My reception in this country has been exceptionally cordial and significant of the seriousness of present situation and the importance to be attached to the United States" entry into the war.
I was met at Liverpool by Rear-Admiral Hope, R.N., a member of Admiral Jellicoe"s staff, and the Admiral of the Port, the former having been sent by the Admiralty to escort me to London. A special train was provided which made a record run, and within a few hours after arrival in London I was received by the First Sea Lord and his princ.i.p.al a.s.sistants in a special conference.
2. _Conferences_:
More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a full statement of the true situation, particularly (as it developed later) on account of its seriousness, combined with a natural reluctance against appearing to seek a.s.sistance, and a hesitancy in taking chances of allowing information indirectly to reach the enemy, and thereby improve enemy _moral_.
I therefore positively took the position that I must be considered a part of the Admiralty organization, and that it was essential to safe and efficient co-operation that I be trusted with a full knowledge of the exact situation.
They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial War Council, to my exposing the true state of affairs both as regards the military situation and rate of destruction of merchant shipping.
I have had daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, both at his office and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty and access to all Government Officials. I have freely consulted with such officials as the following:
Prime Minister.
First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson).
Ministers of Munitions, Shipping, Trade, and other Cabinet officials.
First Sea Lord, and his a.s.sistants.
Chief of Naval Staff.
Directors (corresponding to our Chiefs of Bureaus) of Intelligence, Anti-submarine operations, Torpedoes, Mines, Mining, etc.
3. _General Statement of the Situation_:
Since the last declaration of the enemy Government, which from intelligence information was antic.i.p.ated, the submarine campaign against merchant shipping of all Nations has resolved itself into the real issue of the war and, stated briefly, the Allied Governments have not been able to, and are not now, effectively meeting the situation presented.
4. As stated in my first despatch, the communications and supplies to all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the "Command of the Sea" is actually at stake.
5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine menace have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as probably those of the Department also, had been largely based upon Press reports and reports of our Attaches and other professional Americans who have been abroad during the War. All of this information has been either rigidly censored or else has been given out in such form that it would be of minimum a.s.sistance to enemy _moral_.
6. The necessity for secrecy, which the British Government has experienced, and which I repeatedly encounter in London, and even in the Admiralty itself, is impressive. There have been remarkable and unexpected leakages of information throughout the war. Certain neutral legations of smaller countries are now under strong suspicion.
7. The extent to which the submarine campaign is being waged is in itself excellent evidence of the importance attached to it by the enemy, and of the degree to which they counted, and still are counting, upon it.
The Intelligence Department has reliable information (as reliable as can be) that the enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in _two_ months through shortage of supplies.
8. With improved weather and the shorter nights now coming on we may expect even more enemy submarine success.
9. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was yesterday in conference in the Admiralty as to what greater extent destroyers and auxiliaries of the Fleet may be utilized without endangering its power in the remote possibility of another fleet engagement.
The consensus of opinion seems to be that the latter will not occur, but there is not complete unanimity in this belief, and of course, in any case, the possibility must be adequately and continuously provided against.
_General discussion of situation_:
10. I delayed [four days] forwarding my first report of the situation with a view of obtaining the maximum information consistent with the importance of the time element. I was also somewhat deterred by a natural reluctance to alter so radically my preconceived views and opinions as to the situation.
11. The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions such as raids on our coasts or elsewhere, the critical area in which the war"s decision will be made is in the eastern Atlantic at the focus of all lines of communications.
The known number of enemy submarines and their rate of construction, allowing liberal factors for errors of information, renders it inevitable that the main submarine effort must continue to be concentrated in the above critical area.
12. Even in this critical area, it is manifest that the field is relatively large for the maximum number of submarines which the enemy can maintain in it. For example, with the present Admiralty policy (explained below) they are forced to cover all the possible trade routes of approach between the north of Scotland and Ushant.
13. From consideration of the above and all other essential information available, it is apparent that the enemy could not disperse his main submarine campaign into other quarters of the Globe without diminishing results in this and all areas to a degree which would mean failure to accomplish the Mission of the submarine campaign, which can be nothing else than a final decision of the war.
14. Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated upon the Admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for failing to produce more substantial and visible results. One of the princ.i.p.al demands is for convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection within the war zone.
The answer, which manifestly is not publicly known, is simply that the necessary vessels are not available, and further that those which are available are suffering from the effects of three years of arduous service.
15. It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping is not directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and from these convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer is the same--the area is too large; the necessary vessels are not available.
16. However, I am now consulting with the Director of Shipping as to the practicability and advisability of attempting some approach to such a plan in case the United States is able to put in operation sufficient tonnage to warrant it.
17. After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the Admiralty now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion. They use about six relatively large avenues or arcs of approach to the United Kingdom and Channel, changing their limits or area periodically if necessity demands.
Generally speaking, one is to the north of Scotland, another to the north of Ireland, and three or four others covering the Irish Sea and Channel. Individual ships coming into any of these areas of approach are instructed, generally before sailing, to cross the twentieth meridian at certain and different lat.i.tudes and thence steer certain courses to port.
At times in the past they have found one of these avenues of approach free of submarines under such conditions as to lead them to concentrate shipping therein, but invariably the enemy has become aware of the course pursued.
18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is communication with the shipping itself and full co-operation by the merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually changed, and at all times it cannot be counted upon for more than a fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent.
19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant Captains taking the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least indifference, for Admiralty instructions. The American Liner _New York_ upon which I took pa.s.sage furnishes a typical example. She was instructed to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she pa.s.sed it about nine P.M., thus pa.s.sing in daylight through the most dangerous area.
20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with Merchant masters and sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is "Give us a gun and let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent that it is impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due princ.i.p.ally to difficulty in controlling their speed and to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With this view I do not personally agree but believe that with a little experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formations.
21. The best protection against the submarine menace for all cla.s.ses of ships, merchant as well as Naval, is SPEED and ZIGZAGGING, not more than fifteen minutes on a course. Upon this point no one disagrees, but on the contrary there is absolutely unanimity of opinion.
22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, _particularly destroyers_, and until the enemy submarine _moral_ is broken, there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete unanimity--increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small.
"More Ships! More Ships! More Ships!" is heard on every hand.
23. It is also significant that until very recently the Admiralty have been unable completely to convince some members of the Cabinet that the submarine issue is the deciding factor in the War. The civilian mind, here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly until the pinch is felt in real physical ways.
24. The Prime Minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely sealing up all escape for submarines from their own ports. The fact that all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.) inherently involve the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance by our own Naval forces is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally convinced the Prime Minister of the fallacy of such propositions by describing the situations into which we would be led: namely, that in order to maintain our obstructions we would have to match the forces the enemy brought against them, until finally the majority if not all of our forces would be forced into dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual torpedo and other attack, in fact in a position most favourable to the enemy.
25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does, and always can, force exits, and thereby nullify the close blockade, the weather is a serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used for nets, mines, and obstructions, only to have the arduous work of weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not hold. They chafe through. In this respect we could be of great a.s.sistance, i.e. in supply of moorings and buoys.
26. The Channel is not now, and never has been, completely sealed against submarine egress, let alone the vaster areas of escape to the north. Submarines have gone under mine-fields, and have succeeded in unknown ways in evading and cutting through nets and obstructions.
27. In addition to submarines, heavy forces are free to raid, and in fact escape through, the Channel at any time when the enemy decides that the necessity or return will justify the risk. Hence the suggestion that two divisions of our fast Dreadnoughts might be based upon Brest, primarily for the resulting moral effect against such possible raids.
I was told yesterday by an important Admiralty official that while he thought the chances of raids in, or escape through, the Channel by heavy enemy forces out of reach of the Grand Fleet (North of Scotland) were very remote, nevertheless the possibility existed and was princ.i.p.ally thwarted on moral grounds, that is, the uncertainty in his mind of the opposition which would be encountered. He agreed with others, including the First Sea Lord, that the addition of some of our heavy forces to those maintained in southern Channel approaches by the French and British would undoubtedly entirely preclude the possibility of such raids.
28. _Submarine Losses_:
It has been found necessary to accept _no_ reports of submarine losses as authentic and certain unless survivors are captured or the submarine itself is definitely located by dragging. No dependence even is placed upon evidence of oil on the surface after a submarine has been attacked and forced down, as there is reason to believe that when an enemy submarine dives to escape gunfire she is fitted to expel oil for the particular purpose of conveying the impression that she has been sunk and thereby avoid further pursuit. It has been shown that the amount of damage a submarine can stand is surprising and much more than was antic.i.p.ated before the experience of the war. Upon a recent occasion a British submarine was mistaken for an enemy and though struck by several sh.e.l.ls, dived and escaped to port.