The supposition of an absolutely necessary cause of the world, existing without the world, also destroys itself. For, being outside the world, it is not in time. And yet, to act as a cause, it must be in time. This supposition is therefore absurd.
The theses in these four antinomies const.i.tute the teaching of philosophical dogmatism. The ant.i.theses const.i.tute doctrines of philosophical empiricism.
_IV.--Criticism of the Chief Arguments for the Existence of G.o.d_
The ontological argument aims at a.s.serting the possibility of conceiving the idea of an _ens realissimum_, of being possessed of all reality. But the idea of existence and the fact of existence are two very different things. Whatever I conceive, or sensibly imagine, I necessarily conceive as though it were existing. Though my pocket be empty, I may conceive it to contain a "hundred thalers." If I conceive them there, I can only conceive them as actually existing there. But, alas, the fact that I am under this necessity of so conceiving by no means carries with it a necessity that the coins should really be in my pocket. That can only be determined by experience.
The cosmological argument contends that if anything exists, there must also exist an absolutely necessary being. Now, at least I myself exist.
Hence there exists an absolutely necessary being. The argument coincides with that by which the thesis of the fourth antinomy is supposed. The objections to it are summed up in the proof of the ant.i.thesis of the fourth antimony. As soon as we have recognised the true conception of causality, we have already transcended the sensible world.
The physico-theological or teleological argument is what is often styled the argument from design. It proceeds not from general, but particular experience. Nature discloses manifold signs of wise intention and harmonious order, and these are held to betoken a divine designer. This argument deserves always to be treated with respect. It is the oldest and clearest of all proofs, and best adapted to convince the reason of the ma.s.s of mankind. It animates us in our study of nature. And it were not only a cheerless, but an altogether vain task to attempt to detract from the persuasive authority of this proof. There is nought to urge against its rationality and its utility.
All arguments, however, to prove the existence of G.o.d must, in order to be theoretically valid, start from specifically and exclusively sensible or phenomenal data, must employ only the conceptions of pure physical science, and must end with demonstrating in sensible experience an object congruous with, or corresponding to, the idea of G.o.d. But this requirement cannot be met, for, scientifically speaking, the existence of an absolutely necessary G.o.d cannot be either proved or disproved.
Hence room is left for faith in any moral proofs that may present themselves to us, apart from science. With this subject ethics, the science of practice or of practical reason, will have to deal.
The Critique of Practical Reason
Kant"s "Critique of Practical Reason" ("Kritik der praktischen Vernunft"), published in 1788, is one of the most striking disquisitions in the whole range of German metaphysical literature.
One of its paragraphs has alone sufficed to render it famous. The pa.s.sage concerning the starry heavens and the moral law as the two transcendently overwhelming phenomena of the universe is, perhaps, more frequently quoted than any other written by a German author.
This is the treatise which forms the central focus of Kant"s thinking. It stands midway between the "Critique of Pure Reason"
and the "Critique of Judgment." Herein Kant takes up the position of a vindicator of the truth of Christianity, approaching his proof of its validity and authority by first establishing positive affirmations of the immortality of the soul and the existence of G.o.d. It also includes a theory of happiness, and an argument concerning the _summum bonum_ of life, the special aim being to demonstrate that man should not simply seek to be happy, but should, by absolute obedience to the moral law, seek to become worthy of that happiness which G.o.d can bestow.
_I.--a.n.a.lytic of Practical Reason_
Practical principles are propositions containing a general determination of the will. They are maxims, or subjective propositions, when expressing the will of an individual; objective, when they are valid expressions of the will of rational beings generally.
Practical principles which pre-suppose an object of desire are empirical, or experimental, and supply no practical laws. Reason, in the scope of a practical law, influences the will not by the medium of pleasure or pain. All rational beings necessarily wish for happiness, but they are not all agreed either as to the means to attain it, or as to the objects of their enjoyment of it. Thus, subjective practical principles can only be reckoned as maxims, never as law.
A rational being ought not to conceive that his individual maxims are calculated to const.i.tute universal laws, and to become the basis of universal legislation. To discover any law which would bring all men into harmony is absolutely impossible.
One of the problems of practical reason is to find the law which can necessarily determine the will, a.s.suming that the will is free. The solution of this problem is to be found in action according to the moral law. We should so act that the maxim of our will can always be valid as a principle of universal legislation. Experience shows how the moral consciousness determines freedom of the will.
Suppose that someone affirms of his inclination for sensual pleasure that he cannot possibly resist temptation to indulgence. If a gallows were erected at the place where he is tempted, on which he should be hanged immediately after satiating his pa.s.sions, would he not be able to control his inclination? We need not long doubt what would be his answer.
But ask him, if his sovereign commanded him to bear false witness against an honourable man, under penalty of death, whether he would hold it possible to conquer his love of life. He might not venture to say what he would choose, but he would certainly admit that it is possible to make choice. Thus, he judges that he can choose to do a thing because he is conscious of moral obligation, and he thus recognises for himself a freedom of will of which, but for the moral law, he would never have been conscious.
We obtain the exact opposite of the principle of morality if we adopt the principle of personal private happiness as the determining motive of the will. This contradiction is not only logical, but also practical.
For morality would be totally destroyed were not the voice of reason as clear and penetrating in relation to the will, even to the most ordinary men.
If one of your friends, after bearing false witness against you, attempted to justify his base conduct by enumerating the advantages which he had thus secured for himself and the happiness he had gained, and by declaring that thus he performed a true human duty, you would either laugh him to scorn or turn from him in horror. And yet, if a man acts for his own selfish ends, you have not the slightest objection to such behaviour.
MORALITY AND HAPPINESS
The maxim of self-love simply advises; the law of morality commands.
There is a vast difference between what we are advised and what we are obliged to do. No practical laws can be based on the principle of happiness, even on that of universal happiness, for the knowledge of this happiness rests on merely empirical or experimental data, every man"s ideas of it being conditioned only on his individual opinion.
Therefore, this principle of happiness cannot prescribe rules for all rational beings.
But the moral law demands prompt obedience from everyone, and thus even the most ordinary intelligence can discern what should be done. Everyone has power to comply with the dictates of morality, but even with regard to any single aim it is not easy to satisfy the vague precept of happiness. Nothing could be more absurd than a command that everyone should make himself happy, for one never commands anyone to do what he inevitably wishes to do. Finally, in the idea of our practical reason, there is something which accompanies the violation of a moral law--namely, its demerit, with the consciousness that punishment is a natural consequence. Therefore, punishment should be connected in the idea of practical reason with crime, as a consequence of the crime, by the principles of moral legislation.
a.n.a.lYSIS OF PRINCIPLES
The practical material principles of determination const.i.tuting the basis of morality may be thus cla.s.sified.
_1. Subjective_
External: Education; the civil const.i.tution. Internal: Physical feeling; moral feeling.
_2. Objective_
Internal: Perfection. External: Will of G.o.d.
The subjective elements are all experimental, or empirical, and cannot supply the universal principle of morality, though they are expounded in that sense by such writers as Montaigne, Mandeville, Epicurus, and Hutcheson.
But the objective elements, as enunciated and expounded by Wolf and the Stoics, and by Crusius and other theological moralists, are founded on reason, for absolute perfection as a quality of things (that is, G.o.d Himself) can only be thought of by rational concepts.
The conception of perfection in a practical sense is the adequacy of a thing for various ends. As a human quality (and so internal) this is simply talent, and what completes it is skill. But supreme perfection in substance, that is, G.o.d Himself, and therefore external (considered practically), is the adequacy of this being for all purposes. All these principles above cla.s.sified are material, and so can never furnish the supreme moral law. For even the Divine will can supply a motive in the human mind because of the expectation of happiness from it.
Therefore, the formal practical principle of the pure reason insists that the mere form of a universal legislation must const.i.tute the ultimate determining principle of the will. Here is the only possible practical principle which is sufficient to furnish categorical imperatives, that is, practical laws which make action a duty.
It follows from this a.n.a.lytic that pure reason can be practical. It can determine the will independently of all merely experimental elements.
There is a remarkable contrast between the working of the pure speculative reason and that of the pure practical reason. In the former--as was shown in the treatise on that subject--a pure, sensible intuition of time and s.p.a.ce made knowledge possible, though only of objects of the senses.
On the contrary, the moral law brings before us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any of the data of the world of sense. And the entire range of our theoretical use of reason indicates a pure world of understanding, which even positively determines it, and enables us to know something of it--namely, a law.
We must observe the distinction between the laws of a system of nature to which the will is subject, and of a system of nature which is subject to the will. In the former, the objects cause the ideas which determine the will; in the latter, the objects are caused by the will. Hence, causality of the will has its determining principle exclusively in the faculty of pure reason, which may, therefore, also be called a pure practical reason.
The moral law is a law of the causality through freedom, and therefore of the possibility of a super-sensible system of nature. It determines the will by imposing on its maxim the condition of a universal legislative form, and thus it is able for the first time to impart practical reality to reason, which otherwise would continue to be transcendent when seeking to proceed speculatively with its ideas.
Thus the moral law induces a stupendous change. It changes the transcendent use of reason into the immanent use. And in result reason itself becomes, by its ideas, an efficient cause in the field of experience.
HUME AND SCEPTICISM
It may be said of David Hume that he initiated the attack on pure reason. My own labours in the investigation of this subject were occasioned by his sceptical teaching, for his a.s.sault made them necessary. He argued that without experience it is impossible to know the difference between one thing and another; that is, we can know _a priori_, and, therefore, the notion of a cause is fict.i.tious and illusory, arising only from the habit of observing certain things a.s.sociated with each in succession of connections.
On such principles we can never come to any conclusion as to causes and effects. We can never predict a consequence from any of the known attributes of things. We can never say of any event that it must _necessarily_ have followed from another; that is, that it must have had an antecedent cause. And we could never lay down a rule derived even from the greatest number of observations. Hence we must trust entirely to blind chance, abolishing all reason, and such a surrender establishes scepticism in an impregnable citadel.
Mathematics escaped Hume, because he considered that its propositions were a.n.a.lytical, proceeding from one determination to another, by reason of ident.i.ty contained in each. But this is not really so, for, on the contrary, they are synthetical, the results depending ultimately on the a.s.sent of observers as witnesses to the universality of propositions. So Hume"s empiricism leads inevitably to scepticism even in this realm.
My investigations led me to the conclusion that the objects with which we are familiar are by no means things in themselves, but are simply phenomena, connected in a certain way with experience. So that without contradiction they cannot be separated from that connection. Only by that experience can they be recognised. I was able to prove the objective reality of the concept of cause in regard to objects of experience, and to demonstrate its origin from pure understanding, without experimental or empirical sources.