7. It therefore seems to go without question that the only course for us to pursue is to revert to the ancient practice of convoy. This will be purely an offensive measure, because if we concentrate our shipping into convoys and protect it with our naval forces we will thereby force the enemy, in order to carry out his mission, to encounter naval forces which are not embarra.s.sed with valuable cargoes, and which are a great danger to the submarine. At present our naval forces are wearing down their personnel and material in an attempted combination of escorting single ships, when they can be picked up, and also of attempting to seek and offensively engage an enemy whose object is to avoid such encounters. With the convoy system the conditions will be reversed.
Although the enemy may easily know when our convoys sail, he can never know the course they will pursue or the route of approach to their destinations. Our escorting forces will thus be able to work on a deliberate prearranged plan, preserving their oil supplies and energy, while the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces and seek us. In a word, the handicap we now labour under will be shifted to the enemy; we will have adopted the essential princ.i.p.al of concentration while the enemy will lose it.
8. The most careful and thorough study of the convoy system made by the British Admiralty shows clearly that while we may have some losses under this system, owing to lack of adequate number of anti-submarine craft, they nevertheless will not be critical as they are at present.
9. I again submit that if the Allied campaign is to be viewed as a whole, there is no necessity for any high sea protection on our own coast. The submarine as a type of war vessel possesses no unusual characteristics different from those of other naval craft, with the single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as it is for other craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea as far as surface craft are concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy establishing submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere.
10. To take an extreme ill.u.s.tration, if the enemy could be led or forced into diverting part of his submarine effort to the United States coast, or to any other area distant from the critical area surrounding the coast of France and the United Kingdom, the anti-submarine campaign would at once be won. The enemy labours under severe difficulties in carrying out his campaign, even in this restricted area, owing to the material limitations and the distances they must operate from their bases, through extremely dangerous localities. The extent of the United States coastline and the distances between its princ.i.p.al commercial ports preclude the possibility of any submarine effort in that part of the world except limited operations of diversion designed to affect public opinion, and thereby hold our forces from the vital field of action.
11. The difficulties confronting the convoy system are, of course, considerable. They are primarily involved in the widely dispersed ports of origin of merchant shipping; the difficulty of communication by cable; the time involved by communications by mail; and the difficulties of obtaining a co-operation and co-ordination between Allied Governments.
As reported by cable despatch, the British Government has definitely reached the decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as its ability goes. Convoys from Hampton Roads, Canada, Mediterranean, and Scandinavian countries are already in operation. Convoys from New York will be put in operation as soon as ships are available. The British navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently recommend that we co-operate, at least to the extent of handling convoys from New York.
12. The dangers to convoys from high sea raiders is remote, but, of course, must be provided against, and hence the necessity for escorting cruisers or reserve battleships. The necessity is even greater, however, for anti-submarine craft in the submarine war zone.
13. As stated in my despatches, the arming of merchantmen is not a solution of the submarine menace, it serves the single purpose of forcing the submarine to use torpedoes instead of guns and bombs. The facts that men-of-war cannot proceed safely at sea without escort, and that in the Queenstown avenue of approach alone in the past six weeks there have been thirty armed merchantmen sunk, without having seen the submarine at all before the attack, seem to be conclusive evidence. A great ma.s.s of other evidence and war experience could be collected in support of the above.
14. The week ending June 19th has been one of great submarine activity.
Evidence indicates that fifteen to nineteen of the largest and latest submarines have been operating, of which ten to thirteen were operating in the critical area to the west and south-west of the British Isles.
The above numbers are exclusive of the smaller and earlier type of submarines, and submarines carrying mines alone. Two submarines are working to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar. A feature of the week was the sinking of ships as far west as nineteen degrees. Three merchant ship convoys are en route from Hampton Roads, the last one, consisting of eighteen ships, having sailed on the 19th of June. One hundred and sixteen moored mines have been swept up during the week.
Twenty-two reports of encounters with enemy submarines in waters surrounding the United Kingdom have been reported during the week--three by destroyers, two by cruisers, two by mystery ships, one by French gunboat, three by submarines, nine by auxiliary patrol vessels, one by seaplane, and one by merchant vessel.
There is attached copy of report of operations by anti-submarine craft based on Queenstown.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.
APPENDIX VI
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT"S POLICY
From: Secretary of Navy.
To: Vice-Admiral Sims, U.S.S. _Melville_.
Received: July 10, 1917.
The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is quoted for your information and guidance as an index of the policy of the Department in relation to the co-operation of our naval forces with those of our Allies. Quote: After careful consideration of the present naval situation taken in connection with possible future situations which might arise, the Department is preparing to announce as its policy, in so far as it relates to the Allies. First, the most hearty co-operation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in European or other waters compatible with an adequate defence of our own home waters. Second, the most hearty co-operation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present war period. Third, the realization that while a successful termination of the present war must always be the first Allied aim, and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the United States must in no way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our main fighting fleet. Fourth, the conception that the present main military role of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding the line of communications of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there will be generally speaking two cla.s.ses of vessels engaged: minor craft and major craft, and two roles of action, first, offensive and, second, defensive. Fifth, in pursuing the role set forth in paragraph four, the Department cannot too strongly insist on its opinion that the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But as the primary role in all offensive preparations must perforce belong to the Allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need. Sixth, pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as its general plan of action the following: One, its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, composed of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries in any number not incompatible with home needs, and to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint Allied Admiralties which would not involve a violation of our present state policy. Two, its unwillingness as a matter of policy to separate any division from the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but co-operating unit when, after joint consultations of all Admiralties concerned, the emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension imposed upon the line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in European waters will stand the strain imposed upon it. Three, its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations. End of Quote 11009.
(Sd) JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
APPENDIX VII
COMMENTS UPON NAVY DEPARTMENT"S POLICY
Office Vice-Admiral, Commanding U.S. Destroyer Forces European Waters.
LONDON, July 16, 1917.
From: Vice-Admiral Sims.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Concerning Policy of U.S. Naval co-operation in war, and allied subjects.
1. The Department"s cablegram of July 10, 1917, quoting a letter which had been addressed to the Secretary of State concerning naval policy in relation to the present war, was received on July 10th.
In view of the nature of certain parts of the policy set forth therein, I wish to indicate the general policy which has heretofore governed my recommendation.
2. I have a.s.sumed that our mission was to promote the maximum co-operation with the Allies in defeating a common enemy.
All of my despatches and recommendations have been based on the firm conviction that the above mission could and would be accomplished, and that hence such questions as the possibility of post war situations, or of all or part of the Allies being defeated and America being left alone, were not given consideration--in fact, I cannot see how we could enter into this war whole-heartedly if such considerations were allowed to diminish in any way the chances of Allied success.
3. The first course open to us which naturally occurs to mind is that we should look upon our service as part of the combined Allied service, of which the British Grand Fleet is the main body, and all other Allied naval forces disposed throughout the world, as necessary branches thereof.
This conception views our battleship fleet as a support or reserve of the Allied main body (the British Grand Fleet) and would lead to utilizing our other forces to fill in weak spots and to strengthen Allied lines, both offensively and defensively, wherever necessary.
Such a course might be considered as a disintegration of our fleet, and it is only natural, therefore, that hesitation and caution should be felt in its adoption.
4. I have felt, however, that it was possible to accomplish our mission without in any way involving the so-called disintegration of our fleet as a whole.
In the first instance I have a.s.sumed that our aim would be to project, or prepare to project, our maximum force against the enemy offensively.
5. An estimate of the situation shows clearly that the enemy is depending for success upon breaking down the Allies" lines of communications by virtue of the submarine campaign.
A necessary part of such a plan is to divert strength from the main fleet and from anti-submarine operations by such means as coastal raids, threats of landing operations, air raids, and attacks on hospital ships, which last necessitates destroyer escort for such vessels.
The submarine campaign itself, while it is of necessity concentrated primarily on the most vital lines of communications, is nevertheless carried out in such a manner as to lead the Allies to disperse, and not concentrate, their inadequate anti-submarine Forces.
The Allies are, of course, forced to contemplate at all times, and hence provide against, the possibility of another main fleet action.
6. A study of the submarine situation, the number of submarines available to the enemy, and the necessary lines of the Allies"
communications, for both Army and Navy as well as civil needs, shows clearly that the enemy must direct his main effort in certain restricted areas.
These areas, as has repeatedly been reported, are included approximately in a circle drawn from about Ushant to the north of Scotland. The most effective field for enemy activity is, of course, close into the Irish Sea and Channel approaches, where all lines must focus.
But, as stated above, the enemy also attacks occasionally well out to sea and in other dispersed areas with a view of scattering the limited anti-submarine forces available.
It therefore seems manifest that the war not only is, but must remain, in European waters, in so far as success or failure is concerned.
7. Speaking generally, but disregarding for the moment the question of logistics, our course of action, in order to throw our main strength against the enemy, would be to move all our forces, including the battleship fleet, into the war area.
8. In view of the nature of the present sea warfare as effected by the submarine, such a movement by the battleships would necessitate a large force of light craft--much larger than our peace establishment provided.