VIII.
Quod mundus stabili fide Concordes uariat uices, Quod pugnantia semina Foedus perpetuum tenent, Quod Phoebus roseum diem 5 Curru prouehit aureo, Vt quas duxerit Hesperos Phoebe noctibus imperet, Vt fluctus auidum mare Certo fine coerceat, 10 Ne terris liceat uagis Latos tendere terminos, Hanc rerum seriem ligat Terras ac pelagus regens Et caelo imperitans amor. 15 Hic si frena remiserit, Quidquid nunc amat inuicem Bellum continuo geret Et quam nunc socia fide Pulchris motibus incitant*, 20 Certent soluere machinam.
Hic sancto populos quoque Iunctos foedere continet, Hic et coniugii sacrum Castis nect.i.t amoribus, 25 Hic fidis etiam sua Dictat iura sodalibus.
O felix hominum genus, Si uestros animos amor Quo caelum regitur regat." 30
VIII.
That this fair world in settled course her several forms should vary, That a perpetual law should tame the fighting seeds of things, That Phoebus should the rosy day in his bright chariot carry, That Phoebe should govern the nights which Hesperus forth brings, That to the floods of greedy seas are certain bounds a.s.signed, Which them, lest they usurp too much upon the earth, debar, Love ruling heaven, and earth, and seas, them in this course doth bind.
And if it once let loose their reins, their friendship turns to war, Tearing the world whose ordered form their quiet motions bear.
By it all holy laws are made and marriage rites are tied, By it is faithful friendship joined. How happy mortals were, If that pure love did guide their minds, which heavenly spheres doth guide!"
ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
LIBER SECVNDVS EXPLICIT
INCIPIT LIBER III.
I.
Iam cantum illa finiuerat, c.u.m me audiendi auidum stupentemque arrectis adhuc auribus carminis mulcedo defixerat. Itaque paulo post: "O," inquam, "summum la.s.sorum solamen animorum quam tu me uel sententiarum pondere uel canendi etiam iucunditate refouisti! Adeo ut iam me post haec inparem fortunae ictibus esse non arbitrer. Itaque remedia quae paulo acriora esse dicebas, non modo non perhorresco, sed audiendi auidus uehementer efflagito." Tum illa "Sensi," inquit, "c.u.m uerba nostra tacitus attentusque rapiebas, eumque tuae mentis habitum uel exspectaui uel, quod est uerius, ipsa perfeci. Talia sunt quippe quae restant, ut degustata quidem mordeant, interius autem recepta dulcescant. Sed quod tu te audiendi cupidum dicis, quanto ardore flagrares, si quonam te ducere aggrediamur agnosceres!"
"Quonam?" inquam. "Ad ueram," inquit, "felicitatem, quam tuus quoque somniat animus, sed occupato ad imagines uisu ipsam illam non potest intueri." Tum ego: "Fac obsecro et quae illa uera sit, sine cunctatione demonstra." "Faciam," inquit illa, "tui causa libenter. Sed quae tibi causa notior est, eam prius designare uerbis atque informare conabor ut ea perspecta c.u.m in contrariam partem flexeris oculos, uerae beat.i.tudinis speciem possis agnoscere.
THE THIRD BOOK OF BOETHIUS
I.
Though she had ended her verse, yet the sweetness of it made me remain astonished, attentive, and desirous to hear her longer. Wherefore, after a while, I said: "O most effectual refreshment of wearied minds, how have I been comforted with thy weighty sentences and pleasing music!
Insomuch that I begin to think myself not unable to encounter the a.s.saults of Fortune. Wherefore, I am not now afraid, but rather earnestly desire to know those remedies, which before thou toldest me were too sharp." To which she answered: "I perceived as much as thou sayest, when I saw thee hearken to my speeches with so great silence and attention, and I expected this disposition of thy mind, or rather more truly caused it myself. For the remedies which remain are of that sort that they are bitter to the taste, but being inwardly received wax sweet. And whereas thou sayest that thou art desirous to hear; how much would this desire increase if thou knewest whither we go about to bring thee!" "Whither?" quoth I. "To true felicity," quoth she, "which thy mind also dreameth of, but thy sight is so dimmed with phantasies that thou canst not behold it as it is." Then I beseeched her to explicate without delay wherein true happiness consisteth. To which she answered: "I will willingly do so for thy sake, but first I will endeavour to declare in words and to give shape to that which is better known unto thee, that, having thoroughly understood it, by reflecting of the contrary thou mayest discover the type of perfect blessedness.
I.
Qui serere ingenuum uolet agrum, Liberat arua prius fruticibus, Falce rubos filicemque resecat, Vt noua fruge grauis Ceres eat.
Dulcior est apium mage labor, 5 Si malus ora prius sapor edat.
Gratius astra nitent ubi Notus Desinit imbriferos dare sonos.
Lucifer ut tenebras pepulerit Pulchra dies roseos agit equos. 10 Tu quoque falsa tuens bona prius Incipe colla iugo retrahere.
Vera dehinc animum subierint."
I.
He that a fruitful field will sow, Doth first the ground from bushes free, All fern and briars likewise mow, That he his harvest great may see.
Honey seems sweeter to our taste, If cloyed with noisome food it be.
Stars clearer shine when Notus" blast Hath ceased the rainy storms to breed.
When Lucifer hath night defaced, The day"s bright horses then succeed.
So thou, whom seeming goods do feed, First shake off yokes which so thee press That Truth may then thy mind possess."
II.
Tum defixo paululum uisu et uelut in augustam suae mentis sedem recepta sic coepit: "Omnis mortalium cura quam multiplicium studiorum labor exercet, diuerso quidem calle procedit, sed ad unum tamen beat.i.tudinis finem nit.i.tur peruenire. Id autem est bonum quo quis adepto nihil ulterius desiderare queat. Quod quidem est omnium summum bonorum cunctaque intra se bona continens, cui si quid aforet summum esse non posset, quoniam relinqueretur extrinsecus quod posset optari. Liquet igitur esse beat.i.tudinem statum bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum. Hunc, uti diximus, diuerso tramite mortales omnes conantur adipisci. Est enim mentibus hominum ueri boni naturaliter inserta cupiditas, sed ad falsa deuius error abducit. Quorum quidem alii summum bonum esse nihilo indigere credentes ut diuitiis affluant elaborant; alii uero bonum quod sit dignissimum ueneratione iudicantes adeptis honoribus reuerendi ciuibus suis esse nituntur. Sunt qui summum bonum in summa potentia esse const.i.tuant; hi uel regnare ipsi uolunt uel regnantibus adhaerere conantur. At quibus optimum quiddam claritas uidetur, hi uel belli uel pacis artibus gloriosum nomen propagare festinant. Plurimi uero boni fructum gaudio laet.i.tiaque metiuntur; hi felicissimum putant uoluptate diffluere. Sunt etiam qui horum fines causasque alterutro permutent, ut qui diuitias ob potentiam uoluptatesque desiderant uel qui potentiam seu pecuniae causa seu proferendi nominis appetunt. In his igitur ceterisque talibus humanorum actuum uotorumque uersatur intentio, ueluti n.o.bilitas fauorque popularis quae uidentur quandam claritudinem comparare, uxor ac liberi quae iucunditatis gratia petuntur; amicorum uero quod sanctissimum quidem genus est, non in fortuna sed in uirtute numeratur, reliquum uero uel potentiae causa uel delectationis a.s.sumitur. Iam uero corporis bona promptum est ut ad superiora referantur. Robur enim magnitudoque uidetur praestare ualentiam, pulchritudo atque uelocitas celebritatem, salubritas uoluptatem; quibus omnibus solam beat.i.tudinem desiderari liquet. Nam quod quisque prae ceteris pet.i.t, id summum esse iudicat bonum. Sed summum bonum beat.i.tudinem esse definiuimus; quare beatum esse iudicat statum quem prae ceteris quisque desiderat.
Habes igitur ante oculos propositam fere formam felicitatis humanae--opes, honores, potentiam, gloriam, uoluptates. Quae quidem sola considerans Epicurus consequenter sibi summum bonum uoluptatem esse const.i.tuit, quod cetera omnia iucunditatem animo uideantur afferre. Sed ad hominum studia reuertor, quorum animus etsi caligante memoria tamen bonum suum repet.i.t, sed uelut ebrius domum quo tramite reuertatur ignorat. Num enim uidentur errare hi qui nihilo indigere nituntur? Atqui non est aliud quod aeque perficere beat.i.tudinem possit quam copiosus bonorum omnium status nec alieni egens sed sibi ipse sufficiens. Num uero labuntur hi qui quod sit optimum, id etiam reuerentiae cultu dignissimum putent? Minime. Neque enim uile quiddam contemnendumque est quod adipisci omnium fere mortalium laborat intentio. An in bonis non est numeranda potentia? Quid igitur? Num imbecillum ac sine uiribus aestimandum est, quod omnibus rebus constat esse praestantius? An claritudo nihili pendenda est? Sed sequestrari nequit quin omne quod excellentissimum sit id etiam uideatur esse clarissimum. Nam non esse anxiam tristemque beat.i.tudinem nec doloribus molestiisque subiectam quid attinet dicere, quando in minimis quoque rebus id appet.i.tur quod habere fruique delectet? Atqui haec sunt quae adipisci homines uolunt eaque de causa diuitias, dignitates, regna, gloriam uoluptatesque desiderant quod per haec sibi sufficientiam, reuerentiam, potentiam, celebritatem, laet.i.tiam credunt esse uenturam. Bonum est igitur quod tam diuersis studiis homines petunt; in quo quanta sit naturae uis facile monstratur, c.u.m licet uariae dissidentesque sententiae tamen in diligendo boni fine consentiunt.
II.
Then, for a while looking steadfastly upon the ground, and, as it were, retiring herself to the most secret seat of her soul, she began in this manner: "All men"s thoughts, which are turmoiled with manifold cares, take indeed divers courses, but yet endeavour to attain the same end of happiness, which is that good which, being once obtained, nothing can be further desired. Which is the chiefest of all goods, and containeth in itself whatsoever is good, and if it wanted anything it could not be the chiefest, because there would something remain besides it which might be wished for. Wherefore, it is manifest that blessedness is an estate replenished with all that is good. This, as we said, all men endeavour to obtain by divers ways. For there is naturally ingrafted in men"s minds an earnest desire of that which is truly good; but deceitful error withdraweth it to that which falsely seemeth such. So that some, esteeming it their greatest good to want nothing, labour by all means to abound with riches; others, deeming that to be good which is most deserving of honour, hunt after preferments, to be respected by their fellow-citizens. Others think it the greatest felicity to have great power and authority, and these will either reign themselves or at least procure to be great with princes. But they who think fame better than all these, make all speed possible to spread their names far and near, by achieving some worthy enterprise either in war or peace. Many measure good by joy and mirth, and their chiefest care is how they may abound with pleasure. Some interchange the ends and means of these things one with the other, wanting now riches for the sake of power and pleasure, now power for the sake of wealth and fame. At these and such other do men"s actions and desires aim, as n.o.bility and popularity, which make men esteemed; wife and children, which bring pleasure and delight. But friendship, that most sacred thing, is rather to be attributed to virtue than to fortune. Other things for the most part are desired either for power or pleasure. And it is an easy matter to reduce all corporal goods to the former heads. For strength and greatness give ability; beauty and swiftness, fame; and health yieldeth pleasure. By all which we manifestly seek for nothing else but happiness. For that which every man seeketh most after, is by him esteemed his greatest good. Which is all one with happiness. Wherefore he esteemeth that estate happy which he preferreth before all other.
And thus thou hast in a manner seen the form of human felicity--riches, honour, power, glory, pleasure. Which Epicurus only considering, consequently took pleasure for his chiefest good, because all the rest seemed to delight the mind. But I return to the careful thoughts of men, whose minds, though obscured, yet seek after the greatest good, but like a drunken man know not the way home. For seem they to err who endeavour to want nothing? But nothing can cause happiness so much as the plentiful possession of all that is good, needing the help of none, but is sufficient of itself. Or do they err who take that which is best to be likewise most worthy of respect? No. For it is no vile or contemptible thing which almost all men labour to obtain. Or is not power to be esteemed good? Why, then, is that to be accounted feeble and of no force, which manifestly surpa.s.ses all other things? Or is fame to be contemned? But it cannot be ignored that the most excellent is also most famous. For to what purpose should I say that happiness is not sad or melancholy, or subject to grief and trouble, when even in smallest matters we desire that which we delight to have and enjoy? And these be the things which men desire to obtain, and to this end procure riches, dignities, kingdoms, glory, and pleasures, because by them they think to have sufficiency, respect, power, fame, delight, and joy. Wherefore, that is good which men seek after by divers desires, in which the force of nature is easily descried, since though there be many and different opinions, yet they agree in choosing for their end that which is good.