The residual power in the Const.i.tution of 1776 is vested in the people and exercised through the General a.s.sembly. Within the General a.s.sembly the House of Delegates was to be supreme. The a.s.sembly had two houses: The House of Delegates, replacing the House of Burgesses, had two members from each county and one from each town; and the Senate, replacing the old royally-appointed council, had 24 members chosen from 24 districts throughout the state. A peculiarity of this const.i.tution was the use of 12 electors, chosen by the voters in each district, to actually choose the senator from that district. All legislation originated in the House of Delegates, the Senate being allowed to amend all laws except appropriation bills, which it had to accept or reject completely.
Mindful of royal authority and disdainful of executive power, the const.i.tution emasculated the power of the governor, leaving him a "mere phantom". Elected annually by the combined vote of the General a.s.sembly for a maximum of three consecutive terms, the governor had no veto power and virtually no power of executive action. He could not act between legislative sessions without approval of an eight-man Council of State.
This council was elected by the a.s.sembly "to a.s.sist in the administration of government". In truth, the council restrained the executive.
The virtual semi-autonomy of the county courts and the justices of the peace remained. A system of state courts was provided for, its judges also elected by the a.s.sembly. Property qualifications for voters and for office holders continued in force. No clergymen were permitted to hold state office.[36]
[36] Rutland, Mason, I, 295-310.
The const.i.tution, then retained what had worked well in the past--the General a.s.sembly and the county court system; granted to the House of Delegates the written powers it had claimed as the colonial House of Burgesses; eliminated the royally elected council, but retained the idea of an upper house composed of men of property; and totally restrained the governor. Thus, if one definition of a commonwealth is a government in which the legislature is supreme, then Virginia in 1776 was certainly a commonwealth. This const.i.tution became a model for many other state governments, although most states benefited from the unfortunate experiences of governors Henry (1776-1779) and Jefferson (1779-1781) and gave their executives greater administrative lat.i.tude.
Jefferson had hastened back from Philadelphia to try to influence the writing of the const.i.tution. He arrived too late to have much effect beyond appending to the const.i.tution a preamble paraphrasing the Declaration of Independence. But many of his ideas were too "democratical". He feared the const.i.tution did not have the force of true law, for it had been written by a convention not elected for that purpose by the people. Nor had the people voted directly on the const.i.tution.
Jefferson was even more concerned about the remaining vestiges of feudalism, aristocracy, and privilege. He succeeded in eliminating primogeniture (the eldest child has greater inheritance rights than the younger children) and entails (a person could place restrictions on the use of his property in perpetuity). Both primogeniture and entail smacked of inequality and alienation of rights by one generation against the next. Although his Statute on Religious Freedom was not pa.s.sed until 1786, each session after 1776 saw Jefferson successfully whittle down the privileges of the once-established Anglican Church. From 1776 until 1778 Jefferson, Wythe, and Pendleton labored on a revision of the state law code, but only a part of their code was adopted. A revised criminal code was not fully enacted until the 1790"s. Jefferson made little headway on his plans for public education.
There is no evidence that Virginians were concerned that the convention had written a const.i.tution without their direct approval. The Const.i.tution of 1776 remained in effect until 1830. Virginians developed great pride concerning the work of this revolutionary convention. Here a group of the richest and best men in the colony had initiated revolution, articulated a philosophy for revolution, and established a frame of government which were to be widely imitated throughout the country and adopted in part in France.
Out of this transformation of the English const.i.tution into a government for the Commonwealth of Virginia men like Jefferson, Henry, Mason, and even the more conservative Bland and Pendleton had produced a truly radical doctrine of popular sovereignty, an appeal to a higher law--the law of nature and Nature"s G.o.d, the replacement of virtual representation with direct representation, and the subst.i.tution of a balance of interests within the Virginia society for the old English theory of a balanced government comprising crown, n.o.bility, and commons in restraint of each other.
In the words of historian Bailyn, they had worked "a substantial alteration in the order of society as it was known" in 1775. They had unloosened a "contagion of liberty" which could not be restrained.[37]
Ultimately Virginians and Americans came to believe the rhetoric of the Declaration of Rights and the Declaration of Independence when they read the words "all men are created equal" to mean "all persons". If it is something of an anomaly that the men who wrote these words were slaveholders, it is no anomaly that these words came to be accepted as "self-evident truths" when later generations applied these truths to the rights of man, regardless of race, creed, color, religion, or national origin. But that was a long way off. June-July 1776 was the beginning of a great experiment, not the finished product.
[37] Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, Harvard University Press, 1962, chapter 4.
The British-Americans: The Virginia Loyalists
Jefferson was correct in stating that Virginians moved forward to war with greater unity and with fewer examples of Torism than any other colony. Robert Calhoon, historian of loyalism, notes Virginia Loyalists consisted "of a handful of Anglican clergymen, the members of a moribund Royal Council, and several hundred Scottish merchants, and were ... not a very formidable coalition." This confirms the much older view of Isaac Harrell who characterized Virginia loyalists as small in number, not more than a few thousand, whose activities after the departure of Governor Dunmore were limited. Only in the Norfolk area, the Hobbs Hole region of Middles.e.x County, in Accomac County on the Eastern Sh.o.r.e, and in the isolated frontier area along the Monongahela River, claimed jointly by Pennsylvania and Virginia, were there enough loyalists to even suggest a majority of the population. "Of the 2,500 claims filed with British government for loyalist property lost during the Revolution, only 140 were from Virginia." Most of these 140 claims were made by British natives living in Virginia at the outbreak of the war. Only 13 were Virginians.
Except for the Dunmore raids in 1775-1776 and an abortive plot in 1776 by Dr. John Connolly in the Fort Pitt region there were no loyalist military operations in Virginia. Several hundred loyalists joined the royal army, a small number in comparison to most colonies. Most loyalists went to London or Glasgow. Except for William Byrd III and Attorney-General John Randolph, most native Virginia loyalists, including Richard Corbin, John Grymes, and Ralph Wormeley stayed quietly on their plantations.[38]
Virginia"s only n.o.bleman, aging recluse, Thomas, Sixth Lord Fairfax, owner of the Northern Neck, 9,000 square miles of land, remained untouched at his hunting lodge in Frederick County.
[38] Robert M. Calhoon. The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781, (Harcourt, Brace: New York, 1973), 458; Isaac Harrell, Loyalism in Virginia (Duke University, 1926), 62-65.
In the early years there was a general appreciation of the difficulty some Virginians had experienced in breaking with England and swearing allegiance to a new nation. This switch was especially difficult for members of the governor"s council and the Anglican clergy who had taken personal oaths of allegiance to the king, not a casual act in the 18th Century. Most of these men and women had been respected leaders in pre-Revolutionary Virginia, had many friends, brothers, and sons in the patriot camp, and took no direct action to support the British. Generally they were well treated.
As the war moved along, however, and the colonists suffered enormous losses in the winters of 1777 and 1778, sympathy decreased and demands for public declaration of allegiance to the patriot cause grew. Laws were pa.s.sed providing for heavy taxation and then confiscation of loyalist properties. The fortunes of the war can almost be read in the evolution of loyalist laws. After the battle of Great Bridge (1775) the convention allowed those who had borne arms against Virginia to take an oath of allegiance to the Committee of Safety. Most Norfolk area loyalists did.
But when Dunmore persisted in raiding Virginia that spring, the convention, in May 1776, changed the law and declared those who aided the "enemy" subject to imprisonment and their property to seizure. In December 1776 the new General a.s.sembly voted that those who joined the enemy or gave aid and comfort were to be arrested for treason. If guilty, they would be executed. Those guilty of adherence to the authority of the king (as opposed to those who refused to support the new government) were subject to heavy fines and imprisonment.
A major turning point occurred in 1777 when general patriot outcries against those not supporting the Revolutionary cause forced the a.s.sembly to pa.s.s a test oath. Washington and Jefferson were especially vocal on this point. Every male over 16 was required to renounce his allegiance to the king and to subscribe to a new oath of allegiance to Virginia. In 1778 those who refused to take the oath were subjected to double taxation; in 1779 the tax was tripled. In 1779 legal procedures for the sale of sequestered and confiscated property were established and sales begun, although these sales never brought the income expected to the financially hard pressed state.
A similar progression from toleration to harshness faced the merchants who had stayed in the colonies as well as those who had fled. The latter had much of their property confiscated and their ships seized. Those who stayed found there was no neutrality. The key issue here was debt payment. The a.s.sembly declared that the new Virginia paper money circulated was legal tender and must be accepted for both new and pre-war debts. Many Virginians took advantage of this opportunity to pay their debts in the inflated money, a move which caused many problems after the war when attempts were made to straighten out personal British accounts.
There was no sympathy for those who protested the inequity of this action. Revolutions and civil wars seldom bring equity. The remarkable thing is that in Virginia the Revolution progressed with so little internal strife.[39]
[39] Harrell, Loyalism in Virginia, 66-96.
The War at Home, 1776-1780
From the time Dunmore left in July 1776, until the British moved into Virginia again in 1779, Virginians fought the war for independence on the soils of the other colonies. Their main contributions were providing the men and material which all wars demand. When one considers the natural reluctance of colonials to serve outside their own boundaries, Virginians" record of men and supplies were good.
The demands on the Virginia economy were great. With much of the natural granary in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Long Island occupied by British forces and the middle state ports blockaded, pleas from Washington for Virginia meat and food supplies were constant. Munitions works at Westham (Richmond), Fredericksburg, and Fort Chiswell and naval shipyards at Gosport, South Quay, and Chickahominy River operated at full capacity. A major munitions magazine opened at Point of Fork on the James River in Fluvanna County, and small iron furnaces appeared throughout the Piedmont and in the Valley areas. In 1779 Virginia exports of food and grain outside the United States were halted and redirected to the needs of Congress. Everywhere Virginians began to spin and weave their own cloth.
Simpler life styles became the order of the war.
The plainer way of life was not just a patriotic morale-builder. It was a necessity. The natural trade routes between the Chesapeake and Britain were closed and the tobacco trade was ruined. To finance the war the a.s.sembly taxed nearly everything which could be taxed. Many taxes were those which the Virginians had rejected when imposed by parliament, including legal papers and gla.s.s windows. The difference was the necessity or war and the source of the tax laws--the people"s own elected representatives.
Taxes, alone, however have never financed a major war. As in the French and Indian War, Virginia issued paper money and floated state loans.
Between 1776-1780 the state debt reached 26,000,000 and in the following two years nearly doubled. By 1779 loans and taxes were not enough and the a.s.sembly levied taxes on commodities as well as currency. Taxpayers had to make payments in grain, hemp, or tobacco rather than inflated paper money alone. Inflation set in. By 1780 coffee, when you could get it, sold for $20 per pound, shoes were $60 per pair, and better grades of cloth were bringing $200 a yard. The exchange rate of Virginia money to hard coins (specie) was 10-1 in 1778, 60-1 in early 1780, and then spiraled upwards to 150-1 in April 1780, 350-1 in July, and was going out of sight as Cornwallis" army ravaged the state. It never reached the ratio of 1,000-1 as did the Continental Congress currency, but the phrase "not worth a Continental" might equally have applied to Virginia money.
Few of those who served Virginia and the new nation, whether as officers, footsoldiers, governors, judges, or clerks, did so without suffering substantial financial losses. In many cases they were never reimbursed even for actual expenses.[40] Unfortunately there were many who reaped profits by exploiting the situation.
[40] For a good description of the economic impact of the war on one dedicated Virginian, read Emory Evans" Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Virginia Revolutionary (University Press, Charlottesville, 1975), 65-123.
There also were thousands who moved across the mountains to new lands in the Valley, southwestern Virginia, and Kentucky. In fact, Virginia had to head off an attempt by North Carolinians, headed by Richard Henderson, to detach Kentucky from Virginia. The state had to watch attempts by other states to claim Virginia lands in the Ohio country. To forestall these attempts Virginia took two steps. In 1776 the a.s.sembly divided Fincastle County into three counties--Kentucky, Montgomery, and Washington and established local governments there; and she agreed to ratify the new Articles of Confederation only upon the condition that all other states agree to give up their claims to the Ohio country and that all new states created from those territories have the same rights and privileges as the original states. In so doing, Virginians, under the leadership of Jefferson, formulated a colonial policy for the western lands which a.s.sured equality for the new states, a most important guarantee that there would be no superior and inferior states in the new United States.
All states would be equal.
It should be remembered that this was never a total war. Independence simply demanded that Washington, the Continental Congress, and the states keep an army in the field and a fleet on the seas until the British accepted the fact that they could not defeat the Americans or until they decided victory was not worth the cost. Whenever the call came, Virginians poured forth in sufficient numbers and with sufficient supplies in the crucial days of 1777-1778 and 1780-1781 to prevent defeat. And in 1781 they were there in enough numbers to insure victory at Yorktown.
Part V:
The War for Independence
[Sidenote: "_He has abdicated government here...._"]
Virginia"s partic.i.p.ation in the Revolutionary War military operations developed in seven stages: (1) the initial conflict with Lord Dunmore in the Norfolk and Chesapeake areas in 1775-1776; (2) the thousands of Virginians who joined the Continental Army and campaigned throughout the country; (3) the b.l.o.o.d.y Cherokee war in the southwest from 1775-1782; (4) George Rogers Clark"s audacious and spectacular victory in the Northwest; (5) the British invasion and ravaging of Virginia throughout 1780-1781; (6) the southern campaigns of Generals Gates and Greene in 1780 and 1781; and (7) the final victory at Yorktown in the fall of 1781.[41]
[41] The best general survey of the war is by John Alden, A History of the American Revolution (Knopf: New York, 1969). The best detailed account is by Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, 2 volumes. (MacMillan: New York, 1952). Both have been utilized in this section.
Virginians and the Continental Army, 1775-1779
The decision to make George Washington commander-in-chief of the Continental armies was undoubtedly a political act meant to bind the southern colonies to the war and to blunt charges that this was a New England revolution. Seldom has a political decision borne greater positive benefits. Washington is an enigma and he always will remain so to his countrymen. His greatness as a man and as a commander are difficult to fathom. The contradictions are best summarized by military historian John Alden:
Faults have been, and can be, found in Washington as commander. He did not have the advantages of a good military education. He did not know, and he never quite learned, how to discipline and to drill his men. He was not a consistently brilliant strategist or tactician....
(Often) he secured advantage ... by avoiding battle. Actually he was quite willing to fight when the odds were not too heavily against him. He retreated only when he was compelled to do so, during the campaigns of 1776 and 1777.... On occasion he was perhaps too venturesome. His generalship improved as the war continued. However, his defeats in the field were more numerous than his victories; and he had to share the laurels of his great triumph at Yorktown, with the French. If Washington had his shortcomings as a tactician, he nevertheless performed superbly under the most difficult conditions.
He gave dignity, steadfast loyalty, and indomitable courage to the American cause.... Indeed Congress supplied historians with convincing evidence of Washington"s greatness. It not only appointed him as commander in chief, but maintained him in that post year after year, in victory and defeat, in prosperity and adversity, until the war was won.[42]
[42] Alden, American Revolution, 183-184.
At first Congress was not certain Washington could command and eagerly sought European officers for field command positions. Charles Lee and Horatio Gates, two of the four major-generals appointed to serve under Washington, were residents of Virginia. Both were English army officers who had left the British army, settled in Berkeley County, and become ardent advocates of the colonials" cause. Lee, the well-bred son of English gentry had served under Braddock in the ill-fated Fort Duquesne expedition of 1756, was later wounded, left the army after the war, and became interested in western land schemes. He came to Virginia in 1775 after a stint as a general in the Polish army. Lee was courageous, ambitious, and vain. He could command when necessary, but had difficulty following Washington"s orders. Given credit for stopping the British attack on Charleston, South Carolina, in June 1776, he came back north and was captured in New Jersey in December 1776. Exchanged by the British, he resumed command in 1778. However, his scandalous behavior at Monmouth in June 1778 resulted in his court martial. He was finally dismissed from the service by Congress in 1780.
Gates was the son of an English servant. Somehow he received a regular army commission, serving in the colonies during the French and Indian War. He resigned as a major in 1772 and moved to Virginia. Whereas Lee was haughty, Gates was pleasant and amiable. He also was ambitious and constantly sought military commands whose demands exceeded his talents.
Commander of the northern army which won the great victory at Saratoga in 1777, Gates was willing to take over as commander in chief in the dark days of 1777-1778, but his friends in Congress could not displace Washington. Over Washington"s recommendation, Congress elected him commander of the southern armies in 1780. He left that command after the blundering defeat at Camden, South Carolina, in August 1780. Gates retired to Virginia where he lived to an old age, much honored as an Englishman who loyally supported independence.
The English generals from Virginia did not give Washington his eventual victories, however. His command strength came from Virginians who learned by experience, were devoted to the Revolutionary cause, and were loyal to the general. They were with the Continental Army in its darkest days at Morristown in the winter of 1776-1777 and Valley Forge in 1777-1778.
These included Colonel Theodorick Bland and his cavalry who fought at Brandywine in 1777 and Charleston in 1780; General William Woodford, the victor at Great Bridge, who commanded Virginia Continentals fighting at Brandywine and Germantown in 1777, and Monmouth in 1778, was captured at Charleston in 1780 and died in a New York prison that December; Colonel William Washington and his cavalry who fought in nearly all the battles in southern campaigns; Colonel Peter Muhlenberg, who raised the German Regiment from the Valley and Piedmont around his Woodstock home and commanded them with distinction at Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth, and Stony Point, and later led Virginia militia against Cornwallis in 1781; and the gallant Colonel Edward Porterfield, who died with many of his troops, called "Porterfield"s Virginians" at Camden.
There also was a distinguished group of young men like John Marshall, James Monroe, and Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee who achieved distinction and displayed loyalty to the national cause which they never surrendered.