M187 S.
M188 S.
M189 S.
M190 S.
M191 S.
M192 S.
M193 S.
147 In other words, the material world is wholly impotent: all activity in the universe is spiritual.
M194 I.
148 On the order of its four books and the structure of Locke"s _Essay_, see the Prolegomena in my edition of the _Essay_, pp. liv-lviii.
M195 M.
149 i.e. independent imperceptible Matter.
M196 I.
M197 M.
150 What of the earliest geological periods, asks Ueberweg? But is there greater difficulty in such instances than in explaining the existence of a table or a house, while one is merely seeing, without touching?
M198 M.
151 Locke explains "substance" as "an uncertain supposition of we know not what." _Essay_, Bk. I. ch. 4. -- 18.
M199 E.
M200 I.
M201 Mo.
M202 Mo.
152 Locke makes certainty consist in the agreement of "our ideas with the reality of things." See _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 4. -- 18. Here the sceptical difficulty arises, which Berkeley meets under his Principle. If we have no perception of reality, we cannot compare our ideas with it, and so cannot have any criterion of reality.
M203 Mo.
M204 Mo.
153 [This seems wrong. Certainty, real certainty, is of sensible ideas.
I may be certain without affirmation or negation.-AUTHOR.] This needs further explanation.
M205 Mo.
M206 Mo.
M207 Mo.
M208 I.
154 This entry and the preceding tends to resolve all judgments which are not what Kant calls a.n.a.lytical into contingent.
M209 I.
M210 I.
M211 E.
M212 N. Mo.
155 See Locke"s _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 1, ---- 3-7, and ch. 3. ---- 7-21. The stress Berkeley lays on "co-existence" is significant.
M213 P.
156 i.e. we must not doubt the reality of the immediate data of sense but accept it, as "the mob" do.
M214 I.
M215 S.
M216 S.
157 But is imagination different from actual perception only in _degree_ of reality?
M217 S.
M218 E.
158 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 13, 120; also Locke"s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch.
7. sect. 7.
M219 I.
159 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 1.
M220 I.
160 Berkeley"s aim evidently is to deliver men from empty abstractions, by a return to more reasonably interpreted common-sense.
M221 S.
161 The sort of _external_ world that is intelligible to us is that of which _another person_ is percipient, and which is _objective_ to me, in a percipient experience foreign to mine.
M222 S.
M223 Mo.
M224 S.
162 Cf. Berkeley"s _Arithmetica_ and _Miscellanea Mathematica_, published while he was making his entries in this _Commonplace Book_.
163 Minima sensibilia?
M225 Mo.
M226 E.
M227 Mo.
M228 Mo.
164 Pleasures, _qua_ pleasures, are natural causes of correlative desires, as pains or uneasinesses are of correlative aversions. This is implied in the very nature of pleasure and pain.
M229 I.
M230 I.