At si nescit, quid caeca pet.i.t? 15 Quis enim quidquam nescius optet Aut quis ualeat nescita sequi?
Quoue inueniat, quisque[173] repertam Queat ignarus noscere formam?
An c.u.m mentem cerneret altam, 20 Pariter summam et singula norat?
Nunc membrorum condita nube Non in totum est oblita sui Summamque tenet singula perdens.
Igitur quisquis uera requirit, 25 Neutro est habitu; nam neque nouit Nec penitus tamen omnia nescit, Sed quam retinens meminit summam Consulit alte uisa retractans, Vt seruatis queat oblitas 30 Addere partes."
[173] quisque _codex Bambergensis_ s. xi.: quis _codd. meliores._
III.
What cause of discord breaks the bands of love?
What G.o.d between two truths such wars doth move?
That things which severally well settled be Yet joined in one will never friendly prove?
Or in true things can we no discord see, Because all certainties do still agree?
But our dull soul, covered with members blind, Knows not the secret laws which things do bind, By the drowned light of her oppressed fire.
Why then, the hidden notes of things to find, Doth she with such a love of truth desire?
If she knows that which she doth so require, Why wisheth she known things to know again?
If she knows not, why strives she with blind pain?
Who after things unknown will strive to go?
Or will such ignorant pursuit maintain?
How shall she find them out? Or having so, How shall she then their forms and natures know?
Because this soul the highest mind did view, Must we needs say that it all nature knew?
Now she, though clouds of flesh do her debar, Forgets not all that was her ancient due, But in her mind some general motions are, Though not the skill of things particular.
He that seeks truth in neither course doth fall; Not knowing all, nor ignorant of all, He marketh general things which he retains, And matters seen on high doth back recall, And things forgotten to his mind regains, And joins them to that part which there remains."
IV.
Tum illa: "Vetus," inquit, "haec est de prouidentia querela Marcoque Tullio, c.u.m diuinationem distribuit, uehementer agitata tibique ipsi res diu prorsus multumque quaesita, sed haud quaquam ab ullo uestrum hactenus satis diligenter ac firmiter expedita. Cuius caliginis causa est, quod humanae ratiocinationis motus ad diuinae praescientiae simplicitatem non potest admoueri, quae si ullo modo cogitari queat, nihil prorsus relinquetur ambigui. Quod ita demum patefacere atque expedire temptabo, si prius ea quibus moueris expendero. Quaero enim, cur illam soluentium rationem minus efficacem putes, quae quia praescientiam non esse futuris rebus causam necessitatis existimat, nihil impediri praescientia arbitrii libertatem putat. Num enim tu aliunde argumentum futurorum necessitatis trahis, nisi quod ea quae praesciuntur non euenire non possunt? Si igitur praenotio nullam futuris rebus adicit necessitatem, quod tu etiam paulo ante fatebare, quid est quod uoluntarii exitus rerum ad certum cogantur euentum? Etenim positionis gratia, ut quid consequatur aduertas, statuamus nullam esse praescientiam. Num igitur quantum ad hoc attinet, quae ex arbitrio eueniunt ad necessitatem cogantur?" "Minime." "Statuamus iterum esse, sed nihil rebus necessitatis iniungere; manebit ut opinor eadem uoluntatis integra atque absoluta libertas.
Sed praescientia, inquies, tametsi futuris eueniendi necessitas non est, signum tamen est necessario ea esse uentura. Hoc igitur modo, etiam si praecognitio non fuisset, necessarios futurorum exitus esse constaret. Omne etenim signum tantum quid sit ostendit, non uero efficit quod designat.
Quare demonstrandum prius est nihil non ex necessitate contingere, ut praenotionem signum esse huius necessitatis appareat. Alioquin si haec nulla est, ne illa quidem eius rei signum poterit esse quae non est. Iam uero probationem firma ratione subnixam constat non ex signis neque pet.i.tis extrinsecus argumentis sed ex conuenientibus necessariisque causis esse ducendam. Sed qui fieri potest ut ea non proueniant quae futura esse prouidentur? Quasi uero nos ea quae prouidentia futura esse praenoscit non esse euentura credamus ac non illud potius arbitremur, licet eueniant, nihil tamen ut euenirent sui natura necessitatis habuisse; quod hinc facile perpendas licebit. Plura etenim dum fiunt subiecta oculis intuemur, ut ea quae in quadrigis moderandis atque flectendis facere spectantur aurigae atque ad hunc modum cetera. Num igitur quidquam illorum ita fieri necessitas ulla compellit?" "Minime. Frustra enim esset artis effectus, si omnia coacta mouerentur." "Quae igitur c.u.m fiunt carent exsistendi necessitate, eadem prius quam fiant sine necessitate futura sunt. Quare sunt quaedam euentura quorum exitus ab omni necessitate sit absolutus. Nam illud quidem nullum arbitror esse dicturum, quod quae nunc fiunt, prius quam fierent, euentura non fuerint. Haec igitur etiam praecognita liberos habent euentus. Nam sicut scientia praesentium rerum nihil his quae fiunt, ita praescientia futurorum nihil his quae uentura sunt necessitatis importat. Sed hoc, inquis, ipsum dubitatur, an earum rerum quae necessarios exitus non habent ulla possit esse praenotio. Dissonare etenim uidentur putasque si praeuideantur consequi necessitatem, si necessitas desit minime praesciri nihilque scientia comprehendi posse nisi certum; quod si quae incerti sunt exitus ea quasi certa prouidentur, opinionis id esse caliginem non scientiae ueritatem. Aliter enim ac sese res habeat arbitrari ab integritate scientiae credis esse diuersum. Cuius erroris causa est, quod omnia quae quisque nouit ex ipsorum tantum ui atque natura cognosci aestimat quae sciuntur; quod totum contra est Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui uim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem. Nam ut hoc breui liqueat exemplo, eandem corporis rotunditatem aliter uisus aliter tactus agnoscit. Ille eminus manens totum simul iactis radiis intuetur; hic uero cohaerens...o...b.. atque coniunctus circa ipsum motus ambitum rotunditatem partibus comprehendit. Ipsum quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intellegentia contuetur.
Sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia const.i.tutam, imaginatio uero solam sine materia iudicat figuram. Ratio uero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque ipsam quae singularibus inest uniuersali consideratione perpendit.
Intellegentiae uero celsior oculus exsist.i.t; supergressa namque uniuersitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur.
In quo illud maxime considerandum est: nam superior comprehendendi uis amplect.i.tur inferiorem, inferior uero ad superiorem nullo modo consurgit.
Neque enim sensus aliquid extra materiam ualet uel uniuersales species imaginatio contuetur uel ratio capit simplicem formam, sed intellegentia quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quae subsunt etiam cuncta diiudicat, sed eo modo quo formam ipsam, quae nulli alii nota esse poterat, comprehendit. Nam et rationis uniuersum et imaginationis figuram et materiale sensibile cognoscit nec ratione utens nec imaginatione nec sensibus, sed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta prospiciens. Ratio quoque c.u.m quid uniuersale respicit, nec imaginatione nec sensibus utens imaginabilia uel sensibilia comprehendit. Haec est enim quae conceptionis suae uniuersale ita definiuit: h.o.m.o est animal bipes rationale. Quae c.u.m uniuersalis notio sit, tum imaginabilem sensibilemque esse rem nullus ignorat, quod illa non imaginatione uel sensu sed in rationali conceptione considerat. Imaginatio quoque tametsi ex sensibus uisendi formandique figuras sumpsit exordium, sensu tamen absente sensibilia quaeque conl.u.s.trat non sensibili sed imaginaria ratione iudicandi. Videsne igitur ut in cognoscendo cuncta sua potius facultate quam eorum quae cognosc.u.n.tur utantur? Neque id iniuria; nam c.u.m omne iudicium iudicantis actus exsistat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam non ex aliena sed ex propria potestate perficiat.
IV.
"This," quoth she, "is an ancient complaint of providence, vehemently pursued by Marcus Tullius in his _Distribution of Divination_,[174]
and a thing which thou thyself hast made great and long search after.
But hitherto none of you have used sufficient diligence and vigour in the explication thereof. The cause of which obscurity is for that the motion of human discourse cannot attain to the simplicity of the divine knowledge, which if by any means we could conceive, there would not remain any doubt at all; which I will endeavour to make manifest and plain when I have first explicated that which moveth thee. For I demand why thou thinkest their solution unsufficient, who think that free-will is not hindered by foreknowledge, because they suppose that foreknowledge is not the cause of any necessity in things to come. For fetchest thou any proof for the necessity of future things from any other principle, but only from this, that those things which are foreknown cannot choose but happen? Wherefore if foreknowledge imposeth no necessity upon future events, which thou didst grant not long before, why should voluntary actions be tied to any certain success? For example"s sake, that thou mayest see what will follow, let us suppose that there were no providence or foresight at all. Would those things which proceed from free-will be compelled to any necessity by this means?" "No." "Again, let us grant it to be, but that it imposeth no necessity upon anything; no doubt the same freedom of will will remain whole and absolute.
But thou wilt say, even though foreknowledge be not a necessity for things to happen, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily come to pa.s.s. Wherefore now, even if there had been no foreknowledge, the events of future things would have been necessary. For all signs only show what is, but cause not that which they design. And consequently it must first be proved that all things fall out by necessity, that it may appear that foreknowledge is a sign of this necessity. For otherwise, if there be no necessity, neither can foreknowledge be the sign of that which is not.
Besides it is manifest that every firm proof must be drawn from intrinsical and necessary causes and not from signs and other farfetched arguments. But how is it possible those things should not happen which are foreseen to be to come? As though we did believe that those things will not be which providence hath foreknown and do not rather judge that although they happen, yet by their own nature they had no necessity of being, which thou mayest easily gather hence. For we see many things with our eyes while they are in doing, as those things which the coachmen do while they drive and turn their coaches and in like manner other things. Now doth necessity compel any of these things to be done in this sort?" "No. For in vain should art labour if all things were moved by compulsion." "Wherefore, as these things are without necessity when they are in doing, so likewise they are to come without necessity before they be done. And consequently there are some things to come whose event is free from all necessity. For I suppose no man will say that those things which are done now were not to come before they were done. Wherefore these things even being foreseen come freely to effect.
For as the knowledge of things present causeth no necessity in things which are in doing, so neither the foreknowledge in things to come. But thou wilt say: This is the question, whether there can be any foreknowledge of those things whose events are not necessary. For these things seem opposite, and thou thinkest that, if future things be foreseen, there followeth necessity, if there be no necessity, that they that are not foreknown, and that nothing can be perfectly known unless it be certain. But if uncertain events be foreseen as certain, it is manifest that this is the obscurity of opinion and not the truth of knowledge. For thou thinkest it to be far from the integrity of knowledge to judge otherwise than the thing is. The cause of which error is because thou thinkest that all that is known is known only by the force and nature of the things themselves, which is altogether otherwise. For all that is known is not comprehended according to the force which it hath in itself, but rather according to the faculty of them which know it. For to explicate it with a brief example: the sight and the feeling do diversely discern the same roundness of a die. The sight standing aloof beholdeth it altogether by his beams; but the feeling united and joined to the orb, being moved about the compa.s.s of it, comprehendeth the roundness by parts. Likewise sense, imagination, reason and understanding do diversely behold a man. For sense looketh upon his form as it is placed in matter or subject, the imagination discerneth it alone without matter, reason pa.s.seth beyond this also and considereth universally the species or kind which is in particulars. The eye of the understanding is higher yet. For surpa.s.sing the compa.s.s of the whole world it beholdeth with the clear eye of the mind that simple form in itself.
In which that is chiefly to be considered, that the superior force of comprehending embraceth the inferior; but the inferior can by no means attain to the superior; for the sense hath no force out of matter, neither doth the imagination conceive universal species, nor is reason capable of the simple form, but the understanding, as it were looking downward, having conceived that form, discerneth of all things which are under it, but in that sort in which it apprehendeth that form which can be known by none of the other. For it knoweth the universality of reason, and the figure of imagination, and the materiality of sense, neither using reason, nor imagination, nor senses, but as it were formally beholding all things with that one twinkling of the mind.
Likewise reason, when it considereth any universality, comprehendeth both imagination and sensible things without the use of either imagination or senses. For she defineth the universality of her conceit thus: Man is a reasonable, two-footed, living creature, which being an universal knowledge, no man is ignorant that it is an imaginable and sensible thing, which she considereth by a reasonable conceiving and not by imagination or sense. Imagination also, although it began by the senses of seeing and forming figures, yet when sense is absent it beholdeth sensible things, not after a sensible, but after an imaginary manner of knowledge. Seest thou now how all these in knowing do rather use their own force and faculty than the force of those things which are known? Nor undeservedly; for since all judgment is the act of him who judgeth, it is necessary that every one should perfect his operation by his own power and not by the force of any other.
[174] _De diuin_, ii.
IV.
Quondam porticus attulit Obscuros nimium senes Qui sensus et imagines E corporibus extimis Credant mentibus imprimi, 5 Vt quondam celeri stilo Mos est aequore paginae, Quae nullas habeat notas, Pressas figere litteras.
Sed mens si propriis uigens 10 Nihil motibus explicat, Sed tantum patiens iacet Notis subdita corporum Ca.s.sasque in speculi uicem Rerum reddit imagines, 15 Vnde haec sic animis uiget Cernens omnia notio?
Quae uis singula perspicit Aut quae cognita diuidit?
Quae diuisa recolligit 20 Alternumque legens iter Nunc summis caput inserit, Nunc decedit in infima, Tum sese referens sibi Veris falsa redarguit? 25 Haec est efficiens magis Longe causa potentior Quam quae materiae modo Impressas pat.i.tur notas.
Praecedit tamen excitans 30 Ac uires animi mouens Viuo in corpore pa.s.sio.
c.u.m uel lux oculos ferit Vel uox auribus instrepit, Tum mentis uigor excitus 35 Quas intus species tenet Ad motus similes uocans Notis applicat exteris Introrsumque reconditis Formis miscet imagines. 40
IV.
Cloudy old prophets of the Porch[175] once taught That sense and shape presented to the thought From outward objects their impression take, As when upon a paper smooth and plain On which as yet no marks of ink have lain We with a nimble pen do letters make.
But if our minds to nothing can apply Their proper motions, but do patient lie Subject to forms which do from bodies flow, As a gla.s.s renders empty[176] shapes of things, Who then can show from whence that motion springs By force of which the mind all things doth know?
Or by what skill are several things espied?
And being known what power doth them divide, And thus divided doth again unite, And with a various journey oft aspires To highest things, and oft again retires To basest, nothing being out of sight, And when she back unto herself doth move, Doth all the falsehoods by the truth reprove?
This vigour needs must be an active cause, And with more powerful forces must be deckt, Than that which from those forms, that do reflect From outward matter, all her virtue draws.
And yet in living bodies pa.s.sion"s might Doth go before, whose office is to incite, And the first motions in the mind to make.
As when the light unto our eyes appears, Or some loud voice is sounded in our ears, Then doth the strength of the dull mind awake Those phantasies which she retains within; She stirreth up such notions to begin, Whose objects with their natures best agree, And thus applying them to outward things, She joins the external shapes which thence she brings With forms which in herself included be.
[175] The Porch, _i.e._ the Painted Porch ([Greek: stoa poikilae]) at Athens, the great hall adorned with frescoes of the battle of Marathon, which served as lecture-room to Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect.
[176] Cf. Quin potius noscas rerum simulacra uagari Multa modis multis nulla ui ca.s.saque sensu.
"But rather you are to know that idols or things wander about many in number in many ways, of no force, powerless to excite sense."--Lucr. iv.
127, 128 (trans. Munro).
V.