3. As one who is in health would not choose to be served by the sick, nor that those dwelling with him should be sick, so neither would one that is free bear to be served by slaves, or that those living with him should be slaves.[1]
CHAPTER V.
TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES, WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN.
1. The Administrator[1] having visited him (and this man was an Epicurean), It is proper, said Epictetus, that ignorant people like us should inquire of you that are philosophers (as men who come into a strange city make inquiry of the citizens and those familiar with the place) what is the chief thing in the world, to the end that, having learned it, we may go in search of it, and behold it, as men do with objects in the cities.
2. Now, that there are three things with which man is concerned-soul, and body, and the outer world-scarce any one will deny. It remaineth, then, for men like ye to answer which is the chief of these things? What shall we declare to men? Is it the flesh? And was it for this that Maximus sent forth his son, and sailed with him through the tempest as far as Ca.s.siope,[2] for somewhat that he should feel in the flesh?
3. But the Epicurean denying this, and saying, _G.o.d forbid_, Epictetus said:
Is it not fit, then, that we should be zealous about that, the chief thing?
--"Of all things most fit."
What, then, have we greater than the flesh?
--"The soul," he said.
And the good of the chief thing, is it greater than the good of the lower thing?
--"The good of the chief thing is greater."
And the good things of the soul, are they in the power of the Will, or beyond the Will?
--"They are in the power of the Will."
The pleasure of the soul, then, is within the power of the Will?
He a.s.sented.
And this pleasure itself, whence may it arise? From itself? But this is inconceivable; for we must suppose some original substance of the Good, whereof the soul doth make us sensible when we light upon it.
This, too, he admitted.
Wherein, then, are we sensible of this spiritual pleasure? for if it be in spiritual things, the nature of the Good is discovered. For the Good cannot be something different from the thing that justly delights us; nor, if the original thing be not good, can aught be good that proceeds from it; for, in order that the thing proceeding may be good, the original thing must be good also. But this ye would never say, if ye had your wits, for so ye would speak things that agree not with Epicurus and the rest of your opinions. It remains, then, that we are conscious in bodily things of this pleasure of the soul, and again, that these are the original things and the very substance of the Good.[3]
4. Wherefore Maximus did foolishly if he made his voyage for the sake of anything else than the flesh; that is, than the chief thing. And any man doth foolishly who restraineth himself from others" good, if he be a judge, and able to take them. But, if you please, let us regard this only, how it may be done secretly and safely, and so that none may know it. For neither does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad, but only to be caught stealing; and because it is impossible to be certain of no discovery, therefore he saith, _Ye shall not steal_. But I say that if we steal with skill and discretion, we shall not be caught. And, moreover, if we have powerful friends among men and women at Rome, and the Greeks are feeble, no one will dare to go thither on this score. Why do you refrain from your own good? This is foolish-this is absurd. But not even if you tell me you do refrain will I believe you. For, as it is impossible to a.s.sent to anything that appeareth to be a falsehood or to turn away from what appeareth to be true, even so it is impossible to withhold oneself from anything that appeareth to be good. But riches are a good, and, at all events, the most potent means of pleasure.
Wherefore, then, not compa.s.s them? And why not corrupt our neighbor"s wife, if we may do it secretly? and also, if the husband talk nonsense about it, let us fling him out! If you will be a true and perfect philosopher, and obedient to your own doctrines, thus must you do; but if you do not, you differ no whit from us that are called Stoics. For truly we ourselves say one thing and do another; we speak fair and honest things, and do vile ones. But the opposite distemper will be thine-a vile creed and honorable deeds.
5. And you think, G.o.d help you! of a city of Epicureans? _I do not marry. Nor I; for it is not right to marry, nor beget children, nor take part in public affairs._ What will come to pa.s.s then? Whence shall we have citizens? who shall educate them? who shall be the overseer of youth?[4] who the director of gymnastics? and how shall the youth be trained up? as the Lacedaemonians? or as the Athenians? Take me a youth, and bring him up after these doctrines of thine! Evil are they, subversive of States, mischievous to households, unbecoming to women.
Abandon them, man! Thou dwellest in a chief city; it is thy part to rule, to judge righteously, to refrain from other men"s goods; nor must any woman seem beautiful to thee save thine own wife, nor vessel of gold or silver. Seek for doctrines in harmony with these words, from which setting out thou mayest with gladness abandon things so potent to attract and overcome. But if beside the seduction of these things we have sought out some philosophy like this that pushes us towards them, and confirms us in them, what shall come of it?
6. In the graver"s work, which is the chief thing? the silver or the art? The substance of the hand is flesh, but the main things are the works of the hand. The obligations, therefore, are also three-those that concern us, firstly, in that we are; and secondly, as we are; and thirdly, the main things themselves. And thus in man, too, it is not meet to value the material, this flesh, but the main things. What are these? To take part in public affairs, to marry, to beget children, to fear G.o.d, to care for parents, and, in general, to pursue, to avoid, to desire, to dislike, as each of these things should be done, as Nature made us to do. And how made she us? To be free, generous, pious. For what other creature blushes? what other is capable of the sense of shame?
7. And to these things let Pleasure be subject as a minister, a servant, that she may summon forth our ardor, and that she also may aid in works that are according to Nature.[5]
8. --"But I am a wealthy man, and have no need of aught."
Why, then, dost thou profess philosophy? Thy vessels of gold and vessels of silver are enough for thee; what need hast thou of doctrines?
--"But I am also a judge of the Greeks!"
Dost thou know how to judge-who made thee know?
--"Caesar wrote me a commission."
Let him write thee a commission to be a judge of music, and what help will it be to thee? And how didst thou become a judge? by kissing of what man"s hand? Was it that of Symphorus or Numenius? Before whose bed-chamber didst thou sleep? To whom didst thou send gifts? Dost thou not perceive, then, that to be a judge is worth just as much as Numenius is worth?
--"But I can cast into prison whom I will."
As if he were a stone.
--"But I can flog any man I will."
As if he were an a.s.s. This is no government of men. Rule us as reasoning beings; show us what is for our good, and we shall follow it; show us what is for our ill, and we shall turn away from it; make us emulators of thyself, as Socrates made his disciples. He, indeed, was one that governed men as men, who made them subject unto him in their pursuit and their avoidance, their desire and dislike. _Do this, do not this, or I will cast thee into prison._ This is not the rule of reasoning beings.
But, _As Zeus hath ordered, so do thou act; but if thou dost not, thou shall suffer loss and hurt_. What hurt? _None other than this-not to have done what it behooved thee to do. Thou shall lose faith, piety, decency-look for no greater injuries than these._
CHAPTER VI.
ON STATECRAFT.
1. Not with the stones of Euba and Sparta let the structure of your city walls be variegated; but let the discipline and teaching that comes from Greece penetrate with order the minds of citizens and statesmen.
For with the thoughts of men are cities well established, and not with wood and stone.
2. If thou wouldst have a household well established, then follow the example of the Spartan Lycurgus. For even as he did not fence the city with walls, but fortified the inhabitants with virtue, and so preserved the city free for ever, thus do thou not surround thyself with a great court and set up lofty towers, but confirm the dwellers in the house with good-will, and faith, and friendliness, and no harmful thing shall enter; no, not if the whole army of evil were arrayed against it.
3. Which of us will not admire Lycurgus, the Lacedaemonian? For having lost an eye at the hands of one of the citizens, and having received the young man from the people that he should punish him as he would, he refrained from this; but having taught him and proved him to be a good man, he brought him into the theater. And when the Lacedaemonians marveled, _I received this man from you_, he said, _insolent and violent; I give him back to you mild and civil_.
CHAPTER VII.
ON FRIENDSHIP.
1. Whereinsoever a man is zealous, this, it is fair to suppose, he loveth. Are men, then, zealous for evil things? Never.[1] Or, perchance, for things which do not concern them? Nor for them either. It remaineth, then, that they are zealous about good things only; and that if they are zealous about them, they also love them. Whosoever, then, hath understanding of good things, the same would know how to love. But he who is not able to distinguish good things from evil, and things that are neither from both, how could this man yet be capable of loving? To love, then, is a quality of the wise alone.
2. _And how is this_, saith one, _for I am foolish, and none the less do I love my child_. By the G.o.ds! I wonder, then, how you have begun by confessing yourself to be foolish. For wherein do you lack? Do you not use your senses? do you not judge of appearances? do you not bring to the body the nourishment it needeth, and the covering and habitation?