Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies.
22.XI.40.
As the action has been announced, it must proceed, but the conditions in Mauritius must not involve these people being caged up for the duration of the war. The Cabinet will require to be satisfied about this. Pray make me your proposals.[Reference: Proposal to ship to Mauritius Jewish refugees who had illegally emigrated to Palestine.]
Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord. (General Ismay to see.) 22.XI.40.
In my view Admiral Stark is right, and Plan D 20 20 is strategically sound, and also most highly adapted to our interests. We should, therefore, so far as opportunity serves, in every way contribute to strengthen the policy of Admiral Stark, and should not use arguments inconsistent with it. is strategically sound, and also most highly adapted to our interests. We should, therefore, so far as opportunity serves, in every way contribute to strengthen the policy of Admiral Stark, and should not use arguments inconsistent with it.2. Should j.a.pan enter the war on one side and the United States on ours, ample naval forces will be available to contain j.a.pan by long-range controls in the Pacific. The j.a.panese Navy is not likely to venture far from its home bases so long as a superior battle-fleet is maintained at Singapore or at Honolulu. The j.a.panese would never attempt a siege of Singapore with a hostile, superior American Fleet in the Pacific. The balance of the American Fleet, after providing the necessary force for the Pacific, would be sufficient, with our Navy, to exercise in a very high degree the command of all the seas and oceans except those within the immediate j.a.panese regions. A strict defensive in the Far East and the acceptance of its consequences is also our policy. Once the Germans are beaten the j.a.panese would be at the mercy of the combined fleets.3. I am much encouraged by the American naval view.
Prime Minister to Home Secretary.
23.XI.40.
There seems to be great disparity in these sentences [on A.F.S. men for looting], and I wonder whether any attempt is being made to standardise the punishments inflicted for this very odious crime. Five years" penal servitude for stealing whisky for immediate consumption seems out of proportion when compared with sentences of three or six months for stealing valuables. Exemplary discipline is no doubt necessary, as people must be made to feel that looting is stealing. Still, I should be glad to know that such cases are being reviewed and levelled out.
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
24.XI.40.
I sent you today two Foreign Office telegrams from Bucharest and Sofia respectively, which concur in an estimate of thirty thousand Germans, or one full division, as the maximum in Rumania at the present time. In view of this your Intelligence Branch should carefully, review the advice they gave to the effect that there were five divisions in Rumania and that these could be a.s.sembled on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier in three or four days. I thought myself that this estimate was altogether too pessimistic, and credited the enemy with a rapidity of movement and a degree of preparedness which were perhaps more serious than the facts. Will you have the whole problem examined most carefully again? I had thought myself that it would be a fortnight before anything serious could happen on the Greek frontier, and that perhaps it might be a month. The great thing is to get the true picture, whatever it is.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, and others concerned.
24.XI.40.
This paper shows that we have completely tailed to make cruiser tanks, and that there is no prospect of the present deficiency being made up in the next year. We must therefore equip our armoured divisions in the best possible way open to us in these melancholy circ.u.mstances. At this stage in tank production, numbers count above everything else. It is better to have any serviceable tank than none at all. The formation and training of the divisions can proceed, and the quality and character of the vehicles be improved later on. The "I" tank should not be disdained because of its slow speed, and in default of cruisers must be looked upon as our staple for fighting. We must adapt our tactics for the time being to this weapon as we have no other. We must adapt our tactics for the time being to this weapon as we have no other. Meanwhile the production of cruiser tanks and of A. 22 [a new model] must be driven forward to the utmost limit. Meanwhile the production of cruiser tanks and of A. 22 [a new model] must be driven forward to the utmost limit.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
24.XI.40.
The full order for the thirty-five thousand vehicles should be placed in the United States without further delay. Meanwhile the inquiry into the scale required by the War Office is to proceed.
Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.
27.XI.40.
I was the author of this plan of pow-wow, but the Greek complication seems to be serious. It will be of enormous advantage to us if Germany delays or shrinks from an attack on Bulgaria through Greece. I should not like those people in Greece to feel that, for the sake of what is after all only a parade, we had pressed them into action which could be cited by Germany as a justification for marching. The only thing to do is to put the meeting off until we can see a little more clearly on this very confused chessboard of Eastern Europe.I think the Dominions should be told that we are waiting for the Greek situation to define itself more clearly, and that this ought not to take more than a fortnight. I do not think it is necessary to give any reasons to the Allied Governments, except to a.s.sure them that the delay will be short.[Reference: Draft telegram to General Metaxas.]
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
28.XI.40.
It is of no use giving me these reports five days late. The Admiralty know every day exactly the state of the flotillas. I do not know why this matter should go through the War Cabinet or Defence Ministry. Pray tell the Admiralty to send direct to me, every week, the state o their flotillas.I am much concerned that the patrols on the western approaches should only have gone up to thirty effective. Let me see the chart showing previous weeks tomorrow.
Prime Minister to Minister of Labour.
28.XI.40.
I shall be obliged if you will let me know the present unemployment figures, divided into as many categories as is convenient, and compared with (a) (a) how they stood at the outbreak of war, and how they stood at the outbreak of war, and (b) (b) when the new Government was formed. when the new Government was formed.
Prime Minister to First Sea Lord.
30.XI.40.
It is to me incomprehensible that with the 50 American destroyers coming into service we should not have been able to raise the total serviceable to above 77 by November 23, when they stood at 106 on October 16. What happened between October 16 and October 26 to beat down serviceable destroyers by 28 vessels, and why did they go down from 84 to 77 between November 16 and November 23? just at the very time when another dozen Americans were coming into service.
Prime Minister to C.-in-C. Home Forces.
30.XI.40.
I have authorised the ringing of church bells on Christmas Day, as the imminence of invasion has greatly receded. Perhaps, however, you will let me know what alternative methods of giving the alarm you would propose to use on that day, and, secondly, what steps would be taken to ensure that the ringing of the bells for church services and without any invasion does not in fact lead to an alarm. There must certainly be no relaxation of vigilance.DECEMBER
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Dominions. (General Ismay to see for C.O.S. Committee.) 1.XII.40.
All this talk about Atlantic operations and Atlantic islands is most dangerous, and is contrary to the decision to describe such operations as "Shrapnel." I see no need for these long and pointless telegrams, and it is becoming quite impossible to conduct military operations when everything has to be spread about the Departments and around the world like this.Kindly give me the a.s.surance that there will be no further discussion of these matters by telegram without my seeing the messages before they are multiplied.Let me also know exactly the lists of officials and departments to whom these telegrams have been distributed.
(Action this day.) Prime Minister to C-in-C. Mediterranean (Personal and most secret.) 3.XII.40.
Your 270. We considered whole matter this morning with the Director of Combined Operations, Sir Roger Keyes, who will execute it with full control of all forces employed, and final plans are now being prepared by him. His appointment will not be naval, but limited to these combined operations. If necessary he will waive his naval rank. Cannot feel that air counter-attack will be serious having regard to size island, broken character, many houses and detached forts, in which comparatively small attacking force will be inter-mingled with defenders. Enemy aircraft will not know who holds what till all is over, and even then Italian flags may be displayed on soft spots.2. Capture of "Workshop" 21 21 no doubt a hazard, but Zeebrugge would never have got past scrutiny bestowed on this. Commandos very highly trained, carefully picked volunteers for this kind of work. Weather and fixed date of convoy may of course prevent attempt, in which case whole outfit will go to Malta or Suda for other enterprises. If conditions favorable, nothing will be stinted. no doubt a hazard, but Zeebrugge would never have got past scrutiny bestowed on this. Commandos very highly trained, carefully picked volunteers for this kind of work. Weather and fixed date of convoy may of course prevent attempt, in which case whole outfit will go to Malta or Suda for other enterprises. If conditions favorable, nothing will be stinted.3. Apprehensions you have that A.A. guns, etc., will be diverted from Eastern Mediterranean and new commitment created may be mitigated by capture of enemy A.A., which are numerous. Enemy unlikely attempt recapture, even though garrison left will be small. Commandos will come away after handing over to Regular troops, and be available for further operations.4. Comparing "Workshop" with other operation you mention, in future called "Mandibles" 22 22 (repeat (repeat "Mandibles"), kindly weigh following considerations. "Mandibles"), kindly weigh following considerations."Mandibles" requires ten or twelve thousand men and is far larger affair if the two big ones are to be taken. Little ones you mention would stir up all this area without any important reward unless process continued. Secondly, captures in "Mandibles" area would excite keen rivalry of Greeks and Turks, which above all we don"t want now. Thirdly, our reports show "Mandibles" slowly starving, and perhaps we shall get them cheaper later. Apart from the above, trying "Workshop" does not rule out "Mandibles" afterwards, unless ships and landing-craft are lost, which they may be. Also perhaps operations on enemy"s land communications along North African sh.o.r.e may present opportunities.5. On strategic grounds "Workshop" gives good air command of most used line of enemy communications with Libyan army, and also increased measure air protection for our convoys and transports pa.s.sing so-called Narrows. Joint Staffs here consider very high value attaches to removal of this obstruction to our East and West communications. Besides all this, we need to show ourselves capable of vehement offensive amphibious action. I call upon you, therefore, to use your utmost endeavours to procure success should conditions be favourable at zero hour.
Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production.
3.XII.40.
The King asked me today whether there was any shortage of instruments for aircraft.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
4.XII.40.
Two searchlights [at Suda Bay] seem very insufficient. What is going to be done to increase them?2. In view of the torpedoing of the Glasgow Glasgow by a seaplane while at anchor, ought not ships at anchor to be protected by nets at short range? I gather this was the Italian method at Taranto, but at the moment of the attack they had taken them off. Pray let me have a note on this. by a seaplane while at anchor, ought not ships at anchor to be protected by nets at short range? I gather this was the Italian method at Taranto, but at the moment of the attack they had taken them off. Pray let me have a note on this.
ARMY ORGANISATION.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.
9.XII.40.
I understand that you are asking for another big call-up shortly. The papers talk about a million men. This forces me to examine the distribution of the men you have. According to your paper, twenty-seven British divisions are credited to Expeditionary Force and Middle East. These divisions are accounted for at 35,000 men each, to cover corps, army and line of communication troops, etc., plus 70,000 security troops in M.E.2. The approved establishment of a British division at the present time is 15,500 men. It comprises only nine battalions with an establishment of 850, i.e., about 7500. The establishment of all battalions comprises a considerable proportion of servicing elements, and I doubt whether the rifle and machine-gun strength i.e., fighting strength amounts to more than 750. Thus the total number of men who actually fight in the infantry of a British division is 6750. This makes the fighting infantry of twenty-seven divisions, in what used to be called bayonet or rifle strength, 182,250. It used to be said that the infantry was "the staple of the Army," to which all other branches were ancillary. This has certainly undergone some modification under new conditions, but none the less it remains broadly true. The structure of a division is built round its infantry of nine battalions, with a battery to each battalion, the necessary proportion of signallers and sappers, the battalion, brigade, and divisional transport, and some additional elements, the whole being const.i.tuted as an integral and self-contained unit of 15,500 men.3. When we look at the division as a unit, we find that twenty-seven divisions at 15,500 official establishment require no less than 1,015,000 men. This gives an actual burden of 35,000 men for every divisional unit of 15,500 men, the units themselves being already fully self-contained. Nearly 20,000 men have therefore to be accounted for for each division of the E.F. or M.E. over and above the full approved establishment of 15,500.This great ma.s.s, amounting to 540,000, has now to be explained. We are a.s.sured that the corps, army, L. of C. troops, etc., plus the 70,000 security troops in the M.E., justify this enormous demand upon the manhood of the nation.4. One would have thought, if this were conceded, that the process was at an end. On the contrary, it is only just beginning. There still remain nearly two million men to be accounted for, as are set out on the attached table and graph. No one can complain of seven divisions for the Home Field Force, though it is surprising that they should require 24,000 men for divisional establishments of 15,500. This accounts for 170,000 men.5. A.D.G.B. 500,000 must be submitted to for the present, pending improved methods of dealing with the night-bomber and increased British ascendancy in the air.6. Two hundred thousand men for the permanent staffs and "unavailable" at training and holding units is a distressing figure, having regard to the great margins already provided. Staffs, static and miscellaneous units, "Y" list, etc., require 150,000 after all the twenty-seven divisions and the seven home divisions have been fully supplied with corps and army troops. Apart from everything necessary to handle an army of twenty-seven divisions and seven home divisions, there is this ma.s.s of 350,000 staffs and statics, living well of the nation as heroes in khaki.7. Compared with the above, overseas garrisons, other than M.E., of 75,000 seems moderate. India and Burma at 35,000 is slender.8. One hundred and fifty thousand men for the corps, army, and L. of C. troops for divisions other than British requires to be explained in detail. I understand the Australian and New Zealand fortes had supplied a great many of their rearward services. At any rate, I should like to see the exact distribution of this 150,000 in every category behind the divisions which they are expected to serve.9. The net wastage 330,000 is of course a purely speculative figure. But it might well be supplied from the 350,000 permanent staffs, static and other non-availables already referred to. supplied from the 350,000 permanent staffs, static and other non-availables already referred to.10. Deducting for the moment the 330,000 men for wastage, which deals with the future up till March, 1942, and 110,000 required for overseas garrisons other than M.E., India, and Burma, we face a total of 2,505,000 required for the aforesaid twenty-seven divisions plus seven home divisions, equal to about 74,000 per division. If the 500,000 for A.D.G.B. is omitted we still have over 2,000,000 men, i.e., nearly 60,000 men mobilised for each of thirty-four divisions.Before I can ask the Cabinet to a.s.sent to any further call-up from the public, it is necessary that this whole subject shall be thrashed out, and that at least a million are combed out of the fluff and flummery behind the fighting troops, and made to serve effective military purposes. We are not doing our duty in letting these great numbers be taken from our civil life and kept at the public expense to make such inconceivably small results in the fighting line.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
9.XII.40.
Let me have a report on the development of the Salvage Section of the Admiralty, showing the work that has been done and what expansions, if any, are contemplated to meet the evergrowing need of repairs rapidly.
(Action this day. Prime Minister to Minister of Works and Buildings (Lord Reith).
9.XII.40.
I am in general agreement with your proposals to set up machinery for the large-scale rebuilding which will be necessary after the war. Perhaps you will discuss with Sir Edward Bridges the best methods of obtaining a decision upon this, i.e., whether by the Home Policy Committee or by the Cabinet.2. Your most urgent task, however, is to repair existing buildings which are not seriously but only slightly damaged. Sometimes I see a whole row of houses whose windows are blown out, but which are not otherwise damaged, standing for weeks deserted and neglected. Active measures should be taken to replace the tiles and to close up the windows with fabric, with one small pane for light, and to make such repairs as render the houses fit for habitation. In dealing with house casualties the least serious should claim priority. You ought to have a regular corps of workmen who would get this job done so that the people may get back into their homes, which are unlikely to be hit a second time. Branches of this corps should exist in all the great cities. Not a day should be lost. How the expense is met or divided can be settled with the Treasury. But this question must be no impediment on action.,Pray let me have your plans for dealing with this forthwith.
(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.
14.XII.40.
There is one thing about the warfare between the Air Ministry and M.A.P. which is helpful to the public interest, namely, that I get a fine view of what is going on and hear both sides of the case argued with spirit. Will you very kindly address yourself to the various statements made in this letter attached [from Lord Beaverbrook], and especially to the one that on September 1 you had over a thousand unserviceable trainer aircraft? I have long suspected that the inefficiency which formerly ruled in the A.S.U.s and left us with only forty-five airplanes when the new Government was formed, as against about one thousand two hundred now, was reproduced in all the trainer establishments and communication flights and that a great ma.s.s of airplanes were kept in an unserviceable state, and I remember particularly the statement of one of your high officers that the Training Command worked on a basis of fifty per cent unserviceable. Who is responsible for repair and training establishments? If I were you, I should throw the whole business of repair on to M.A.P., and then you would be able to criticise them for any shortcomings.See also the figures of how repaired aircraft and engines have increased since the change was made.I recur to the point I made to you yesterday when you sent me your letter to M.A.P. The Air Ministry"s view is that the Germans have nearly 6000 airplanes in front-line action, and we have about 2000. Air Ministry also believe that the German output is 1800 a month, out of which they provide only 400 for training establishments, while we, out of 1400 output, provide also 400. How do you, then, explain that the Germans are able to keep three times our establishment in front-line action with only an equal monthly subscription of trainer aircraft? Apparently, on your figures, which I may say I do not accept (except for controversial purposes), the Germans can keep three times as large a force in action as you can for the same number of trainer planes. I know that you will rightly say you are preparing for the expansion of the future, but they have to keep going on a threefold scale, and expand as well.I await with keen interest further developments of your controversy.
Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook. (Private.) 15.XII.40.
It is a magnificent achievement 23 23 in the teeth of the bombing. Quite apart from new production, the repaired aircraft has been your own creation. We now have 1200 in the A.S.U."s, which is a great comfort. Dispersion has greatly hampered you, but was absolutely necessary as an insurance to spread the risk. in the teeth of the bombing. Quite apart from new production, the repaired aircraft has been your own creation. We now have 1200 in the A.S.U."s, which is a great comfort. Dispersion has greatly hampered you, but was absolutely necessary as an insurance to spread the risk.In addition, you have not confined yourself to mere numbers, but, on the contrary, have pushed hard into quality.The reason why there is this crabbing, as at A,24 is of course the warfare which proceeds between A.M. and M.A.P. They regard you as a merciless critic, and even enemy. They resent having had the M.A.P. functions carved out of their show, and I have no doubt they pour out their detraction by every channel open. I am definitely of opinion that it is more in the public interest that there should be sharp criticism and counter-criticism between the two departments than that they should be handing each other out ceremonious bouquets. One must therefore accept the stimulating but disagreeable conditions of war. is of course the warfare which proceeds between A.M. and M.A.P. They regard you as a merciless critic, and even enemy. They resent having had the M.A.P. functions carved out of their show, and I have no doubt they pour out their detraction by every channel open. I am definitely of opinion that it is more in the public interest that there should be sharp criticism and counter-criticism between the two departments than that they should be handing each other out ceremonious bouquets. One must therefore accept the stimulating but disagreeable conditions of war.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Dominions.
15.XII.40.