M412 M. P.
M413 M.
244 This suggests a negative argument for Kant"s antinomies, and for Hamilton"s law of the conditioned.
M414 M.
M415 N.
245 Newton became Sir Isaac on April 16, 1705. Was this written before that date?
246 These may be _considered_ separately, but not _pictured_ as such.
M416 P.
M417 M.
247 In as far as they have not been sensibly realised in finite percipient mind.
248 [Or rather that invisible length does exist.]-AUTHOR, on margin.
249 Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598-1647), the Italian mathematician. His _Geometry of Indivisibles_ (1635) prepared the way for the Calculus.
M418 M.
M419 P. G.
250 [By "the excuse" is meant the finiteness of our mind-making it possible for contradictions to appear true to us.]-AUTHOR, on margin.
251 He allows elsewhere that words with meanings not realisable in imagination, i.e. in the form of idea, may discharge a useful office. See _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 20.
M420 M. P.
252 We do not perceive unperceived matter, but only matter realised in living perception-the percipient act being the factor of its reality.
M421 M.
M422 P.
253 The secondary qualities of things.
M423 M. P.
254 Because, while dependent on percipient sense, they are independent of _my_ personal will, being determined to appear under natural law, by Divine agency.
M424 P.
M425 M.
255 Keill"s _Introductio ad veram Physicam_ (Oxon. 1702)-Lectio 5-a curious work, dedicated to the Earl of Pembroke.
256 [Extension without breadth-i. e. insensible, intangible length-is not conceivable. "Tis a mistake we are led into by the doctrine of abstraction.]-AUTHOR, on margin of MS.
257 Here "Sir Isaac." Hence written after April, 1705.
M426 M.
_ 258 Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. iv. sect. 18; ch. v. sect. 3, &c.
259 He applies _thing_ to self-conscious persons as well as to pa.s.sive objects of sense.
_ 260 Scaligerana Secunda_, p. 270.
261 [These arguments must be proposed shorter and more separate in the Treatise.]-AUTHOR, on margin.
262 "Idea" here used in its wider meaning-for "operations of mind," as well as for sense presented phenomena that are independent of individual will. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 1.
263 "sensations," i.e. objective phenomena presented in sense.
264 See _Principles_, sect. 1.
265 See _Principles_, sect. 2.
266 An "unperceiving thing" cannot be the factor of material reality.
267 [To the utmost accuracy, wanting nothing of perfection. _Their_ solutions of problems, themselves must own to fall infinitely short of perfection.]-AUTHOR, on margin.
M427 P.
268 Jean de Billy and Rene de Billy, French mathematicians-the former author of _Nova Geometriae Clavis_ and other mathematical works.
M428 T.
269 According to Baronius, in the fifth volume of his "Annals," Ficinus appeared after death to Michael Mercatus-agreeably to a promise he made when he was alive-to a.s.sure him of the life of the human spirit after the death of the body.
M429 M.
270 So far as we are factors of their reality, in sense and in science, or can be any practical way concerned with them.
271 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 101-34.
M430 P.
272 "something," i.e. _abstract_ something.
273 Lord Pembroke (?)-to whom the _Principles_ were dedicated, and to whom Locke dedicated his _Essay_.
274 This is an interesting example of a feature that is conspicuous in Berkeley-the art of "humoring an opponent in his own way of thinking," which it seems was an early habit. It is thus that he insinuates his New Principles in the _Essay on Vision_, and so prepares to unfold and defend them in the book of _Principles_ and the three _Dialogues_-straining language to reconcile them with ordinary modes of speech.
275 In Diderot"s _Lettre sur les aveugles, a l"usage de ceux qui voient_, where Berkeley, Molyneux, Condillac, and others are mentioned. Cf. also Appendix, pp. 111, 112; and _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 71, with the note, in which some recorded experiments are alluded to.
_ 276 De Anima_, II. 6, III. 1, &c. Aristotle a.s.signs a pre-eminent intellectual value to the sense of sight. See, for instance, his _Metaphysics_, I. 1.
277 Sir A. Grant, (_Ethics of Aristotle_, vol. II. p. 172) remarks, as to the doctrine that the Common Sensibles are apprehended concomitantly by the senses, that: "this is surely the true view; we see in the apprehension of number, figure, and the like, not an operation of sense, but the mind putting its own forms and categories, i.e. itself, on the external object. It would follow then that the senses cannot really be separated from the mind; the senses and the mind each contribute an element to every knowledge.