No agent can be conceiv"d indifferent as to pain or pleasure.

_We_ do not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.

(M372) A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circ.u.mstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.

(M373) Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard b.a.l.l.s.

Wt judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting gla.s.s?

All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.

We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.

Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wch will onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.

Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.

(M374) By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.

We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.

(M375) In moral matters men think ("tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wch freedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties(220).

Men impute their actions to themselves because they will"d them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.

This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.

If anything is meant by the _potentia_ of A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wt he desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.

Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.

Qu. concerning the procession of Wills _in infinitum_.

Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality.

Their definitions, being of words not yet known to ye learner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.

(M376) The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: for yt about mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, no antic.i.p.ated opinions to be encounter"d; they not having yet thought on such matters. "Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, strigose(221), rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho" never so exact, will not go down with most.

Extension seems to consist in variety of h.o.m.ogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture.

Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind.

(M377) Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, wch depend on the Will, wch is determin"d by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent wch is finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin"d by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence "tis evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.

Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.

Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.

The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the radius"s of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t"other.

In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.

Why the horizontal moon greater?

Why objects seen erect?

(M378) To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wth other perceptions?

Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1st could not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can"t perceive distance.

Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.

Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing the _punctum visibile_ below 30 minutes?

(M379) Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their modes, circ.u.mstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words borrow"d from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.

(M380) The grand mistake is that we think we have _ideas_ of the operations of our minds(222). Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.

Qu. How can our idea of G.o.d be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35(223).

(M381) The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them(224).

(M382) The substance _wood_ a collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2.

c. 26. s. 1.

Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.

Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wch are now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,-there seeming to be no _necessary_ connexion between those thoughts?

Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.

Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish"d by convexes, or enlarg"d by concaves?

(M383) Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.

(M384) Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.-but not an actual existence. "Tis prudent to correct men"s mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly(225).

(M385) Colours in ye dark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.

How the retina is fill"d by a looking-gla.s.s?

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