68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of Matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived: for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a _nonent.i.ty_ I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the _unknown occasion_(647), at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of G.o.d. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present," when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.
69. Again, let us examine what is meant by _occasion_. So far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or go before it, in the ordinary course of things. But, when it is applied to Matter, as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be pa.s.sive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense; as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling _matter_ an _occasion_? This term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received signification.
70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by G.o.d, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds(648). For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether pa.s.sive, and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to G.o.d, by whom they _are_ perceived(649), as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds: that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner.
71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from _Spirit_ and _idea_, from perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not certain Ideas (of I know not what sort) in the mind of G.o.d, which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method: much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune; though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of Matter (which after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick from what is said of unknown occasions) seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unperceived substance.
72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a Spirit-infinitely wise, good, and powerful-is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature(650). But, as for _inert, senseless Matter_, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence; or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to G.o.d of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have just now seen.
73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of _material substance_; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the a.s.sent that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking _substratum_ or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be conceived to exist by themselves(651). Afterwards, in process of time, men(652) being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this _substratum_ or material substance of _those_ qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike; which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter(653), nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing;-so long as that word is taken to denote an _unthinking substratum_ of qualities or accidents, wherein they exist without the mind(654).
74. But-though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon: yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the _thing_ itself is indefensible, at least to retain the _name_; which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of _being_, or _occasion_, though without any shew of reason, at least so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds?
75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless _Somewhat_, by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of G.o.d, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter; though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility; yet the upshot of all is-that there are certain _unknown_ Ideas in the mind of G.o.d; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by _occasion_ with regard to G.o.d. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name(655).
76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of G.o.d, and whether _they_ may be called by the name _Matter_, I shall not dispute(656). But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing; since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in, or be supported by, an unperceiving substance(657).
77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension, and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or _substratum_ of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of _their_ existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours.-I answer, first, if what you mean by the word _Matter_ be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us. And I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not _what_, and we know not _why_.
78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense, it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against _their_ existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, colour, and the like.
_Qualities_, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but _sensations_ or _ideas_, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever(658).
79. But you will insist, What if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot a.s.sign any use to it, or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter _exists_, and that this Matter is _in general_ a _substance_, or _occasion of ideas_; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with great difficulties.-I answer, when words are used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please, without danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that _twice two_ is equal to _seven_; so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation, but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents, which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other.
80. In the _last_ place, you will say, What if we give up the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown _Somewhat_-neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea-inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing in no place?
For, say you, whatever may be urged against _substance_ or _occasion_, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to.-I answer, You may, if so it shall seem good, use the word _matter_ in the same sense as other men use _nothing_, and so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition; the parts whereof, when I consider with attention, either collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind, different from what is excited by the term _nothing_.
81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing-the positive abstract idea of _quiddity_, _ent.i.ty_, or _existence_. I own, indeed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion of all: that is to me the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties, both in number and extent, are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine, by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them, were certainly the utmost folly and presumption. Since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds(659). But, how ready soever I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension, with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a _notion_ of Ent.i.ty or Existence, _abstracted_ from _spirit_ and _idea_, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and trifling with words.
It remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion.
82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point, as will sufficiently convince every good Christian, that bodies do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies(660)-To which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist; that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles: and the difference betwixt _things_ and _ideas_, _realities_ and _chimeras_, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers call _Matter_, or the existence of objects without the mind(661), is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.
83. Again, whether there be or be not external things(662), it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking _our_ conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us: whence it plainly follows, that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so very manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.
84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses" rod? was it not _really_ turned into a serpent? or was there only a change of _ideas_ in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles: which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy.-To this I reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of _real_ and _imaginary_ has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the reader"s understanding to resume the explication of it in this place. I shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality(663). So that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what has been said.
85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences(664).
Some of these appear at first sight-as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. Whether corporeal substance can think?
Whether Matter be infinitely divisible? And how it operates on spirit?-these and the like inquiries have given infinite amus.e.m.e.nt to philosophers in all ages. But, depending on the existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our Principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been premised. But this will appear more plainly in the sequel.
86. From the Principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads-that of _ideas_ and that of _Spirits_.
Of each of these I shall treat in order.
And First as to _ideas_, or _unthinking things_. Our knowledge of these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a two-fold existence of sense-the one _intelligible_ or in the mind, the other _real_ and without the mind(665).
Whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own, distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth _real_ as it was _conformable to real things_, it follows they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind(666)?
87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many _sensations_ in the mind, are perfectly known; there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to _things_ or _archetypes existing without the mind_, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary; and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in _rerum natura_. All this scepticism(667) follows from our supposing a difference between _things_ and _ideas_, and that the former have a subsistence without the mind, or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and shew how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects. [(668)But this is too obvious to need being insisted on.]
88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And after all their labouring and struggle of thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things(669). But, all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and do not amuse ourselves with the terms _absolute_, _external_, _exist_, and such like, signifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense: it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature; since the very existence of an _unthinking being_ consists in _being perceived_.
89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the a.s.saults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of _what is meant_ by _thing_, _reality_, _existence_; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. _Thing_ or _being_ is the most general name of all: it comprehends under it two kinds, entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name, viz. _spirits_ and _ideas_. The former are active, indivisible, [(670)incorruptible] substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, [(671)perishable pa.s.sions,] or dependent beings; which subsist not by themselves(672), but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances.
[(673)We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason(674). We may be said to have some knowledge or _notion_(675) of our own minds, of spirits and active beings; whereof in a strict sense we have not _ideas_. In like manner, we know and have a _notion_ of relations between things or ideas; which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that _ideas_, _spirits_, and _relations_ are all in their respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term _idea_ would be improperly extended to signify _everything_ we know or have any notion of(676).]
90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are _real_ things, or do really exist(677): this we do not deny; but we deny they _can_ subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind(678); since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed _external_, with regard to their origin; in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind. Thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist; but it must be in another mind(679).
91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves(680).
Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance or support wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their _reality_, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances, or _spirits_, which act, and think and perceive them. Whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving Substance, which they call _Matter_, to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the Eternal Mind of the Creator; wherein they suppose only Ideas of the corporeal substances(681) created by Him: if indeed they allow them to be at all _created_(682).
92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or Corporeal Substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a G.o.d, have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him(683). How great a friend _material substance_ has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it, that when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground; insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists(684).
93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding _immaterial substance_, and supposing the soul to be divisible, and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity, arising from the impulse of one body on another-all this is very natural.
And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on _unthinking Matter_, and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it; methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.
94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship _their own ideas_; but rather address their homage to that Eternal Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things.
95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our faith, hath occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the _same_, with regard not to the form, or that which is perceived by sense(685), but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take away this _material substance_-about the ident.i.ty whereof all the dispute is-and mean by _body_ what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas: and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.
96. Matter(686) being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.
97. Beside the external(687) existence of the objects of perception, another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of _abstract ideas_, such as it hath been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody knows; but, having pa.s.sed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a _time_, in such a _place_, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words. In conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if _time_ be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.
98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of _time_, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly, and is partic.i.p.ated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all: only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my existence: since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he pa.s.ses away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life: both which seem equally absurd(688). Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks. And in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the _existence_ of a spirit from its _cogitation_, will, I believe, find it no easy task(689).
99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract _extension_ and _motion_ from all other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight of them, and run into great extravagances. [(690) Hence spring those odd paradoxes, that the fire is not hot, nor the wall white; or that heat and colour are in the objects nothing but figure and motion.] All which depend on a twofold abstraction: first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and, secondly, that the ent.i.ty of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike _sensations_, and alike _real_; that where the extension is, there is the colour too, to wit, in his mind(691), and that their archetypes can exist only in some other _mind_: and that the objects of sense(692) are nothing but those sensations, combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived. [(693) And that consequently the wall is as truly white as it is extended, and in the same sense.]
100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality difficult, and the study thereof of less use to mankind. [(694)And in effect one may make a great progress in school ethics without ever being the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave himself in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or his neighbours than he did before.] And in effect the doctrine of _abstraction_ has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.
101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense and their relations, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics. With regard to each of these I shall make some observations.