843 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 80, 81.
844 i.e. all Spirits and their dependent ideas or phenomena.
845 This, according to Hume (who takes for granted that Berkeley"s reasonings can produce no conviction), is the natural effect of Berkeley"s philosophy.-"Most of the writings of that very ingenious author (Berkeley) form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted.... That all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appear from this-_that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction_. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism." (Hume"s _Essays_, vol. II. Note N, p.
554.)
846 Omitted in last edition.
847 "Tell me, Hylas,"-"So Hylas"-in first and second editions.
848 Variously called _noumena_, "things-in-themselves," absolute substances, &c.-which Berkeley"s philosophy banishes, on the ground of their unintelligibility, and thus annihilates all farther questions concerning them. Questions about existence are thus confined within the concrete or realising experiences of living spirits.
849 Berkeley claims that his doctrine supersedes scepticism, and excludes the possibility of fallacy in sense, in excluding an ultimately representative perception of Matter. He also a.s.sumes the reasonableness of faith in the reality and constancy of natural law.
When we see an orange, the visual sense guarantees only colour. The other phenomena, which we a.s.sociate with this colour-the other "qualities" of the orange-are, when we only _see_ the orange, matter of faith. We believe them to be realisable.
850 He accepts the common belief on which interpretation of sense symbols proceeds-that sensible phenomena are evolved in rational order, under laws that are independent of, and in that respect external to, the individual percipient.
851 Mediately as well as immediately.
852 We can hardly be said to have an _immediate_ sense-perception of an individual "thing"-meaning by "thing" a congeries of sense-ideas or phenomena, presented to different senses. We immediately perceive some of them, and believe in the others, which those suggest. See the last three notes.
853 He probably refers to Descartes, who _argues_ for the trustworthiness of our faculties from the veracity of G.o.d; thus apparently arguing in a circle, seeing that the existence of G.o.d is manifested to us only through our suspected faculties. But is not confidence in the trustworthiness of the Universal Power at the heart of the universe, the fundamental _presupposition_ of all human experience, and G.o.d thus the basis and end of philosophy and of experience?
854 As Locke does. See _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 11.
855 Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, sect. 45-48.
856 And to be thus external to individual minds.
857 It is here that Berkeley differs, for example, from Hume and Comte and J.S. Mill; who accept sense-given phenomena, and a.s.sume the constancy of their orderly reappearances, _as a matter of fact_, while they confess total ignorance of the _cause_ of natural order.
(Thus ignorant, why do they a.s.sume reason or order in nature?) The ground of sensible things, which Berkeley refers to Divine Power, Mill expresses by the term "_permanent possibility_ of sensation."
(See his _Examination of Hamilton_, ch. 11.) Our belief in the continued existence of a sensible thing _in our absence_ merely means, with him, our conviction, derived from custom, that we should perceive it under inexplicable conditions which determine its appearance.
858 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26.
859 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142.
860 Inasmuch as I am conscious of _myself_, I can gather, through the sense symbolism, the real existence of other minds, external to my own. For I cannot, of course, enter into the very consciousness of another person.
861 "reason," i.e. reasoning or necessary inference-founded here on our sense of personal dependence; not merely on our faith in sense symbolism and the interpretability of the sensible world. Our belief in the existence of finite minds, external to our own, is, with Berkeley, an application of this faith.
862 "Matter," i.e. Matter as abstract substance. Cf. _Principles_, sect.
135-138.
863 Does this imply that with Berkeley, _self_, as distinguished from the _phenomena_ of which the material world consists, is not a necessary presuppostion of experience? He says in many places-I am _conscious_ of "my own being," and that my mind is myself. Cf.
_Principles_, sect, 2.
864 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8.
865 Cf. Ibid., sect. 20
866 This important pa.s.sage, printed within brackets, is not found in the first and second editions of the _Dialogues_. It is, by antic.i.p.ation, Berkeley"s answer to Hume"s application of the objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter, to the reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through memory, as identical amid the changes of its successive states.
867 See note 4 on preceding page.
868 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 142.
869 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he a.s.sume that he exists when he is not conscious of ideas-sensible or other? Or, does he deny that he is ever unconscious?
870 That is of matter supposed to exist independently of any mind.
Berkeley speaks here of a _consciousness_ of matter. Does he mean consciousness of belief in abstract material Substance?
871 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 54-57.
872 Which he does not doubt.
873 This sentence expresses the whole question between Berkeley and his antagonists.
874 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 29-41.
875 The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition.
876 The index pointing to the originative causes in the universe is thus the ethical judgment, which fastens upon the free voluntary agency of _persons_, as absolutely responsible causes, not merely caused causes.
877 That only ideas or phenomena are presented to our senses may be a.s.sented to by those who nevertheless maintain that intelligent sensuous experience implies more than the sensuous or empirical data.
878 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 49.
879 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58.
880 "without the mind," i.e. without the mind of each percipient person.
881 This is the gist of the whole question. According to the Materialists, sense-presented phenomena are due to unpresented, unperceived, abstract Matter; according to Berkeley, to living Spirit; according to Hume and Agnostics, their origin is unknowable, yet (incoherently) they claim that we _can_ interpret them-in physical science.
882 A similar objection is urged by Erdmann, in his criticism of Berkeley in the _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_.
883 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 50; _Siris_, sect. 319.
884 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58.
885 "order"-"series," in first and second editions.
886 "Matter," i.e. when the reality of "matter" is supposed to signify what Berkeley argues cannot be; because really meaningless.
887 "the connexion of ideas," i.e. the physical coexistences and sequences, maintained in constant order by Power external to the individual, and which are disclosed in the natural sciences.
888 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 38. Berkeley is not for making things _subjective_, but for recognising ideas or phenomena presented to the senses as _objective_.
889 They are not mere illusory appearances but are the very things themselves making their appearance, as far as our limited senses allow them to be realised for us.