In the meanwhile conditions in the Teutonic countries were reaching a serious point. Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey were facing an enraged world. Their man power was almost exhausted, the numbers of killed and wounded in Germany alone being estimated at 6,000,000 men; famine, agitation and mutiny were at the door and revolution on the horizon; food was scarce and of poor quality; Austria was disintegrating; signs were evident of dissensions in the German government and suggestions were even made that the Kaiser abdicate.
Allied pressure in the field together with insistent emphasis on the Allied distrust of the German government were at last having their combined effect; the Teutonic morale was breaking down. On October 4 the German chancellor requested President Wilson to take steps toward peace on the basis of the "fourteen points." An interchange of notes ensued which indicated that the Teutonic powers were humbled and that the Chancellor was speaking in behalf of the people of Germany. The Inter-allied Council then met at Versailles and drew up the terms of an armistice which were delivered to Germany on November 7. That nation was already in a tumult, in the midst of which demonstrations in favor of a republic were prominent, and while the German government was considering the terms of the armistice the Kaiser abdicated and fled to Holland, and a new cabinet was formed with a Socialist at the head. The end was evidently at hand and on November 11 the world was cheered with the news that Germany had signed the armistice and the war was over.[8]
As far as the United States was concerned the questions of greatest public interest after the close of the conflict, fell into two categories: one connected with the complicated question of the exact terms of settlement between the Allies and the Teutonic powers, including modifications of the foreign policy of the United States; the other, that concerning the readjustments necessary in the internal affairs of the nation--economic, social and moral, as well as political.
Any adequate discussion of these matters requires so much more information and perspective than can now be had, that only the barest outlines can be given.
The conference for the determination of the settlements of the war was to meet in Paris. The American representatives were to include Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, Henry White, who had represented the United States in many diplomatic matters, especially as amba.s.sador to Italy and to France, Colonel Edward M. House, a trusted personal advisor of the President, and General Tasker H. Bliss, the American military representative on the Inter-allied Council. President Wilson himself was to head the delegation.
In November, 1918, shortly before the departure of the President for Paris, occurred the Congressional elections, which were destined to have an important effect on the immediate future. Until late October the usual display of partisan politics had been, on the surface at least, uncommonly slight. On the 25th, however, the President urged the country to elect a Democratic Congress, declaring that the Republican leaders in Washington, although favorable to the war, had been hostile to the administration, and that the election of a Republican majority would enable them to obstruct a legislative program. The Republicans a.s.serted that the request was a challenge to the motives and fidelity of their party, and a partisan and mendacious accusation. As a result of the ensuing contest the control of both Senate and House were won by the Republicans. It is impossible to judge whether the President"s appeal recoiled seriously against his own party or whether the tendency to reaction against the administration at mid-term, which has been so common since the Civil War, was the decisive force. In any case, however, Wilson was compelled to go to Paris enc.u.mbered with the handicap of political defeat at home.
Nevertheless he was received with unbounded enthusiasm by the French people and at once became one of the central figures among the leaders at Paris. Not only did the American delegates work in conjunction with the representatives of the Allies, but Wilson became a member of an inner council, the other partic.i.p.ants in which were Premier Lloyd George of England, Premier Georges Clemenceau of France and Premier Orlando of Italy. The "Big Four," as the group was known, led the conference and made its most important decisions. The day of the aloofness of the United States from international affairs, which had been ended only temporarily by the war with Spain, was apparently brought to a final close.[9]
At length the treaty with Germany was completed, President Wilson returned to America, and on July 10, 1919, he appeared before the Senate to outline the purposes and contents of the agreement and to offer his services to that body and to its Committee on Foreign Relations in order to enable them intelligently to exercise their advisory function as part of the treaty-making power. The Treaty was seen to contain two general features: a stern reckoning with Germany which commended itself to all except a small minority of the Senate; and a plan for a League of Nations which provided for concerted action on the part of the nations of the world to reduce armaments and to minimize the danger of war.
President Wilson"s interest in the League was intense and of long standing. He had hoped--and in this he was supported doubtless by the entire American people--that the European conflict might be a "war to end war," and to this conclusion he believed that a world a.s.sociation was essential. Public interest in the project was indicated by the efforts put forth in its behalf by Ex-President Taft, George W.
Wickersham, who had been Attorney-General in the Taft cabinet, President Lowell of Harvard University, and other influential citizens.
[Ill.u.s.tration: The Cost of Food Jan. 1913-Jan. 1920]
Although interest in the Treaty and the League of Nations overshadowed all other issues, nevertheless many problems relating to internal reconstruction pressed forward for settlement. It was commonly, if not universally felt that somehow the United States would be different after the war, but in what ways and to what degree remained to be determined.
Reconstruction in the world of industry was complicated by the demobilization of several millions of men from the army and navy, as well as the freeing of a still larger number of both men and women from various kinds of war work.[10] When the armistice was signed, the industries of the country were under contract with the War Department to provide supplies valued at six billion dollars, and these contracts had to be terminated with as little dislocation of industrial life as might be consistent with the necessity of stopping the production of materials which the government could not use. The laboring cla.s.ses had loyally supported the war and had largely relinquished the use of the strike for the time being. In the meantime the cost of living had doubled, while wages in most industries had not responded equally. After the war, therefore, it was inevitable that the laboring cla.s.ses should become restive under prevailing economic conditions. No more important question faced the country, a keen observer declared, than that concerning the wages of the laboring man: "How are the ma.s.ses of men and women who labor with their hands to be secured out of the products of their toil what they will feel to be and will be in fact a fair return!"
The huge purchases of war materials in the United States by European nations had transformed this country to a creditor nation to which the chief countries of the world owed large interest payments. The situation was a distinct contrast to the past, for the industrial development of the country especially since the Civil War, had been made possible in considerable measure by capital borrowed in European countries.
Hitherto, therefore, the United States had been a debtor nation sending large yearly interest payments abroad. Moreover, America was being increasingly looked to for raw materials as well as manufactured articles, and was likely to become more than ever an exporting nation.
The mobilization of the large armies required for the war proved the need of energetic reforms in fields that had earlier been too much neglected. The fact that so many as twenty-nine per cent. of the young men examined for the army between the ages of twenty-one and thirty had to be rejected because of physical defects was a cause of astonishment.
The need of greater efforts in behalf of education was proved by the large number of illiterates discovered, and the necessity of training immigrants in the fundamentals of American government was so clearly demonstrated as to give rise to wide-spread plans for Americanization.
More definite were the effects of the war on the prohibition movement.
For many years a small but growing minority of reformers had urged the adoption of means for stopping the use of intoxicating liquors and they had been successful in procuring const.i.tutional amendments in about half the states by the close of 1916. The war presented an opportunity for further progress. In September, 1918, they procured the pa.s.sage of a resolution in Congress allowing the President to establish zones around places where war materials were manufactured; liquors were not to be sold within these areas. Soon afterward the manufacture of beer and wine was forbidden until the conclusion of the war, on the ground that the grains and fruits needed for the production of these beverages could better be used as foods. In the meantime a federal const.i.tutional amendment establishing prohibition had been referred to the states for ratification. By January 16, 1919, it had received the necessary ratification by three-fourths of the states and took effect a year later.[11]
The railroads const.i.tuted another difficult problem. Agreement seemed to be general that they could not be relinquished by the government to private control without significant changes in existing legislation, and several forces, especially the insistence of the President and of the opponents of government ownership, combined to spur Congress to act on the matter at an early date. The Esch-c.u.mmins law of February 28, 1920, was an important addition to the body of interstate commerce legislation. It enlarged and increased the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission; it authorized the Commission to recommend government loans to the railroads; established a Railroad Labor Board to settle disputes between the carriers and their employees; empowered the Commission to require the joint use of track and terminal facilities in emergencies; forbade the construction of new lines and the issuance of stocks and bonds without the consent of the Commission; directed the preparation and adoption of plans for the consolidation of the railway properties into a limited number of systems; permitted pooling under the authorization of the Commission; and provided for the acc.u.mulation of reserve funds and a fund for purchasing additions to railway equipment.
Whether a final solution of the transportation problem or not, the new act embodied much of the experience gained since the pa.s.sage of the law of 1887.
In the field of politics and government an important part of reconstruction was the readjustment of relations between the federal executive and Congress. During the war it was inevitable that the President should provide most of the initiative in legislation; but it was likewise inevitable that the legislative branch should rea.s.sert itself as soon as possible. The fact that the consideration of the Treaty of Versailles necessarily concerned the Senate rather than the House of Representatives, gave the upper chamber an opportunity to attempt the repression of executive power to the proportions which had characterized it immediately before the war. Moreover if the members of the Senate should imitate the example of their predecessors in the conflict with President Johnson in 1867, that body might attempt to regain for itself the primacy in the federal government which had been partially lost under Cleveland"s regime and completely superseded through Roosevelt"s development of the presidential office.
The course of the Treaty in the Senate was such as to stimulate any friction which might result from the difficult process of reconstruction. Despite the early sentiment favorable to prompt ratification, that part of the Treaty which related to a League of Nations met a variety of opposing forces. Some of them were based on personal, political and partisan considerations, and some of them founded upon a sincere hesitancy about adventuring into new and untried fields of international effort. In the main, party lines were somewhat strictly drawn in the Senate, the Democrats favoring and the Republicans opposing ratification of the treaty as it stood.[12] All debates in the Senate relating to the treaty were for the first time in our history open to the public, and popular interest was keen and sustained. Among people outside of Congress party lines were more commonly broken than in the Senate, and members of that body were deluged with pet.i.tions and correspondence for and against ratification. At length it appeared that a considerable fraction of the Senate desired ratification without any change whatever, a smaller number desired absolute rejection and a "middle group" wished ratification with certain reservations which would interpret or possibly amend portions of the plan for a League of Nations--portions which they felt were vague or dangerous to American interests. After long-continued discussion, the friends of the project were unable to muster the necessary two-thirds for ratification, and its enemies failed to obtain the majority required to make amendments, and the entire matter was accordingly postponed, pending the results of the presidential election of 1920.
The United States, therefore, found itself after the close of the World War in much the same position that it had been in more than half a century earlier at the end of the Civil War. The unity of purpose and the devotion to ideals which had overcome all difficulties during the combat had seemingly, at least, given way to partisan diversity of endeavor, to strife for supremacy in government and to the avoidance of the great problems of reconstruction. Time, patience and controversy would be necessary to bring about a wise settlement. The United States was face to face with the greatest problems that had arisen since the Civil War.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The opposition to the Wilson foreign policy is best expressed in Theodore Roosevelt, _Fear G.o.d and Take Your Own Part_ (1916).
Roosevelt"s condonation of the invasion of Belgium is in _The Outlook_ (Sept., 1914), "The World War." Wilson"s changing att.i.tude toward the war is explained in A.M. Low, _Woodrow Wilson, an Interpretation_ (1918), but is best followed in his addresses and messages. The early stages of the war and American interest in it are described in Ogg; _The American Year Book_; J.B. McMaster, _The United States in the World War _(1918); J.W. Gerard, _My Four Years in Germany_ (1918), superficial but interesting and written by the American Amba.s.sador; Brand Whitlock, _Belgium_ (2 vols., 1919), verbose, but well written by the United States minister to Belgium; Dodd, already mentioned; J.S. Ba.s.sett, _Our War with Germany_ (1919), written in excellent spirit. The President"s address calling for a declaration of war is contained in the various editions of his addresses, and in _War Information Series_, No. 1, "The War Message and Pacts Behind It," published by the Committee on Public Information.
The subject of federal agencies for the prosecution of the war is fully discussed in W.F. Willoughby, _Government Organization in War Time and After_ (1919); there is no adequate account of the Committee on Public Information. On the government and the railroads, consult F.H. Dixon in _Quarterly Journal of Economics_ (Aug., 1919), "Federal Operation of Railroads during the War." E.L. Bogart, _Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War_ (1918), is useful.
Combat operations are described in the general histories of the war already mentioned, and in "Report of General Pershing" in War Department, _Annual Report_, 1918.
Accounts of the Peace Conference, the Treaty and the League of Nations labor under the attempt to prove President Wilson right or wrong, in addition to such insurmountable difficulties as lack of information and perspective. J.S. Ba.s.sett, _Our War with Germany_ (1919), has some temperate chapters; Dodd is friendly to Wilson, but not offensively partisan; R.S. Baker, _What Wilson did at Paris_ (1919) is readable; J.M. Keynes, _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_ (1920), is interesting and designed to prove a point; see also C.H. Haskins and R.H. Lord, _Some Problems of the Peace Conference_ (1920); the account in the _American Year Book_ for 1919 lacks something of its usual non-partisan balance. On the League of Nations a thorough study is S.P.H. Duggan, _The League of Nations_ (1919). Material opposing the treaty may be found in _The New Republic_, _The Nation_, and the _North American Review_; favorable to it is the editorial page of the New York _Times_, whose columns contain the best day-to-day accounts of the debates in the Senate.
A full bibliography is A.E. McKinley (ed.), _Collected Materials for the Study of the War_ (1918).
[1] As a result of this incident the Senate decided to limit somewhat its rule allowing unlimited debate. Under the "closure" rule adopted March 8, 1917, a two-thirds majority may limit discussion on any measure to one hour for each member.
[2] War was declared against Austria on December 7, 1917. The United States was followed immediately by Cuba and Panama, and before the close of the year by Siam, Liberia, China and Brazil. Many other Central and South American states severed relations with Germany and before the close of the struggle several of them declared war.
[3] The purpose and effect of Wilson"s patient foreign policy were briefly expressed by Joseph H. Choate, a Republican advocate of early entry into the war, in a speech in New York on April 25, 1917. Choate declared that a declaration of war after the _sinking of the Lusitania_ would have resulted in a divided country and remarked: "But we now see what the President was waiting for and how wisely he waited. He was waiting to see how fast and how far the American people would keep pace with him and stand up for any action that he proposed."
[4] An official of the War Department estimated that the lumber used in the sixteen cantonments if made into sidewalks would go four times around the world.
[5] Roumania had entered the conflict in August, 1916, but had been immediately overrun, her capital Bucharest taken in December, and that country rendered no longer important before the entrance of America.
[6] The earlier draft law resulted in about 11,000,000 registrants. The draft ages were 21-30 years. Under the later law the ages were 18-45.
The so-called Training Detachments had already been established, providing for the training of mechanics, carpenters, electricians, telegraphers, and other necessary skilled artisans at a number of colleges and scientific inst.i.tutions.
Almost coincidently with the expansion of the army came an epidemic of the Spanish influenza. Hitherto the health of the army had been extraordinarily good, but the epidemic was so widespread and so malignant in its attack that during eight weeks there were more than twice as many deaths as in the entire army for the year preceding.
[7] By November 11, 26,059 prisoners and 847 guns had been captured and at one point near Sedan the American advance had covered twenty-five miles. 1,200,000 American troops had been engaged and the weight of the ammunition fired was greater than that used by the Union armies during the entire Civil War. In November the American army held twenty-two per cent. of the western front. The losses of the A.E.F. during the entire period of its activities up to November 18, 1918, were by death 53,160; the wounded numbered 179,625.
[8] An armistice had been signed with Turkey on October 31, and with Austria on November 4.
[9] Something little short of a revolution in American international relations was taking place when the President of the United States received in Paris lists of callers such as that mentioned in the newspapers of May 17, 1919:
Prince Charron of the Siamese delegation; Dr. Markoff, of the Carpatho-Russian Committee; M. Ollivier, President of the French National Union of Railwayman; M. Jacob, a representative of the Celtic Circle of Paris; Messrs. Bureo and Jacob of the Uruguyan delegation; Turkhan Pasha, the Albanian leader; Enrique Villegas, former Foreign Minister of Chile; Foreign Minister Benez and M.
Kramer, of the Czecho-slovak delegation, to discuss the question of Silesia and Teschen; Deputy Damour, concerning the American commemorative statue to be erected in the Gironde River; a delegation from the Parliament of Kuban, Northern Caucasus; the Archbishop of Trebizond, Joseph Reinach, the French historian, and Governor Richard L. Manning of South Carolina.
[10] The Secretary of War estimated the total of all these groups at 13,650.000
[11] The Eighteenth Amendment is as follows: Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Const.i.tution by the legislatures of the several states, as provided in the Const.i.tution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the states by the Congress.
[12] As the Congress that which had been elected in 1918, the Senate was controlled by the Republicans.