line, opened with tremendous effect upon the column, and it was driven back with severe loss, leaving its dead in front of our works.[98]
Several days of comparative quiet ensued. During this time the army of General Grant was heavily reenforced from Washington.