"I determined to send the three divisions of the Second Corps, to wit, Gordon"s, Ramseur"s, and Pegram"s, under General Gordon, to the enemy"s rear, to make the attack at 5 A.M., which would be a little before daybreak on the 19th; to move myself with Kershaw"s and Wharton"s divisions and all the artillery along the pike through Strasburg, and attack the enemy on the front and left flank, as soon as Gordon should become engaged, and for Bosser to move with his own and Wickham"s brigade on the back road across Cedar Creek, and attack the enemy"s cavalry simultaneously with Gordon"s attack, while Lomax should move by Front Royal, cross the river, and come to the Valley pike, so as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which he was to judge by the sound of the firing."
Gordon moved at the appointed time. At 1 A.M. Kershaw and Wharton, accompanied by General Early, advanced. At Strasburg, Kershaw moved to the right on the road to Bowman"s Mill, and Wharton moved along the pike to Hupp"s Hill, with instructions not to display his forces, but to avoid notice until the attack began, when he was to move forward, support the artillery when it came up, and send a force to get possession of the bridge on the pike over the creek. Kershaw"s division got in sight of the enemy at half-past three o"clock. He was directed to cross his division at the proper time over the creek as quietly as possible, and to form it into column of brigades as he did so, and advance in that manner against the left breastwork, extending to the right or left as might be necessary. At half-past four he was ordered forward, and, a very short time after he started, the firing from Bosser on our left and the picket-firing at the ford at which Gordon was crossing were heard. Kershaw crossed the creek without molestation and formed his division as directed, and precisely at five o"clock his leading brigade, with little opposition, swept over the left work, capturing seven guns, which were at once turned on the enemy. At the same time Wharton and the artillery were just arriving at Hupp"s Hill, and a very heavy fire of musketry was heard in the rear from Gordon"s column. Wharton had advanced his skirmishers to the creek, capturing some prisoners, but the foe still held the works on our left of the pike, commanding that road and the bridge, and opened with his artillery on us. Our artillery was at once brought into action, and opened on the enemy, but he soon evacuated his works, and our men from the other columns rushed into them. Wharton was immediately ordered forward, Kershaw"s division had swept along the enemy"s works on the right of the pike, which were occupied by Crook"s corps, and he and Gordon had united at the pike, and their divisions had pushed across it in pursuit. A delay of an hour at the river had occurred in Gordon"s movement, which enabled Sheridan partially to form his lines after the alarm produced by Kershaw"s attack; and Gordon"s, which was after daylight, was therefore met with greater obstinacy by the enemy than it would otherwise have encountered, and the fighting had been severe. Gordon, however, pushed his advance with such energy, that the Nineteenth and Crook"s corps were in complete rout, and their camps, with a number of pieces of artillery and a considerable quant.i.ty of small-arms, abandoned.
The Sixth Corps, which was on the right, and some distance from the point attacked, had had time to get under arms and take position so as to arrest our progress. A fog which had prevailed soon rose sufficiently for us to see the Sixth Corps" position on a ridge to the west of Middletown, and it was discovered to be a strong one. The enemy had not advanced, but opened on us with artillery, and orders were given to concentrate all our guns on him. In the mean time a force of cavalry was moving along the pike, through the fields to the right of Middletown, thus placing our right and rear in great danger.
Wharton was ordered to form his division at once, and take position to hold that cavalry in check. Discovering that the Sixth Corps could not be attacked with advantage on its left flank, because the approach in that direction was through an open flat and across a boggy stream with high banks, Gordon in conjunction with Kershaw was ordered to a.s.sail the right flank, while a heavy fire of artillery was opened from our right. In a short time eighteen or twenty guns were concentrated on the enemy, and he was soon in retreat. Ramseur and Pegram advanced at once to the position from which he was driven, and just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily on the right, and Pegram"s division was ordered to move to the north of Middletown and take position across the pike against the cavalry. As soon as Pegram moved, Kershaw was ordered from the left to supply his place.
Bosser had attacked the enemy promptly at the appointed time, but had not been able to surprise him, as he was found on the alert on that flank. There was now one division of cavalry threatening our right flank, and two were on the left near the Back road, held in check by Bosser. His force was so weak he could only watch.
After he had been driven from his second position, the enemy had taken a new one about two miles north of Middletown. An advance by Gordon and Kershaw and Ramseur was ordered, but, after it had been made for some distance, Gordon"s skirmishers came back, reporting a line of battle in front, behind breastworks, and an attack was not made.
"It was now apparent that it would not do," says General Early, "to press my troops farther. They had been up all night and were much jaded. In pa.s.sing over rough ground to attack the enemy at dawn their own ranks had been much disordered and the men scattered, and it had required time to reform them. Their ranks were much thinned by the absence of the men engaged in plundering the enemy"s camps."
It was determined, therefore, to try to hold what had been gained, and orders were given to carry off the captured and abandoned artillery, small-arms, and wagons. A number of bold attempts were made, during the subsequent part of the day, by the enemy"s cavalry, to break our line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed.
Late in the afternoon, his infantry advanced against Ramseur"s, Kershaw"s, and Gordon"s lines, and the attack on Ramseur"s and Kershaw"s fronts was handsomely repulsed; but a portion of the a.s.sailants had penetrated an interval which was between Evans"s brigade on the extreme left and the rest of the line, when that brigade gave way, and Gordon"s other brigades soon followed. General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men and lead them back, but without avail. This affair was soon known with exaggerations along Kershaw"s and Ramseur"s lines, and their men, fearing to be flanked, began to fall back in disorder, though no force was pressing them. At the same time the enemy"s cavalry, observing the disorder in our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to rally the men, but the ma.s.s of them continued to resist all appeals. Ramseur succeeded in retaining with him two or three hundred men of his division, and about the same number was retained by Major Goggin from Conner"s brigade; these, aided by several pieces of artillery, held the whole force on our left in check for one hour and a half until Ramseur was shot down, and the ammunition of the artillery was exhausted. While the latter was being replaced by other guns, the force that had continued steady gave way also. Pegram"s and Wharton"s divisions and Wofford"s brigade had remained steadfast on the right, and resisted every effort of the cavalry, but no portion of this force could be moved to the left without leaving the pike open to the cavalry, which would have destroyed all hope at once. Every effort to rally the men in the rear having failed, these troops were ordered to retire. The disorder soon extended to them. The greater part of the infantry was halted at Fisher"s Hill, and Rosser, whose command had retired in good order on the Back road, was ordered to that point with his cavalry to cover the retreat, and hold that position until the troops were beyond pursuit. He fell back on the forenoon of the 20th, when the enemy had not advanced to that place. The troops were halted at Newmarket, seven miles from Mount Jackson. Our loss in the battle of Cedar Creek was twenty-three pieces of artillery, some ordnance, and medical wagons and ambulances, about 1,860 killed and wounded, and something over a thousand prisoners; 1,500 prisoners were captured from the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed and wounded was very heavy. We had in this battle about 8,500 muskets and a little over forty pieces of artillery. Sheridan"s cavalry numbered 8,700, and his infantry force was fully as large as at Winchester.
Subsequently General Early confronted Sheridan"s whole force north of Cedar Creek for two days, November 11th and 12th, without an attack being made upon him. On November 27th the fortified post at New Creek on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was surprised and captured by General Rosser. Two regiments of Federal cavalry with their arms and colors were taken, and eight pieces of artillery and a very large amount of ordnance, quartermaster, and commissary stores fell into our hands. Eight hundred prisoners, four pieces of artillery, and some wagons and horses were brought off. When the campaign closed, the invader held precisely the same position in the Valley which he held before the opening of the campaign in the spring.
In the Red River country of Louisiana, it became certain in February, 1864, that the enemy was about to make an expedition against our forces under General Richard Taylor, not so much to get possession of the country as to obtain the cotton in that region. Their forces were to be commanded by Major-General Banks, and to consist of his command, augmented by a part of Major-General Sherman"s army from Vicksburg, and accompanied by a fleet of gunboats under Admiral Porter. With these the force under General Steele, in Arkansas, was to cooperate. Taylor"s forces at this time consisted of Harrison"s mounted regiment with a four-gun battery, in the north toward Monroe; Mouton"s brigade, near Alexandria; Polignac"s, at Trinity, on the Was.h.i.ta, fifty-five miles distant; Walker"s division, at Marksville and toward Simmsport, with two hundred men detached to a.s.sist the gunners at Fort De Russy, which, though still unfinished, contained eight heavy guns and two field-pieces. Three companies of mounted men were watching the Mississippi, and the remainder of a regiment was on the Teche.
On March 12th Admiral Porter, with nineteen gunboats and ten thousand men of Sherman"s army, entered the Red River. A detachment on the 14th marched to De Russy and took possession of it. On the 15th the advance of Porter reached Alexandria, and on the 19th General Franklin left the lower Teche with eighteen thousand men to meet him.
General Steele, in Arkansas, reported his force at seven thousand men. The force of General Taylor at this time had increased to five thousand and three hundred infantry, five hundred cavalry, and three hundred artillerymen; and Liddel on the north had about the same number of cavalry and a four-gun battery. Some reenforcements were soon received. On March 31st Banks"s advance reached Natchitoches, and Taylor moved toward Pleasant Hill, arriving on the next day. On April 4th and 5th. He moved to Mansfield, concentrating his force in that vicinity. There two brigades of Missouri infantry and two of Arkansas, numbering four thousand and four hundred muskets, joined him. On April 7th the enemy were reported from Pleasant Hill to be advancing in force, but their progress was arrested by a body of our cavalry.
General Taylor then selected his position in which to wait for an attack expected on the next day. It was in the edge of a wood, fronting an open field eight hundred yards in width and twelve hundred in length, through the center of which the road to Pleasant Hill pa.s.sed. On the opposite side of the field was a fence separating it from the pine-forest, which, open on the higher ground and filled with underwood on the lower, spread over the country. The position was three miles in front of Mansfield, and covered a cross-road leading to the Sabine. On each side of the main Mansfield-Pleasant Hill road at two miles" distance, was a road parallel to it, and these were connected by this Sabine cross-road.
On the 8th General Taylor disposed, on the right of the road to Pleasant Hill, Walker"s infantry division of three brigades with two batteries; on the left, Mouton"s two brigades and two batteries. As the hors.e.m.e.n came in from the front, they took position, dismounted, on Mouton"s left. A regiment of hors.e.m.e.n was posted on each of the parallel roads, and cavalry with a battery held in reserve on the main road. Taylor"s force amounted to 5,300 infantry, 3,000 mounted men, and 500 artillerymen; total, 8,800. Banks left Grand Ecore with an estimated force of 25,000.
As the enemy showed no disposition to advance, a forward movement of the whole line was made. On the left our forces crossed the field under a heavy fire and entered the wood, where a b.l.o.o.d.y contest ensued, which resulted in gradually turning their right, which was forced back with loss of prisoners and guns. On the right little resistance was encountered until the wood was entered. Finding that our force outflanked the opponent"s left, the right brigade was kept advanced, and we swept everything before us.
His first line, consisting of all the mounted force and one division of the Thirteenth Corps, was in full flight, leaving prisoners, guns, and wagons in our hands. Two miles to the rear of the first position, the Second Division of the Federal Thirteenth Corps was brought up, but was speedily routed, losing guns and prisoners. The advance was continued. Four miles from the original position, his Nineteenth Army Corps was found drawn up on a ridge overlooking a small stream. Sharp work followed, but, as our force persisted, his fell back at nightfall. Twenty-five hundred prisoners, twenty pieces of artillery, several stands of colors, many thousands of small-arms, and two hundred and fifty wagons, were taken.
On the next morning the enemy was found about a mile in front of Pleasant Hill, which occupies a plateau a mile wide from west to east along the Mansfield road. His lines extended across the plateau from the highest ground on the west, his left, to a wooded height on the right of the Mansfield road. Winding along in front of this position was a dry gully cut by winter rains, bordered by a thick growth of young pines. This was held by his advanced infantry, his main line and guns being on the plateau. The force of General Taylor-- Churchill"s brigade having joined him now--amounted to twelve thousand five hundred men against eighteen thousand of General Banks, among them the fresh corps of General A. J. Smith. The action commenced about 4.30 P.M. It was the plan of General Taylor, as no offensive movement on the part of the enemy was antic.i.p.ated, to turn both his flanks and subject him to a concentric fire and overwhelm him. The right was successfully turned, but our force on his left did not proceed far enough to outflank him. An obstinate contest ensued, with much confusion, and failure to execute the plan of battle. Night ended the conflict on our right, and both sides occupied their original positions. General Banks made no attempt to recover the ground from which his right and center had been driven. During the night he retreated, leaving four hundred wounded, and his dead unburied. On the next morning he was pursued twenty miles before his rear was overtaken, and on the road were found stragglers, and burning wagons and stores. Our loss in the two actions of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill was twenty-two hundred. At Pleasant Hill the loss was three guns and four hundred and twenty-six prisoners. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was larger than ours. We captured twenty guns and twenty-eight hundred prisoners, not including stragglers. Their campaign was defeated. In the second volume of the "Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War," page 239, a report of Admiral Porter, dated Grand Ecore, April 14, 1864, says:
"The army here has met with a great defeat, no matter what the generals try to make of it," etc.
On April 21st General Banks retreated from Grand Ecore to Alexandria, hara.s.sed by a small cavalry force. A large part of our forces had been taken by General E. K. Smith to follow General Steele. On April 28th Porter"s fleet was lying above the falls, then impa.s.sable, and Banks"s army was in and around Alexandria behind earthworks. On May 13th both escaped from Alexandria, and on May 19th Banks crossed the Atchafalaya, and the campaign closed at the place where it began.
Porter was able to extricate his eight ironclads and two wooden gunboats by building a dam with transports, as shown in the adjoining cut. General Banks boasted that the army obtained ten thousand bales of cotton, to which Admiral Porter added five thousand more as collected by the navy. This was the compensation reported for the loss of many lives, much public property, and a total defeat. Even for the booty as well as for the escape of their fleet, they were probably indebted to the unfortunate withdrawal of a large part of Taylor"s force, as mentioned above.[104]
On April 12, 1864, an attack was made by two brigades of General N.
B. Forrest"s force, under Brigadier-General J. R. Chalmers, upon Fort Pillow. This was an earthwork on a bluff on the east side of the Mississippi, at the mouth of Coal Creek. It was garrisoned by four hundred men and six pieces of artillery. General Chalmers promptly gained possession of the outer works and drove the garrison to their main fortifications. The fort was crescent-shaped, the parapet eight feet in height and four feet across the top, surrounded by a ditch six feet deep and twelve feet in width. About this time General Forrest arrived and soon ordered his forces to move up. The brigade of Bell, on the northeast, advanced until it gained a position in which the men were sheltered by the conformation of the ground, which was intersected by a ravine. The other brigade, under McCulloch, carried the intrenchments on the highest part of the ridge, immediately in front of the southeastern face of the fort, and occupied a cl.u.s.ter of cabins on its southern face and about sixty yards from it. The line of investment was now short and complete, within an average distance of one hundred yards. It extended from Coal Creek on the north, which was impa.s.sable, to the river-bank south of the fort. In the rear were numerous sharpshooters, well posted on commanding ridges, to pick off the garrison whenever they exposed themselves. At the same time, our forces were so placed that the artillery could not be brought to bear upon them with much effect except by a fatal exposure of the gunners. During all this time a gunboat in the river kept up a continuous fire in all directions, but without effect. General Forrest, confident of his ability to take the fort by a.s.sault, which it seemed must be perfectly apparent to the garrison, and desiring to prevent further loss of life, sent a demand for an unconditional surrender, with the a.s.surance that they should be treated as prisoners of war. The answer was written with a pencil on a slip of paper, "Negotiations will not attain the desired object." Meantime, three boats were seen to approach, the foremost of which was apparently loaded with troops, and, as an hour"s time had been asked for to communicate with the officers of the gunboat, it seemed to be a pretext to gain time for reenforcements. General Forrest, understanding also that the enemy doubted his presence and had p.r.o.nounced the demand to be a trick, declared himself, and demanded an answer within twenty minutes whether the commander would fight or surrender. Meanwhile, the foremost boat indicated an intention to land, but a few shots caused her to withdraw to the other side of the river, along which they all pa.s.sed up. The answer from the fort was a positive refusal to surrender. Three companies on the left were now placed in an old rifle-pit and almost in the rear of the fort, and on the right a portion of Barton"s regiment of Bell"s brigade was also under the bluff and in the rear of the fort.
On the signal, the works were carried without a halt. As the troops poured into the fortification the enemy retreated toward the river, arms in hand and firing back, and their colors flying, doubtless expecting the gunboats to sh.e.l.l us away from the bluff and protect them until they could be taken off or reenforced. As they descended the bank an enfilading and deadly fire was poured in upon them from right and left by the forces in rear of the fort, of whose presence they were ignorant. To this was now added the destructive fire of the regiments that had stormed the fort. Fortunately some of our men cut down the flag, and the firing ceased. Our loss was twenty killed and sixty wounded. Of the enemy two hundred and twenty-eight were buried that evening and quite a number next day. We captured six pieces of artillery and about three hundred and fifty stand of small-arms. The gunboat escaped up the river.
[Footnote 102: I. Stoddard Johnston, "Southern Historical Society Papers," June, 1879, p. 258, _et seq_.]
[Footnote 103: "I had often seen delicate ladies who had been plundered, insulted, ind rendered desolate by the acts of our most atrocious enemies, and, while they did not call for it, yet in the anguished expressions of their features while narrating their misfortunes, there was a mute appeal to every manly sentiment of my bosom for retribution, which I could no longer withstand. On my pa.s.sage through the lower Valley into Maryland, a lady had said to me, with tears in her eyes: "Our lot is a hard one, and we see no peace; but there are a few green spots in our lives, and they are when the Confederate soldiers come along and we can do something far them." May G.o.d defend and bless these n.o.ble women of the Valley, who so often ministered to the wounded, sick, and dying Confederate soldiers, and gave their last morsel of bread to the hungry! They bore with heroic courage the privations, sufferings, persecutions, and dangers to which the war, which was constantly waged in their midst, exposed them, and upon no portion of the Southern people did the disasters, which finally befell our army and country, fall with more crushing effect than on them."]
[Footnote 104: "Destruction and Reconstruction," Taylor, p. 162, _et.
seq_.]
CHAPTER XLVIII.
a.s.signment of General J. E. Johnston to the Command of the Army of Tennessee.--Condition of his Army.--An Offensive Campaign suggested.--Proposed Objects to be accomplished.--General Johnston"s Plans.--Advance of Sherman.--The Strength of the Confederate Position.--General Johnston expects General Sherman to give Battle at Dalton.--The Enemy"s Flank Movement via Snake Creek Gap to Resaca.--Johnston falls back to Resaca.--Further Retreat to Adairsville.--General Johnston"s Reasons.--Retreat to Ca.s.sville.-- Projected Engagement at Kingston frustrated.--Retreat beyond the Etowah River.--Strong Position at Alatoona abandoned.--Nature of the Country between Marietta and Dallas.--Engagements at New Hope Church.--Army takes Position at Kenesaw.--Senator Hill"s Letter.-- Death of Lieutenant-General Polk.--Battle at Kenesaw Mountain.-- Retreat beyond the Chattahoochee.--Results reviewed.--Popular Demand for Removal of General Johnston.--Reluctance to remove him.-- Reasons for Removal.--a.s.signment of General J. B. Hood to the Command.--He a.s.sumes the Offensive.--Battle of Peach-tree Creek.-- Death of General W. H. T. Walker.--Sherman"s Movement to Jonesboro.--Defeat of Hardee.--Evacuation of Atlanta.--Sherman"s Inhuman Order.--Visit to Georgia.--Suggested Operations.--Want of cooperation by the Governor of Georgia.--Conference with Generals Beauregard, Hardee, and Cobb, at Augusta.--Departure from Original Plan.--General Hood"s Movement against the Enemy"s Communications.-- Partial Successes.--Withdrawal of the Army to Gadsden and Movement against Thomas.--Sherman burns Atlanta and begins his March to the Sea.--Vandalism.--Direction of his Advance.--General Wheeler"s Opposition.--His Valuable Service.--Sherman reaches Savannah.-- General Hardee"s Command.--The Defenses of the City.--a.s.sault and Capture of Fort McAlister.--The Results.--Hardee evacuates Savannah.
On December 16, 1863, I directed General J. E. Johnston to transfer the command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana to Lieutenant-General Polk, and repair to Dalton, Georgia, to a.s.sume command of the Army of Tennessee, representing at that date an effective total of 43,094. My information led me to believe that the condition of that army, in all that const.i.tutes efficiency, was satisfactory, and that the men were anxious for an opportunity to retrieve the loss of prestige sustained in the disastrous battle of Missionary Ridge. I was also informed that the enemy"s forces, then occupying Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson, with a detached force at Knoxville, were weaker in numbers than at any time since the battle of Missionary Ridge, and that they were especially deficient in cavalry and in artillery and train-horses. I desired, therefore, that prompt and vigorous measures be taken to enable our troops to commence active operations against the enemy as early as practicable.
It was important to guard against the injurious results to the morale of the troops, which always attend a prolonged season of inactivity; but the recovery of the territory in Tennessee and Kentucky, which we had been compelled to abandon, and on the supplies of which the proper subsistence of our armies mainly depended, imperatively demanded an onward movement. I believed that, by a rapid concentration of our troops between the scattered forces of the enemy, without attempting to capture his intrenched positions, we could compel him to accept battle in the open field, and that, should we fail to draw him out of his intrenchments, we could move upon his line of communications. The Federal force at Knoxville depended mainly for support on its connection with that at Chattanooga, and both were wholly dependent on uninterrupted communication with Nashville. Could we, then, by interposing our force, separate these two bodies of the enemy, and cut off his communication from Nashville to Chattanooga by destroying the railroad, both conditions were fulfilled. Of the practicability of this movement I had little doubt; of its expediency, if practicable, there could be none. I impressed repeatedly upon General Johnston by letter, and by officers of my staff and others, sent to him by me for the purpose of putting him in possession of these views, the importance of a prompt aggressive movement by the Army of Tennessee. The following were among the considerations presented to General Johnston, at my request, by Brigadier-General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia, on April 16, 1864:
1. To take the enemy at disadvantage while weakened, it is believed, by sending troops to Virginia, and having others still absent on furlough.
2. To break up his plans by antic.i.p.ating and frustrating his combinations.
3. So to press him in his present position as to prevent his heavier ma.s.sing in Virginia.
4. To defeat him in battle, and gain great consequent strength in supplies, men, and productive territory.
5. To prevent the waste of the army incident to inactivity.
6. To inspirit the troops and the country by success, and to discourage the enemy.
7. To obviate the necessity of falling back, which might probably occur if our antagonist be allowed to consummate his plans without molestation.
General Johnston cordially approved of an aggressive movement, and informed me of his purpose to make it as soon as reenforcements and supplies, then on the way, should reach him. He did not approve the proposed advance into Tennessee. He believed that the Federal forces in Tennessee were not weaker, but if anything stronger, than at Missionary Ridge; that defeat beyond the Tennessee would probably prove ruinous to us, resulting in the loss of his army, the occupation of Georgia by the enemy, the "piercing of the Confederacy in its vitals," and the loss of all the southwestern territory. He proposed, therefore, to stand on the defensive until strengthened, "to watch, prepare, and strike" as soon as possible. As soon as reenforced, he declared his purpose to advance to Ringgold, attack there, and, if successful, as he expected to be, to strike at Cleveland, cut the railroad, control the river, and thus isolate East Tennessee, and, as a consequence, force his antagonist to give battle on this side of the Tennessee River. Simultaneously with, and in aid of, this movement, General Johnston proposed that a large cavalry force should be sent to Middle Tennessee, in the rear of the enemy.
These operations, he thought, would result in forcing the Federal army to evacuate the Tennessee Valley, and make an advance into the heart of the State safely practicable.
The irreparable loss of time in making any forward movement as desired having sufficed for the combinations which rendered an advance across the Tennessee River no longer practicable, I took prompt measures to enable General Johnston to carry out immediately his own proposition to strike first at Ringgold and then at Cleveland, proposing that General Buckner should threaten Knoxville, General Forrest advance into or threaten Middle Tennessee, and General Roddy hold the enemy in northern Alabama, and thus prevent his concentration in our front. This movement, although it held out no such promise as did the plan of advance before the enemy had had time to make his combinations, might have been attended with good results had it been promptly executed. But no such movement was made or even attempted. General Johnston"s belief that General Grant would be ready to a.s.sume the offensive before he could be prepared to do so, proved too well founded, while his purpose, if the Federal army did not attack, that we should prepare and take the initiative ourselves, was never carried out.[105]
On the morning of May 2, 1864, General Johnston discovered that the enemy, under the command of General Sherman, was advancing against him, and two days subsequently it was reported that he had reached Ringgold (about fifteen miles north of Dalton) in considerable force.
At this date the official returns show that the effective strength of the Army of Tennessee, counting the troops actually in position at Dalton and those in the immediate rear of that place, was about fifty thousand. When to these is added General Polk"s command (then _en route_), and the advance of which joined him at Resaca, the effective strength of General Johnston"s army was not less than 68,620 men of all arms, excluding from the estimate the thousands of men employed on extra duty, amounting, as General Hood states, to ten thousand when he a.s.sumed command of the army.
Army at Dalton, May 1, 1864, according to General Johnston"s estimates[106] ... ... ... ... 37,652 infantry.
2,812 artillery.
2,392 cavalry.
Mercer"s brigade, joined May 2d ... ... ... 2,000 infantry.
Thirty-seventh Mississippi Regiment, _en route_ 400 "
Dibrell"s and Harrison"s brigades in rear, recruiting their horses ... ... ... ... . 2,336 cavalry.
Martin"s division at Cartersville ... ... . . 1,700 "
------ 49,292 Polk"s command ... ... ... ... ... ... 19,330 ------ Total effective ... ... ... ... ... . . 68,620
To enable General Johnston to repulse the hostile advance and a.s.sume the offensive, no effort was spared on the part of the Government.
Almost all the available military strength of the south and west, in men and supplies, was pressed forward and placed at his disposal. The supplies of the commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance departments of his army were represented as ample and suitably located. The troops, encouraged by the large accessions of strength which they saw arriving daily, and which they knew were marching rapidly to their support, were eager to advance, and confident in their power to achieve victory and recover the territory which they had lost. Their position was such as to warrant the confident expectation of successful resistance at least. Long mountain-ranges, penetrated by few and difficult roads and paths, and deep and wide rivers, seemed to render our position one from which we could not be dislodged or turned, while that of the enemy, dependent for his supplies upon a single line of railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating, was manifestly perilous. The whole country shared the hope which the Government entertained, that a decisive victory would soon be won in the mountains of Georgia, which would free the south and west from invasion, would open to our occupation and the support of our armies the productive territory of Tennessee and Kentucky, and so recruit our army in the West as to render it impracticable for the enemy to acc.u.mulate additional forces in Virginia.
On May 6th the Confederate forces were in position in and near Dalton, which point General Johnston believed that General Sherman would attack with his whole force. This belief seems to have been held by General Johnston until the evening of May 12th, when, having previously learned the proximity of the advance of Lieutenant-General Polk"s command, and that the rest of his troops were hurrying forward to reenforce him, but discovering that the main body of Sherman"s army was moving round his left flank, via Snake-Creek Gap to Resaca, under cover of Rocky-Face Mountain, he withdrew his troops from Dalton and fell back on Resaca, situated on the Western and Atlantic Railroad, eighteen miles south of Dalton on a peninsula formed by the junction of the Oostenaula and Conasauga Rivers. The Confederate position at this place was strengthened by continuous rifle-pits and strong field-works, by which it was protected on the flanks on the above-named rivers, and a line of retreat across the Oostenaula secured. Information, on May 15th, that the right of the Federal army was crossing the Oostenaula near Calhoun (four miles south of Resaca), thus threatening his line of communications, induced General Johnston to fall back from Resaca toward Adairsville, thirteen miles south on the railroad. General Johnston, in accounting for his abandonment of his strong position at Dalton, and of his subsequent position at Resaca, states that he was dislodged from the first position--that in front of Dalton--by General Sherman"s movement to his right through Snake-Creek Gap, threatening our line of communication at Resaca; and from the position taken at Resaca to meet that movement, by a similar one on the part of the Federal General toward Calhoun--the second being covered by the river, as the first had been by the mountains.
After abandoning Resaca, General Johnston hoped to find a good position near Calhoun; but, finding none, he fell back to a position about a mile north of Adairsville, where the valley of the Oothcaloga was supposed from the map to be so narrow that his army, formed in line of battle across it, could hold the heights on both flanks. On reaching this point, however, it was found that the valley was so much broader than was supposed, that the army, in line of battle, could not obtain the antic.i.p.ated advantage of ground. Hence a further retreat to Ca.s.sville was ordered, seventeen miles farther south, and a few miles to the east of the railroad. Here, supposing that the Federal army would divide, one column following the railroad through Kingston and the other the direct road to the Etowah Railroad Bridge through Ca.s.sville, General Johnston hoped that the opportunity would be offered him to engage and defeat one of the enemy"s columns before it could receive aid from the other, and, as the distance between them would be greatest at Kingston, he determined to attack at this point. The coming battle was announced in orders to each regiment of the army.