That the intention of the said Warren Hastings, in pressing for a peace with the Mahrattas on terms so dishonorable and by measures so rash and ill-concerted, was not to restore and establish a general peace throughout India, but to engage the India Company in a new war against Hyder Ali, and to make the Mahrattas parties therein. That the eagerness and pa.s.sion with which the said Hastings pursued this object laid him open to the Mahrattas, who depended thereon for obtaining whatever they should demand from us. That, in order to carry the point of an offensive alliance against Hyder Ali, the said Hastings exposed the negotiation for peace with the Mahrattas to many difficulties and delays. That the Mahrattas were bound by a clear and recent engagement, which Hyder had never violated in any article, to make no peace with us which should not include him; that they pleaded the sacred nature of this obligation in answer to all our requisitions on this head, while the said Hastings, still importunate for his favorite point, suggested to them various means of reconciling a substantial breach of their engagement with a formal observance of it, and taught them how they might at once be parties in a peace with Hyder Ali and in an offensive alliance for immediate hostility against him. That these lessons of public duplicity and artifice, and these devices of ostensible faith and real treachery, could have no effect but to degrade the national character, and to inspire the Mahrattas themselves, with whom we were in treaty, with a distrust in our sincerity and good faith. That the object of this fraudulent policy (viz., the utter destruction of Hyder Ali, and a part.i.tion of his dominions) was neither wise in itself, or authorized by the orders and instructions of the Company to their servants; that it was incompatible with the treaty of peace, in which Hyder Ali was included, and contrary to the repeated and best-understood injunctions of the Company,--being, in the first place, a bargain for a new war, and, in the next, aiming at an extension of our territory by conquest.
That the best and soundest political opinions on the relations of these states have always represented our great security against the power of the Mahrattas to depend on its being balanced by that of Hyder Ali; and the Mysore country is so placed as a barrier between the Carnatic and the Mahrattas as to make it our interest rather to strengthen and repair that barrier than to level and destroy it. That the said treaty of part.i.tion does express itself to be _eventual_ with regard to the making and keeping of peace; but through the whole course of the said Hastings"s proceeding he did endeavor to prevent any peace with the Sultan or Nabob of Mysore, Tippoo Sahib, and did for a long time endeavor to frustrate all the methods which could have rendered the said treaty of conquest and part.i.tion wholly unnecessary.
That the Mahrattas having taken no effectual step to oblige Hyder Ali to make good the conditions for which they had engaged in his behalf, and the war continuing to be carried on in the Carnatic by Tippoo Sultan, son and successor of Hyder Ali, the Presidency of Fort St. George undertook, upon their own authority, to open a negotiation with the said Tippoo: which measure, though indispensably necessary, the said Hastings utterly disapproved and discountenanced, expressly denying that there was any ground or motive for entering into any direct or separate treaty with Tippoo, and not consenting to or authorizing any negotiation for such treaty, until after a cessation of hostilities had been brought about with him by the Presidency of Fort St. George, in August, 1783, and the ministers of Tippoo had been received and treated with by that Presidency, and commissioners, in return, actually sent by the said Presidency to the court of Poonah: which late and reluctant consent and authority were extorted from him, the said Hastings, in consequence of the acknowledgment of his agent at the court of Mahdajee Sindia, upon whom the said Warren Hastings had depended for enforcing the clauses of the Mahratta treaty, of the precariousness of such dependence, and of the necessity of that direct and separate treaty with Tippoo, so long and so lately reprobated by the said Warren Hastings, notwithstanding the information and entreaties of the Presidency of Fort St. George, as well as the known distresses and critical situation of the Company"s affairs. That, though the said Warren Hastings did at length give instructions for negotiating and making peace with Tippoo, expressly adding, that those instructions extended to _all_ the points which occurred to _him or them_ as capable of being agitated or gained upon the occasion,--though the said instructions were sent after the said commissioners by the Presidency of Fort St. George, with directions to obey them,--though not only the said instructions were obeyed, but advantages gained which did not occur to the said Warren Hastings,--though the said peace formed a contrast with the Mahratta peace, in neither ceding any territory possessed by the Company before the war, or delivering up any dependant or ally to the vengeance of his adversaries, but providing for the restoration of all the countries that had been taken from the Company and their allies,--though the Supreme Council of Calcutta, forming the legal government of Bengal in the absence of the said Warren Hastings, ratified the said treaty,--yet the said Warren Hastings, then absent from the seat of government, and out of the province of Bengal, and forming no legal or integral part of the government during such absence, did, after such ratification, usurp the power of acting as a part of such government (as if actually sitting in Council with the other members of the same) in the consideration and unqualified censure of the terms of the said peace.
That the Nabob of Arcot, with whom the said Hastings did keep up an unwarrantable clandestine correspondence, without any communication with the Presidency of Madras, wrote a letter of complaint, dated the 27th of March, 1784, against the Presidency of that place, without any communication thereof to the said Presidency, the said complaint being addressed to the said Warren Hastings, the substance of which complaint was, that he, the Nabob, had not been made a party to the late treaty; and although his interest had been sufficiently provided for in the said treaty, the said Warren Hastings did sign a declaration, on the 23d of May, at Lucknow, forming the basis of a new article, and making a new party to the treaty, after it had been by all parties (the Supreme Council of Calcutta included) completed and ratified, and did transmit the said new stipulation to the Presidency at Calcutta, solely for the purposes and at the instigation of the Nabob of Arcot; and the said declaration was made without any previous communication with the Presidency aforesaid, and in consequence thereof orders were sent by the Council at Calcutta to the Presidency of Fort St. George, _under the severest threats in case of disobedience_: which orders, whatever were their purport, would, as an undue a.s.sumption of and partic.i.p.ation in the government, from which he was absent, become a high misdemeanor; but, being to the purport of opening the said treaty after its solemn ratification, and proposing a new clause and a new party to the same, was also an aggravation of such misdemeanor, as it tended to convey to the Indian powers an idea of the unsteadiness of the councils and determinations of the British government, and to take away all reliance on its engagements, and as, above all, it exposed the affairs of the nation and the Company to the hazard of seeing renewed all the calamities of war, from whence by the conclusion of the treaty they had emerged, and upon a pretence so weak as that of proposing the Nabob of Arcot to be a party to the same,--though he had not been made a party by the said Warren Hastings in the Mahratta treaty, which professed to be for the relief of the Carnatic,--though he was not a party to the former treaty with Hyder, also relative to the Carnatic,--though it was not certain, if the treaty were once opened, and that even Tippoo should then consent to that Nabob"s being a party, whether he, the said Nabob, would agree to the clauses of the same, and consequently whether the said treaty, once opened, could afterwards be concluded: an uncertainty of which he, the said Hastings, should have learned to be aware, having already once been disappointed by the said Nabob"s refusing to accede to a treaty which he, the said Warren Hastings, made for him with the Dutch, about a year before.
That the said Warren Hastings,--having broken a solemn and honorable treaty of peace by an unjust and unprovoked war,--having neglected to conclude that war when he might have done it without loss of honor to the nation,--having plotted and contrived, as far as depended on him, to engage the India Company in another war as soon as the former should be concluded,--and having at last put an end to a most unjust war against the Mahrattas by a most ignominious peace with them, in which he sacrificed objects essential to the interests, and submitted to conditions utterly incompatible with the honor of this nation, and with his own declared sense of the dishonorable nature of those conditions,--and having endeavored to open anew the treaty concluded with Tippoo Sultan through the means of the Presidency of Fort St.
George, upon principles of justice and honor, and which established peace in India, and thereby exposing the British possessions there to the renewal of the dangers and calamities of war,--has by these several acts been guilty of sundry high crimes and misdemeanors.
XXI.--CORRESPONDENCE.
That, by an act of the 13th year of his present Majesty, int.i.tuled, "An act for establishing certain regulations for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company, as well in India as in Europe, the Governor-General and Council are required and directed to pay due obedience to all such orders as they shall receive from the Court of Directors of the said United Company, and to correspond from time to time, and constantly and diligently transmit to the said Court an exact particular of all advices or intelligence and of all transactions and matters whatsoever that shall come to their knowledge, relating to the government, commerce, revenues, or interest of the said United Company."
That, in consequence of the above-recited act, the Court of Directors, in their general instructions of the 29th March, 1774, to the Governor-General and Council, did direct, "that the correspondence with the princes or country powers in India should be carried on through the Governor-General only; but that all letters to be sent by him should be first approved in Council; and that he should lay before the Council, at their next meeting, all letters received by him in the course of such correspondence, for their information."
And the Governor-General and Council were therein further ordered, "that, in transacting the business of their department, they should enter with the utmost perspicuity and exactness all their proceedings whatsoever, and all dissents, if such should at any time be made by any member of their board, together with all letters sent or received in the course of their correspondence; and that broken sets of such proceedings, to the latest period possible, be transmitted to them [the Court of Directors], a complete set at the end of every year, and a duplicate by the next conveyance."
That, in defiance of the said orders, and in breach of the above-recited act of Parliament, the said Warren Hastings has, in sundry instances, concealed from his Council the correspondence carried on between him and the princes or country powers in India, and neglected to communicate the advices and intelligence he from time to time received from the British Residents at the different courts in India to the other members of the government, and, without their knowledge, counsel, or partic.i.p.ation, has dispatched orders on matters of the utmost consequence to the interests of the Company.
That, moreover, the said Warren Hastings, for the purpose of covering his own improper and dangerous practices from his employers, has withheld from the Court of Directors, upon sundry occasions, copies of the proceedings had, and the correspondence carried on by him in his official capacity as Governor-General, whereby the Court of Directors have been kept in ignorance of matters which it highly imported them to know, and the affairs of the Company have been exposed to much inconvenience and injury.
That, in all such concealments and acts done or ordered without the consent and authority of the Supreme Council, the said Warren Hastings has been guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors.
XXII.--FYZOOLA KHaN.
PART I.
RIGHTS OF FYZOOLA KHaN, ETC., BEFORE THE TREATY OF LALL-DANG.
I. That the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, who now holds of the Vizier the territory of Rampoor, Shahabad, and certain other districts dependent thereon, in the country of the Rohillas, is the second son of a prince renowned in the history of Hindostan under the name of Ali Mohammed Khan, some time sovereign of all that part of Rohilcund which is particularly distinguished by the appellation of the Kutteehr.
II. That, after the death of Ali Mohammed aforesaid, as Fyzoola Khan, together with his elder brother, was then a prisoner of war at a place called Herat, "the Rohilla chiefs took possession of the ancient estates" of the captive princes; and the Nabob Fyzoola Khan was from necessity compelled to waive his hereditary rights for the inconsiderable districts of Rampoor and Shahabad, then estimated to produce from six to eight lacs of annual revenue.
III. That in 1774, on the invasion of Rohilcund by the united armies of the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah and the Company, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, "with some of his people, was present at the decisive battle of St.
George," where Hafiz Rhamet, the great leader of the Rohillas, and many others of their princ.i.p.al chiefs were slain; but, escaping from the slaughter, Fyzoola Khan "made his retreat good towards the mountains, with all his treasure." He there collected the scattered remains of his countrymen; and as he was the eldest surviving son of Ali Mohammed Khan, as, too, the most powerful obstacle to his pretensions was now removed by the death of Hafiz, he seems at length to have been generally acknowledged by his natural subjects the undoubted heir of his father"s authority.
IV. That, "regarding the sacred _sincerity_ and friendship of the English, whose _goodness_ and celebrity is everywhere known, _who dispossess no one_," the Nabob Fyzoola Khan made early overtures for peace to Colonel Alexander Champion, commander-in-chief of the Company"s forces in Bengal: that he did propose to the said Colonel Alexander Champion, in three letters, received on the 14th, 24th, and 27th of May, to put himself under the protection either of the Company, or of the Vizier, through the mediation and with the guaranty of the Company; and that he did offer, "whatever was conferred upon him, to pay as much without damage or deficiency as any other person would agree to do": stating, at the same time, his condition and pretensions hereinbefore recited as facts "evident as the sun"; and appealing, in a forcible and awful manner, to the generosity and magnanimity of this nation, "by whose means he hoped in G.o.d that he should receive justice"; and as "the person who designed the war was no more," as "in that he was himself guiltless," and as "he had never acted in such a manner as for the Vizier to have taken hatred to his heart against him, that he might be reinstated in his ancient possessions, the country of Ins father."
V. That on the last of the three dates above mentioned, that is to say, on the 27th of May, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan did also send to the commander-in-chief a _vakeel_, or amba.s.sador, who was authorized on the part of him, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, his master, to make a specific offer of three propositions; and that by one of the said propositions "an annual increase of near 400,000_l._ would have accrued to the revenues of our ally, and the immediate acquisition of above 300,000_l._ to the Company, for their influence in effecting an accommodation perfectly consistent with their engagements to the Vizier," and strictly consonant to the demands of justice.
VI. That, so great was the confidence of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan in the just, humane, and liberal feelings of Englishmen, as to "lull him into an inactivity" of the most essential detriment to his interests: since, "in the hopes which he entertained from the interposition of our government," he declined the invitation of the Mogul to join the arms of his Majesty and the Mahrattas, "refused any connection with the Seiks,"
and did even neglect to take the obvious precaution of crossing the Ganges, as he had originally intended, while the river was yet fordable,--a movement that would have enabled him certainly to baffle all pursuit, and probably "to keep the Vizier in a state of disquietude for the remainder of his life."
VII. That the commander-in-chief, Colonel Alexander Champion aforesaid, "thought nothing could be more honorable to this nation than the support of so exalted a character; and whilst it could be done on terms so advantageous, supposed it very unlikely that the vakeel"s proposition should be received with indifference"; that he did accordingly refer it to the administration through Warren Hastings, Esquire, then Governor of Fort William and President of Bengal; and he did at the same time inclose to the said Warren Hastings a letter from the Nabob Fyzoola Khan to the said Hastings,--which letter does not appear, but must be supposed to have been of the same tenor with those before cited to the commander-in-chief,--of which also copies were sent to the said Hastings by the commander-in-chief; and he, the commander-in-chief aforesaid, after urging to the said Hastings sundry good and cogent arguments of policy and prudence in favor of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, did conclude by "wishing for nothing so much as for the adoption of some measure that might strike all the powers of the East with admiration of our justice, in contrast to the conduct of the Vizier."
VIII. That, in answer to such laudable wish of the said commander-in-chief, the President, Warren Hastings, preferring his own prohibited plans of extended dominion to the mild, equitable, and wise policy inculcated in the standing orders of his superiors, and now enforced by the recommendation of the commander-in-chief, did instruct and "desire" him, the said commander-in-chief, "instead of soliciting the Vizier to relinquish his conquest to Fyzoola Khan, to discourage it as much as was in his power"; although the said Hastings did not once express, or even intimate, any doubt whatever of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan"s innocence as to the origin of the war, or of his hereditary right to the territories which he claimed, but to the said pleas of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, as well as to the arguments both of policy and justice advanced by the commander-in-chief, he, the said Hastings, did solely oppose certain speculative objects of imagined expediency, summing up his decided rejection of the proposals made by the Nabob Fyzoola Khan in the following remarkable words. "With respect to Fyzoola Khan, _he appears not to merit our consideration. The petty sovereign of a country estimated at six or eight lacs ought not for a moment to prove an impediment to any of our measures, or to affect the consistency of our conduct_."
IX. That, in the aforesaid violent and arbitrary position, the said Warren Hastings did avow it to be a public principle of his government, that no right, however manifest, and no innocence, however unimpeached, could ent.i.tle the weak to our protection against others, or save them from our own active endeavors for their oppression, and even extirpation, should they interfere with our notions of political expediency; and that such a principle is highly derogatory to the justice and honor of the English name, and fundamentally injurious to our interests, inasmuch as it hath an immediate tendency to excite distrust, jealousy, fear, and hatred against us among all the subordinate potentates of Hindostan.
X. That, in prosecution of the said despotic principle, the President, Warren Hastings aforesaid, did persist to obstruct, as far as in him lay, every advance towards an accommodation between the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah and the Nabob Fyzoola Khan; and particularly on the 16th of September, only eight days after the said Hastings, in, conjunction with the other members of the Select Committee of Bengal, had publicly testified his _satisfaction_ in the prospect of _an accommodation_, and had _hoped_ that "his Excellency [the Vizier] would be disposed to conciliate the affections [of the Rohillas] to his government _by acceding to lenient terms_," he, the said Hastings, did nevertheless write, and without the consent or knowledge of his colleagues did privately dispatch, a certain answer to a letter of the commander-in-chief, in which answer the said Hastings did express other _contradictory hopes_, namely, that the commander-in-chief _had resolved on prosecuting the war to a final issue_,--"because" (as the said Hastings explains himself) "it appears very plainly that Fyzoola Khan and his adherents _lay at your mercy_, because I apprehend much inconveniency from delays, and because _I am morally certain that no good will he gained by negotiating_": thereby artfully suggesting his wishes of what might be, in his hopes of what had been, resolved; and plainly, though indirectly, instigating the commander-in-chief to much effusion of blood in an immediate attack on the Rohillas, posted as they were "in a very strong situation," and "combating for all."
XI. That the said Hastings, in the answer aforesaid, did further endeavor to inflame the commander-in-chief against the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, by representing the said Nabob "as highly presuming, insolent, and evasive"; and knowing the distrust which the Nabob Fyzoola Khan entertained of the Vizier, the said Hastings did "expressly desire it should be left wholly to the Vizier to treat with the enemy by _his own agents_ and _in his own manner_,"--though he, the said Hastings, "by no means wished the Vizier to lose time by seeking an accommodation, since it would be more effectual, more decisive, and more _consistent with his dignity, indeed with his honor, which he has already pledged_, to abide by his first offers, to dictate the conditions of peace, and to admit only an acceptance without reservation, or a clear refusal, from his adversary": thereby affecting to hold up, in opposition to and in exclusion of the substantial claims of justice, certain ideal obligations of dignity and honor,--that is to say, the gratification of pride, and the observance of an arrogant determination once declared.
XII. That, although the said answer did not reach the commander-in-chief until peace was actually concluded, and although the dangerous consequences to be apprehended from the said answer were thereby prevented, yet, by the sentiments contained in the said answer, Warren Hastings, Esquire, did strongly evince his ultimate adherence to all the former violent and unjust principles of his conduct towards the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, which principles were disgraceful to the character and injurious to the interests of this nation; and that the said Warren Hastings did thereby, in a particular manner, exclude himself from any share of credit for "the honorable period put to the Rohilla war, which has in some degree done away the reproach so wantonly brought on the English name."
PART II.
RIGHTS OF FYZOOLA KHaN UNDER THE TREATY OF LALL-DANG.
I. That, notwithstanding the culpable and criminal reluctance of the President, Hastings, hereinbefore recited, a treaty of peace and friendship between the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah and the Nabob Fyzoola Khan was finally signed and sealed on the 7th October, 1774, at a place called Lall-Dang, in the presence and with the attestation of the British commander-in-chief, Colonel Alexander Champion aforesaid; and that for the said treaty the Nabob Fyzoola Khan agreed to pay, and did actually pay, the valuable consideration of half his treasure, to the amount of fifteen lacs of rupees, or 150,000_l._ sterling, and upwards.
II. That by the said treaty the Nabob Fyzoola Khan was established in the quiet possession of Rampoor, Shahabad, and "some other districts dependent thereon," subject to certain conditions, of which the more important were as follow.
"That Fyzoola Khan should retain in his service five thousand _troops_, and not a single man more.
"That, with whomsoever the Vizier should make war, Fyzoola Khan should send _two or three thousand men, according to his ability_, to join the forces of the Vizier.
"And that, if the Vizier should march in person, Fyzoola Khan should himself accompany him _with his troops_."
III. That from the terms of the treaty above recited it doth plainly, positively, and indisputably appear that the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, in case of war, was not bound to furnish more than three thousand men under any construction, unless the Vizier should march in person.
IV. That the Nabob Fyzoola Khan was not positively bound to furnish so many as three thousand men, but an indefinite number, not more than three and not less than two thousand; that of the precise number within such limitations the ability of Fyzoola Khan, and not the discretion of the Vizier, was to be the standard; and that such ability could only mean that which was equitably consistent not only with the external defence of his jaghire, but with the internal good management thereof, both as to its police and revenue.
V. That, even in case the Vizier should march in person, it might be reasonably doubted whether the personal service of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan "with his troops" must be understood to be with _all_ his troops, or only with the number before stipulated, not more than three and not less than two thousand men; and that the latter is the interpretation finally adopted by Warren Hastings aforesaid, and the Council of Bengal, who, in a letter to the Court of Directors, dated April 5th, 1783, represent the clauses of the treaty relative to the stipulated aid as meaning simply that Fyzoola Khan "should send two or three thousand men to join the Vizier"s forces, or attend in person in case it should be requisite."
VI. That from the aforesaid terms of the treaty it doth not specifically appear of what the stipulated aid should consist, whether of horse or foot, or in what proportion of both; but that it is the recorded opinion, maturely formed by the said Hastings and his Council, in January, 1783, that even "a single horseman included in the aid which Fyzoola Khan might furnish would prove a literal compliance with the stipulation."
VII. That, in the event of any doubt fairly arising from the terms of the treaty, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, in consideration of his hereditary right to the whole country, and the price by him actually paid for the said treaty, was in equity ent.i.tled to the most favorable construction.
VIII. That, from the attestation of Colonel Champion aforesaid, the government of Calcutta acquired the same right to interpose with the Vizier for the protection of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan as they, the said government, had before claimed from a similar attestation of Sir Robert Barker to a.s.sist the Vizier in extirpating the whole nation of the said Fyzoola Khan,--more especially as in the case of Sir Robert Barker it was contrary to the remonstrances of the then administration, and the furthest from the intentions of the said Barker himself, that his attestation should involve the Company, but the attestation of Colonel Champion was authorized by all the powers of the government, as a "sanction" intended "to add validity" to the treaty; that they, the said government, and in particular the said Warren Hastings, as the first executive member of the same, were bound by the ties of natural justice duly to exercise the aforesaid right, if need were; and that their duty so to interfere was more particularly enforced by the spirit of the censures pa.s.sed both by the Directors and Proprietors in the Rohilla war, and the satisfaction expressed by the Directors "in the honorable end put to that war."
PART III.
GUARANTY OF THE TREATY OF LALL-DANG.
I. That during the life of the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah, and for some time after his death, under his son and successor, Asoph ul Dowlah, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan did remain without disturbance or molestation; that he did all the while imagine his treaty to be under the sanction of the Company, from Colonel Champion"s affixing his signature thereto as a witness, "which signature, as he [Fyzoola Khan] supposed," (rendered the Company the _arbitrators_) between the Vizier and himself, in case of disputes; and that, being "a man of sense, but _extreme pusillanimity_, a good farmer, fond of wealth, _not possessed of the pa.s.sion of ambition_," he did peaceably apply himself to "improve the state of his country, and did, _by his own prudence and attention_, increase the revenues thereof beyond the amount specified in Sujah ul Dowlah"s grant."
II. That in the year 1777, and in the beginning of the year 1778, being "alarmed at the young Vizier"s resumption of a number of jaghires granted by his father to different persons, and the injustice and oppression of his conduct in general," and having now learned (from whom does not appear, but probably from some person supposed of competent authority) that Colonel Champion formerly witnessed the treaty as a private person, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan did make frequent and urgent solicitations to Nathaniel Middleton, Esquire, then Resident at Oude, and to Warren Hastings aforesaid, then Governor-General of Bengal, "for a renovation of his [the Nabob Fyzoola Khan"s] treaty with the late Vizier, and the guaranty of the Company," or for a "separate agreement with the Company for his defence": considering them, the Company, as "the only power in which he had confidence, and to which he could look up for protection."