"Europeans of credit and responsibility," that is, Europeans armed with wealth and power, and exercising offices of authority and trust, instead of being excepted from the spirit of the restriction, must be supposed the persons who are chiefly meant to be comprehended in it; for abstract the idea of an European from the ideas of power and influence, and the restriction is no longer rational.
Your Committee are therefore of opinion that the nature of the evil which was meant to be prevented by the above orders and regulations was not altered, or the evil itself diminished, by the collusive methods made use of to evade them,--and that, if the regulations were proper, (as they unquestionably were,) they ought to have been punctually complied with, particularly by the members of the government, _who formed the plan_, and who, as trustees of the Company, were especially answerable for their being duly carried into execution. Your Committee have no reason to believe that it could ever have been generally understood "that the Company"s prohibition of farms to Europeans was meant only to exclude such as could not possibly, in their own persons, come under the jurisdiction of the Duanne courts": no such restriction is so much as hinted at. And if it had been so understood, Mr. Barwell was one of the persons who, from their rank, station, and influence, must have been the princ.i.p.al objects of the prohibition. Since the establishment of the Company"s influence in Bengal, no Europeans, of any rank whatever, have been subject to the process of the country judicature; and whether they act avowedly for themselves, and take farms in their own name, or subst.i.tute native Indians to act for them, the difference is not material. The same influence that screened an European from the jurisdiction of the country courts would have equally protected his native agent and representative. For many years past the Company"s servants have presided in those courts, and in comparison with _their_ authority the native authority is nothing.
The earliest instructions that appear to have been given by the Court of Directors in consequence of these transactions in Bengal are dated the 5th of February, 1777. In their letter of that date they applaud the proceedings of the board, meaning the majority, (then consisting of General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis,) _as highly meritorious_, and promise them their _firmest support_. "Some of the _cases_" they say, "_are so flagrantly corrupt, and others attended with circ.u.mstances so oppressive to the inhabitants, that it would be unjust to suffer the delinquents to go unpunished_." With this observation their proceedings appear to have ended, and paused for more than a year.
On the 4th of March, 1778, the Directors appear to have resumed the subject. In their letter of that date they instructed the Governor and Council forthwith to commence a prosecution in the Supreme Court of Judicature against the persons who composed the Committee of Circuit, or their representatives, and also against Mr. Barwell, in order to recover, for the use of the Company, the amount of all advantages acquired by them from their several engagements in salt contracts and farms. Adverting, however, to the declaration made by Mr. Barwell, that he would account to the Court of Directors for the last shilling he had received and abide implicity by their judgment, they thought it probable, that, on being acquainted with their peremptory orders for commencing a prosecution, he might be desirous of paying his share of profits into the Company"s treasury; and they pointed out a precaution to be used in accepting such a tender on his part.
On this part of the transaction your Committee observe, that the Court of Directors appear blamable in having delayed till February, 1777, to take any measure in consequence of advices so interesting and important, and on a matter concerning which they had made so strong a declaration,--considering that early in April, 1776, they say "they had investigated the charges, and had then come to certain resolutions concerning them." But their delaying to send out positive orders for commencing a prosecution against the parties concerned till March, 1778, cannot be accounted for. In the former letter they promise, if they should find it necessary, to return the original covenants of such of their servants as had been any ways concerned in the undue receipt of money, in order to enable the Governor-General and Council to recover the same by suits in the Supreme Court. But your Committee do not find that the covenants were ever transmitted to Bengal. To whatever cause these instances of neglect and delay may be attributed, they could not fail to create an opinion in Bengal that the Court of Directors were not heartily intent upon the execution of their own orders, and to discourage those members of government who were disposed to undertake so invidious a duty.
In consequence of these delays, even their first orders did not arrive in Bengal until some time after the death of Colonel Monson, when the whole power of the board had devolved to Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell.
When they sent what they call _their positive orders_, in March, 1778, they had long been apprised of the death of Colonel Monson, and must have been perfectly certain of the effect which that event would have on the subsequent measures and proceedings of the Governor-General and Council. Their opinion of the principles of those gentlemen appears in their letter of the 28th of November, 1777, wherein they say "they cannot but express their concern that the power of granting away their property in perpetuity should have devolved upon such persons."
But the conduct of the Court of Directors appears to be open to objections of a nature still more serious and important. A recovery of the amount of Mr. Barwell"s profits seems to be the only purpose which they even professed to have in view. But your Committee are of opinion that to preserve the reputation and dignity of the government of Bengal was a much more important object, and ought to have been their first consideration. The prosecution was not the pursuit of mean and subordinate persons, who might with safety to the public interest remain in their seats during such an inquiry into their conduct. It appears very doubtful, whether, if there were grounds for such a prosecution, a proceeding in Great Britain were not more politic than one in Bengal.
Such a prosecution ought not to have been ordered by the Directors, but upon grounds that would have fully authorized the recall of the gentleman in question. This prosecution, supposing it to have been seriously undertaken, and to have succeeded, must have tended to weaken the government, and to degrade it in the eyes of all India. On the other hand, to intrust a man, armed as he was with all the powers of his station, and indeed of the government, with the conduct of a prosecution against himself, was altogether inconsistent and absurd. The same letter in which they give these orders exhibits an example which sets the inconsistency of their conduct in a stronger light, because the case is somewhat of a similar nature, but infinitely less pressing in its circ.u.mstances. Observing that the Board of Trade had commenced a prosecution against Mr. William Barton, a member of that board, for various acts of peculation committed by him, they say, "We must be of opinion, that, as _prosecutions are actually carrying on against him by our Board of Trade_, he is, during such prosecution at least, an improper person to hold a seat _at that board_; and therefore we direct that he be suspended from the Company"s service until our further pleasure concerning him be known." The principle laid down in this instruction, even before their own opinion concerning Mr. Barton"s case was declared, and merely on the prosecution of others, serves to render their conduct not very accountable in the case of Mr. Barwell. Mr.
Barton was in a subordinate situation, and his remaining or not remaining in it was of little or no moment to the prosecution. Mr.
Barton was but one of seven; whereas Mr. Barwell was one of four, and, with the Governor-General, was in effect the Supreme Council.
In the present state of power and patronage in India, and during the relations which are permitted to subsist between the judges, the prosecuting officers, and the Council-General, your Committee is very doubtful whether the mode of prosecuting the highest members in the Bengal government, before a court at Calcutta, could have been almost in any case advisable.
It is possible that particular persons, in high judicial and political situations, may, by force of an unusual strain of virtue, be placed far above the influence of those circ.u.mstances which in ordinary cases are known to make an impression on the human mind. But your Committee, sensible that laws and public proceedings ought to be made for general situations, and not for personal dispositions, are not inclined to have any confidence in the effect of criminal proceedings, where no means are provided for preventing a mutual connection, by dependencies, agencies, and employments, between the parties who are to prosecute and to judge and those who are to be prosecuted and to be tried.
Your Committee, in a former Report, have stated the consequences which they apprehended from the dependency of the judges on the Governor-General and Council of Bengal; and the House has entered into their ideas upon this subject. Since that time it appears that Sir Elijah Impey has accepted of the guardianship of Mr. Barwell"s children, and was the trustee for his affairs. There is no law to prevent this sort of connection, and it is possible that it might not at all affect the mind of that judge, or (upon his account) indirectly influence the conduct of his brethren; but it must forcibly affect the minds of those who have matter of complaint against government, and whose cause the Court of Directors appear to espouse, in a country where the authority of the Court of Directors has seldom been exerted but to be despised, where the operation of laws is but very imperfectly understood, but where men are acute, sagacious, and even suspicious of the effect of all personal connections. Their suspicions, though perhaps not rightly applied to every individual, will induce them to take indications from the situations and connections of the prosecuting parties, as well as of the judges. It cannot fail to be observed, that Mr. Naylor, the Company"s attorney, lived in Mr. Barwell"s house; the late Mr. Bogle, the Company"s commissioner of lawsuits, owed his place to the patronage of Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, by whom the office was created for him; and Sir John Day, the Company"s advocate, who arrived in Bengal in February, 1779, had not been four months in Calcutta, when Mr. Hastings, Mr. Barwell, and Sir Eyre Coote doubled his salary, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler.
If the Directors are known to devolve the whole cognizance of the offences charged on their servants so highly situated upon the Supreme Court, an excuse will be furnished, if already it has not been furnished, to the Directors for declining the use of their own proper political power and authority in examining into and animadverting on the conduct of their servants. Their true character, as strict masters and vigilant governors, will merge in that of prosecutors. Their force and energy will evaporate in tedious and intricate processes,--in lawsuits which can never end, and which are to be carried on by the very dependants of those who are under prosecution. On their part, these servants will decline giving satisfaction to their masters, because they are already before another tribunal; and thus, by shifting responsibility from hand to hand, a confederacy to defeat the whole spirit of the law, and to remove all real restraints on their actions, may be in time formed between the servants, Directors, prosecutors, and court. Of this great danger your Committee will take farther notice in another place.
No notice whatever appears to have been taken of the Company"s orders in Bengal till the 11th of January, 1779, when Mr. Barwell moved, _that the claim made upon him by the Court of Directors should be submitted to the Company"s lawyers, and that they should be perfectly instructed to prosecute upon it_. In his minute of that date he says, "_that the state of his health had long since rendered it necessary for him to return to Europe_."
Your Committee observe that he continued in Bengal another year. He says, "that he had hitherto waited for the arrival of Sir John Day, the Company"s advocate; but as the season was now far advanced, he wished to bring the trial speedily to issue."
In this minute he retracts his original engagement to submit himself to the judgment of the Court of Directors, "and to account to them for the last shilling he had received": he says, "that no merit had been given him for the offer; that a most unjustifiable advantage had been attempted to be made of it, by first declining it and _descending to abuse_, and then giving orders upon it as if it had been rejected, when called upon by him in the person of his agent to bring home the charge of delinquency."
Mr. Barwell"s reflections on the proceedings of the Court of Directors are not altogether clearly expressed; nor does it appear distinctly to what facts he alludes. He a.s.serts that a most unjustifiable advantage had been attempted to be made of his offer. The fact is, the Court of Directors have nowhere declined accepting it; on the contrary, they caution the Governor-General and Council about the manner of receiving the tender of the money which they expect him to make. They say nothing of any call made on them by Mr. Barwell"s agent in England; nor does it appear to your Committee that they "have descended to abuse." They have a right, and it is their duty, to express, in distinct and appropriated terms, their sense of all blamable conduct in their servants.
So far as may be collected from the evidence of the Company"s records, Mr. Barwell"s a.s.sertions do not appear well supported; but even if they were more plausible, your Committee apprehend that he could not be discharged from his solemn recorded promise to abide by the judgment of the Court of Directors. Their judgment was declared by their resolution to prosecute, which it depended upon himself to satisfy by making good his engagement. To excuse his not complying with the Company"s claims, he says, "_that his compliance would be urged as a confession of delinquency, and to proceed from conviction of his having usurped on the rights of the Company_." Considerations of this nature might properly have induced Mr. Barwell to stand upon his right in the first instance, "_and to appeal_" (to use his own words) "_to the laws of his country, in order to vindicate his fame_." But his performance could not have more weight to infer delinquency than his promise. Your Committee think his observation comes too late.
If he had stood a trial, when he first acknowledged the facts, and submitted himself to the judgment of the Court of Directors, the suit would have been carried on under the direction of General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis; whereas in the year 1779 his influence at the board gave him the conduct of it himself. In an interval of four years it may be presumed that great alterations might have happened in the state of the evidence against him.
In the subsequent proceedings of the Governor-General and Council the House will find that Mr. Barwell complained that his instances for carrying on the prosecution were ineffectual, owing to the legal difficulties and delays _urged by the Company"s law officers_, which your Committee do not find have yet been removed. As far as the latest advices reach, no progress appears to have been made in the business. In July, 1782, the Court of Directors found it necessary to order an account of all suits against Europeans depending in the Supreme Court of Judicature to be transmitted to them, and that no time should be lost in bringing them to a determination.
SALTPETRE.
The next article of direct monopoly subservient to the Company"s export is saltpetre. This, as well as opium, is far the greater part the produce of the province of Bahar. The difference between the management and destination of the two articles has been this. Until the year 1782, the opium has been sold in the country, and the produce of the sale laid out in country merchandise for the Company"s export. A great part of the saltpetre is sent out in kind, and never has contributed to the interior circulation and commerce of Bengal. It is managed by agency on the Company"s account. The price paid to the manufacturer is invariable.
Some of the larger undertakers receive advances to enable them to prosecute their work; but as they are not always equally careful or fortunate, it happens that large balances acc.u.mulate against them.
Orders have been sent from Calcutta from time to time to recover their balances, with little or no success, but with great vexation to all concerned in the manufacture. Sometimes they have imprisoned the failing contractors in their own houses,--a severity which answers no useful purpose. Such persons are so many hands detached from the improvement and added to the burden of the country. They are persons of skill drawn from the future supply of that monopoly in favor of which they are prosecuted. In case of the death of the debtor, this rigorous demand falls upon the ruined houses of widows and orphans, and may be easily converted into a means either of cruel oppression or a mercenary indulgence, according to the temper of the exactors. Instead of thus having recourse to imprisonment, the old balance is sometimes deducted from the current produce. This, in these circ.u.mstances, is a grievous discouragement. People must be discouraged from entering into a business, when, the commodity being fixed to one invariable standard and confined to one market, the best success can be attended only with a limited advantage, whilst a defective produce can never be compensated by an augmented price. Accordingly, very little of these advances has been recovered, and after much vexation the pursuit has generally been abandoned. It is plain that there can be no life and vigor in any business under a monopoly so const.i.tuted; nor can the true productive resources of the country, in so large an article of its commerce, ever come to be fully known.
The supply for the Company"s demand in England has rarely fallen short of two thousand tons, nor much exceeded two thousand five hundred. A discretionary allowance of this commodity has been made to the French, Dutch, and Danes, who purchase their allotted shares at some small advance on the Company"s price. The supply destined for the London market is proportioned to the spare tonnage; and to accommodate that tonnage, the saltpetre is sometimes sent to Madras and sometimes even to Bombay, and that not unfrequently in vessels expressly employed for the purpose.
Mr. Law, Chief of Patna, being examined on the effect of that monopoly, delivered his opinion, that with regard to the Company"s _trade_ the monopoly was advantageous, but as sovereigns of the country they must be losers by it. These two capacities in the Company are found in perpetual contradiction. But much doubt may arise whether this monopoly will be found advantageous to the Company either in the one capacity or the other. The gross commodity monopolized for sale in London is procured from the revenues in Bengal; the certain is given for the hazardous. The loss of interest on the advances, sometimes the loss of the princ.i.p.al,--the expense of carriage from Patna to Calcutta,--the various loadings and unloadings, and insurance (which, though borne by the Company, is still insurance),--the engagement for the Ordnance, limited in price, and irregular in payment,--the charge of agency and management, through all its gradations and successions,--when all these are taken into consideration, it may be found that the gain of the Company as traders will be far from compensating their loss as sovereigns. A body like the East India Company can scarcely, in any circ.u.mstance, hope to carry on the details of such a business, from its commencement to its conclusion, with any degree of success. In the subjoined estimate of profit and loss, the value of the commodity is stated at its invoice price at Calcutta. But this affords no just estimate of the whole effect of a dealing, where the Company"s charge commences in the first rudiments of the manufacture, and not at the purchase at the place of sale and valuation: for they [there?] may be heavy losses on the value at which the saltpetre is estimated, when, shipped off on their account, without any appearance in the account; and the inquiries of your Committee to find the charges on the saltpetre previous to the shipping have been fruitless.
BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.
The other link by which India is bound to Great Britain is the government established there originally by the authority of the East India Company, and afterwards modified by Parliament by the acts of 1773 and 1780. This system of government appears to your Committee to be at least as much disordered, and as much perverted from every good purpose for which lawful rule is established, as the trading system has been from every just principle of commerce. Your Committee, in tracing the causes of this disorder through its effects, have first considered the government as it is const.i.tuted and managed within itself, beginning with its most essential and fundamental part, the order and discipline by which the supreme authority of this kingdom is maintained.
The British government in India being a subordinate and delegated power, it ought to be considered as a fundamental principle in such a system, that it is to be preserved in the strictest obedience to the government at home. Administration in India, at an immense distance from the seat of the supreme authority,--intrusted with the most extensive powers,--liable to the greatest temptations,--possessing the amplest means of abuse,--ruling over a people guarded by no distinct or well-ascertained privileges, whose language, manners, and radical prejudices render not only redress, but all complaint on their part, a matter of extreme difficulty,--such an administration, it is evident, never can be made subservient to the interests of Great Britain, or even tolerable to the natives, but by the strictest rigor in exacting obedience to the commands of the authority lawfully set over it.
But your Committee find that this principle has been for some years very little attended to. Before the pa.s.sing the act of 1773, the professed purpose of which was to secure a better subordination in the Company"s servants, such was the firmness with which the Court of Directors maintained their authority, that they displaced Governor Cartier, confessedly a meritorious servant, for disobedience of orders, although his case was not a great deal more than a question by whom the orders were to be obeyed.[12] Yet the Directors were so sensible of the necessity of a punctual and literal obedience, that, conceiving their orders went to the parties who were to obey, as well as to the act to be done, they proceeded with a strictness that, in all cases except that of their peculiar government, might well be considered as rigorous. But in proportion as the necessity of enforcing obedience grew stronger and more urgent, and in proportion to the magnitude and importance of the objects affected by disobedience, this rigor has been relaxed. Acts of disobedience have not only grown frequent, but systematic; and they have appeared in such instances, and are manifested in such a manner, as to amount, in the Company"s servants, to little less than absolute independence, against which, on the part of the Directors, there is no struggle, and hardly so much as a protest to preserve a claim.
Before your Committee proceed to offer to the House their remarks on the most distinguished of these instances, the particulars of which they have already reported, they deem it necessary to enter into some detail of a transaction equally extraordinary and important, though not yet brought into the view of Parliament, which appears to have laid the foundation of the princ.i.p.al abuses that ensued, as well as to have given strength and encouragement to those that existed. To this transaction, and to the conclusions naturally deducible from it, your Committee attribute that general spirit of disobedience and independence which has since prevailed in the government of Bengal.
Your Committee find that in the year 1775 Mr. Lauchlan Macleane was sent into England as agent to the Nabob of Arcot and to Mr. Hastings. The conduct of Mr. Hastings, in a.s.sisting to extirpate, for a sum of money to be paid to the Company, the innocent nation of the Rohillas, had drawn upon him the censure of the Court of Directors, and the unanimous censure of the Court of Proprietors. The former had even resolved to prepare an application to his Majesty for Mr. Hastings"s dismission.
Another General Court was called on this proceeding. Mr. Hastings was then openly supported by a majority of the Court of Proprietors, who professed to entertain a good opinion of his general ability and rect.i.tude of intention, notwithstanding the unanimous censure pa.s.sed upon him. In that censure they therefore seemed disposed to acquiesce, without pushing the matter farther. But, as the offence was far from trifling, and the condemnation of the measure recent, they did not directly attack the resolution of the Directors to apply to his Majesty, but voted in the ballot that it should be reconsidered. The business therefore remained in suspense, or it rather seemed to be dropped, for some months, when Mr. Macleane took a step of a nature not in the least to be expected from the condition in which the cause of his princ.i.p.al stood, which was apparently as favorable as the circ.u.mstances could bear. Hitherto the support of Mr. Hastings in the General Court was only by a majority; but if on application from the Directors he should be removed, a mere majority would not have been sufficient for his restoration. The door would have been barred against his return to the Company"s service by one of the strongest and most substantial clauses in the Regulating Act of 1778. Mr. Macleane, probably to prevent the manifest ill consequences of such a step, came forward with a letter to the Court of Directors, declaring his provisional powers, and offering on the part of Mr. Hastings an immediate resignation of his office.
On this occasion the Directors showed themselves extremely punctilious with regard to Mr. Macleane"s powers. They probably dreaded the charge of becoming accomplices to an evasion of the act by which Mr. Hastings, resigning the service, would escape the consequences attached by law to a dismission; they therefore demanded Mr. Macleane"s written authority.
This he declared he could not give into their hands, as the letter contained other matters, of a nature extremely confidential, but that, if they would appoint a committee of the Directors, he would readily communicate to them the necessary parts of the letter, and give them perfect satisfaction with regard to his authority. A deputation was accordingly named, who reported that they had seen Mr. Hastings"s instructions, contained in a paper in _his own handwriting_, and that the authority for the act now done by Mr. Macleane was clear and sufficient. Mr. Vansittart, a very particular friend of Mr. Hastings, and Mr. John Stewart, his most attached and confidential dependant, attended on this occasion, and proved that directions perfectly correspondent to this written authority had been given by Mr. Hastings in their presence. By this means the powers were fully authenticated; but the letter remained safe in Mr. Macleane"s hands.
Nothing being now wanting to the satisfaction of the Directors, the resignation was formally accepted. Mr. Wheler was named to fill the vacancy, and presented for his Majesty"s approbation, which was received. The act was complete, and the office that Mr. Hastings had resigned was legally filled. This proceeding was officially notified in Bengal, and General Clavering, as senior in Council, was in course to succeed to the office of Governor-General.
Mr. Hastings, to extricate himself from the difficulties into which this resignation had brought him, had recourse to one of those unlooked-for and hardy measures which characterize the whole of his administration.
He came to a resolution of disowning his agent, denying his letter, and disavowing his friends. He insisted on continuing in the execution of his office, and supported himself by such reasons as could be furnished in such a cause. An open schism instantly divided the Council. General Clavering claimed the office to which he ought to succeed, and Mr.
Francis adhered to him: Mr. Barwell stuck to Mr. Hastings. The two parties a.s.sembled separately, and everything was running fast into a confusion which suspended government, and might very probably have ended in a civil war, had not the judges of the Supreme Court, on a reference to them, settled the controversy by deciding that the resignation was an invalid act, and that Mr. Hastings was still in the legal possession of his place, which had been actually filled up in England. It was extraordinary that the nullity of this resignation should not have been discovered in England, where the act authorizing the resignation then was, where the agent was personally present, where the witnesses were examined, and where there was and could be no want of legal advice, either on the part of the Company or of the crown. The judges took no light matter upon them in superseding, and thereby condemning the legality of his Majesty"s appointment: for such it became by the royal approbation.
On this determination, such as it was, the division in the meeting, but not in the minds of the Council, ceased. General Clavering uniformly opposed the conduct of Mr. Hastings to the end of his life. But Mr.
Hastings showed more temper under much greater provocations. In disclaiming his agent, and in effect accusing him of an imposture the most deeply injurious to his character and fortune, and of the grossest forgery to support it, he was so very mild and indulgent as not to show any active resentment against his unfaithful agent, nor to complain to the Court of Directors. It was expected in Bengal that some strong measures would have immediately been taken to preserve the just rights of the king and of the Court of Directors; as this proceeding, unaccompanied with the severest animadversion, manifestly struck a decisive blow at the existence of the most essential powers of both. But your Committee do not find that any measures whatever, such as the case seemed to demand, were taken. The observations made by the Court of Directors on what they call "_these extraordinary transactions_" are just and well applied. They conclude with a declaration, "_that the measures which it might be necessary for them to take, in order to retrieve the honor of the Company, and to prevent the like abuse from being practised in future, should have their most serious and earliest consideration_"; and with this declaration they appear to have closed the account, and to have dismissed the subject forever.
A sanction was hereby given to all future defiance of every authority in this kingdom. Several other matters of complaint against Mr. Hastings, particularly the charge of peculation, fell to the ground at the same time. Opinions of counsel had been taken relative to a prosecution at law upon this charge, from the then Attorney and the then Solicitor-General and Mr. Dunning, (now the Lords Thurlow, Loughborough, and Ashburton,) together with Mr. Adair (now Recorder of London). None of them gave a positive opinion against the grounds of the prosecution.
The Attorney-General doubted on _the prudence_ of the proceedings, and censured (as it well deserved) the ill statement of the case. Three of them, Mr. Wedderburn, Mr. Dunning, and Mr. Adair, were clear in favor of the prosecution. No prosecution, however, was had, and the Directors contented themselves with censuring and admonishing Mr. Hastings.
With regard to the Supreme Council, the members who chose (for it was choice only) to attend to the orders which were issued from the languishing authority of the Directors continued to receive unprofitable applauses and no support. Their correspondence was always filled with complaints, the justice of which was always admitted by the Court of Directors; but this admission of the existence of the evil showed only the impotence of those who were to administer the remedy. The authority of the Court of Directors, resisted with success in so capital an instance as that of the resignation, was not likely to be respected in any other. What influence it really had on the conduct of the Company"s servants may be collected from the facts that followed it.
The disobedience of Mr. Hastings has of late not only become uniform and systematical in practice, but has been in principle, also, supported by him, and by Mr. Barwell, late a member of the Supreme Council in Bengal, and now a member of this House.
In the Consultation of the 20th of July, 1778, Mr. Barwell gives it as his solemn and deliberate opinion, that, "while Mr. Hastings is in the government, the respect and dignity of his station should be supported.
In these sentiments, I must decline an acquiescence in _any_ order which has a _tendency_ to bring the government into disrepute. As the Company have the means and power of forming their own administration in India, they may at pleasure place whom they please at the head; but in my opinion they are not authorized to treat a person in that post with _indignity_."
By treating them with indignity (in the particular cases wherein they have declined obedience to orders) they must mean those orders which imply a censure on any part of their conduct, a reversal of any of their proceedings, or, as Mr. Barwell expresses himself in words very significant, in any orders that have a _tendency_ to bring _their_ government into _disrepute_. The amplitude of this latter description, reserving to them the judgment of any orders which have so much as that _tendency_, puts them in possession of a complete independence, an independence including a despotic authority over the subordinates and the country. The very means taken by the Directors for enforcing their authority becomes, on this principle, a cause of further disobedience.
It is observable, that their principles of disobedience do not refer to any local consideration, overlooked by the Directors, which might supersede their orders, or to any change of circ.u.mstances, which might render another course advisable, or even perhaps necessary,--but it relates solely to their own interior feelings in matters relative to themselves, and their opinion of their own dignity and reputation. It is plain that they have wholly forgotten who they are, and what the nature of their office is. Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell are servants of the Company, and as such, by the duty inherent in that relation, as well as by their special covenants, were obliged to yield obedience to the orders of their masters. They have, as far as they were able, cancelled all the bonds of this relation, and all the sanctions of these covenants.
But in thus throwing off the authority of the Court of Directors, Mr.
Hastings and Mr. Barwell have thrown off the authority of the whole legislative power of Great Britain; for, by the Regulating Act of the thirteenth of his Majesty, they are expressly "directed and required to pay due obedience to _all_ such orders as they shall receive from the Court of Directors of the said United Company." Such is the declaration of the law. But Mr. Barwell declares that he declines obedience to _any_ orders which he shall interpret to be indignities on a Governor-General.
To the clear injunctions of the legislature Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell have thought proper to oppose their pretended reputation and dignity; as if the chief honor of public ministers in every situation was not to yield a cheerful obedience to the laws of their country. Your Committee, to render evident to this House the general nature and tendency of this pretended dignity, and to ill.u.s.trate the real principles upon which they appear to have acted, think it necessary to make observations on three or four of the cases, already reported, of marked disobedience to particular and special orders, on one of which the above extraordinary doctrine was maintained.
These are the cases of Mr. Fowke, Mr. Bristow, and Mahomed Reza Khan. In a few weeks after the death of Colonel Monson, Mr. Hastings having obtained a majority in Council by his casting vote, Mr. Fowke and Mr.
Bristow were called from their respective offices of Residents at Benares and Oude, places which have become the scenes of other extraordinary operations under the conduct of Mr. Hastings in person.
For the recall of Mr. Bristow no reason was a.s.signed. The reason a.s.signed for the proceeding with regard to Mr. Fowke was, that "the purposes for which he was appointed were then fully accomplished."
An account of the removal of Mr. Fowke was communicated to the Court of Directors in a letter of the 22d of December, 1776. On this notification the Court had nothing to conclude, but that Mr. Hastings, from a rigid pursuit of economy in the management of the Company"s affairs, had recalled a useless officer. But, without alleging any variation whatsoever in the circ.u.mstances, in less than twenty days after the order for the recall of Mr. Fowke, and _the very day after the dispatch_ containing an account of the transaction, Mr. Hastings recommended Mr. Graham to this very office, the end of which, he declared to the Directors but the day before, had been fully accomplished; and not thinking this sufficient, he appointed Mr. D.