Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
25.V.40.
I must know at earliest why Gort gave up Arras, and what actually he is doing with the rest of his army. Is he still persevering in Weygand"s plan, or has he become largely stationary? If the latter, what do you consider the probable course of events in the next few days, and what course do you recommend? Clearly, he must not allow himself to be encircled without fighting a battle. Should he [not] do this by fighting his way to the coast and destroying the armoured troops which stand between him and the sea with overwhelming force of artillery, while covering himself and the Belgian front, which would also curl back, by strong rearguards? Tomorrow at latest this decision must be taken.It should surely be possible for Dill to fly home from any aerodrome momentarily clear, and R.A.F. should send a whole squadron to escort him.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War, and C.I.G.S.
25.V.40.
Pray find out who was the officer responsible for sending the order to evacuate Calais yesterday, and by whom this very lukewarm telegram I saw this morning was drafted, in which mention is made of "for the sake of Allied solidarity." This is not the way to encourage men to fight to the end. Are you sure there is no streak of defeatist opinion in the General Staff?
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
25.V.40.
Something like this should be said to the Brigadier defending Calais: Defence of Calais to the utmost is of the highest importance to our country and our Army now. First, it occupies a large part of the enemy"s armoured forces, and keeps them from attacking our line of communication. Secondly, it preserves a sally-port from which portions of the British Army may make their way home. Lord Gort has already sent troops to your aid, and the Navy will do all possible to keep you supplied. The eyes of the Empire are upon the defence of Calais, and His Majesty"s Government are confident that you and your gallant regiment will perform an exploit worthy of the British name.
This message was sent to Brigadier Nicholson at about 2 P.M P.M. on May 25.
The final decision not to relieve the garrison was taken on the evening of May 26. Till then the destroyers were held ready. Eden and Ironside were with me at the Admiralty. We three came out from dinner and at 9 P.M P.M. did the deed. It involved Eden"s own regiment, in which he had long served and fought in the previous struggle. One has to eat and drink in war, but I could not help feeling physically sick as we afterwards sat silent at the table.
Here was the message to the Brigadier: Every hour you continue to exist is of the greatest help to the B.E.F. Government has therefore decided you must continue to fight. Have greatest possible admiration for your splendid stand. Evacuation will not (repeat not) not) take place, and craft required for above purpose are to return to Dover. take place, and craft required for above purpose are to return to Dover. Verity Verity and and Windsor Windsor to cover Commander minesweeping and his retirement. to cover Commander minesweeping and his retirement.
Calais was the crux. Many other causes might have prevented the deliverance of Dunkirk, but it is certain that the three days gained by the defence of Calais enabled the Gravelines waterline to be held, and that without this, even in spite of Hitler"s vacillations and Rundstedt"s orders, all would have been cut off and lost.
Upon all this there now descended a simplifying catastrophe. The Germans, who had hitherto not pressed the Belgian front severely, on the 24th of May broke the Belgian line on either side of Courtrai, which is but thirty miles from Ostend and Dunkirk. The King of the Belgians soon considered the situation hopeless, and prepared himself for capitulation.
By May 23 the First and Second Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, withdrawn by stages from Belgium, were back again on the frontier defences north and east of Lille, which they had built for themselves during the winter. The German scythe-cut round our southern flank had reached the sea, and we had to shield ourselves from this. As the facts forced themselves upon Gort and his headquarters, troops had successfully been sent to positions along the ca.n.a.l line La Ba.s.see-Bethune-Aire-St. Omer-Watten. These, with elements of the French Sixteenth Corps, touched the sea at the Gravelines waterline. The British Third Corps was responsible in the main for this curled-in flank facing south. There was no continuous line, but only a series of defended "stops" at the main crossings, some of which, like St. Omer and Watten, had already fallen to the enemy. The indispensable roads northward from Ca.s.sel were threatened. Gort"s reserve consisted only of the two British divisions, the 5th and 50th, which had, as we have seen, just been so narrowly extricated from their southerly counterattack made at Arras in forlorn fulfilment of the Weygand plan. At this date the total frontage of the B.E.F. was about ninety miles, everywhere in close contact with the enemy.
To the south of the B.E.F. lay the First French Army, having two divisions in the frontier defences and the remainder, comprising eleven divisions in no good shape, cramped in the area north and east of Douai. This army was under attack from the southeast claw of the German encirclement. On our left the Belgian Army was being driven back from the Lys Ca.n.a.l at many places, and with their retirement northward a gap was developing north of Menin.
In the evening of the 25th, Lord Gort took a vital decision. His orders still were to pursue the Weygand plan of a southerly attack towards Cambrai, in which the 5th and 50th Divisions, in conjunction with the French, were to be employed. The promised French attack northward from the Somme showed no sign of reality. The last defenders of Boulogne had been evacuated. Calais still held out. Gort now abandoned the Weygand plan. There was in his view no longer hope of a march to the south and to the Somme. Moreover, at the same time the crumbling of the Belgian defence and the gap opening to the north created a new peril, dominating in itself. A captured order of the German Sixth Army showed that one corps was to march northwestward towards Ypres and another corps westward towards Wytschaete. How could the Belgians withstand this double thrust?
Confident in his military virtue, and convinced of the complete breakdown of all control, either by the British and French Governments or by the French Supreme Command, Gort resolved to abandon the attack to the southward, to plug the gap which a Belgian capitulation was about to open in the north, and to march to the sea. At this moment here was the only hope of saving anything from destruction or surrender. At 6 P.M. P.M. he ordered the 5th and 50th Divisions to join the Second British Corps to fill the impending Belgian gap. He informed General Blanchard, who had succeeded Billotte in command of the First Army Group, of his action; and this officer, acknowledging the force of events, gave orders at 11.30 he ordered the 5th and 50th Divisions to join the Second British Corps to fill the impending Belgian gap. He informed General Blanchard, who had succeeded Billotte in command of the First Army Group, of his action; and this officer, acknowledging the force of events, gave orders at 11.30 P.M. P.M. for a withdrawal on the 26th to a line behind the Lys Ca.n.a.l west of Lille, with a view to forming a bridgehead around Dunkirk. for a withdrawal on the 26th to a line behind the Lys Ca.n.a.l west of Lille, with a view to forming a bridgehead around Dunkirk.
Early on May 26, Gort and Blanchard drew up their plan for withdrawal to the coast. As the First French Army had farther to go, the first movements of the B.E.F. on the night of May 26/27 were to be preparatory, and rearguards of the British First and Second Corps remained on the frontier defences till the night of May 27/28. In all this Lord Gort had acted upon his own responsibility. But by now we also at home, with a somewhat different angle of information, had already reached the same conclusions. On the 26th a telegram from the War Office approved his conduct, and authorised him "to operate towards the coast forthwith in conjunction with the French and Belgian armies." The emergency gathering on a vast scale of naval vessels of all kinds and sizes was already in full swing.
The reader must now look at the diagram which shows the general areas held on the night of May 25/26 by the British divisions.
[image]
On the western flank of the corridor to the sea the position remained largely unchanged during the 26th. The localities held by the 48th and 44th Divisions came under relatively little pressure. The 2d Division, however, had heavy fighting on the Aire and La Ba.s.see Ca.n.a.ls, and they held their ground. Farther to the east a strong German attack developed around Carvin, jointly defended by British and French troops. The situation was restored by the counterattack of two battalions of the 50th Division, which were in bivouac close by. On the left of the British line the 5th Division, with the 143d Brigade of the 48th Division under command, had travelled through the night, and at dawn took over the defence of the Ypres-Comines Ca.n.a.l to close the gap which had opened between the British and Belgian armies. They were only just in time. Soon after they arrived the enemy attacked, and the fighting was heavy all day. Three battalions of the 1st Division in reserve were drawn in. The 50th Division, after bivouacking south of Lille, moved northward to prolong the flank of the 5th Division around Ypres. The Belgian Army, heavily attacked throughout the day and with their right flank driven in, reported that they had no forces with which to regain touch with the British line, and also that they were unable to fall back to the line of the Yser Ca.n.a.l in conformity with the British movement.
Meanwhile, the organisation of the bridgeheads around Dunkirk was proceeding. The French were to hold from Gravelines to Bergues, and the British thence along the ca.n.a.l by Furnes to Nieuport and the sea. The various groups and parties of all arms which were arriving from both directions were woven into this line. Confirming the orders of the 26th, Lord Gort received from the War Office a telegram, despatched at 1 P.M. P.M. on the 27th, telling him that his task henceforward was "to evacuate the maximum force possible." I had informed M. Reynaud the day before that the policy was to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force, and had requested him to issue corresponding orders. Such was the breakdown in communications that at 2 on the 27th, telling him that his task henceforward was "to evacuate the maximum force possible." I had informed M. Reynaud the day before that the policy was to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force, and had requested him to issue corresponding orders. Such was the breakdown in communications that at 2 P.M. P.M. on the 27th the commander of the First French Army issued an order to his corps, on the 27th the commander of the First French Army issued an order to his corps, "La bataille sera livree sans esprit de recul sur la position de la Lys." "La bataille sera livree sans esprit de recul sur la position de la Lys."
Four British divisions and the whole of the First French Army were now in dire peril of being cut off around Lille. The two arms of the German encircling movement strove to close the pincers upon them. Although we had not in those days the admirable map rooms of more coherent periods, and although no control of the battle from London was possible, I had for three days past been harrowed by the position of the ma.s.s of Allied troops around Lille, including our four fine divisions. This, however, was one of those rare but decisive moments when mechanical transport exercises its rights. When Gort gave the order, all these four divisions came back with surprising rapidity almost in a night. Meanwhile, by fierce battles on either side of the corridor, the rest of the British army kept the path open to the sea. The pincer-claws, which were delayed by the 2d Division, and checked for three days by the 5th Division, eventually met on the night of May 29 in a manner similar to the great Russian operation round Stalingrad in 1942. The trap had taken two and a half days to close, and in that time four British divisions and a great part of the First French Army, except the Fifth Corps, which was lost, withdrew in good order through the gap, in spite of the French having only horse transport, and in spite of the main road to Dunkirk being already cut and the secondary roads filled with retiring troops, long trains of transport, and many thousands of refugees.
The question about our ability to go on alone, which I had asked Mr. Chamberlain to examine with other Ministers ten days before, was now put formally by me to our military advisers. I drafted the reference purposely in terms which, while giving a lead, left freedom to the Chiefs of Staff to express their view, whatever it might be. I knew beforehand that they were absolutely determined; but it is wise to have written records of such decisions. I wished, moreover, to be able to a.s.sure Parliament that our resolve was backed by professional opinion. Here it is, with the answer: We have reviewed our report on "British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality" in the light of the following terms of reference remitted to us by the Prime Minister."In the event of France being unable to continue in the war and becoming neutral, with the Germans holding their present position and the Belgian army being forced to capitulate after a.s.sisting the British Expeditionary Force to reach the coast; in the event of terms being offered to Britain which would place her entirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmament, cession of naval bases in the Orkneys, etc.; what are the prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and probably Italy? Can the Navy and the Air Force hold out reasonable hopes of preventing serious invasion, and could the forces gathered in this island cope with raids from the air involving detachments not greater than ten thousand men; it being observed that a prolongation of British resistance might be very dangerous for Germany engaged in holding down the greater part of Europe?"2. Our conclusions are contained in the following paragraphs.3. While our Air Force is in being, our Navy and Air Force together should be able to prevent Germany carrying out a serious seaborne invasion of this country.4. Supposing Germany gained complete air superiority, we consider that the Navy could hold up an invasion for a time, but not for an indefinite period.5. If, with our Navy unable to prevent it, and our Air Force gone, Germany attempted an invasion, our coast and beach defences could not prevent German tanks and infantry getting a firm footing on our sh.o.r.es. In the circ.u.mstances envisaged above our land forces would be insufficient to deal with a serious invasion.6. The crux of the matter is air superiority. Once Germany had attained this, she might attempt to subjugate this country by air attack alone.7. Germany could not gain complete air superiority unless she could knock out our Air Force, and the aircraft industries, some vital portions of which are concentrated at Coventry and Birmingham.8. Air attacks on the aircraft factories would be made by day or by night. We consider that we should be able to inflict such casualties on the enemy by day as to prevent serious damage. Whatever we do, however, by way of defensive measures and we are pressing on with these with all despatch we cannot be sure of protecting the large industrial centres, upon which our aircraft industries depend, from serious material damage by night attack. The enemy would not have to employ precision bombing to achieve this effect.9. Whether the attacks succeed in eliminating the aircraft industry depends not only on the material damage by bombs, but on the moral effect on the workpeople and their determination to carry on in the face of wholesale havoc and destruction.10. If therefore the enemy presses home night attacks on our aircraft industry, he is likely to achieve such material and moral damage within the industrial area concerned as to bring all work to a standstill.11. It must be remembered that numerically the Germans have a superiority of four to one. Moreover, the German aircraft factories are well dispersed and relatively inaccessible.12. On the other hand, so long as we have a counter-offensive bomber force, we can carry out similar attacks on German industrial centres and by moral and material effect bring a proportion of them to a standstill.13. To sum up, our conclusion is that prima facie prima facie Germany has most of the cards; but the real test is whether the morale of our fighting personnel and civil population will counterbalance the numerical and material advantages which Germany enjoys. We believe it will. Germany has most of the cards; but the real test is whether the morale of our fighting personnel and civil population will counterbalance the numerical and material advantages which Germany enjoys. We believe it will.
This report, which of course was written at the darkest moment before the Dunkirk Deliverance, was signed not only by the three Chiefs of Staff, Newall, Pound, and Ironside, but by the three Vice-Chiefs, Dill, Phillips, and Peirse. Reading it in after years, I must admit that it was grave and grim. But the War Cabinet and the few other Ministers who saw it were all of one mind. There was no discussion. Heart and soul we were together.
I now addressed myself to Lord Gort: 27.V.40.At this solemn moment I cannot help sending you my good wishes. No one can tell how it will go. But anything is better than being cooped up and starved out. I venture these few remarks. First, cannon ought to kill tanks, and they may as well be lost doing that as any other way. Second, I feel very anxious about Ostend till it is occupied by a brigade with artillery. Third, very likely the enemy tanks attacking Calais are tired, and, anyhow, busy on Calais. A column directed upon Calais while it is still holding out might have a good chance. Perhaps they will be less formidable when attacked themselves.2. It is now necessary to tell the Belgians. I am sending following telegram to Keyes, but your personal contact with the King is desirable. Keyes will help. We are asking them to sacrifice themselves for us.3. Presume [our] troops know they are cutting their way home to Blighty. Never was there such a spur for fighting. We shall give you all that the Navy and Air Force can do. Anthony Eden is with me now and joins his good wishes to mine.
[Enclosure.]
Prime Minister to Admiral Keyes.Impart following to your friend [the King of the Belgians]. Presume he knows that British and French are fighting their way to coast between Gravelines and Ostend inclusive, and that we propose to give fullest support from Navy and Air Force during hazardous embarkation. What can we do for him? Certainly we cannot serve Belgium"s cause by being hemmed in and starved out. Our only hope is victory, and England will never quit the war whatever happens till Hitler is beat or we cease to be a State. Trust you will make sure he leaves with you by aeroplane before too late. Should our operation prosper and we establish [an] effective bridgehead, we would try, if desired, to carry some Belgian divisions to France by sea. Vitally important Belgium should continue in war, and safety [of] King"s person essential.
My telegram did not reach Admiral Keyes until after his return to England on the 28th. In consequence this particular message was not delivered to King Leopold. The fact is not, however, important because on the afternoon of the 27th between five and six o"clock Admiral Keyes spoke to me on the telephone. The following pa.s.sage is taken from his report.
At about 5 P.M P.M., on the 27th, when the King told me his Army had collapsed and he was asking for a cessation of hostilities, a cipher telegram was sent to Gort and to the War Office by wireless. The War Office received it at 5.54 P.M P.M. I motored at once to La Panne and telephoned to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was not at all surprised, in view of the repeated warnings, but he told me that I must make every endeavour to persuade the King and Queen to come to England with me, and dictated a message which he said I ought to have received that afternoon:27.V.40."Belgian Emba.s.sy here a.s.sumes from King"s decision to remain that he regards the war as lost and contemplates separate peace."It is in order to dissociate itself from this, that the const.i.tutional Belgian Government has rea.s.sembled on foreign soil. Even if present Belgian Army has to lay down its arms there are two hundred thousand Belgians of military age in France, and greater resources than Belgium had in 1914, on which to fight back. By present decision the King is dividing the nation and delivering it into Hitler"s protection. Please convey these considerations to the King, and impress upon him the disastrous consequences to the Allies and to Belgium of his present choice."I gave King Leopold the Prime Minister"s message, but he said that he had made up his mind that he must stay with his Army and people....
At home I issued the following general injunction:
(Strictly confidential.) 28.V.40.
In these dark days the Prime Minister would be grateful if all his colleagues in the Government, as well as important officials, would maintain a high morale in their circles; not minimising the gravity of events, but showing confidence in our ability and inflexible resolve to continue the war till we have broken the will of the enemy to bring all Europe under his domination.No tolerance should be given to the idea that France will make a separate peace; but whatever may happen on the Continent, we cannot doubt our duty, and we shall certainly use all our power to defend the Island, the Empire, and our Cause.
During the morning of the 28th, Lord Gort met General Blanchard again. I am indebted to General Pownall, Lord Gort"s Chief of Staff, for this record made by him at the time: Blanchard"s enthusiasm at the Ca.s.sel meeting had evaporated when he visited us today. He had no constructive suggestions or plans. We read to him the telegram ordering us to proceed to the coast with a view to embarkation. He was horrified. And that was strange; for what other reason did he think that he and Gort had been ordered to form bridgeheads? To what else could such a preliminary move lead? We pointed out that we had both received similar instructions regarding the bridgeheads. What had happened now was that we had got from our Government the next and logical step (which had no doubt been communicated to the French Government), whereas he had received as yet no such corresponding order. This pacified him somewhat, but by no means entirely. Then we said that we too, like him, wanted to keep the British and the First French Army together in this their last phase. Presumably, therefore, the First French Army would continue the retirement tonight, keeping aligned with us. Whereat he went completely off the deep end it was impossible, he declared. We explained to him as clearly as the human tongue can explain the factors in the situation. The threat from the Germans on our northeastern flank would probably not develop in strength for the next twenty-four hours (though when it did come it would be serious indeed). What was of immediate importance was the threat to our long southwestern flank. There, as he well knew, advance guards of German infantry divisions, supported by artillery, had made attacks yesterday at various points. Though the main points Wormhould, Ca.s.sel, Hazebrouck had held, there had been some penetration. The Germans might be relied upon to press these advantages, and we could be sure that the main bodies of the divisions would soon deploy and force themselves right across our line of withdrawal to the sea (a withdrawal which had been ordered for us, if not for him). There was therefore not a moment to be lost in getting back from the Lys, and we must get back tonight at least to the line Ypres-Poperinghe-Ca.s.sel. To wait till tomorrow night was to give two two days to the Germans to get behind us, an act of madness. We thought it unlikely that we could get even thirty per cent of our forces away even if we reached the sea; many, indeed, in forward positions would never reach it. But even if we could only save a small proportion of highly trained officers and men it would be something useful to the continuance of the war. Everything possible must therefore be done, and the one thing that was possible, if only in part, was to get back some way tonight.... days to the Germans to get behind us, an act of madness. We thought it unlikely that we could get even thirty per cent of our forces away even if we reached the sea; many, indeed, in forward positions would never reach it. But even if we could only save a small proportion of highly trained officers and men it would be something useful to the continuance of the war. Everything possible must therefore be done, and the one thing that was possible, if only in part, was to get back some way tonight....Then came a liaison officer from General Prioux, now commanding the First Army. The liaison officer told Blanchard that Prioux had decided that he could not not withdraw any farther tonight, and therefore intended to remain in the quadrangle of ca.n.a.ls whose northeastern corner is Armentieres and southwestern corner Bethune. This seemed to decide Blanchard against withdrawal. We begged him for the sake of the First Army and of the Allied cause to order Prioux to bring back at least some of his army in line with us. Not all of them could be so tired or so far away that it was impossible. For every man brought back there was at least withdraw any farther tonight, and therefore intended to remain in the quadrangle of ca.n.a.ls whose northeastern corner is Armentieres and southwestern corner Bethune. This seemed to decide Blanchard against withdrawal. We begged him for the sake of the First Army and of the Allied cause to order Prioux to bring back at least some of his army in line with us. Not all of them could be so tired or so far away that it was impossible. For every man brought back there was at least some some chance of embarkation, whereas every man who remained behind would certainly be eaten up. Why not chance of embarkation, whereas every man who remained behind would certainly be eaten up. Why not try, try, then? There was nothing to be gained by not trying: for those who did try there was at least then? There was nothing to be gained by not trying: for those who did try there was at least some some hope. But there was no shaking him. He declared that evacuation from the beach was impossible no doubt the British Admiralty had arranged it for the B.E.F., but the French Marine would never be able to do it for French soldiers. It was therefore idle to try the chance wasn"t worth the effort involved; he agreed with Prioux. hope. But there was no shaking him. He declared that evacuation from the beach was impossible no doubt the British Admiralty had arranged it for the B.E.F., but the French Marine would never be able to do it for French soldiers. It was therefore idle to try the chance wasn"t worth the effort involved; he agreed with Prioux.He then asked, in terms, whether it was therefore Gort"s intention to withdraw tonight to the line Ypres-Poperinghe-Ca.s.sel or not, knowing that in doing so Gort would be going without without the French First Army. To which Gort replied that he the French First Army. To which Gort replied that he was was going. In the first place, he had been ordered to re-embark, and to do so necessitated immediate withdrawal. To wait another twenty-four hours would mean that he would not be able to carry out his orders, for the troops would be cut off. In the second place, and apart from the formal aspect of obeying orders, it was madness to leave the troops forward in their present exposed positions. There, they would certainly be overwhelmed very soon. For these reasons, therefore, and with great regret, it was necessary for the B.E.F. to withdraw even if the First French Army did not do so.... going. In the first place, he had been ordered to re-embark, and to do so necessitated immediate withdrawal. To wait another twenty-four hours would mean that he would not be able to carry out his orders, for the troops would be cut off. In the second place, and apart from the formal aspect of obeying orders, it was madness to leave the troops forward in their present exposed positions. There, they would certainly be overwhelmed very soon. For these reasons, therefore, and with great regret, it was necessary for the B.E.F. to withdraw even if the First French Army did not do so....
[image]
In the early hours of the 28th, the Belgian Army surrendered. Lord Gort had intimation of this only one hour before the event, but the collapse had been foreseen three days earlier, and in one fashion or another the gap was plugged. I announced this event to the House in far more moderate terms than those M. Reynaud had thought it right to use: The House will be aware that the King of the Belgians yesterday sent a plenipotentiary to the German Command asking for a suspension of arms on the Belgian front. The British and French Governments instructed their generals immediately to dissociate themselves from this procedure and to persevere in the operations in which they are now engaged. However, the German Command has agreed to the Belgian proposals and the Belgian Army ceased to resist the enemy"s will at four o"clock this morning.I have no intention of suggesting to the House that we should attempt at this moment to pa.s.s judgment upon the action of the King of the Belgians in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army. This army has fought very bravely and has both suffered and inflicted heavy losses. The Belgian Government has dissociated itself from the action of the King, and, declaring itself to be the only legal Government of Belgium, has formally announced its resolve to continue the war at the side of the Allies.
Concern was expressed by the French Government that my reference to King Leopold"s action was in sharp contrast to that of M. Reynaud. I thought it my duty, when speaking in the House on June 4, after a careful examination of the fuller facts then available, and in justice not only to our French Ally, but also to the Belgian Government now in London, to state the truth in plain terms.
At the last moment when Belgium was already invaded, King Leopold called upon us to come to his aid, and even at the last moment we came. He and his brave, efficient Army, nearly half a million strong, guarded our left flank and thus kept open our only line of retreat to the sea. Suddenly, without prior consultation, with the least possible notice, without the advice of his Ministers and upon his own personal act, he sent a plenipotentiary to the German Command, surrendered his Army, and exposed our whole flank and means of retreat.
All this day of the 28th, the escape of the British Army hung in the balance. On the front from Comines to Ypres and thence to the sea, facing east and attempting to fill the Belgian gap, General Brooke and his Second Corps fought a magnificent battle. For two days past, the 5th Division had held Comines against all attacks, but as the Belgians withdrew northward, and then capitulated, the gap widened beyond repair. The protection of the flank of the B.E.F. was now their task. First the 50th Division came in to prolong the line; then the 4th and 3d Divisions, newly withdrawn from east of Lille, hastened in motor transports to extend the wall of the vital corridor that led to Dunkirk. The German thrust between the British and Belgian armies was not to be prevented, but its fatal consequence, an inward turn across the Yser, which would have brought the enemy onto the beaches behind our fighting troops, was foreseen and everywhere forestalled.
The Germans sustained a b.l.o.o.d.y repulse. Orders were given to the British artillery, both field and medium, to fire off all their ammunition at the enemy, and the tremendous fire did much to quell the German a.s.sault. All the time, only about four miles behind Brooke"s struggling front, vast ma.s.ses of transport and troops poured back into the developing bridgehead of Dunkirk, and were fitted with skilful improvisation into its defences. Moreover, within the perimeter itself, the main east-west road was at one time completely blocked by vehicles, and a one-way track was cleared only by bulldozers hurling them into the ditches on either side.
In the afternoon of the 28th, Gort ordered a general withdrawal to the bridgehead, which now ran Gravelines-Bergues-Furnes-Nieuport. On this front the British divisions stood from right to left, and from Bergues to the sea by Nieuport, in the following order: 46th, 42d, 1st, 50th, 3d, and 4th. By the 29th, a large part of the B.E.F. had arrived within the perimeter, and by this time the naval measures for evacuation were beginning to attain their full effect. On May 30, General Headquarters reported that all British divisions, or the remains of them, had come in.
More than half the First French Army found their way to Dunkirk, where the great majority were safely embarked. But the line of retreat of at least five divisions was cut by the German pincer movement west of Lille. On the 28th, they attempted to break out westward, but in vain; the enemy closed in upon them from all sides. All through the next three days the French in Lille fought on gradually contracting fronts against increasing pressure, until on the evening of the 31st, short of food and with their ammunition exhausted, they were forced to surrender. About fifty thousand men thus fell into German hands. These Frenchmen, under the gallant leadership of General Molinie, had for four critical days contained no less than seven German divisions which otherwise could have joined in the a.s.saults on the Dunkirk perimeter. This was a splendid contribution to the escape of their more fortunate comrades and of the British Expeditionary Force.
It was a severe experience for me, bearing so heavy an over-all responsibility, to watch during these days in flickering glimpses this drama in which control was impossible, and intervention more likely to do harm than good. There is no doubt that by pressing in all loyalty the Weygand plan of retirement to the Somme as long as we did, our dangers, already so grave, were increased. But Gort"s decision, in which we speedily concurred, to abandon the Weygand plan and march to the sea, was executed by him and his staff with masterly skill, and will ever be regarded as a brilliant episode in British military annals
5.
The Deliverance of Dunkirk May 26 to June 4
"Hard and Heavy Tidings" - A Demonstration of Ministers - Service of Intercession and Prayer - The Gathering of the Little Ships - Seven Hundred Vessels - Three Vital Factors - The Mosquito Armada - Bringing off the French - Final Orders to Lord Gort - A Possible Consequence - Gort Transfers the Dunkirk Command to Alexander - My Third Visit to Paris, May 31 - General Spears and Marshal Petain - The Evacuation Complete - My Statement to Parliament, June 4 - Significance of the Air Victory - Britain"s Resolve.
THERE WAS A SHORT SERVICE of intercession and prayer in Westminster Abbey. The English are loth to expose their feelings, but in my stall in the choir I could feel the pent-up, pa.s.sionate emotion, and also the fear of the congregation, not of death or wounds or material loss, but of defeat and the final ruin of Britain. of intercession and prayer in Westminster Abbey. The English are loth to expose their feelings, but in my stall in the choir I could feel the pent-up, pa.s.sionate emotion, and also the fear of the congregation, not of death or wounds or material loss, but of defeat and the final ruin of Britain.
It was Tuesday, May 28, and I did not attend the House until that day week. There was no advantage to be gained by a further statement in the interval, nor did Members express a wish for one. But everyone realised that the fate of our Army and perhaps much else might well be decided by then. "The House," I said. "should prepare itself for hard and heavy tidings. I have only to add that nothing which may happen in this battle can in any way relieve us of our duty to defend the world cause to which we have vowed ourselves; nor should it destroy our confidence in our power to make our way, as on former occasions in our history, through disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat of our enemies." I had not seen many of my colleagues outside the War Cabinet, except individually, since the formation of the Government, and I thought it right to have a meeting in my room at the House of Commons of all Ministers of Cabinet rank other than the War Cabinet Members. We were perhaps twenty-five round the table. I described the course of events, and I showed them plainly where we were, and all that was in the balance. Then I said quite casually, and not treating it as a point of special significance: "Of course, whatever happens at Dunkirk, we shall fight on."
There occurred a demonstration which, considering the character of the gathering twenty-five experienced politicians and Parliament men, who represented all the different points of view, whether right or wrong, before the war surprised me. Quite a number seemed to jump up from the table and come running to my chair, shouting and patting me on the back. There is no doubt that had I at this juncture faltered at all in the leading of the nation, I should have been hurled out of office. I was sure that every Minister was ready to be killed quite soon, and have all his family and possessions destroyed, rather than give in. In this they represented the House of Commons and almost all the people. It fell to me in these coming days and months to express their sentiments on suitable occasions. This I was able to do, because they were mine also. There was a white glow, overpowering, sublime, which ran through our island from end to end.
Accurate and excellent accounts have been written of the evacuation of the British and French armies from Dunkirk. Ever since the 20th the gathering of shipping and small craft had been proceeding under the control of Admiral Ramsay, who commanded at Dover. On the evening of the 26th (6.57 P.M P.M.) an Admiralty signal put "Operation Dynamo" into play, and the first troops were brought home that night. After the loss of Boulogne and Calais only the remains of the port of Dunkirk and the open beaches next to the Belgian frontier were in our hands. At this time it was thought that the most we could rescue was about 45,000 men in two days. Early the next morning, May 27, emergency measures were taken to find additional small craft "for a special requirement." This was no less than the full evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force. It was plain that large numbers of such craft would be required for work on the beaches, in addition to bigger ships which could load in Dunkirk Harbour. On the suggestion of Mr. H. C. Riggs, of the Ministry of Shipping, the various boatyards, from Teddington to Brightlingsea, were searched by Admiralty officers, and yielded upwards of forty serviceable motor-boats or launches, which were a.s.sembled at Sheerness on the following day. At the same time lifeboats from liners in the London docks, tugs from the Thames, yachts, fishing-craft, lighters, barges, and pleasure-boats anything that could be of use along the beaches were called into service. By the night of the 27th a great tide of small vessels began to flow towards the sea, first to our Channel ports, and thence to the beaches of Dunkirk and the beloved Army.
The Admiralty did not hesitate to give full rein to the spontaneous movement which swept the seafaring population of our south and southeastern sh.o.r.es. Everyone who had a boat of any kind, steam or sail, put out for Dunkirk, and the preparations, fortunately begun a week earlier, were now aided by the brilliant improvisation of volunteers on an amazing scale. The numbers arriving on the 29th were small, but they were the forerunners of nearly four hundred small craft which from the 31st were destined to play a vital part by ferrying from the beaches to the off-lying ships almost a hundred thousand men. In these days I missed the head of my Admiralty map room, Captain Pim, and one or two other familiar faces. They had got hold of a Dutch schuit schuit which in four days brought off eight hundred soldiers. Altogether there came to the rescue of the Army under the ceaseless air bombardment of the enemy about eight hundred and fifty vessels, of which nearly seven hundred were British and the rest Allied. which in four days brought off eight hundred soldiers. Altogether there came to the rescue of the Army under the ceaseless air bombardment of the enemy about eight hundred and fifty vessels, of which nearly seven hundred were British and the rest Allied.
Here is the official list in which ships not engaged in embarking troops are omitted: BRITISH S SHIPS.
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ALLLIED S SHIPS.
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Meanwhile ash.o.r.e around Dunkirk the occupation of the perimeter was effected with precision. The troops arrived out of chaos and were formed in order along the defences, which even in two days had grown. Those men who were in best shape turned about to form the line. Divisions like the 2d and 5th, which had suffered most, were held in reserve on the beaches and were then embarked early. In the first instance there were to be three corps on the front, but by the 29th, with the French taking a greater share in the defences, two sufficed. The enemy had closely followed the withdrawal, and hard fighting was incessant, especially on the flanks near Nieuport and Bergues. As the evacuation went on, the steady decrease in the number of troops, both British and French, was accompanied by a corresponding contraction of the defence. On the beaches among the sand dunes, for three, four, or five days scores of thousands of men dwelt under unrelenting air attack. Hitler"s belief that the German Air Force would render escape impossible, and that therefore he should keep his armoured formations for the final stroke of the campaign, was a mistaken but not unreasonable view.
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Three factors falsified his expectations. First, the incessant air-bombing of the ma.s.ses of troops along the seash.o.r.e did them very little harm. The bombs plunged into the soft sand, which m.u.f.fled their explosions. In the early stages, after a crashing air raid, the troops were astonished to find that hardly anybody had been killed or wounded. Everywhere there had been explosions, but scarcely anyone was the worse. A rocky sh.o.r.e would have produced far more deadly results. Presently the soldiers regarded the air attacks with contempt. They crouched in the sand dunes with composure and growing hope. Before them lay the grey but not unfriendly sea. Beyond, the rescuing ships and Home.
The second factor which Hitler had not foreseen was the slaughter of his airmen. British and German air quality was put directly to the test. By intense effort Fighter Command maintained successive patrols over the scene, and fought the enemy at long odds. Hour after hour they bit into the German fighter and bomber squadrons, taking a heavy toll, scattering them and driving them away. Day after day this went on, till the glorious victory of the Royal Air Force was gained. Wherever German aircraft were encountered, sometimes in forties and fifties, they were instantly attacked, often by single squadrons or less, and shot down in scores, which presently added up into hundreds. The whole Metropolitan Air Force, our last sacred reserve, was used. Sometimes the fighter pilots made four sorties a day. A clear result was obtained. The superior enemy were beaten or killed, and for all their bravery mastered, or even cowed. This was a decisive clash. Unhappily, the troops on the beaches saw very little of this epic conflict in the air, often miles away or above the clouds. They knew nothing of the loss inflicted on the enemy. All they felt was the bombs scourging the beaches, cast by the foes who had got through, but did not perhaps return. There was even a bitter anger in the Army against the Air Force, and some of the troops landing at Dover or at Thames ports in their ignorance insulted men in Air Force uniform. They should have clasped their hands; but how could they know? In Parliament I took pains to spread the truth.
But all the aid of the sand and all the prowess in the air would have been vain without the sea. The instructions given ten or twelve days before had under the pressure and emotion of events borne amazing fruit. Perfect discipline prevailed ash.o.r.e and afloat. The sea was calm. To and fro between the sh.o.r.e and the ships plied the little boats, gathering the men from the beaches as they waded out or picking them from the water, with total indifference to the air bombardment, which often claimed its victims. Their numbers alone defied air attack. The Mosquito Armada as a whole was unsinkable. In the midst of our defeat glory came to the island people, united and unconquerable; and the tale of the Dunkirk beaches will shine in whatever records are preserved of our affairs.
Notwithstanding the valiant work of the small craft, it must not be forgotten that the heaviest burden fell on the ships plying from Dunkirk Harbour where two-thirds of the men were embarked. The destroyers played the predominant part as the casualty lists show. Nor must the great part played by the personnel ships with their mercantile crews be overlooked.
The progress of the evacuation was watched with anxious eyes and growing hope. On the evening of the 27th, Lord Gort"s position appeared critical to the Naval authorities, and Captain Tennant, R.N., from the Admiralty, who had a.s.sumed the duties of Senior Naval Officer at Dunkirk, signalled for all available craft to be sent to the beaches immediately, as "evacuation tomorrow night is problematical." The picture presented was grim, even desperate. Extreme efforts were made to meet the call, and a cruiser, eight destroyers, and twenty-six other vessels were sent. The 28th was a day of tension, which gradually eased as the position on land was stabilised with the powerful help of the Royal Air Force. The naval plans were carried through despite severe losses on the 29th, when three destroyers and twenty-one other vessels were sunk and many others damaged.
There was never any question of our leaving the French behind. Here was my order before any request or complaint from the French was received:
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War, C.I.G.S. and General Ismay.
29.V.40.
(Original to C.I.G.S.)It is essential that the French should share in such evacuations from Dunkirk as may be possible. Nor must they be dependent only upon their own shipping resources. Arrangements must be concerted at once with the French Missions in this country, or, if necessary, with the French Government, so that no reproaches, or as few as possible, may arise. It might perhaps be well if we evacuated the two French divisions from Dunkirk, and replaced them pro tem, pro tem, with our own troops, thus simplifying the command. But let me have the best proposals possible, and advise me whether there is any action I should take. with our own troops, thus simplifying the command. But let me have the best proposals possible, and advise me whether there is any action I should take.
Prime Minister to General Spears (Paris).
29.V.40.