I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch "tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wch I observe by my senses no difference, & wch therefore have the same name.
Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind.
If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I am certain, "tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them.
I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & submission to better judgments. Wt I lay before you are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, a.n.a.logy, or authority.
Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.
(M51) When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour"d extension may give us the idea of motion.
(M52) Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.
(M53) Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea-there is nothing wch is not an _ens rationis_. I answer, things are as real, and exist _in rerum natura_, as much as ever. The difference between _entia realia_ & _entia rationis_ may be made as properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you"ll agree with me in this.
(M54) Fruitless the distinction "twixt real and nominal essences.
We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin"d answers them in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.
(M55) Vain is the distinction "twixt intellectual and material world(86).
V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful than this.
(M56) Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for
(M57) them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature.
The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.
The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves-fix, settle, and determine them,-we regarding them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This we think is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not "tis of the last importance,
(M58) I allow not of the distinction there is made "twixt profit and pleasure.
(M59) I"d never blame a man for acting upon interest. He"s a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality.
My positive a.s.sertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with "It seems to me," "I suppose," &c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me.
It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine.
This in the Preface.
(M60) Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some lat.i.tude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding.
Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number consists in relations(87).
Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.
(M61) We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves & order, praecedaneous(88). To the knowledge of our own existence-in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think.
(M62) We move our legs ourselves. "Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch(89).
(M63) Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke(90).
(M64) Mem. Again and again to mention & ill.u.s.trate the doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c.
(M65) Wt I say is demonstration-perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix"d & determin"d ideas annexed to their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and "tis a demonstration yt colours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted on.
(M66) The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas.
(M67) I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.
(M68) I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and separating of signs.
(M69) Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas.
Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.
(M70) Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel"d over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.
Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.
A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz.
they contain both the same number of points.
[Forasmuch as] to be used.
Mem. To mention somewhat wch may encourage the study of politiques, and testify of me yt I am well dispos"d toward them.
(M71) If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide Locke(91), lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9.
A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect.
This demonstrable from the definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end definitions often praemis"d. Hence "tis evident that, according to Newton"s doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.
(M72) I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul.
This is wt Locke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend to(92).
(M73) Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences. Mem. Barrow"s remark. Entirely owing to language.
Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.
(M74) Of great use & ye last importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas.
(M75) Wonderful in Locke that he could, wn advanced in years, see at all thro" a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick.
This more to be admir"d than yt he did not see farther.