But we had a second string. At 6 P.M P.M. on September 10, the British Naval Attache in Madrid was officially informed by the French Admiralty that three French cruisers, type Georges Leygues, Georges Leygues, and three destroyers, had left Toulon and intended to pa.s.s the Straits of Gibraltar on the morning of the 11th. This was the normal procedure accepted at this time by the Vichy Government, and was a measure of prudence taken by them only at the latest moment. The British Naval Attache reported at once to the Admiralty and also to Admiral North at Gibraltar. The signal was received in the Admiralty at 11.50 and three destroyers, had left Toulon and intended to pa.s.s the Straits of Gibraltar on the morning of the 11th. This was the normal procedure accepted at this time by the Vichy Government, and was a measure of prudence taken by them only at the latest moment. The British Naval Attache reported at once to the Admiralty and also to Admiral North at Gibraltar. The signal was received in the Admiralty at 11.50 P.M P.M. on September 10. It was deciphered and sent to the Duty Captain; who pa.s.sed it on to the Director of Operations Division (Foreign). It should have been obvious to this officer, who was himself fully informed of the Dakar expedition, that the message was of decisive importance. He took no instant action on it, but let it go forward in the ordinary way with the First Sea Lord"s telegrams. For this mistake he received in due course the expression of their lordships" displeasure.
However, the destroyer Hotspur, Hotspur, on patrol in the Mediterranean, sighted the French ships at 5.15 on patrol in the Mediterranean, sighted the French ships at 5.15 A.M A.M. on September 11, fifty miles to the east of Gibraltar, and reported to Admiral North. Admiral Somerville, who commanded Force "H," which was based on Gibraltar, had also received a copy of the Naval Attache"s signal at eight minutes past midnight that same morning. He brought the Renown Renown to one hour"s notice for steam at 7 to one hour"s notice for steam at 7 A.M A.M. and awaited instructions from the Admiralty. In consequence of the error in the Director of Operations Division, and of the delay at the Foreign Office upon the other message from the Consul-General, the First Sea Lord knew nothing about the pa.s.sage of the French warships till Hotspur"s Hotspur"s signal was brought to him during the Chiefs of Staff meeting before the Cabinet. He at once telephoned the Admiralty to order signal was brought to him during the Chiefs of Staff meeting before the Cabinet. He at once telephoned the Admiralty to order Renown Renown and her destroyers to raise steam. This had already been done. He then came to the War Cabinet. But through the coincidence of this failure of two separate communications one from the Consul-General in Tangier and the other from the Naval Attache in Madrid and through lack of appreciation in various quarters, all was too late. If the Consul-General had marked the first message and her destroyers to raise steam. This had already been done. He then came to the War Cabinet. But through the coincidence of this failure of two separate communications one from the Consul-General in Tangier and the other from the Naval Attache in Madrid and through lack of appreciation in various quarters, all was too late. If the Consul-General had marked the first message Important, Important, or if either of the admirals at Gibraltar, even though not in the secret, had so considered it themselves, or if the Foreign Office had been working normally, or if the Director of Operations had given the second message the priority which would have ensured the First Sea Lord"s being woken up to read it immediately, the or if either of the admirals at Gibraltar, even though not in the secret, had so considered it themselves, or if the Foreign Office had been working normally, or if the Director of Operations had given the second message the priority which would have ensured the First Sea Lord"s being woken up to read it immediately, the Renown Renown could have stopped and parleyed with the French squadron pending decisive orders, which would certainly have been given by the War Cabinet or, till they could be summoned, by me. could have stopped and parleyed with the French squadron pending decisive orders, which would certainly have been given by the War Cabinet or, till they could be summoned, by me.
In the event all our network of arrangements broke down, and three French cruisers and three destroyers pa.s.sed the Straits at full speed (twenty-five knots) at 8.35 A.M A.M. on the 11th and turned southward down the African coast. The War Cabinet, on being apprised, instantly instructed the First Lord to order the Renown Renown to get in touch with the French ships, ask for their destination, and make it clear that they would not be allowed to proceed to any German-occupied ports. If they replied that they were going south, they were to be told they could proceed to Casablanca, and in this case they were to be shadowed. If they tried to go beyond Casablanca to Dakar, they were to be stopped. But the cruisers were never caught. A haze lay over Casablanca on the 12th and 13th. One of the reconnoitring British aircraft was shot down; reports about the presence of additional warships in Casablanca Harbour were conflicting; and the to get in touch with the French ships, ask for their destination, and make it clear that they would not be allowed to proceed to any German-occupied ports. If they replied that they were going south, they were to be told they could proceed to Casablanca, and in this case they were to be shadowed. If they tried to go beyond Casablanca to Dakar, they were to be stopped. But the cruisers were never caught. A haze lay over Casablanca on the 12th and 13th. One of the reconnoitring British aircraft was shot down; reports about the presence of additional warships in Casablanca Harbour were conflicting; and the Renown Renown and her destroyers waited all day and night south of Casablanca to intercept the French squadron. At 4.20 on the afternoon of the 13th, the and her destroyers waited all day and night south of Casablanca to intercept the French squadron. At 4.20 on the afternoon of the 13th, the Renown Renown received an air report that there were no cruisers in Casablanca. In fact, they were already far to the southward, steaming for Dakar at full speed. received an air report that there were no cruisers in Casablanca. In fact, they were already far to the southward, steaming for Dakar at full speed.
There seemed, however, to be still another chance. Our expedition and its powerful escort was by now itself south of Dakar, approaching Freetown. At 12.16 A.M A.M. on September 14, the Admiralty signalled to Admiral John Cunningham telling him that the French cruisers had left Casablanca at a time unknown and ordering him to prevent them entering Dakar. He was to use every ship available, including the c.u.mberland; c.u.mberland; and the and the Ark Royal Ark Royal should operate her aircraft without a destroyer screen if this were unavoidable. The cruisers should operate her aircraft without a destroyer screen if this were unavoidable. The cruisers Devonshire, Australia, Devonshire, Australia, and and c.u.mberland c.u.mberland and the and the Ark Royal Ark Royal thereupon turned back at maximum speed to establish a patrol line to the north of Dakar. They did not reach their stations until evening on September 14. The French squadron was already anch.o.r.ed in the port with awnings spread. thereupon turned back at maximum speed to establish a patrol line to the north of Dakar. They did not reach their stations until evening on September 14. The French squadron was already anch.o.r.ed in the port with awnings spread.
This chapter of accidents sealed the fate of the Franco-British expedition to Dakar. I had no doubt whatever that the enterprise should be abandoned. The whole scheme of a bloodless landing and occupation by General de Gaulle seemed to me ruined by the arrival of the French squadron, probably carrying reinforcements, good gunners, and bitter-minded Vichy officers, to decide the Governor, to pervert the garrison and man the batteries. It was possible, however, to cancel the plan without any loss of prestige, so important to us at this time, and indeed without anyone knowing anything about it. The expedition could be diverted to Duala and cover General de Gaulle"s operations against the French Cameroons, and thereafter the ships and transports could be dispersed or return home.
Accordingly, at the meeting of the War Cabinet at noon on September 16, after outlining the history of the Dakar operation from its inception, the serious results of the postponement of the date, originally fixed for September 13, the leakage of information from various sources, and the misfortune of the French warships having slipped through the Straits, I declared that the whole situation was altered and that the operation was now out of the question. The Cabinet adopted my advice, and the following orders were despatched to the Dakar force at 2 P.M. P.M. that day: that day: His Majesty"s Government have decided that presence of French cruisers at Dakar renders the execution of Dakar operation impracticable. Alternative plans have been examined here. Landing at Konakri does not appear to offer any chance of success in view of difficulty of communications to Bomako, the lack of transport with the force, and the probability that forces from Dakar would forestall. Moreover, close blockade of Dakar from seaward is not possible with the naval forces available, and therefore presence of de Gaulle"s force at Bomako would not appreciably influence situation at Dakar. Best plan appears to be for General de Gaulle"s force to land at Duala with the object of consolidating the Cameroons, Equatorial Africa, and Chad, and extending influence of de Gaulle to Libreville. The British portion of the force would remain for the present at Freetown.Unless General de Gaulle has any strong objections to the latter course, it should be put into operation forthwith.
The expedition arrived at Freetown on September 17. All the leaders reacted vehemently against the idea of abandoning the enterprise. The Admiral and the General argued that until it was known to what extent the arrival of the Vichy cruisers had raised local morale their presence did not materially alter the previous naval situation. At present, they said, the cruisers had awnings spread, and two were so berthed as to be virtually impotent, while presenting excellent bombing targets.
Here was another twist in the situation. It was very rare at this stage in the war for commanders on the spot to press for audacious courses. Usually the pressure to run risks came from home. In this case the General, General Irwin, had carefully put all his misgivings on paper before he started. I was, therefore, agreeably surprised at the evident zeal to put this complicated and semi-political operation to the test. If the men on the spot thought it was a time to do and dare, we should certainly give them a free hand. I therefore sent at 11.52 P.M P.M. on September 16 the following: You are fully at liberty to consider the whole situation yourselves and consult de Gaulle, and we shall carefully consider then any advice you may give.
There soon arrived a vehement protest from General de Gaulle, who wished to carry out the plan.
At the very least [he said], should the British Government uphold its new and negative decision concerning direct action upon Dakar by sea, I request immediate co-operation of British naval and air forces here present to support and cover an operation which I personally shall conduct with my own troops against Dakar from the interior.1 Our commanders now reported: 2 2 At meeting today de Gaulle insisted upon necessity for early action at Dakar.... He is advised that substantial support for him is likely to be found in Dakar if agents are sent to foster it, action is not unduly deferred, and a too-British complexion of the operation avoided. His agents are ready at Bathurst and have their instructions. De Gaulle now proposes original plan to enter harbour unopposed should go forward, but that if this fails, Free French troops should attempt landing at Rufisque, supported by naval and air action if necessary, and thence advance on Dakar. British troops only to be landed in support if called upon after bridgehead has been established....After careful consideration of all factors, we are of the opinion that the presence of these three cruisers has not sufficiently increased the risks, which were always accepted, to justify the abandonment of the enterprise. We accordingly recommend acceptance of de Gaulle"s new proposal, and that, should he fail, landing of British troops should be undertaken to install him as previously contemplated. Increased strength in [our] naval forces is, however, considered essential.The operation should be carried out four days after decision of His Majesty"s Government is received.
And, finally, from Major-General Irwin to the C.I.G.S.: As you know, I have already accepted risks in this operation not fully justified on purely military grounds. New information possibly increases those risks, but I consider them worth accepting in view of obvious results of success. De Gaulle has also committed himself to complete co-operation with British troops in case of need, and he has not shirked responsibility for fighting between Frenchmen.
The War Cabinet met for the second time on the 17th at 9 P.M P.M. Everyone was agreed to let the commanders go ahead as they wished. Final decision was postponed till noon the next day, it being plain that no time was being lost, as there was still nearly a week before the blow could be struck. At the request of the Cabinet, I drafted the following message to the commanders of the Dakar force: We cannot judge relative advantages of alternative schemes from here. We give you full authority to go ahead and do what you think is best in order to give effect to the original purpose of the expedition. Keep us informed.
This was despatched at 1.20 P.M. P.M. September 18. September 18.
There was nothing to do now but await results. On the 19th, the First Sea Lord reported that the French squadron, or parts of it, were leaving Dakar for the south. This made it pretty clear that it had carried Vichy-minded troops, technicians, and authorities to Dakar. The probabilities of a vigorous resistance were increased out of all proportion to the new forces involved. There would certainly be sharp fighting. My colleagues, who were tough, and also nimble to change with circ.u.mstances, as is right in war, shared my instinct to let things rip, and the various reports were heard in silence.
On the 20th, Admiral Pound told us that the French cruiser Primauguet, Primauguet, intercepted by the intercepted by the Cornwall Cornwall and and Delhi, Delhi, had agreed to go to Casablanca and was now being escorted thither. The three French warships sighted by the had agreed to go to Casablanca and was now being escorted thither. The three French warships sighted by the Australia Australia turned out to be the cruisers turned out to be the cruisers Georges Leygues, Montcalm, Georges Leygues, Montcalm, and and Gloire. Gloire. At noon on the 19th, the At noon on the 19th, the Australia Australia had been joined by the had been joined by the c.u.mberland, c.u.mberland, and they continued to shadow the Vichy ships till evening. These now turned to the northward and increased their speed from fifteen to thirty-one knots. A chase ensued. We were not able to overtake them. At 9.0 and they continued to shadow the Vichy ships till evening. These now turned to the northward and increased their speed from fifteen to thirty-one knots. A chase ensued. We were not able to overtake them. At 9.0 P.M P.M., however, the Gloire Gloire had an engine breakdown and could steam no more than fifteen knots. Her captain agreed to return to Casablanca, escorted by the had an engine breakdown and could steam no more than fifteen knots. Her captain agreed to return to Casablanca, escorted by the Australia. Australia. This pair were due to pa.s.s Dakar about midnight, and the captain of the This pair were due to pa.s.s Dakar about midnight, and the captain of the Australia Australia told the told the Gloire Gloire that if he were attacked by submarines he would at once sink her. She no doubt spoke to Dakar, and all pa.s.sed off pleasantly. The that if he were attacked by submarines he would at once sink her. She no doubt spoke to Dakar, and all pa.s.sed off pleasantly. The c.u.mberland, c.u.mberland, shadowing the other two Vichy warships, lost touch in a heavy rainstorm, and both, though sighted, got back into Dakar without fire being made upon them. The shadowing the other two Vichy warships, lost touch in a heavy rainstorm, and both, though sighted, got back into Dakar without fire being made upon them. The Poitiers, Poitiers, when challenged at sea on the 17th, had already scuttled herself. when challenged at sea on the 17th, had already scuttled herself.
I kept General s.m.u.ts fully informed.
Prime Minister to General s.m.u.ts.
22.IX.40.
You will have seen my message about Dakar. I have been thinking a great deal about what you said in your various messages about not neglecting the African sphere. The de Gaulle movement to rescue the French colonies has prospered in Equatoria and the Cameroons. We could not allow these solid gains to be destroyed by French warships and personnel from Vichy, sent probably at German dictation. If Dakar fell under German control and became a U-boat base, the consequences to the Cape route would be deadly. We have therefore set out upon the business of putting de Gaulle into Dakar, peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must, and the expedition now about to strike seems to have the necessary force.Naturally the risk of a b.l.o.o.d.y collision with the French sailors and part of the garrison is not a light one. On the whole, I think the odds are heavily against any serious resistance, having regard to the low morale and unhappy plight of this French colony, and the ruin and starvation which faces them through our sea control. Still, no one can be sure till we try. The argument that such a risk ought not to be run at a time when French opinion, encouraged by British resistance, is veering towards us even at Vichy, and that anything like a second Oran would be a great set-back, has weighed heavily with us. Nevertheless, we came to the united conclusion that this objection might not turn out to be valid, and must in any case be surpa.s.sed by the dangers of doing nothing and of allowing Vichy to prevail against de Gaulle. If Vichy did not declare war after Oran, or under the pressure of our blockade, there is no reason why they should do so if there is a fight at Dakar. Besides the strategical importance of Dakar and political effects of its capture by de Gaulle, there are sixty or seventy millions of Belgian and Polish gold wrongfully held in the interior, and the great battleship Richelieu, Richelieu, by no means permanently disabled, would indirectly come into our hands. Anyhow, the die is cast. by no means permanently disabled, would indirectly come into our hands. Anyhow, the die is cast.We do not intend to disturb Morocco at present on account of the German pressure on Spain and Spanish interests there. We are very hopeful about Syria, whither General Catroux will go next week. An important battle is now impending at Mersa Matruh, and I hope our armoured reinforcements will arrive in time.I am not particularly impressed with the dangers in Kenya, especially if we lie back and fight from the broad-gauge railway, leaving the enemy the difficult communications. I am trying to send a few suitable tanks to this theatre, which otherwise I feel is overstocked with troops needed in the Soudan and in the Delta.It gives me so much pleasure and confidence to be trekking with you along the path we have followed together for so many years.
To President Roosevelt I telegraphed:
Former Naval Person to President.
23.IX.40.
I was encouraged by your reception of information conveyed by Lord Lothian about Dakar. It would be against our joint interests if strong German submarine and aircraft bases were established there. It looks as if there might be a stiff fight. Perhaps not, but anyhow orders have been given to ram it through. We should be delighted if you would send some American warships to Monrovia and Freetown, and I hope by that time to have Dakar ready for your call. But what really matters now is that you should put it across the French Government that a war declaration would be very bad indeed for them in all that concerns United States. If Vichy declares war, that is the same thing as Germany, and Vichy possessions in the Western Hemisphere must be considered potentially German possessions.Many thanks also for your hint about invasion. We are all ready for them. I am very glad to hear about the rifles.
It is not necessary here to narrate in detail all that happened during the three days in which Dakar was attacked. These deserve their place in military chronicles, and are a further good example of bad luck. The meteorologists at the Air Ministry had, of course, carefully studied climatic conditions on the West African coast. A long survey of records reveals uniform, regular bright sunlight and clear weather at this season of the year. On September 23, when the Anglo-French armada approached the fortress, with de Gaulle and his French ships well in the van, fog reigned supreme. We had hoped, since the great majority of the population, French and native, was on our side, that the appearance of all these ships with the British lying far back on the horizon would have decided the action of the Governor. It soon proved, however, that the Vichy partisans were masters, and there can be no doubt that the arrival of the cruisers with their troops had blotted out any hope of Dakar joining the Free French movement. De Gaulle"s two aeroplanes landed on the local airfield, and their pilots were immediately arrested. One of them had on his person a list of the leading Free French adherents. De Gaulle"s emissaries, sent under the Tricolour and the white flag, were rebuffed, and others who entered later in a launch were fired upon and one of them wounded. All hearts were hardened, and the British Fleet approached through the mist to within five thousand yards. At 10 A.M. A.M. a harbour battery opened fire on one of our wing destroyers. The fire was returned, and the engagement soon became general. The destroyers a harbour battery opened fire on one of our wing destroyers. The fire was returned, and the engagement soon became general. The destroyers Inglefield Inglefield and and Foresight Foresight were slightly damaged, and the were slightly damaged, and the c.u.mberland c.u.mberland was struck in the engine-room and had to quit. One French submarine was bombed by an aircraft at periscope depth, and one French destroyer set on fire. was struck in the engine-room and had to quit. One French submarine was bombed by an aircraft at periscope depth, and one French destroyer set on fire.
There is an age-long argument about ships versus versus forts. Nelson said that a six-gun battery could fight a hundred-gun ship-of-the-line. Mr. Balfour, in the Dardanelles inquiry, said in 1916, "If the ship has guns which can hit the fort at ranges where the fort cannot reply, the duel is not necessarily so unequal." On this occasion the British Fleet, with proper spotting, could in theory engage, and after a certain number of rounds destroy, the Dakar batteries of 9.4-inch guns at 27,000 yards. But the Vichy forces had at this time also the battleship forts. Nelson said that a six-gun battery could fight a hundred-gun ship-of-the-line. Mr. Balfour, in the Dardanelles inquiry, said in 1916, "If the ship has guns which can hit the fort at ranges where the fort cannot reply, the duel is not necessarily so unequal." On this occasion the British Fleet, with proper spotting, could in theory engage, and after a certain number of rounds destroy, the Dakar batteries of 9.4-inch guns at 27,000 yards. But the Vichy forces had at this time also the battleship Richelieu, Richelieu, which proved capable of firing two-gun salvos from fifteen-inch artillery. This had to be taken into account by the British Admiral. Above all there was the fog. The firing, therefore, died away at about 11.30, and all British and Free French ships retired. which proved capable of firing two-gun salvos from fifteen-inch artillery. This had to be taken into account by the British Admiral. Above all there was the fog. The firing, therefore, died away at about 11.30, and all British and Free French ships retired.
In the afternoon General de Gaulle tried to land his troops at Rufisque, but the fog and the confusion had now become so dense that the attempt was abandoned. By 4.30 P.M. P.M. the commanders decided to withdraw the troopships and resume the operation next day. The signal with this information reached London at 7.19 the commanders decided to withdraw the troopships and resume the operation next day. The signal with this information reached London at 7.19 P.M P.M., and I thereupon sent the following personal message to the commander timed at fourteen minutes past ten o"clock on September 23: Having begun, we must go on to the end. Stop at nothing.
An ultimatum was sent that night to the Governor of Dakar, to which reply was made that he would defend the fortress to the last. The commanders answered that they intended continuing the operation. Visibility was better than on the previous day, but still poor. The sh.o.r.e batteries opened on our ships as they closed, and Barham Barham and and Resolution Resolution engaged engaged Richelieu Richelieu at 13,600 yards. Shortly afterwards at 13,600 yards. Shortly afterwards Devonshire Devonshire and and Australia Australia engaged a cruiser and a destroyer, damaging the latter. The bombardment ended at about ten o"clock, by which time engaged a cruiser and a destroyer, damaging the latter. The bombardment ended at about ten o"clock, by which time Richelieu Richelieu had been hit by a fifteen-inch sh.e.l.l, as also had had been hit by a fifteen-inch sh.e.l.l, as also had Fort Manuel, Fort Manuel, and a light cruiser was on fire. Moreover, one enemy submarine, which had tried to interfere with our approach, had been forced to the surface by a depth charge, the crew surrendering. None of our ships was. .h.i.t. In the afternoon the bombardment was renewed for a short time. On this occasion and a light cruiser was on fire. Moreover, one enemy submarine, which had tried to interfere with our approach, had been forced to the surface by a depth charge, the crew surrendering. None of our ships was. .h.i.t. In the afternoon the bombardment was renewed for a short time. On this occasion Barham Barham was. .h.i.t four times without serious damage. The bombardment was inconclusive except to indicate that the defences were strong and the garrison determined to resist. was. .h.i.t four times without serious damage. The bombardment was inconclusive except to indicate that the defences were strong and the garrison determined to resist.
On September 25, the action was resumed. The weather was clear, and our fleet bombarded at 21,000 yards" range, when they were replied to, not only by the very accurate coastal batteries, but by double salvos from the fifteen-inch guns of the Richelieu. Richelieu. A smoke-screen used by the Dakar commander baffled our aim. Soon after 9 A smoke-screen used by the Dakar commander baffled our aim. Soon after 9 A.M A.M. the battleship Resolution Resolution was. .h.i.t by a torpedo from a Vichy submarine. After this the Admiral decided to withdraw to seaward, "in view of the condition of the was. .h.i.t by a torpedo from a Vichy submarine. After this the Admiral decided to withdraw to seaward, "in view of the condition of the Resolution, Resolution, the continued danger from submarines, and the great accuracy and determination of the sh.o.r.e defences." the continued danger from submarines, and the great accuracy and determination of the sh.o.r.e defences."
Meanwhile, the Defence Committee, which met at 10 A.M. A.M. without me, had formed the opinion that no pressure should be brought to bear on the commanders to take any action against their better judgment. The Cabinet met at 11.30 without me, had formed the opinion that no pressure should be brought to bear on the commanders to take any action against their better judgment. The Cabinet met at 11.30 A.M. A.M. and news of the results of the morning"s operations reached us during the meeting. On these tidings it seemed clear that the matter had been pressed as far as prudence and our resources would allow. Several good ships had been severely damaged. It was obvious that Dakar would be defended to the death. No one could be sure that the fierce pa.s.sions of protracted fighting would not provoke a French declaration of war from Vichy. We, therefore, after a painful discussion, were all agreed to push no more. and news of the results of the morning"s operations reached us during the meeting. On these tidings it seemed clear that the matter had been pressed as far as prudence and our resources would allow. Several good ships had been severely damaged. It was obvious that Dakar would be defended to the death. No one could be sure that the fierce pa.s.sions of protracted fighting would not provoke a French declaration of war from Vichy. We, therefore, after a painful discussion, were all agreed to push no more.
Accordingly I sent the following telegram (1.27 P.M P.M., September 25) to the commanders: On all the information now before us, including damage to Resolution, Resolution, we have decided that the enterprise against Dakar should be abandoned, the obvious evil consequences being faced. Unless something has happened which we do not know, which makes you wish to attempt landing in force, you should forthwith break off. You should inform us "Most Immediate" whether you concur, but unless the position has entirely changed in our favour, you should not actually begin landing till you receive our reply. we have decided that the enterprise against Dakar should be abandoned, the obvious evil consequences being faced. Unless something has happened which we do not know, which makes you wish to attempt landing in force, you should forthwith break off. You should inform us "Most Immediate" whether you concur, but unless the position has entirely changed in our favour, you should not actually begin landing till you receive our reply.a.s.suming enterprise abandoned, we shall endeavour to cover Duala by naval force, but we cannot safeguard de Gaulle"s forces [if they remain] at Bathurst. Question of reinforcing Freetown with troops is being considered. Instructions regarding disposal of remainder of forces will be given on receipt of your reply.
The commanders made the following reply:
Concur in breaking off.
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
25.IX.40.
I much regret we had to abandon Dakar enterprise. Vichy got in before us and animated defence with partisans and gunnery experts. All friendly elements were gripped and held down. Several of our ships were hit, and to persist with landing in force would have tied us to an undue commitment when you think of what we have on our hands already.
In the three days" bombardment no British ships were sunk, but the battleship Resolution Resolution was disabled for several months, and two destroyers sustained damage which required considerable repairs in home dockyards. Two Vichy submarines were sunk, the crew of one being saved, two destroyers were burnt out and beached, and the battleship was disabled for several months, and two destroyers sustained damage which required considerable repairs in home dockyards. Two Vichy submarines were sunk, the crew of one being saved, two destroyers were burnt out and beached, and the battleship Richelieu Richelieu was. .h.i.t by a fifteen-inch sh.e.l.l and damaged by two near misses of two-hundred-fifty-pound bombs. There was, of course, no means at Dakar of repairing this formidable vessel, which had already been rendered temporarily immobile in July, and it could now be definitely dismissed as a hostile factor from our calculations. was. .h.i.t by a fifteen-inch sh.e.l.l and damaged by two near misses of two-hundred-fifty-pound bombs. There was, of course, no means at Dakar of repairing this formidable vessel, which had already been rendered temporarily immobile in July, and it could now be definitely dismissed as a hostile factor from our calculations.
It is interesting to note the changes of role of the War Cabinet and of its commanders in the enterprise. The commanders were at first by no means enthusiastic, and General Irwin protected himself by a lengthy reasoned memorandum to the V.C.I.G.S. in which all the difficulties were stressed. After the expedition had got south of the Canary Islands, the French cruiser squadron, with its reinforcements of Vichy partisans, carrying with it in physical as well as moral form the authority of the French Republic, slipped through the Straits of Gibraltar. I had no doubt from that moment that the situation had been transformed; and the War Cabinet on my advice, supported by the Chiefs of the Staff, agreed that we should stop the enterprise while time remained and no loss had been incurred, and no failure would be exposed.
Then the commanders on the spot came forward with their strong desire to take action, and the War Cabinet, quite rightly in my view, felt that the commanders should be the judges and be given a free hand. Accordingly the attempt was made, and it was immediately apparent, by the efficient and vehement resistance of Dakar, that the War Cabinet were right and rightly advised.
Although the fighting at Dakar had been far more serious than had been expected, we were not wrong in our judgment that the Vichy Government would not declare war upon Great Britain. They contented themselves with air retaliation upon Gibraltar from North Africa. On September 24 and 25, successive raids were made upon the harbour and dockyard; in the first, fifty bombs were dropped, and in the second, in which about a hundred aircraft took part, four times as many. The French aviators did not seem to have their hearts in the business, and most of the bombs fell in the sea. Damage was negligible and no one was hurt. Our anti-aircraft batteries shot down three aircraft. Fighting at Dakar having ended in a Vichy success, the incident was tacitly treated as "quits."
No blame attached to the British naval and military commanders, and both were constantly employed until the end of the war, the Admiral attaining the highest distinction. It was one of my rules that errors towards the enemy errors towards the enemy must be lightly judged. They were quite right to try, if with their knowledge on the spot they thought they could carry the matter through; and the fact that they underestimated the effect produced on the Vichy garrison by the arrival of the cruisers and their reinforcements was in no way counted against them. Of General de Gaulle I said in the House of Commons that his conduct and bearing on this occasion had made my confidence in him greater than ever. must be lightly judged. They were quite right to try, if with their knowledge on the spot they thought they could carry the matter through; and the fact that they underestimated the effect produced on the Vichy garrison by the arrival of the cruisers and their reinforcements was in no way counted against them. Of General de Gaulle I said in the House of Commons that his conduct and bearing on this occasion had made my confidence in him greater than ever.
The story of the Dakar episode deserves close study, because it ill.u.s.trates in a high degree not only the unforeseeable accidents of war, but the interplay of military and political forces, and the difficulties of combined operations, especially where allies are involved. To the world at large it seemed a glaring example of miscalculation, confusion, timidity, and muddle. In the United States, where special interest was taken on account of the proximity of Dakar to the American continent, there was a storm of unfavourable criticism. The Australian Government was distressed. At home there were many complaints of faulty war direction. I decided, however, that no explanations should be offered, and Parliament respected my wish.3 * * * * *
In retrospect a brighter view may perhaps be taken of these events. Students of naval history may be struck by the resemblance of this affair to one which occurred nearly three centuries ago. In 1655, Cromwell despatched a joint naval and military expedition to seize San Domingo, in the West Indies. The attack did not succeed, but the commanders, instead of returning empty-handed, turned failure into success by going on to capture Jamaica.
Although we failed at Dakar, we succeeded in arresting the onward progress of the French cruisers and frustrating their determined efforts to suborn the garrisons in French Equatorial Africa. Within a fortnight General de Gaulle was enabled to establish himself at Duala, in the Cameroons, which became a rallying-point for the Free French cause. Free French activities in these regions played their part, not only in halting the penetration of the Vichy virus, but in making possible, through their control of Central Africa, the later development of our transcontinental air transport route from Takoradi to the Middle East.
10.
Mr. Eden"s Mission October, 1940
Retirement of Mr. Chamberlain - Cabinet Changes - The Leadership of the Conservative Party - Reasons for My Decision to Accept the Vacant Post - We Reopen the Burma Road - My Telegram to President Roosevelt - Growth of Our Strength on the Desert Front - My Complaints About the Middle East Administration - Malta Anxieties - Mr. Eden Flies to the Middle East - My Appreciation of October 13, 1940 - Mr. Eden"s Conferences with the Generals at Cairo - His Report and Requests - Our Growing Strength at Mersa Matruh - Proposed Meeting of Mr. Eden and General s.m.u.ts at Khartoum - My Desire for a Forestalling Offensive Against the Italians - Need for Better Use of Our Resources in the Middle East.
AT THE BEGINNING of October, Mr. Chamberlain"s health got far worse. The exploratory operation to which he had subjected himself in September and from which he had returned so courageously to duty had revealed to the doctors that he was suffering from cancer and that there was no surgical remedy. He now became aware of the truth and that he would never be able to return to his work. He therefore placed his resignation in my hands. In view of the pressure of events, I felt it necessary to make the changes in the Government which have been mentioned in an earlier chapter. Sir John Anderson became Lord President of the Council and presided over the Home Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. Mr. Herbert Morrison succeeded him as Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, and Sir Andrew Duncan became Minister of Supply. These changes were effective on October 3. of October, Mr. Chamberlain"s health got far worse. The exploratory operation to which he had subjected himself in September and from which he had returned so courageously to duty had revealed to the doctors that he was suffering from cancer and that there was no surgical remedy. He now became aware of the truth and that he would never be able to return to his work. He therefore placed his resignation in my hands. In view of the pressure of events, I felt it necessary to make the changes in the Government which have been mentioned in an earlier chapter. Sir John Anderson became Lord President of the Council and presided over the Home Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. Mr. Herbert Morrison succeeded him as Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, and Sir Andrew Duncan became Minister of Supply. These changes were effective on October 3.
Mr. Chamberlain also thought it right to resign the leadership of the Conservative Party, and I was invited to take his place. I had to ask myself the question about which there may still be various opinions whether the leadership of one great party was compatible with the position I held from King and Parliament as Prime Minister of an Administration composed of and officially supported by all parties. I had no doubt about the answer. The Conservative Party possessed a very large majority in the House of Commons over all other parties combined. Owing to the war conditions no election appeal to the nation was available in case of disagreement or deadlock. I should have found it impossible to conduct the war if I had had to procure the agreement in the compulsive days of crisis and during long years of adverse and baffling struggle, not only of the leaders of the two minority parties, but of the leader of the Conservative majority. Whoever had been chosen and whatever his self-denying virtues, he would have had the real political power. For me there would have been only the executive responsibility.
These arguments do not apply in the same degree in time of peace; but I do not feel I could have borne such a trial successfully in war. Moreover, in dealing with the Labour and Liberal Parties in the coalition, it was always an important basic fact that as Prime Minister and at this time leader of the largest party, I did not depend upon their votes and I could in the ultimate issue carry on in Parliament without them. I therefore accepted the position of leader of the Conservative Party which was pressed upon me, and I am sure that without it, and all the steady loyalties which attached to it, I should not have been able to discharge my task until victory was won. Lord Halifax, who was the most probable alternative choice of the party if I had declined, himself proposed the motion, which was unanimously adopted.
The summer had crashed its way along with ma.s.sive, rending shocks, but with growing a.s.surance of survival. Autumn and winter plunged us into a maze of complications, less mortal but more puzzling. The invasion challenge had definitely weakened. The Battle of Britain in the air was won. We had bent the German beam. Our Home Army and Home Guard had grown vastly more powerful. The equinoctial gales of October stretched rough, capricious hands across the Channel and the Narrow Seas. All the arguments from which I had formerly drawn comfort were justified and strengthened. In the Far East the danger of a j.a.panese declaration of war seemed to have receded. They had waited to see what would happen about the invasion; and nothing had happened. The j.a.panese war lords had looked for a certainty. But certainties are rare in war. If they had not thought it worth while to strike in July, why should they do so now when the life of the British Empire burned brighter and fiercer and world conditions were less favourable to them? We felt ourselves strong enough to reopen the Burma Road when its three months" closure had elapsed. The j.a.panese were experienced in sea war, and probably thought about it along the same lines as the British Admiralty. Nonetheless, it was not without anxiety that the decision to open the Burma Road and allow supplies to flow along it into China was taken. In this broad measurement of the unknowable our judgment was not proved wrong.
I was glad to telegraph to the President news which I was sure would be agreeable to him and to the United States.
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
4.X.40.
After prolonged consideration of all the issues involved we today decided to let the Burma Road be reopened when the three months" period expires on October 17. The Foreign Secretary and I will announce this to Parliament on Tuesday, 8th. I shall say that our hopes of a just settlement being reached between j.a.pan and China have not borne fruit, and that the Three-Power Pact revives the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1939 and has a clear pointer against the United States. I know how difficult it is for you to say anything which would commit the United States to any hypothetical course of action in the Pacific. But I venture to ask whether at this time a simple action might not speak louder than words. Would it not be possible for you to send an American squadron, the bigger the better, to pay a friendly visit to Singapore? There they would be welcomed in a perfectly normal and rightful way. If desired, occasion might be taken of such a visit for a technical discussion of naval and military problems in those and Philippine waters, and the Dutch might be invited to join. Anything in this direction would have a marked deterrent effect upon a j.a.panese declaration of war upon us over the Burma Road opening. I should be very grateful if you would consider action along these lines, as it might play an important part in preventing the spreading of the war.In spite of the Dakar fiasco, the Vichy Government is endeavouring to enter into relations with us, which shows how the tides are flowing in France now that they feel the German weight and see we are able to hold our own.Although our position in the air is growing steadily stronger both actually and relatively, our need for aircraft is urgent. Several important factories have been seriously injured and the rate of production is hampered by air alarms. On the other hand, our losses in pilots have been less than we expected, because in fighting over our own soil a very large proportion get down safely or only wounded. When your officers were over here, we were talking in terms of pilots. We are now beginning to think that aeroplanes will be the limiting factor so far as the immediate future is concerned.I cannot feel that the invasion danger is past. The gent has taken off his clothes and put on his bathing-suit, but the water is getting colder and there is an autumn nip in the air. We are maintaining the utmost vigilance.
These welcome events at opposite ends of the world cleared the way for stronger action in the Middle East. Every nerve had to be strained to make headway against Italy, whose movements were slower than I had expected. Strong reinforcements had reached General Wavell. The two tank regiments had arrived in the desert. General Maitland-Wilson, who commanded the "Army of the Nile," as it was now called, formed a high opinion of the possibilities of the "Matildas," as the infantry or "I" tanks were nick-named by the troops. Our defence position at Mersa Matruh was now far more solid, and though this I did not yet knew new thoughts began to stir in Staff and planning circles at the Middle East Headquarters. Obviously our next main task was to strengthen our forces in the Middle East, and especially in the Western Desert, both from Britain and from India.
I was still in argument with the Admiralty about military convoys attempting the pa.s.sage of the Mediterranean, I saying, "You can now see that we ought to have tried it," and they, "There was not so much hurry after all." I still remained extremely dissatisfied with the distribution of our forces already in the Middle East, and with the disparity, as I judged it, between ration and fighting strength. I feared greatly for Malta. I pressed General Wavell and the Secretary of State, both directly and through the Chiefs of Staff, on all these points. To Mr. Eden I wrote:
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.
24.IX.40.
There is no difference between us in principle; but the application of the principle raises issues of detail, and this is especially true of the denudation of this island in the face of the imminent threat of invasion. Meanwhile, the General Staff continue to press for diversions from the Middle East, such as the Seventh Australian Division to be used for garrisoning the Malay peninsula. Now the two Indian brigades are to be employed in these jungles against a possible war with j.a.pan, and a still more unlikely j.a.panese siege of Singapore. The paper on Indian reinforcements was considered last night by me and the Chiefs of the Staff. You will see in it that a division is to be provided for Malaya, another for Basra, and a corps for Iraq, thus absorbing all the Indian reinforcements available in 1941. This geographical distribution or dispersion of our forces shows the ideas prevailing, which are altogether erroneous in a strategic sense. However, it was explained to me that, although these forces were earmarked for particular theatres, they could all go to the Middle East if required. I therefore agreed to words being inserted making this clear. Nonetheless, the impression produced by the paragraph dispersing these divisions without regard to war needs made an unfavourable impression upon me.We have next to consider the increasing waste of troops in Kenya, and the continued waste in Palestine. Some improvement has been made in Palestine, but Kenya, on the contrary, is at this moment to have a mountain battery sent there instead of to the Soudan. I fear that when General s.m.u.ts goes there he will naturally be influenced by the local situation. However, I hope to keep in touch with him by cable.Lastly, there is the shocking waste of British Regular troops on mere police duty in the Ca.n.a.l Zone, in Cairo, and at Alexandria, and the general slackness of the Middle East Command in concentrating the maximum for battle and in narrowing the gap between ration strength and fighting strength. I have not had any answer to my request for figures on this point.My idea, like yours, is to gather the strongest army in the Middle East possible in the next few months, and I have indicated on other papers the number of divisions I hope can be a.s.sembled there. But I think the first thing would be for the War Office and the Egyptian Command to make the best use possible of the very large number of troops they have already, and for which we are paying heavily.Further, I am much disquieted about the position at Malta. It is now agreed that two battalions shall be sent as reinforcements; but after how much haggling and boggling, and excuses that they could not be accommodated in the island! Have you read General Dobbie"s appreciation and his statement that he has his battalions all spread on fifteen-mile fronts each, with no reserves not already allocated to the defence of aerodromes? Do you realise there is no command of the sea at Malta, and that it might be attacked at any time by an expeditionary force of twenty or thirty thousand men from Italy, supported by the Italian Fleet? Yet it was proposed that these two battalions should go to Freetown to complete the brigade there, although no enemy can possibly attack Freetown while we have the command of the Atlantic Ocean. You will, I am sure, excuse my putting some of these points to you, because they ill.u.s.trate tendencies which appear ill-related to the very scheme of war which you have in mind.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
6.X.40.
Whenever the Fleet is moving from Alexandria to the Central Mediterranean, reinforcements should be carried in to Malta, which I consider to be in grievous danger at the present time. These reinforcements should be found by taking battalions from the Ca.n.a.l Zone and replacing them by dismounted Yeomanry or Australian details now in Palestine, or by South African units presently to be moved from Kenya. Pray let me have proposals on these lines, and make sure that at least one battalion goes to Malta on the next occasion. We cannot waste Regular battalions on internal security duties in Egypt. If they were needed for the Field Army, they would of course be irremovable, but that is not what they are being used for.
I was in such close agreement with the Secretary of State for War, and felt so much the need of having our views put forward on the spot, instead of through endless telegrams, that I now asked him whether he would not make a personal inspection of the Middle East. He was delighted, and started immediately. He made a thorough tour of the whole theatre. In his absence I took over the War Office.
I also at this time laid the whole military situation as I saw it before the Chiefs of Staff.
Prime Minister to General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee.
13.X.40.