No discussion as to the validity of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty took place between the two governments after the close of President Arthur"s administration. Mr. Cleveland"s message above quoted was accepted as a reaffirmation of the treaty on the part of the American government.
Upon two occasions subsequently questions arose between the two governments involving the stipulations of the treaty. In 1888, and again in 1894, the United States felt called upon to protest against British interference in the affairs of the Mosquito coast.[178] The ground of interposition on the part of Great Britain was alleged to be found in the treaty of Managua, signed between Great Britain and Nicaragua on the 28th of January, 1860. This convention, it will be remembered, was one of the three treaties entered into by Great Britain with Central American republics with a view to removing the causes of dispute in the construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The treaty of Managua a.s.signed a district to the Mosquito Indians within the limits of the republic of Nicaragua. The sovereignty of Nicaragua over the district was recognized, but the Indians were secured in the possession and enjoyment of their own domestic customs and regulations. It was agreed, however, that nothing in the treaty should prevent the Mosquitos at any subsequent date from voluntarily agreeing to absolute incorporation with the republic of Nicaragua. By the terms of the treaty the protectorate of Great Britain over the Mosquito coast was to cease three months after the exchange of ratifications.
In reply to the protest of 1888, Lord Salisbury said that her majesty"s government had no intention to a.s.sert a protectorate in substance or in form over the Mosquito nation, but that according to the convention with Nicaragua of 1860, Great Britain undertook "to secure certain rights and privileges to the Mosquito Indians, and in the event, which has arisen, of the Mosquito Indians complaining that their rights are infringed by Nicaragua, by whom is remonstrance to be made to Nicaragua unless by Great Britain, with whom she has concluded the convention in question?"[179]
In the spring of 1894, yet more serious trouble arose. The Mosquito territory was invaded by the troops of Nicaragua and Bluefields was surrounded. The British consul at that point protested against this act as contrary to the treaty of Managua. The protest being unheeded, a force of troops was landed from the British ship _Cleopatra_ and on March 9, the Nicaraguans were forced to retire. Mr. Bayard was instructed by telegraph "to ascertain and report fully by cable the occasion for this action." The British government disavowed all intention of violating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which it recognized "as extant and in full force."
In July, 1894, United States marines were landed at Bluefields to protect American interests and to restore order. Later the British government a.s.sured Mr. Bayard that its action had been wholly unconnected with any political or conventional question touching the Mosquito reservation, but simply to protect British interests.
By a convention signed November 20, 1894, the Mosquito Indians surrendered their rights under the treaty of 1860 and were incorporated with Nicaragua. This voluntary incorporation took away all further occasion for interposition on the part of Great Britain, and Mr. Bayard reported that it was received with "the most open expression of satisfaction at the foreign office."[180]
The attempts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to bring about a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were, as we have seen, unsuccessful. In fact, their only effect was to strengthen the British government for the time being in the determination to hold us more strictly to the terms of that convention. In 1896 Secretary Olney in a review of the situation declared:
Upon every principle which governs the relations to each other, either of nations or of individuals, the United States is completely estopped from denying that the treaty is in full force and vigor. If changed conditions now make stipulations, which were once deemed advantageous, either inapplicable or injurious, the true remedy is not in ingenious attempts to deny the existence of the treaty or to explain away its provisions, but in a direct and straightforward application to Great Britain for a reconsideration of the whole matter.[181]
It was precisely in this spirit that Secretary Hay undertook in 1899 to negotiate a new treaty with England. The original draft of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, signed February 5, 1900, provided for a neutralized ca.n.a.l and drafted for its control rules substantially in accord with the Constantinople convention of 1888, providing for the regulation of the Suez ca.n.a.l. The most important provision of the new treaty was that authorizing the United States to construct and to a.s.sume the management of an isthmian ca.n.a.l, either directly or through a company. The United States Senate, however, amended the treaty in three important particulars: (1) by declaring that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was thereby superseded; (2) by providing that the restrictions in the regulations governing the use of the ca.n.a.l should not apply to measures which the United States might adopt for its own defense and for the maintenance of public order along the ca.n.a.l; and (3) by cutting out entirely the article providing for the adherence of other powers. The British government refused to accept these amendments, and a year elapsed before an agreement was finally reached.[182] The revised treaty which was ratified by the Senate December 16, 1901, was a compromise between the original draft and the Senate amendments. The new treaty abrogated in express terms the Clayton-Bulwer convention, and provided that the United States might construct a ca.n.a.l under its direct auspices, to be under its exclusive management. The principle of neutralization was nominally retained, but under the sole guarantee of the United States, with power to police the ca.n.a.l, and the clause of the first draft forbidding fortifications was omitted.[183]
This convention removed the princ.i.p.al diplomatic obstacles which stood in the way of constructing a ca.n.a.l through the isthmus. For several years the United States had been investigating the cost of constructing a ca.n.a.l through Nicaragua, that route being the one which had always been considered most feasible by the great majority of American engineers. Two commissions, one in 1895 and another in 1897, had reported favorably on the practicability of that route. A third commission, headed by Admiral John G. Walker, was appointed under act of March 3, 1899, which authorized an expenditure of $1,000,000 for the purpose of making a thorough investigation of all available routes.
While the Walker commission was carrying on investigations in Nicaragua, at Panama, and along the Atrato river, the various financial interests concerned in the choice of routes were actively at work in Washington, each trying to influence Congress in favor of its particular project.
The New Panama Ca.n.a.l Company had secured, at the time of the reorganization, an extension of its concession to October, 1904, and subsequently another concession to October, 1910, but the validity of the latter arrangement was in doubt. The company could not raise the necessary funds to continue the work at Panama and was therefore threatened with the forfeiture of its franchise and property. It concluded, therefore, that its only hope lay in transferring its concession and property to the American government. With this end in view, an active lobby was maintained at Washington for the purpose of influencing public opinion in favor of the Panama route.
But the Panama Company had a powerful rival in the Maritime Ca.n.a.l Company, which held a charter from Congress and had secured a concession from Nicaragua. This company had started work at Greytown in 1890, but having been forced from lack of funds to stop work in 1893, was now urging Congress to make its enterprise a national one. It found a ready champion in Senator Morgan of Alabama, who had for years taken a lively interest in the ca.n.a.l question and who had strong convictions as to the superiority of the Nicaragua route. In 1900 Nicaragua declared the concession of the Maritime Ca.n.a.l Company null and void, and granted a new concession to a group of New York capitalists known as the Grace-Eyre-Cragin Syndicate. The Maritime Ca.n.a.l Company, however, refused to abandon its claims, and a contest between the two concerns was carried to the lobbies of Congress. The opposition of the transcontinental railroads to a ca.n.a.l at either point brought into play another set of powerful interests, usually arrayed against the plan which appeared for the time being most likely to succeed.[184]
On November 16, 1901, the Walker commission after a thorough investigation of the Nicaragua and Panama routes made its report. It estimated the cost of construction of the Nicaragua ca.n.a.l at $189,864,062, and the cost of completing the Panama ca.n.a.l at $144,233,358. To this latter sum had to be added the cost of acquiring the rights and property of the French company, which had stated to the commission that it estimated its interests at $109,141,500, making the total cost of the Panama ca.n.a.l $253,374,858. The commission expressed the opinion that the interests of the French company were not worth over $40,000,000. In conclusion the report stated:
After considering all the facts developed by the investigations made by the commission and the actual situation as it now stands, and having in view the terms offered by the New Panama Company, this commission is of the opinion that the most practicable and feasible route for an isthmian ca.n.a.l, to be under the control, management, and ownership of the United States, is that known as the Nicaragua route.[185]
A bill was promptly introduced into the House of Representatives by Mr.
Hepburn providing for the construction of the ca.n.a.l through Nicaragua, and on January 9, 1902, this bill pa.s.sed the House by the almost unanimous vote of 308 to 2. The report of the commission had meanwhile created great consternation among the stockholders of the New Panama Ca.n.a.l Company, and on January 4, 1902, a definite offer to sell out to the United States at $40,000,000 was made to the commission by cable. On January 18, the commission filed a supplementary report which recommended the adoption of the Panama route instead of that through Nicaragua.
When the Hepburn bill came up for discussion in the Senate, the situation had thus been radically changed, and a long debate ensued as to the relative merits of the two routes. Senator Morgan continued to fight for Nicaragua as the traditional American route, declaring that the Panama Company could not give a valid transfer of its property and interests. But this objection was cleverly met by Senator Spooner, who offered an amendment, which was virtually a subst.i.tute, authorizing the President to acquire the rights and property of the French company at a cost not exceeding $40,000,000; to acquire from the Republic of Colombia, upon such terms as he might deem reasonable, perpetual control of a strip of land, not less than six miles in width, extending from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, with jurisdiction over said strip; and to proceed as soon as these rights were acquired, to construct a ca.n.a.l. But should the President be unable to obtain a satisfactory t.i.tle to the property of the French company and the control of the necessary strip of land from the Republic of Colombia "within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms," then he was instructed to secure control of the necessary strip through Nicaragua and to proceed to construct a ca.n.a.l there. The bill as amended pa.s.sed the Senate June 19, 1902, by a vote of 67 to 6. The House at first refused to concur in the Spooner amendment, but after a conference it finally gave way and the measure was adopted by a vote of 260 to 8. The act was signed by President Roosevelt June 28.[186]
Attorney-General Knox was sent to Paris to make a thorough investigation of the affairs of the Panama Company. He reported that it could give a clear t.i.tle. The next step was to secure a right of way through Colombia. After considerable delay Secretary Hay and Mr. Herran, the Colombian charge d"affaires, signed, January 22, 1903, a ca.n.a.l convention, by the terms of which the United States agreed to pay Colombia $10,000,000 in cash and an annuity of $250,000 for the lease of a strip of land six miles wide across the isthmus. Objection was raised to this treaty because it failed to secure for the United States full governmental control over the ca.n.a.l zone, but it was considered the best that could be gotten and it was ratified by the United States Senate March 17, 1903.
The Colombian Senate, however, did not regard the treaty with favor.
They felt that Panama was their greatest national a.s.set, and they knew perfectly well that in spite of threats to the contrary President Roosevelt was determined not to adopt the alternative of the Spooner amendment and go to Nicaragua. After discussing the treaty for nearly two months, they finally rejected it August 12 by the unanimous vote of all the senators present.[187] They probably thought that they could get better terms from the United States and particularly that they might reserve a fuller measure of sovereignty over the isthmus. President Roosevelt declared that the action of the Colombian Senate was due to an "anti-social spirit" and to the cupidity of the government leaders, who merely wished to wait until they could confiscate the $40,000,000 worth of property belonging to the French company and then sell out to the United States. This view is not borne out by the dispatches of Mr.
Beaupre, the American minister, who repeatedly warned Secretary Hay that there was a "tremendous tide of public opinion against the ca.n.a.l treaty," which even the Colombian government could not ignore. The charge of bad faith against Colombia does not come in good grace from a country whose const.i.tution also requires the ratification of treaties by the Senate.
As soon as the Hay-Herran convention was rejected by the Colombian Senate, the advocates of the Nicaragua route began to take courage and to demand that as the "reasonable time" allowed in the Spooner act for the President to acquire the right of way through Panama had expired, it was now his duty to adopt the Nicaragua route. The directors of the French company were again in a state of consternation. If they could not sell to the United States they would have to sacrifice their property entirely, or sell to some other purchaser at a lower figure. It was rumored that Germany was willing to buy their interests. The directors of the company were so completely demoralized that William Nelson Cromwell, their American attorney, hastened to Paris to dissuade them from taking any rash step. The rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty was a great disappointment to the inhabitants of the isthmus, who considered this action a sacrifice of their interests, and some of the foremost citizens conferred with the American agent of the Panama Railroad Company as to the advisability of organizing a revolution. Before taking any step in this direction, it was considered advisable to send one of their number to the United States, and Dr. Amador was selected for this mission. He had conferences with William Nelson Cromwell and with Secretary Hay. The latter merely outlined what he considered the rights and duties of the United States under the treaty of 1846, but refused of course to commit the government to a definite support of the revolutionary project. Amador was somewhat discouraged at the result of his conference with Hay, but his hopes were revived by the sudden arrival of Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the former chief engineer of the French company, who entered with enthusiasm into the revolutionary scheme.[188]
The Colombian Congress adjourned October 30 without any reconsideration of the treaty, and President Roosevelt at once ordered the _Boston_, _Dixie_, _Atlanta_, and _Nashville_ to proceed within easy reach of the isthmus. Their commanders received orders to keep the transit open and to "prevent the landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of Panama." The _Nashville_ arrived off Colon November 2. It can hardly be denied that these measures created a situation very favorable to revolution.[189]
The revolutionists had been greatly disappointed at Dr. Amador"s failure to get a definite promise of support from the American government, but their spirits revived when they learned of the presence of American war vessels. Still they were slow in taking advantage of their opportunities and the government at Washington was growing impatient. At 3.40 P.
M. November 3 the following dispatch was sent to the American consuls at Panama and Colon: "Uprising on isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully informed. Loomis, Acting." At 8.15 a reply was received from the consul at Panama: "No uprising yet. Reported will be in the night. Situation is critical." At 9 P. M. a second dispatch was received from the same source: "Uprising occurred to-night, 6; no bloodshed. Army and navy officials taken prisoners. Government will be organized to-night."[190]
Before the _Nashville_ received the order to prevent the landing of armed forces, 450 Colombian troops arrived at Colon. The princ.i.p.al officers were provided with a special train to take them across the isthmus to Panama. When they arrived they were seized by the revolutionary leaders and locked up for safe-keeping, while the railroad officials saw to it that there were no trains for their troops to use.
The next day Commander Hubbard landed fifty marines from the _Nashville_ at Colon, and a day later the officer in charge of the Colombian forces was persuaded by a generous bribe to reembark his troops and leave.
Events continued to follow one another with startling rapidity. On the 6th the _de facto_ government was recognized and a week later Bunau-Varilla was received by President Roosevelt as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama. Such hasty recognition of a new government was of course without precedent in the annals of American diplomacy, and it naturally confirmed the rumor that the whole affair had been prearranged. On October 10 President Roosevelt had written a personal letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of the _Review of Reviews_, who was a strong advocate of the Panama route, in which he said:
Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent state, or if it made itself so at this moment; but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation of a revolt, and therefore I cannot say it.[191]
This letter throws an interesting light on an article in the _Review of Reviews_ for November of the same year in which Dr. Shaw discussed the question, "What if Panama should Revolt?" and outlined with remarkable prophetic insight the future course of events.
In his annual message of December 7, 1903, the President discussed the Panama revolution and undertook to justify his course under the treaty of 1846. This message failed to allay public criticism, and on January 4, 1904, he sent a special message to Congress in defense of his action.
He held that Colombia was not ent.i.tled "to bar the transit of the world"s traffic across the isthmus," and that the intervention of the United States was justified, (1) by our treaty rights, (2) by our international interests, and (3) by the interests of "collective civilization." The "legal" argument in this message, if we may dignify it by that name, is reported to have been prepared by Root and Knox, both at that time members of the Cabinet. Several years later, after Mr.
Roosevelt had retired from the presidency, he expressed the real truth in a public speech when he said:
If I had followed traditional conservative methods I should have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two hundred pages to the Congress and the debate would be going on yet, but I took the Ca.n.a.l zone and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on the ca.n.a.l does also.
The reason why the President did not wish the matter to go before Congress again was that he had decided upon the Panama route, and he knew that when Congress convened in December, the situation remaining unchanged, action would be taken to compel him to adopt the alternative of the Spooner amendment and go to the Nicaragua route. His object in the hasty recognition of the Panama revolution was therefore to make the Panama route an accomplished fact before Congress should meet. This was the att.i.tude definitely a.s.sumed in the message of January 4, 1904, in the course of which he said:
The only question now before us is that of the ratification of the treaty. For it is to be remembered that a failure to ratify the treaty will not undo what has been done, will not restore Panama to Colombia, and will not alter our obligation to keep the transit open across the Isthmus, and to prevent any outside power from menacing this transit.
The treaty referred to was the convention with Panama which had been signed November 18, 1903, and which was ratified by the Senate February 23, 1904, by a vote of 66 to 14. By the terms of this agreement the United States guaranteed the independence of the Panama Republic, and agreed to pay the Panama Republic a sum of $10,000,000 upon the exchange of ratifications and an annual rental of $250,000 a year beginning nine years thereafter. Panama on her part granted to the United States in perpetuity a zone of land ten miles wide for the construction of a ca.n.a.l, the United States receiving as full power and authority over this strip and the waters adjacent as if it were the sovereign of the said territory.[192] The construction of the ca.n.a.l was at once undertaken and the work was carried through successfully by General Goethals and a corps of army engineers. It was opened to commerce August 15, 1914, though it was not completed at that time and traffic was subsequently interrupted by landslides.
Colombia naturally felt aggrieved at the course pursued by President Roosevelt and refused to recognize the Republic of Panama. She objected to his interpretation of the convention of 1846. In this convention the United States pledged itself to keep the isthmian transit open and guaranteed Colombia"s sovereignty over the same. This treaty established an obligation to Colombia alone, and it is difficult to accept the President"s view that it established an obligation to the world at large against Colombia. Colombia demanded that the whole question be submitted to arbitration. As the United States had always held the ground that disputes arising out of the interpretation of treaties should be settled by arbitration, it was inconsistent for the United States to refuse to arbitrate. But President Roosevelt did refuse. The Panama episode created strained relations with Colombia and made a very bad impression throughout Latin America. The United States has since been eyed with suspicion by its weaker Southern neighbors. The Taft and Wilson administrations both tried to appease Colombia by a money payment, but this subject will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.
FOOTNOTES:
[140] Report of International American Conference, Vol. IV (Hist. App.), p. 143.
[141] Snow: "Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy," p. 328.
[142] Our treaties with Mexico and Honduras, although covering the case of ca.n.a.l constructions, were of no practical importance, as the routes through these countries were not feasible.
[143] Correspondence in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Ca.n.a.l, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the Monroe Doctrine. Government Printing Office, 1885, p. 5. Referred to hereafter as "Collected Correspondence."
[144] _Ibid._, pp. 23-27.
[145] _Ibid._, pp. 27 and 40.
[146] Seward to Adams, July 11, 1862.
[147] "Collected Correspondence," pp. 7 and 8.
[148] Mr. Scruggs to Mr. Bayard, April 16, 1885, For. Rel., also "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, p. 326.
[149] "Collected Correspondence," p. 94.
[150] _Ibid._, p. 14.
[151] "Collected Correspondence," pp. 11 and 12.
[152] "Collected Correspondence," p. 99.
[153] Mr. Buchanan to Hon. John A. McClernand, April 2, 1850, "American Hist. Rev.," Oct., 1899.
[154] "Wharton"s Digest," Sec. 295.