TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
PARIS, May 2, 1788.
DEAR SIR,--I am honored with your Excellency"s letter by the last packet, and thank you for the information it contains on the communication between the Cayahoga and Big Beaver. I have ever considered the opening a ca.n.a.l between those two water courses as the most important work in that line which the State of Virginia could undertake. It will infallibly turn through the Potomac all the commerce of Lake Erie, and the country west of that, except what may pa.s.s down the Mississippi; and it is important that it be soon done, lest that commerce should, in the meantime, get established in another channel.
Having, in the spring of the last year, taken a journey through the southern parts of France, and particularly examined the ca.n.a.l of Languedoc, through its whole course, I take the liberty of sending you the notes I made on the spot, as you may find in them something, perhaps, which may be turned to account, some time or other, in the prosecution of the Potomac ca.n.a.l. Being merely a copy from my travelling notes, they are undigested and imperfect, but may still perhaps give hints capable of improvement in your mind.
The affairs of Europe are in such a state still, that it is impossible to say what form they will take ultimately. France and Prussia, viewing the Emperor as their most dangerous and common enemy, had heretofore seen their common safety as depending on a strict connection with one another. This had naturally inclined the Emperor to the scale of England, and the Empress also, as having views in common with the Emperor, against the Turks. But these two powers would, at any time, have gladly quitted England, to coalesce with France, as being the power which they met everywhere, opposed as a barrier to all their schemes of aggrandis.e.m.e.nt. When, therefore, the present King of Prussia took the eccentric measure of bidding defiance to France, by placing his brother in law on the throne of Holland, the two empires immediately seized the occasion of soliciting an alliance with France.
The motives for this appeared so plausible, that it was believed the latter would have entered into this alliance, and that thus, the whole political system of Europe would have taken a new form. What has prevented this court from coming into it, we know not. The unmeasurable ambition of the Emperor, and his total want of moral principle and honor, are suspected. A great share of Turkey, the recovery of Silesia, the consolidation of his dominions by the Bavarian exchange, the liberties of the Germanic body, all occupy his mind together, and his head is not well enough organized, to pursue so much only of all this as is practicable. Still, it was thought that France might safely have coalesced with these powers, because Russia and herself, holding close together, as their interests would naturally dictate, the Emperor could never stir but with their permission. France seems, however, to have taken the worst of all parties, that is, none at all. She folds her arms, lets the two empires go to work to cut up Turkey as they can, and holds Prussia aloof, neither as a friend nor foe. This is withdrawing her opposition from the two empires, without the benefit of any condition whatever. In the meantime, England has clearly overreached herself. She excited the war between the Russians and Turks, in hopes that France, still supporting the Turks, would be embarra.s.sed with the two empires. She did not foresee the event which has taken place, of France abandoning the Turks, and that which may take place, of her union with the two empires. She allied herself with Holland, but cannot obtain the alliance of Prussia. This latter power would be very glad to close again the breach with France, and, therefore, while there remains an opening for this, holds off from England, whose fleets could not enter into Silesia, to protect that from the Emperor. Thus, you see, that the old system is unhinged, and no new one hung in its place.
Probabilities are rather in favor of a connection between the two empires, France and Spain. Several symptoms show themselves, of friendly dispositions between Russia and France, unfriendly ones between Russia and England, and such as are barely short of hostility between England and France. But into real hostilities, this country would with difficulty be drawn. Her finances are too deranged, her internal union too much dissolved, to hazard a war. The nation is pressing on fast to a fixed const.i.tution. Such a revolution in the public opinion has taken place, that the crown already feels its powers bounded, and is obliged, by its measures, to acknowledge limits. A States General will be called at some epoch not distant; they will probably establish a civil list, and leave the government to temporary provisions of money, so as to render frequent a.s.semblies of the national representative necessary. How that representative will be organized is yet uncertain. Among a thousand projects, the best seems to me, that of dividing them into two Houses, of Commons and n.o.bles; the Commons to be chosen by the Provincial a.s.semblies, who are chosen themselves by the people, and the n.o.bles by the body of n.o.blesse, as in Scotland. But there is no reason to conjecture that this is the particular scheme which will be preferred.
The war between the Russians and Turks, has made an opening for our Commodore Paul Jones. The Empress has invited him into her service. She insures to him the rank of rear admiral; will give him a separate command, and, it is understood, that he is never to be commanded. I think she means to oppose him to the Captain Pacha, on the Black Sea.
He is by this time, probably, at St. Petersburg. The circ.u.mstances did not permit his awaiting the permission of Congress, because the season was close at hand for opening the campaign. But he has made it a condition, that he shall be free at all times to return to the orders of Congress, whenever they shall please to call for him; and also, that he shall not in any case be expected to bear arms against France. I believe Congress had it in contemplation, to give him the grade of admiral, from the date of his taking the Serapis. Such a measure now would greatly gratify him, second the efforts of fortune in his favor, and better the opportunities of improving him for our service, whenever the moment shall come in which we may want him.
The danger of our incurring something like a bankruptcy in Holland, which might have been long, and even fatally felt in a moment of crisis, induced me to take advantage of Mr. Adams" journey to take leave at the Hague to meet him there, get him to go on to Amsterdam, and try to avert the impending danger. The moment of paying a great sum of annual interest was approaching. There was no money on hand, the board of treasury had notified that they could not remit any; and the progress of the loan which had been opened there, had absolutely stopped. Our bankers there gave me notice of all this; and that a single day"s failure in the payment of interest would have the most fatal effect on our credit. I am happy to inform you we were able to set the loan a going again, and that the evil is at least postponed.
Indeed, I am tolerably satisfied, that if the measures we proposed are ratified by Congress, all European calls for money (except the French debt) are secure enough, till the end of the year 1790; by which time, we calculated that the new government might be able to get money into their treasury. Much conversation with the bankers, brokers and money holders, gave me insight into the state of national credit there, which I had never before been able satisfactorily to get. The English credit is the first, because they never open a loan, without laying and appropriating taxes for the payment of the interest, and there has never been an instance of their failing one day, in that payment. The Emperor and Empress have good credit, because they use it little, and have hitherto been very punctual. This country is among the lowest, in point of credit. Ours stands in hope only. They consider us as the surest nation on earth for the repayment of the capital; but as the punctual payment of interest is of absolute necessity in their arrangements, we cannot borrow but with difficulty and disadvantage.
The moneyed men, however, look towards our new government with a great degree of partiality, and even anxiety. If they see that set out on the English plan, the first degree of credit will be transferred to us. A favorable occasion will arise to our new government of a.s.serting this ground to themselves. The transfer of the French debt, public and private, to Amsterdam, is certainly desirable. An act of the new government, therefore, for opening a loan in Holland for the purpose, laying taxes at the same time, for paying annually the interest and a part of the princ.i.p.al, will answer the two valuable purposes, of ascertaining the degree of our credit, and of removing those causes of bickering and irritation, which should never be permitted to subsist with a nation, with which it is so much our interest to be on cordial terms as with France. A very small portion of this debt, I mean that part due to the French officers, has done us an injury, of which, those in office in America, cannot have an idea. The interest is unpaid for the last three years; and these creditors, highly connected, and at the same time needy, have felt and communicated hard thoughts of us.
Borrowing, as we have done, three hundred thousand florins a year, to pay our interest in Holland, it would have been worth while to have added twenty thousand more to suppress those clamors. I am anxious about everything which may affect our credit. My wish would be, to possess it in the highest degree, but to use it little. Were we without credit, we might be crushed by a nation of much inferior resources, but possessing higher credit. The present system of war renders it necessary to make exertions far beyond the annual resources of the State, and to consume in one year the efforts of many. And this system we cannot change. It remains then, that we cultivate our credit with the utmost attention.
I had intended to have written a word to your Excellency on the subject of the new Const.i.tution, but I have already spun out my letter to an immoderate length. I will just observe, therefore, that according to my ideas, there is a great deal of good in it. There are two things, however, which I dislike strongly. 1. The want of a declaration of rights. I am in hopes the opposition of Virginia will remedy this, and produce such a declaration. 2. The perpetual re-eligibility of the President. This, I fear, will make that an office for life, first, and then hereditary. I was much an enemy to monarchies before I came to Europe. I am ten thousand times more so, since I have seen what they are. There is scarcely an evil known in these countries, which may not be traced to their king, as its source, nor a good, which is not derived from the small fibres of republicanism existing among them. I can further say, with safety, there is not a crowned head in Europe, whose talents or merits would ent.i.tle him to be elected a vestryman, by the people of any parish in America. However, I shall hope, that before there is danger of this change taking place in the office of President, the good sense and free spirit of our countrymen, will make the changes necessary to prevent it. Under this hope, I look forward to the general adoption of the new Const.i.tution with anxiety, as necessary for us under our present circ.u.mstances. I have so much trespa.s.sed on your patience already, by the length of this letter, that I will add nothing further, than those a.s.surances of sincere esteem and attachment with which I have the honor to be, your Excellency"s most obedient, and most humble servant.
TO MR. JAMES MADISON.
PARIS, May 3, 1788.
DEAR SIR,--Mine of February the 6th, acknowledged the receipt of yours of December the 9th and 20th; since that, those of February the 19th and 20th have come to hand. The present will be delivered to you by Mr.
Warville, whom you will find truly estimable, and a great enthusiast for liberty. His writings will have shown you this.
For public news, I must refer you to my letters to Mr. Jay. Those I wrote to him from Amsterdam will have informed you of my journey thither. While there, I endeavored to get, as well as I could, into the state of national credit there; for though I am an enemy to the using our credit but under absolute necessity, yet the possessing a good credit I consider as indispensable, in the present system of carrying on war. The existence of a nation having no credit is always precarious. The credit of England is the best. Their paper sells at par on the exchange of Amsterdam the moment any of it is offered, and they can command there any sum they please. The reason is, that they never borrow, without establishing taxes for the payment of the interest, and they never yet failed one day in that payment. The Emperor and Empress have good credit enough. They use it little and have been ever punctual. This country cannot borrow at all there; for though they always pay their interest within the year, yet it is often some months behind. It is difficult to a.s.sign to our credit its exact station in this scale. They consider us as the most certain nation on earth for the princ.i.p.al; but they see that we borrow of themselves to pay the interest, so that this is only a conversion of their interest into princ.i.p.al. Our paper, for this reason, sells for from four to eight per cent. below par, on the exchange, and our loans are negotiated with the Patriots only. But the whole body of money dealers, Patriot and Stadtholderian, look forward to our new government with a great degree of partiality and interest. They are disposed to have much confidence in it, and it was the prospect of its establishment, which enabled us to set the loan of last year into motion again. They will attend steadfastly to its first money operations. If these are injudiciously begun, correction, whenever they shall be corrected, will come too late. Our borrowings will always be difficult and disadvantageous. If they begin well, our credit will immediately take the first station.
Equal provision for the interest, adding to it a certain prospect for the princ.i.p.al, will give us a preference to all nations, the English not excepted. The first act of the new government should be some operation, whereby they may a.s.sume to themselves this station. Their European debts form a proper subject for this. Digest the whole, public and private, Dutch, French and Spanish, into a table, showing the sum of interest due every year, and the portions of princ.i.p.al payable the same year. Take the most certain branch of revenue, and one which shall suffice to pay the interest, and leave such a surplus as may accomplish all the payments of the capital, at terms somewhat short of those at which they will become due. Let the surplusses of those years, in which no reimburs.e.m.e.nt of princ.i.p.al falls, be applied to buy up our paper on the exchange of Amsterdam, and thus antic.i.p.ate the demands of princ.i.p.al. In this way, our paper will be kept up at par; and this alone will enable us to command in four and twenty hours, at any time, on the exchange of Amsterdam, as many millions as that capital can produce. The same act which makes this provision for the existing debts, should go on to open a loan to their whole amount; the produce of that loan to be applied, as fast as received, to the payment of such parts of the existing debts as admit of payment. The rate of interest to be as the government should privately instruct their agent, because it must depend on the effect these measures would have on the exchange.
Probably it could be lowered from time to time. Honest and annual publications of the payments made will inspire confidence, while silence would conceal nothing from those interested to know.
You will perceive by the _compte rendu_ which I send you, that this country now calls seriously for its interest at least. The non-payment of this, hitherto, has done our credit little injury, because the government here, saying nothing about it, the public have supposed they wished to leave us at our ease as to the payment. It is now seen that they call for it, and they will publish annually the effect of that call. A failure here, therefore, will have the same effect on our credit hereafter, as a failure at Amsterdam. I consider it then, as of a necessity not to be dispensed with, that these calls be effectually provided for. If it shall be seen that the general provision, before hinted at, cannot be in time, then it is the present Government which should take on itself to borrow in Amsterdam, what may be necessary.
The new Government should by no means be left by the old, to the necessity of borrowing a stiver, before it can tax for its interest.
This will be to destroy the credit of the new Government in its birth.
And I am of opinion, that if the present Congress will add to the loan of a million (which Mr. Adams and myself have proposed this year) what may be necessary for the French calls to the year 1790, the money can be obtained at the usual disadvantage. Though I have not, at this moment, received such authentic information from our bankers as I may communicate to Congress, yet I know privately from one of them, (Mr.
Jacob Van Staphorst, who is here,) that they had on hand a fortnight ago, four hundred thousand florins, and the sale going on well. So that the June interest, which had been in so critical a predicament, was already secured. If the loan of a million on Mr. Adams" bonds of this year, be ratified by Congress, the applications of the money on hand may go on immediately, according to the statement I sent to Mr. Jay.
One article in this, I must beg you to press on the treasury board; that is, an immediate order for the payment of the three years"
arrearages to the French officers. They were about holding a meeting to take desperate measures on this subject, when I was called to Holland.
I desired them to be quiet till my return, and since my return, I have pressed a further tranquillity till July, by which time, I have given them reason to hope I may have an answer from the treasury board, to my letters of March. Their ill humor can be contained no longer, and as I know no reason why they may not be paid at that time, I shall have nothing to urge in our defence after that.
You remember the report, drawn by Governor Randolph, on the navigation of the Mississippi. When I came to Europe, Mr. Thompson was so kind as to have me a copy of it made out. I lent it to Dr. Franklin, and he mislaid it, so that it could never be found. Could you make interest with him to have me another copy made, and send it to me? By Mr.
Warville I send your pedometer. To the loop at the bottom of it, you must sew a tape, and at the other end of the tape, a small hook, (such as we use under the name of hooks and eyes) cut a little hole in the bottom of your left watch pocket, pa.s.s the hook and tape through it, and down between the breeches and drawers, and fix the hook on the edge of your knee band, an inch from the knee buckle; then hook the instrument itself by its swivel hook, on the upper edge of the watch pocket. Your tape being well adjusted in length, your double steps will be exactly counted by the instrument, the shortest hand pointing out the thousands, the flat hand the hundreds, and the long hand the tens and units. Never turn the hands backward; indeed, it is best not to set them to any given place, but to note the number they stand at when you begin to walk. The adjusting the tape to its exact length is a critical business, and will cost you many trials. But once done, it is done for ever. The best way is, to have a small buckle fixed on the middle of the tape, by which you can take it up, and let it out at pleasure. When you choose it should cease to count, unhook it from the top of the watch pocket, and let it fall down to the bottom of the pocket.
I am, with sentiments of the most sincere esteem and attachment, dear Sir your affectionate friend and servant.
David Humphreys
(1752-1818)
David Humphreys fought through the Revolutionary War, and early in 1780 was selected as aide to General Washington with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Having particularly distinguished himself at the siege of York, Congress voted him a handsome sword. In July, 1784, he went to France as Secretary of Legation to Thomas Jefferson. In 1790 he was appointed Minister to Portugal, and in 1797 accepted the office of Minister to Spain, continuing at that post till 1802, after concluding treaties with Tripoli and Algiers. In 1812 he took command of the militia of Connecticut, and as a member of the Legislature was active in reorganizing for the local defence. A collection of his writings was published in 1804.
John Jay
(1745-1829)
John Jay was sent in 1774 as a delegate to the first Congress, and took a leading part in its proceedings. He drew up the "Address to the People of Great Britain, and wrote the address issued by Congress in 1775 to the people of Canada. He was a leading member of the New York Convention, serving on the most important committees, and actively engaged in repelling invasions and suppressing Tory combinations. He had a chief share in framing the Const.i.tution of New York and in May, 1777, was appointed Chief Justice of New York. From December 1778 to September, 1779 he was again a member of Congress. He was then appointed Minister to Spain and with Adams, Franklin and others, signed the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain on September 3, 1783. In 1787 he united with Hamilton and Madison in writing "The Federalist" to answer objections to the proposed Federal Const.i.tution, and contributed powerfully to its adoption. In 1788 he was appointed Chief Justice of the United States, and from 1795 to 1801 was Governor of New York.