In 1856 an effort was made to terminate the difficulties arising out of the different constructions put upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by the negotiation of a supplementary convention. On October 17 of that year a treaty was signed in London by the American minister and Lord Clarendon, known as the Dallas-Clarendon treaty. It provided (1) for the withdrawal of the British protectorate over the Mosquito Indians; (2) it regulated the boundaries of the Belize settlements on the basis of a compromise; and (3) it provided for a cession of the Bay Islands to Honduras, upon condition of the ratification of a treaty already negotiated between Great Britain and Honduras, which virtually erected an independent state of the islands, exempt in many particulars from the sovereignty of Honduras, and under the protectorate of Great Britain.
The first two clauses were acceptable to the United States Senate, but it was deemed proper to amend the third by striking out all that part of it which contemplated the concurrence of the United States in the British treaty with Honduras, and simply to provide for a recognition by the two governments of the sovereignty of Honduras over the islands in question.[158] Great Britain rejected this amendment and the Dallas-Clarendon treaty fell through. Great Britain and the United States were thus thrown back upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with its conflicting interpretations.
In October, 1857, the President was notified informally that the British government had decided to dispatch Sir Wm. Ouseley, a diplomatist of well-recognized authority and experience, to Central America to make a definite settlement of all matters in dispute between the United States and England; that the efforts of the new plenipotentiary would be directed to those objects which had been dealt with in the Dallas-Clarendon treaty of 1856, viz., the cession of the Bay Islands to Honduras, the subst.i.tution of the sovereignty of Nicaragua for the protectorate of England over the Mosquitos and the regulation of the frontiers of Belize; that it was the intention of Her Majesty"s government to carry the Clayton-Bulwer treaty into execution according to the general tenor of the interpretation put upon it by the United States, but to do so by separate negotiation with the Central American republics, in lieu of a direct engagement with the federal government.[159]
President Buchanan replied that he would be satisfied with this course and that upon receiving an official a.s.surance to that effect, he would change the character of the message he had already prepared for Congress. On the 30th of November, 1857, the British government submitted to the United States the alternative of referring the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to the arbitration of any European power which the United States might prefer to select or of adjusting matters by negotiations with the Central American republics, as already outlined in Sir William Ouseley"s prospective mission.[160]
At this stage of the negotiations matters were further complicated (1) by the negotiation of the Ca.s.s-Yrissari treaty of November 16, 1857, between the United States and Nicaragua for protection of the transit route and (2) by the invasion of Nicaraguan territory by a band of filibusters under General Walker, bent on the subversion of the lawful government of the country. The treaty was not ratified, however, and the Walker expedition was arrested by the interposition of the United States navy.
The United States government not having given any definite answer to the British proposal to submit the treaty to arbitration, the British government delayed dispatching Sir William Ouseley on his mission. In the negotiations which took place during this delay the question of the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was discussed between the two governments. In his message of December 8, 1857, President Buchanan had suggested the abrogation of the treaty by mutual consent as the wisest course that could be pursued in view of the increasing complications to which the varying constructions of it were giving rise. The British government took up this suggestion and expressed its willingness to concur in such a course, but also expressed the opinion that the initiative should be taken by the government which was dissatisfied with its provisions.
The British minister was, however, directed by his government to make it perfectly clear to the government of the United States, that to abrogate the treaty was to return to the _status quo ante_ its conclusion in 1850; that Great Britain had no kind of jealousy respecting American colonization in Central America, and did not ask or wish for any exclusive privileges whatever in that quarter.[161] Finally, Sir William Ouseley was dispatched on his mission and during the years 1859 and 1860 succeeded in negotiating treaties with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the provisions of which were in substantial accord with the rejected Dallas-Clarendon treaty.[162]
The treaty with Nicaragua signed at Managua, January 28, 1860, though restoring to that republic nominal sovereignty over the Mosquito territory, reserved to the Indians the right of retaining their own customs, a.s.signed boundaries to that reservation in all probability greatly beyond its true limits, and confirmed grants of land previously made in that territory. Notwithstanding these facts, in his annual message of December 3, 1860, President Buchanan declared that the United States government was satisfied with the final settlement. His words were:
The discordant constructions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty between the two governments, which at different periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government.[163]
The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was negotiated with the expectation that the construction of a ship ca.n.a.l would rapidly follow, but the unfortunate entanglements that grew out of the variant constructions put upon that treaty by the contracting powers deferred to an indefinite period the accomplishment of the object it was designed to promote. By the time these differences were adjusted the attention of the American public was centered upon the first throes of the gigantic struggle of the war of secession and the ca.n.a.l question was for several years completely overshadowed. The government of the United States emerged from that struggle with larger ideas of its position among the powers of the world and with broader views of national policy. Mr. Seward gave expression to that feeling in the purchase of Alaska, in his interposition in Mexico and in his efforts to secure a position for the United States in the West Indies. In order to strengthen the position of the United States he wished to purchase Tiger Island, a possession of Honduras in Fonseca bay on the Pacific coast. As this island lay in Central America, Mr. Seward could not take any steps in the matter without the consent of Great Britain, on account of the renunciatory clause with respect to that territory in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. He, therefore, directed Mr.
Adams, April 25, 1866, to sound Lord Clarendon as to the disposition of the British government toward the United States acquiring a coaling station in Central America. In this dispatch we find the first suggestion of a repudiation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty on the ground that it was a special and not a general contract, and that the work for which it had been negotiated had never been undertaken. Mr. Seward uses these words:
At the time the treaty was concluded there was every prospect that that work would not only soon be begun, but that it would be carried to a successful conclusion. For reasons, however, which it is not necessary to specify, it never was even commenced, and at present there does not appear to be a likelihood of its being undertaken. It may be a question, therefore, supposing that the ca.n.a.l should never be begun, whether the renunciatory clauses of the treaty are to have perpetual operation. Technically speaking, this question might be decided in the negative. Still, so long as it should remain a question, it would not comport with good faith for either party to do anything which might be deemed contrary to even the spirit of the treaty.[164]
The subject was brought to the attention of Lord Clarendon in a casual way by Mr. Adams, but it was not pressed and Mr. Seward refrained from disregarding the renunciatory clause of the treaty.
In 1867, a treaty between the United States and Nicaragua, covering the case of an interoceanic ca.n.a.l, was negotiated and ratified by both parties. It granted to the United States the right of transit between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans on any lines of communication, natural or artificial, by land or by water, then existing, or that might thereafter be constructed, upon equal terms with the citizens of Nicaragua, and the United States agreed to extend its protection to all such routes of communication, and "to guarantee the neutrality and innocent use of the same." The United States further agreed to employ its influence with other nations to induce them to guarantee such neutrality and protection.[165]
This treaty, like the treaty with Colombia of 1846 and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, contemplated the neutralization of the ca.n.a.l. It in no way infringed our engagements with England under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, but in providing for the joint guarantee of other powers, was in accord with the provisions of that treaty.
In 1873, Mr. Hamilton Fish directed General Schenck to remonstrate, if upon investigation he found it to be necessary, against British encroachments upon the territory of Guatemala as an infringement of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.[166]
In spite of the doubts expressed by Mr. Seward in the dispatch to Mr.
Adams above quoted, as to the perpetual character of the obligations imposed by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the obligatory force of that instrument after the readjustment of 1860 was not seriously questioned until interest in the ca.n.a.l question was suddenly aroused anew by the concession granted by Colombia to Lieutenant Wyse in 1878, and the subsequent organization of a French construction company under the presidency of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the promoter of the Suez ca.n.a.l.
The prospect of the speedy construction of a ca.n.a.l under French control, for which De Lesseps" name seemed a sufficient guarantee, produced a sudden and radical change of policy on the part of the United States.
In a special message to Congress, March 8, 1880, President Hayes made the following statement of what he conceived to be the true policy of this country in regard to a Central American ca.n.a.l:
The policy of this country is a ca.n.a.l under American control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this control to any European power, or to any combination of European powers. If existing treaties between the United States and other nations, or if the rights of sovereignty or property of other nations stand in the way of this policy--a contingency which is not apprehended--suitable steps should be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and establish the American policy on this subject, consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected by it.
The capital invested by corporations or citizens of other countries in such an enterprise must, in a great degree, look for protection to one or more of the great powers of the world. No European power can intervene for such protection without adopting measures on this continent which the United States would deem wholly inadmissible. If the protection of the United States is relied upon, the United States must exercise such control as will enable this country to protect its national interests and maintain the rights of those whose private capital is embarked in the work.
An interoceanic ca.n.a.l across the American isthmus will essentially change the geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and between the United States and the rest of the world. It will be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our Pacific sh.o.r.es, and virtually a part of the coast-line of the United States. Our merely commercial interest in it is greater than that of all other countries, while its relation to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States. No other great power would, under similar circ.u.mstances, fail to a.s.sert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interests and welfare.
Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I repeat, in conclusion, that it is the right and the duty of the United States to a.s.sert and maintain such supervision and authority over any interoceanic ca.n.a.l across the isthmus that connects North and South America as will protect our national interests. This I am quite sure will be found not only compatible with, but promotive of, the widest and most permanent advantage to commerce and civilization.[167]
The message itself was accompanied by a report from the secretary of state, Mr. Evarts, in which he called attention to the mutual engagements entered into between the United States and Colombia by the treaty of 1846 in reference to a transit route across the isthmus and declared that the guarantee of the neutrality of the isthmus and of the sovereignty of Colombia over the same would be a very different thing when the isthmus should be opened to the interests and ambitions of the great commercial nations.[168]
President Garfield, in his inaugural address, approved the position taken by his predecessor on the ca.n.a.l question,[169] and very soon after a.s.suming the portfolio of state, Mr. Blaine outlined the new policy to our representatives in Europe, cautioning them, however, against representing it as the development of a new policy and affirming that it was "nothing more than the p.r.o.nounced adherence of the United States to principles long since enunciated by the highest authority of the government."
This dispatch of Mr. Blaine is remarkable for several reasons, but chiefly for the fact that it completely ignores the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, there being no allusion to that celebrated convention either open or implied. Aside from this there are three points to be noted. In the first place Mr. Blaine calls attention to the rights and duties devolving upon the United States from the treaty with Colombia of 1846, and states that in the judgment of the President the guarantee there given by the United States requires no reenforcement, or accession, or a.s.sent from any other power; that the United States in more than one instance had been called upon to vindicate the neutrality thus guaranteed; and that there was no contingency, then foreseen or apprehended, in which such vindication would not be within the power of the nation.
In the second place, Mr. Blaine declared with emphasis that during any war to which the United States of America or the United States of Colombia might be a party, the pa.s.sage of armed vessels of a hostile nation through the ca.n.a.l of Panama would be no more admissible than would the pa.s.sage of the armed forces of a hostile nation over the railway lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific sh.o.r.es of the United States, or of Colombia. This declaration was in direct opposition to the second article of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Mr. Blaine then proceeded to expatiate upon the remarkable development of our Pacific slope and the importance of the ca.n.a.l in facilitating communication between our Atlantic and Pacific states, alluding to the ca.n.a.l in this connection, in the very apt phrase of President Hayes, as forming a part of the _coast-line_ of the United States. It does not appear to have occurred to Mr. Blaine that the same arguments applied with equal force to Great Britain"s American possessions to the north of us, which likewise extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and were likewise entering upon a period of unusual development.
The third point to be noted in the dispatch is the statement that the United States would object to any concerted action of the European powers for the purpose of guaranteeing the ca.n.a.l or determining its status.[170] This declaration was supposed to be nothing more than a reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine.
A copy of this doc.u.ment was left by Mr. Lowell at the British foreign office on the 12th of July, 1881. No formal notice of the dispatch was taken by the British government until November, when Lord Granville replied that, as Mr. Blaine had made the statement that the government of the United States had no intention of initiating any discussion upon this subject, he did not propose to enter into a detailed argument in reply to Mr. Blaine"s observations. He wished, however, merely to point out that the position of Great Britain and the United States with reference to the ca.n.a.l, irrespective of the magnitude of the commercial relations of the former power, was determined by a convention signed between them at Washington on the 19th of April, 1850, commonly known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and her majesty"s government relied with confidence upon the observance of all the engagements of that treaty.[171]
Before this reply reached Washington, Mr. Blaine had again taken up the question of the ca.n.a.l in a special dispatch of November 19, 1881. In this dispatch he addressed himself specifically to a consideration of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and urged upon the consideration of the British government modifications of such a radical character as to amount to a complete abrogation of the treaty. The grounds of objection to the treaty were stated in full. In the first place it was declared that the treaty had been made more than thirty years before under exceptional and extraordinary conditions, which were at least temporary in their nature and had long since ceased to exist. The remarkable development of the United States on the Pacific coast since that time had created new duties and responsibilities for the American government which required, in the judgment of the President, some essential modifications in the treaty. The objections to the perpetuity of the treaty were then stated in full. First and foremost was the objection that the treaty by forbidding the military fortification of the proposed ca.n.a.l practically conceded its control to Great Britain by reason of her naval superiority. The military power of the United States in any conflict on the American continent was irresistible, yet the United States was restrained from using this power for the protection of the ca.n.a.l, while no restrictions could be placed upon the natural advantages that England enjoyed in this regard as a great naval power. A more serious objection to the treaty, however, was urged in the statement that it embodied a misconception of the relative positions of Great Britain and the United States with respect to interests on this continent. The United States would not consent to perpetuate any treaty that impeached "our right and long-established claim to priority on the American continent."
In the third place, at the time the convention was agreed upon, Great Britain and the United States were the only nations prominent in the commerce of Central and South America. Since that time other nations not bound by the prohibitions of that treaty had become interested in Central America, and the republic of France had become sponsor for a new ca.n.a.l scheme. Yet by the treaty with England the United States was prevented from a.s.serting its rights and the privileges acquired through treaty with Colombia anterior to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
In the fourth place, the treaty had been made with the implied understanding that British capital would be available for the construction of a ca.n.a.l. That expectation had never been realized, and the United States was now able to construct a ca.n.a.l without aid from outside resources.
In conclusion, Mr. Blaine proposed several modifications of the treaty which would leave the United States free to fortify the ca.n.a.l and to hold political control of it in conjunction with the country in which it might be located.[172]
A few days after the dispatch was written, Lord Granville"s answer to Mr. Blaine"s first dispatch reached Washington, and on the 29th of November, Mr. Blaine wrote a second dispatch equally voluminous with the one of November 19. In this he reviewed the discussions which had taken place between 1850 and 1860 in regard to the treaty with a view to showing that it had never been satisfactory to the United States and had been the cause of serious misunderstanding. He failed, however, to make mention of the settlement of 1860 and the declaration of President Buchanan that the United States was satisfied with that adjustment.
The full reply of the British government to Mr. Blaine"s arguments was given in two dispatches dated respectively January 7 and 14, 1882. Lord Granville took exception to certain conclusions which Mr. Blaine had sought to establish by a.n.a.logy with the conduct of Great Britain in regard to the Suez ca.n.a.l. His lordship fully concurred in what Mr.
Blaine had said as to the unexampled development of the United States on the Pacific coast, but reminded him that the development of her majesty"s possessions to the north of the United States, while less rapid, had been, nevertheless, on a scale that bore some relation even to that of the Pacific states. In the view of her majesty"s government, the changes desired by the United States would not improve the situation as regarded the ca.n.a.l, while the declaration that the United States would always treat the waterway connecting the two oceans "as part of her coast-line" threatened the independence of the territory lying between that waterway and the United States.
Her majesty"s government believed that the only way to relieve the situation was to extend the invitation to all maritime states to partic.i.p.ate in an agreement based on the stipulations of the convention of 1850.[173]
The task of replying to Lord Granville"s two dispatches fell upon Mr.
Blaine"s successor in the State Department, Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr.
Frelinghuysen"s voluminous dispatch of May 8, 1882, reiterated in the main the arguments advanced by Mr. Blaine. He adduced evidence at great length to try to show that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was a special contract for the accomplishment of a specific object, which had never been achieved, and was no longer binding; that Great Britain had violated the treaty by converting her _settlement_ of British Honduras into a _possession_ without ever receiving the a.s.sent of the United States, and that such act would ent.i.tle the United States to renounce the treaty. The dispatch was further characterized by a direct appeal to the Monroe Doctrine in these words:
The President believes that the formation of a protectorate by European nations over the isthmus transit would be in conflict with a doctrine which has been for many years a.s.serted by the United States. This sentiment is properly termed a doctrine, as it has no prescribed sanction and its a.s.sertion is left to the exigency which may invoke it. It has been repeatedly announced by the executive department of this government, and through the utterances of distinguished citizens; it is cherished by the American people, and has been approved by the government of Great Britain.
After quoting a part of President Monroe"s message of December 2, 1823, and reviewing the circ.u.mstances under which it was delivered, Mr.
Frelinghuysen said:
Thus the doctrine of non-intervention by European powers in American affairs arose from complications in South America, and was announced by Mr. Monroe on the suggestion of the official representative of Great Britain.[174]
In his reply of December 30, 1882, Lord Granville proved conclusively that Article VIII. of the treaty was understood by the American government during the discussions of 1850-1860 as establishing a general principle applicable to all waterways connecting the two oceans. In answer to the second point, Lord Granville adduced the notes exchanged between Mr. Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer in July, 1850, which made it perfectly clear that, in the understanding of both governments at that time, the claims of Great Britain to Belize or British Honduras were not affected one way or the other by the treaty.[175]
In a later dispatch, August 17, 1883, Lord Granville briefly touched upon Mr. Frelinghuysen"s appeal to the Monroe Doctrine, reminding him very pertinently that neither the American administration which negotiated the treaty nor the Senate which ratified it considered that they were precluded by the utterances of President Monroe from entering into such a treaty with one or more of the European powers.[176]
The correspondence on the treaty closed with Mr. Frelinghuysen"s dispatch of November 22, 1883, in which he reiterated with no small degree of bluntness and pertinacity the arguments of his earlier dispatches.
The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was designed at the time of its execution to establish a permanent principle of control over interoceanic communication in Central America. No provision was made, as in most treaties, for its abrogation, and the American government could not terminate it without the consent of Great Britain for fear that she would return to her position of vantage at the time the treaty was made.
For this reason, while Mr. Frelinghuysen claimed that the treaty was voidable, he did not actually declare it void.
Mr. Blaine"s efforts to secure a modification were the result of the development of a new policy by the United States and the arguments presented by Mr. Blaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen in support of this policy were disingenuous and flimsy. It may be safely said that no state papers have ever emanated from our government on so serious a question equally lacking in logical consistency and moral force.
The result was that Great Britain refused to consent to a modification of the treaty and the United States saw before her the alternative of abiding by the terms of the treaty or ultimately resorting to war with England.
In December, 1884, Mr. Frelinghuysen negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua providing for the construction of a ca.n.a.l by the United States to be under the joint ownership and protection of the United States and Nicaragua. The United States also guaranteed the integrity of the territory of Nicaragua. When Mr. Cleveland became president this treaty was still before the Senate for consideration. Mr. Cleveland withdrew the treaty, and in his first annual message, December 8, 1885, reverted to our traditional policy. He declared himself opposed to entangling alliances with foreign states and declared:
Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier dividing the two greatest maritime areas of the world, must be for the world"s benefit, a trust for mankind, to be removed from the chance of domination by any single power, nor become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize for warlike ambition.[177]