We admire the way in which you are dealing with your baffling task. I hope you will manage to convey to Vichy, through the French Amba.s.sador, two root ideas. First, that we will let bygones go and work with anyone who convinces us of his resolution to defeat the common foes. Secondly, that as we are fighting for our lives as well as for a victory which will relieve simultaneously all the captive States, we shall stop at nothing. Try to make Vichy feel what we here all take for certain, namely, that we have got Hitler beat, and though he may ravage the Continent and the war may last a long time his doom is certain. It pa.s.ses my comprehension why no French leaders secede to Africa, where they would have an empire, the command of the seas, and all the frozen French gold in the United States. If this had been done at the beginning we might well have knocked out Italy by now. But surely the opportunity is the most splendid ever offered to daring men. Naturally one would not expect precise responses to such suggestions, but try to put it into their heads if you see any opening.
The various reports which we received of Montoire did not alter my general view of what our att.i.tude towards Vichy should be. Now in November I expressed my views to my colleagues in a memorandum.
14.XI.40.Although revenge has no part in politics, and we should always be looking forward rather than looking back, it would be a mistake to suppose that a solution of our difficulties with Vichy will be reached by a policy of mere conciliation and forgiveness. The Vichy Government is under heavy pressure from Germany, and there is nothing that they would like better than to feel a nice, soft, cosy, forgiving England on their other side. This would enable them to win minor favours from Germany at our expense, and hang on as long as possible to see how the war goes. We, on the contrary, should not hesitate, when our interests require it, to confront them with difficult and rough situations, and make them feel that we we have teeth as well as. .h.i.tler. have teeth as well as. .h.i.tler.It must be remembered that these men have committed acts of baseness on a scale which have earned them the lasting contempt of the world, and that they have done this without the slightest authority from the French people. that they have done this without the slightest authority from the French people. Laval is certainly filled by the bitterest hatred of England, and is reported to have said that he would like to see us Laval is certainly filled by the bitterest hatred of England, and is reported to have said that he would like to see us "crabouilles," "crabouilles," which means squashed so as to leave only a grease-spot. Undoubtedly, if he had had the power, he would have marketed the unexpected British resistance with his German masters to secure a better price for French help in finishing us off. Darlan is mortally envenomed by the injury we have done to his Fleet. Petain has always been an anti-British defeatist, and is now a dotard. The idea that we can build on such men is vain. They may, however, be forced by rising opinion in France and by German severities to change their line in our favour. Certainly we should have contacts with them. But in order to promote such favourable tendencies we must make sure the Vichy folk are kept well ground between the upper and nether millstones of Germany and Britain. In this way they are most likely to be brought into a more serviceable mood during the short run which remains to them. which means squashed so as to leave only a grease-spot. Undoubtedly, if he had had the power, he would have marketed the unexpected British resistance with his German masters to secure a better price for French help in finishing us off. Darlan is mortally envenomed by the injury we have done to his Fleet. Petain has always been an anti-British defeatist, and is now a dotard. The idea that we can build on such men is vain. They may, however, be forced by rising opinion in France and by German severities to change their line in our favour. Certainly we should have contacts with them. But in order to promote such favourable tendencies we must make sure the Vichy folk are kept well ground between the upper and nether millstones of Germany and Britain. In this way they are most likely to be brought into a more serviceable mood during the short run which remains to them.
Marshal Petain became increasingly resentful of Laval"s prodding him along the road which would lead to war with Britain and German occupation of the North African Colonies. On December 13, Laval arrived at Vichy with the proposal that Petain should come to Paris to be present at the ceremonial transfer of the ashes of Napoleon"s son, the Duke of Reichstadt ("L"Aiglon"), to the Invalides. This was. .h.i.tler"s flowery idea of a solemn consecration of the entente entente reached at Montoire. reached at Montoire.
Petain was not, however, attracted by a parade where the victor of Verdun would be exhibited on French soil with German guards of honour before the tomb of the Emperor Napoleon. He was, moreover, both wearied and fearful of Laval"s methods and aims. Members of Petain"s staff, therefore, arranged the arrest of Laval. Energetic German intervention procured his release, but Petain refused to accept him back as Minister. Laval retired in wrath to German-occupied Paris. I was glad that M. Flandin took his place as Foreign Minister. These events marked a change at Vichy. It seemed that the limits of collaboration had at last been reached. There were at this moment hopes of better French relations with Britain and of more sympathetic understanding for Vichy from the United States.
It is convenient to carry the Spanish story forward at this point. Franco, now convinced of a long war and of the Spanish abhorrence of any more war, and by no means sure of a German victory, used every device of exasperating delay and exorbitant demands. He was by this time so sure of Suner that on October 18 he made him Foreign Minister, representing the removal of Beigbeder as a proof of his devotion to the Axis. In November, Suner was summoned to Berchtes-gaden, and Hitler expressed his impatience with Spain"s delay in coming into the war. By now the Battle of Britain had been lost by the German Air Force. Italy was already involved in Greece and in North Africa. Serrano Suner did not respond as was wished. He dwelt lengthily instead upon the economic difficulties of the Peninsula. Three weeks later, Admiral Canaris, Chief of the German Secret Service, was sent to Madrid to arrange the details of Spain"s entry into the war. He suggested that the German troops should pa.s.s the Spanish frontier on January 10, in preparation for an attack on Gibraltar on January 30. The Admiral was surprised when Franco told him that it was impossible for Spain to enter the war on the date mentioned. It seemed that the Caudillo feared the loss of Atlantic islands and Spanish colonies to the British Navy. He also emphasised the lack of food and the inability of Spain to stand a protracted war. As the German landing in England seemed indefinitely postponed, Franco introduced a new condition. He would not move, at any rate, until Suez was in Axis hands, until Suez was in Axis hands, since not till then would he feel sure that Spain would not be involved in long-drawn-out hostilities. since not till then would he feel sure that Spain would not be involved in long-drawn-out hostilities.
On February 6, 1941, Hitler wrote a letter to Franco, appealing in strong and urgent terms that he should play the man without further delay. Franco replied, expressing his undying loyalty. He urged that preparations for the attack on Gibraltar should be continued with renewed vigour. As another new point he declared that only Spanish troops with German equipment must be used for this enterprise. Even if all this was arranged, Spain could not enter the war for economic reasons. Ribbentrop thereupon reported to the Fuehrer that Franco had no intention of making war. Hitler was scandalised, but, being now set upon the invasion of Russia, he did not perhaps like the idea of trying Napoleon"s other unsuccessful enterprise, the invasion of Spain, at the same time. Considerable Spanish forces were now gathered along the Pyrenees, and he felt it was wiser to stick to his method with nations, "One by One." Thus by subtlety and trickery and blandishments of all kinds Franco succeeded in tiding things over and keeping Spain out of the war, to the inestimable advantage of Britain when she was all alone.
We could not count upon this at the time, and I urged the President to do all in his power to help forward the policy of conciliation.
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
23.XI.40.
Our accounts show that situation in Spain is deteriorating and that the Peninsula is not far from starvation point. An offer by you of food month by month so long as they keep out of the war might be decisive. Small things do not count now, and this is a time for very plain talk to them. The occupation by Germany of both sides of the Straits would be a grievous addition to our naval strain, already severe. The Germans would soon have batteries working by radar [i.e., they could aim in the darkness], which would close the Straits both by night and day. With a major campaign developing in the Eastern Mediterranean and the need to reinforce and supply our armies there all round the Cape, we could not contemplate any military action on the mainland at or near the Straits. The Rock of Gibraltar will stand a long siege, but what is the good of that if we cannot use the harbour or pa.s.s the Straits? Once in Morocco, the Germans will work southward, and U-boats and aircraft will soon be operating freely from Casablanca and Dakar. I need not, Mr. President, enlarge upon the trouble this will cause to us, or the approach of trouble to the Western Hemisphere. We must gain as much time as possible.
This great danger had in fact pa.s.sed away, and, though we did not know it, it pa.s.sed forever. It is fashionable at the present time to dwell on the vices of General Franco, and I am, therefore, glad to place on record this testimony to the duplicity and ingrat.i.tude of his dealings with Hitler and Mussolini. I shall presently record even greater services which these evil qualities in General Franco rendered to the Allied cause.
12.
Mussolini Attacks Greece OctoberNovember, 1940
Mussolini"s Decision to Attack Greece - His Letter to Hitler of October 19 - The Florence Conference - The Italian Invasion of Greece, October 28, 1940 - Reinforcement of Admiral Cunningham"s Fleet - The Arrival of the "Ill.u.s.trious" - Our Obligations - Importance of Crete - Telegrams to Mr. Eden - Air Support for Greece - Minute to Chief of the Air Staff, November 2, 1940 - Wavell-Wilson Plans for an Offensive in Libya - Secrecy Causes Misunderstanding - Further Telegrams to Mr. Eden - Greek Need for the Cretan Division - Mr. Eden"s Latest Telegrams - His Return - He Unfolds "Operation Compa.s.s" - General Agreement - War Cabinet Approves - The Fleet Air Arm Attack the Italian Fleet - Gallant Exploit at Taranto - Half the Italian Fleet Disabled for Six Months - Naval Dispositions - My Desire for an Amphibious Feature in "Compa.s.s" - My Telegram to Wavell of November 26 - Policy Towards Turkey - An Improved Situation - Shortcomings at Suda Bay - Death of Mr. Chamberlain - A Tribute to His Memory.
A FRESH FRESH, though not entirely unexpected outrage by Mussolini, with baffling problems and far-reaching consequences to all our hara.s.sed affairs, now broke upon the Mediterranean scene.
The Duce took the final decision to attack Greece on October 15, 1940. That morning a meeting of the Italian war leaders was held in the Palazzo Venezia. He opened the proceedings in the following words: The object of this meeting is to define the course of action in general terms which I have decided to initiate against Greece. In the first instance this action will have aims of both a maritime and territorial character. The territorial aims will be based on the possession of the whole coast of Southern Albania ... and the Ionian islands Zante, Cephalonia, and Corfu and the occupation of Salonika. When we have attained these objectives, we shall have improved our position vis-a-vis vis-a-vis England in the Mediterranean. In the second instance ... the complete occupation of Greece, in order to put her out of action and to a.s.sure that in all circ.u.mstances she will remain in our politico-economic sphere. England in the Mediterranean. In the second instance ... the complete occupation of Greece, in order to put her out of action and to a.s.sure that in all circ.u.mstances she will remain in our politico-economic sphere.Having thus defined the question, I have laid down the date which in my opinion must not be postponed even for an hour and that is for the 26th of this month. This is an action which I have matured at length for months, before our entry into the war and before the beginning of the conflict.... I would add that I foresee no complications in the north. Yugoslavia has every interest to keep quiet.... I also exclude complications from the side of Turkey, particularly since Germany has established herself in Rumania and since Bulgaria has increased her strength. The latter can play a part in our game, and I shall take the necessary steps so as not to miss the present unique opportunity for achieving her aspirations in Macedonia and for an outlet to the sea....1 On October 19, Mussolini wrote to Hitler telling him of the decision to which he had come. Hitler was then on his journey to Hendaye and Montoire. The letter (the text of which has not come to light) seems to have followed him round. When it finally reached him, he at once proposed to Mussolini a meeting to discuss the general political situation in Europe. This meeting took place in Florence on October 28. That morning the Italian attack on Greece had begun.
It seems, however, that Hitler did not choose to make an issue of the Greek adventure. He said politely that Germany was in accord with the Italian action in Greece, and then proceeded to tell the tale of his meetings with Franco and Petain. There can be no doubt that he did not like what had been done by his a.s.sociate. A few weeks later, after the Italian attack was checked, he wrote to Mussolini in his letter of November 20: "When I asked you to receive me at Florence I began the journey with the hope of being able to expound my views before before the threatened action against Greece had been taken, about which I had heard only in general terms." In the main, however, he accepted the decision of his ally. the threatened action against Greece had been taken, about which I had heard only in general terms." In the main, however, he accepted the decision of his ally.
Before dawn on October 28, the Italian Minister in Athens presented an ultimatum to General Metaxas, the Premier of Greece. Mussolini demanded that the whole of Greece should be opened to Italian troops. At the same time the Italian army in Albania invaded Greece at various points. The Greek Government, whose forces were by no means unready on the frontier, rejected the ultimatum. They also invoked the guarantee given by Mr. Chamberlain on April 13, 1939. This we were bound to honour. By the advice of the War Cabinet, and from his own heart, His Majesty replied to the King of the h.e.l.lenes: "Your cause is our cause; we shall be fighting against a common foe." I responded to the appeal of General Metaxas: "We will give you all the help in our power. We will fight a common foe and we will share a united victory." This undertaking was during a long story made good.
Although we were still heavily outnumbered on paper by the Italian Fleet, marked improvements had been made in our Mediterranean strength. During September the Valiant, Valiant, the armoured-deck aircraft-carrier the armoured-deck aircraft-carrier Ill.u.s.trious, Ill.u.s.trious, and two A.A. cruisers had come safely through the Mediterranean to join Admiral Cunningham at Alexandria. Hitherto his ships had always been observed and usually bombed by the greatly superior Italian Air Force. The and two A.A. cruisers had come safely through the Mediterranean to join Admiral Cunningham at Alexandria. Hitherto his ships had always been observed and usually bombed by the greatly superior Italian Air Force. The Ill.u.s.trious, Ill.u.s.trious, with her modern fighters and latest radar equipment, by striking down patrols and a.s.sailants gave a new secrecy to the movements of our Fleet. This advantage was timely. Apart from a few air squadrons, a British mission and perhaps some token troops, we had nothing to give; and even these trifles were a painful subtraction from ardent projects already lighting in the Libyan theatre. One salient strategic fact leaped out upon us CRETE! The Italians must not have it. We must get it first and at once. It was fortunate that at this moment Mr. Eden was in the Middle East, and that I thus had a Ministerial colleague on the spot with whom to deal. He was about to return home after his conference with General s.m.u.ts at Khartoum. I telegraphed to him: with her modern fighters and latest radar equipment, by striking down patrols and a.s.sailants gave a new secrecy to the movements of our Fleet. This advantage was timely. Apart from a few air squadrons, a British mission and perhaps some token troops, we had nothing to give; and even these trifles were a painful subtraction from ardent projects already lighting in the Libyan theatre. One salient strategic fact leaped out upon us CRETE! The Italians must not have it. We must get it first and at once. It was fortunate that at this moment Mr. Eden was in the Middle East, and that I thus had a Ministerial colleague on the spot with whom to deal. He was about to return home after his conference with General s.m.u.ts at Khartoum. I telegraphed to him: 29.X.40.I recognise importance of your conference with s.m.u.ts, but hope first Wavell, and thereafter you, will return at earliest to Cairo.We here are all convinced an effort should be made to establish ourselves in Crete, and that risks should be run for this valuable prize. You will have seen the Service telegrams on this subject.
Prime Minister to Mr. Eden [ [at Khartoum].
29.X.40.
It seems of prime importance to hold the best airfield possible and a naval fuelling base at Suda Bay. Successful defence of Crete is invaluable aid to defence of Egypt. Loss of Crete to [the] Italians [would be a] grievous aggravation [of] all Mediterranean difficulties. So great a prize is worth the risk, and almost equal to [a] successful offensive in Libya. Pray, after an examination of whole problem with Wavell and s.m.u.ts, do not hesitate to make proposals for action on large scale at expense of other sectors, and ask for any further aid you require from here, including aircraft and anti-aircraft [batteries]. We are studying how to meet your need. Consider your return to Cairo indispensable.
At the invitation of the Greek Government, Suda Bay, the best harbour in Crete, was occupied by our forces two days later.
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
30.X.40.
What steps are we taking to get news from the Greek front? Have we observers there? What is our attache there doing?Why do you not send one of your generals from Egypt at the head of a military mission to be at the headquarters of the Greek field army? Let them go and see the fighting and give us some close-up information about the relative merits of the two armies. I expect to have a good wire every day or so, telling us exactly what is happening, as far as the Greeks will allow it.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.
30.X.40.
There is no objection to two battalions going to Freetown, pending their relief by the West African Brigade, after which they can go on to Egypt. They are not to leave England until it is agreed that the West African Brigade is to go to West Africa.Both Crete and Malta come before Freetown in A.A. guns, and I cannot approve of this diversion at the present time. Neither can I agree to the diversion of a fighter squadron [for Freetown] at this stage. The Navy is responsible for preventing any sea-borne expedition attacking our West African colonies. As to the air attack, if the French bomb Freetown or Bathurst, we will bomb Vichy. I do not think this will happen.
Prime Minister to Air Vice-Marshal Longmore.2 1.XI.40.
[In dispatching a Blenheim squadron to Greece] you have taken a very bold and wise decision. I hope to reinforce you as soon as possible.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.A.S. and for C.O.S. Committee.
1.XI.40.
I should propose to make immediate arrangements to send four additional heavy bomber squadrons (including the one already sent to Malta) to the Middle East at once, and also four Hurricane fighter squadrons. Let me see plans for this movement. I should like to have a report on this today.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.
1.XI.40.
Mr. Eden has asked for ten thousand rifles for the Middle East. Can we not supply these out of the American packet, or is there any small parcel of rifles anywhere in the world to be picked up?
Prime Minister to C.A.S.
2.XI.40.
1. I had in mind that the four bomber squadrons would fly to Crete or Greece via Malta. The personnel and ground stores would have to be carried through by cruiser. It is essential to have these squadrons operating at the earliest from bases in Greek territory upon the Italian Fleet at Taranto, and generally against Southern For so vital an operation of war the Navy would have to make special exertions, and you should not a.s.sume that a ship will not be forthcoming, at any rate for such ground personnel, stores, etc., as are necessary to come into action at this very critical time. I see more difficulty in the vehicles, but perhaps some could come from Egypt, and the rest be improvised.2. The fighters are, of course, more difficult, but I should hope that they could fly from a carrier to Malta, as was done last time. If necessary, the Furious Furious would have to help the would have to help the Ark Royal. Ark Royal. Could they fly from Malta to an aerodrome in Greece? If not, could they fly on to a carrier to refuel, and thence to Greece? In the case of the fighters the same arrangements would have to be made about stores, ground personnel, etc., as with the bombers. Could they fly from Malta to an aerodrome in Greece? If not, could they fly on to a carrier to refuel, and thence to Greece? In the case of the fighters the same arrangements would have to be made about stores, ground personnel, etc., as with the bombers.
Prime Minister to Mr. Eden [ [at G.H.Q., Middle East].
2.XI.40.
Greek situation must be held to dominate others now. We are well aware of our slender resources. Aid to Greece must be attentively studied lest whole Turkish position is lost through proof that England never tries to keep her guarantees. I invite you to stay in Cairo for at least another week while these questions are being studied and we make sure we have done our best from both ends. Meanwhile, another thirty thousand men are reaching you by November 15, which must affect local situation in Egypt.
During Mr. Eden"s earlier conferences and talks with General Wavell and also with General Wilson, he posed the question, What action was intended if the Italian offensive did not develop? He was told in extreme secrecy that a plan was being made to attack the Italians in the Western Desert instead of waiting for them to open their offensive against Mersa Matruh. Neither he nor Wavell imparted these ideas to me or to the Chiefs of Staff. General Wavell begged the Secretary of State for War not to send any telegram on this subject, but to tell us verbally about it when he got home. Thus for some weeks we remained without knowledge of the way their minds were moving. It is clear from my message of October 26 that any forestalling operation on a large scale in the Western Desert would command my keen support. We were all, however, until Mr. Eden"s return left under the impression that Wavell and Wilson were still wedded to the defensive battle at Mersa Matruh, and would wait there until they were attacked. The only action they seemed to contemplate in this extremely serious crisis was to send a battalion or so to Crete, a few air squadrons to Greece, and make some minor diversions against the Dodecanese and a small though desirable offensive in the Soudan. This seemed by no means good enough employment for the very large forces with which, at great risk, exertion, and cost, we had furnished them.
Our correspondence during this period was thus on both sides based upon misunderstanding. Wavell and the Secretary of State thought that for the sake of giving ineffectual aid to Greece we were pressing them to dissipate the forces they were gathering for an offensive in the Western Desert. We, on the other hand, not crediting them with offensive intentions, objected to their standing idle or trifling at such a crucial moment. In fact, as will presently be seen, we were all agreed. On November 1, indeed, Mr. Eden telegraphed cryptically: We cannot from Middle East forces send sufficient air or land reinforcements to have any decisive influence upon course of fighting in Greece. To send such forces from here, or to divert reinforcements now on their way or approved, would imperil our whole position in the Middle East and jeopardise plans for an offensive operation now being laid in more than one theatre. and jeopardise plans for an offensive operation now being laid in more than one theatre.3 After much painful effort and at the cost of grave risks we have, so far as our land forces are concerned, now built up a reasonably adequate After much painful effort and at the cost of grave risks we have, so far as our land forces are concerned, now built up a reasonably adequate defensive defensive 3 3 force here. We should presently be in a position to undertake certain offensive operations which if successful may have far-reaching effects on the course of the war as a whole. It would surely be bad strategy to allow ourselves to be diverted from this task, and unwise to employ our forces in fragments in a theatre of war where they cannot be decisive.... The best way in which we can help Greece is by striking at Italy, and we can do that most effectively from areas where our strength has been developed and where our plans are laid. I am anxious to put before you in detail at the earliest date the dispositions and plans which have been worked out here, and propose ... to return home by the shortest route, leaving on the 3d. force here. We should presently be in a position to undertake certain offensive operations which if successful may have far-reaching effects on the course of the war as a whole. It would surely be bad strategy to allow ourselves to be diverted from this task, and unwise to employ our forces in fragments in a theatre of war where they cannot be decisive.... The best way in which we can help Greece is by striking at Italy, and we can do that most effectively from areas where our strength has been developed and where our plans are laid. I am anxious to put before you in detail at the earliest date the dispositions and plans which have been worked out here, and propose ... to return home by the shortest route, leaving on the 3d.
This telegram crossed one from me to him at Khartoum which afterwards had to be repeated back to Cairo, whither he had repaired.
Prime Minister to Mr. Eden [ [at G.H.Q., Middle East].
3.XI.40.
Gravity and consequence of Greek situation compels your presence in Cairo. However unjust it may be, collapse of Greece without any effort by us will have deadly effect on Turkey and on future of war. Greeks probably as good as Italians, and Germans not yet on the spot. Establishment of fuelling base and airfield in Crete to be steadily developed into permanent war fortresses [is] indispensable. This is being done. But surely effort must be made to aid Greece directly, even if only with token forces. Quite understand how everyone with you is fixed on idea of set-piece battle at Mersa Matruh. For that very reason it is unlikely to occur. Enemy will await completion pipeline and development of larger forces than are now concentrated. Your difficulties in attacking across the desert obvious, but if you have no major offensive of your own in Libya possible during next two months, then you should run risks to stimulate Greek resistance. Over seventy thousand men sent to Middle East Command since June and thirty thousand reaching you before November 15, fifty-three thousand by end of the year. Armoured regiments have started in big convoy yesterday. Cannot therefore believe that various minor offensives of which you speak, plus major defence at Mersa Matruh, will outvalue need of effective action in Greece.No one will thank us for sitting tight in Egypt with ever-growing forces while Greek situation and all that hangs on it is cast away. Loss of Athens far greater injury than Kenya and Khartoum, but no necessity for such a price to be paid. Read carefully Palairet"s (our minister in Athens) telegrams. New emergencies must be met in war as they come, and local views must not subjugate main issue. No one expected Italy so late in the year would attack Greece. Greece, resisting vigorously with reasonable aid from Egypt and England, might check invaders. I am trying to send substantial bomber and fighter reinforcements to Crete and Greece, flying from England, with stores by cruiser. If this proves feasible details will be cabled tomorrow or Monday. Trust you will grasp situation firmly, abandoning negative and pa.s.sive policies and seizing opportunity which has come into our hands. "Safety first" is the road to ruin in war, even if you had the safety, which you have not. Send me your proposals earliest, or say you have none to make.
And again: 4.XI.40.We are sending you air reinforcements, arriving as fully explained in accompanying message from Chiefs of Staff. Send at once to Greece one Gladiator squadron and two more Blenheim squadrons, three in all. If necessary send a second battalion to Crete. Agreeably with arrival of our air reinforcements aforesaid and at earliest send one more Gladiator squadron. Anti-aircraft guns for airfields in Greece should precede arrival of squadrons.
It was proposed at this time to ask the Greeks to keep their Cretan division in the island. I therefore minuted:
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
6.XI.40.
It will be difficult to deny the Greeks the use of this Cretan division. If that be so, we shall certainly have to put more troops on the island. It is important that there should be a certain number of troops, and that it should be thought by the enemy that we are landing considerable numbers. The area to be watched is very extensive, and the consequences of a counter-attack would be most disastrous.Pray let me know your views.
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
7.XI.40.
We shall render poor service to Greece if in consequence of our using Crete for our own purposes we deny them the use of two-thirds of their Fifth Division. The defence of Crete depends on the Navy, but nevertheless there must be a certain deterrent force of troops on sh.o.r.e. I doubt if the two battalions of British and the three remaining Greek battalions will be sufficient. I am much obliged to you for telegraphing as I asked to General Wavell. He must provide in meal or in malt:(1) Three or four thousand additional British troops and a dozen guns. These need not be fully equipped or mobile.(2) He must do this from forces which he will not be using in the possibly impending battle.(3) We must tell the Greeks we release [for service with their main army] the six battalions and the artillery of the Fifth Greek Division.Every effort should be made to rush arms or equipment to enable a reserve division of Greeks to be formed in Crete. Rifles and machine guns are quite sufficient in this case. To keep a Greek division out of the battle on the Epirus front would be very bad, and to lose Crete because we had not sufficient bulk of forces there would be a crime.
It was time Mr. Eden should come home to report to us as he earnestly desired. The following telegrams are self-explanatory:
Mr. Eden to Prime Minister.
3.XI.40.