M23 N.
M24 N.
64 George Cheyne, the physician (known afterwards as author of the _English Malady_), published in 1705 a work on Fluxions, which procured him admission to the Royal Society. He was born in 1670.
65 This reminds us of Hume, and inclines towards the empirical notion of Causation, as merely constancy in sequence-not even continuous metamorphosis.
66 This is Berkeley"s objection to abstract, i.e. unperceived, quant.i.ties and infinitesimals-important in the sequel.
67 The "lines and figures" of pure mathematics, that is to say; which he rejects as meaningless, in his horror unrealisable abstractions.
M25 I.
M26 I.
M27 M. E.
M28 E.
68 Things really exist, that is to say, in degrees, e.g. in a lesser degree, when they are imagined than when they are actually perceived by our senses; but, in this wide meaning of existence, they may in both cases be said to exist.
M29 E.
69 Added on blank page of the MS.
70 In Berkeley"s limitation of the term _idea_ to what is presented objectively in sense, or represented concretely in imagination.
Accordingly "an infinite idea" would be an idea which transcends ideation-an express contradiction.
M30 M.
M31 M.
M32 M.
M33 S.
71 Does the _human_ spirit depend on _sensible_ ideas as much as they depend on spirit? Other orders of spiritual beings may be percipient of other sorts of phenomena than those presented in those few senses to which man is confined, although self-conscious activity abstracted from _all_ sorts of presented phenomena seems impossible.
But a self-conscious spirit is not necessarily dependent on _our_ material world or _our_ sense experience.
M34 S.
M35 S.
72 [This I do not altogether approve of.]-AUTHOR, on margin.
M36 M.
M37 S.
73 He afterwards guarded the difference, by contrasting _notion_ and _idea_, confining the latter to phenomena presented objectively to our senses, or represented in sensuous imagination, and applying the former to intellectual apprehension of "operations of the mind," and of "relations" among ideas.
M38 E.
74 See _Principles_, sect. 89.
75 Is thought, then, independent of language? Can we realise thought worthy of the name without use of words? This is Berkeley"s excessive juvenile reaction against verbal abstractions.
76 Every general notion is _ideally realisable_ in one or other of its possible concrete or individual applications.
M39 N.
M40 S.
77 This is the germ of Berkeley"s notion of the objectivity of the material world to individual percipients and so of the rise of individual self-consciousness.
M41 S.
78 Added by Berkeley on blank page of the MS.
79 Cf. p. 420, note 2. Bishop Sprat"s _History of the Royal Society_ appeared in 1667.
80 Much need; for what he means by _idea_ has not been attended to by his critics.
M42 I. Mo.
81 What "Second Book" is this? Does he refer to the "Second Part" of the _Principles_, which never appeared? G.o.d is the culmination of his philosophy, in _Siris_.
M43 M.
82 This is Berkeley"s material substance. Individual material substances are for him, steady aggregates of sense-given phenomena, having the efficient and final cause of their aggregation in eternally active Mind-active mind, human and Divine, being essential to their realisation for man.
M44 I.
83 Cf. Introduction to the _Principles_, especially sect. 18-25.
M45 M.
84 Stillingfleet charges Locke with "discarding substance out of the reasonable part of the world."
M46 M.
85 The philosophers supposed the real things to exist behind our ideas, in concealment: Berkeley was now beginning to think that the objective ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, the existence of which needs no proof, were _themselves_ the significant and interpretable realities of physical science.
M47 I.
M48 M.
M49 S.
M50 I.
M51 N.
M52 P.
M53 M.
M54 N.
M55 M.
86 If the material world can be _real_ only in and through a percipient intelligence, as the realising factor.
M56 S.
M57 Mo.
M58 Mo.
M59 Mo.