Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and Chief of Air Staff.
2.VI.40.
It is of the utmost importance, in view of the [possible] raids on Lyons and Ma.r.s.eilles, that we should be able to strike back with our heavy bombers at Italy the moment she enters the war. I consider therefore that these squadrons should be flown to their aerodromes in Southern France at the earliest moment when French permission can be obtained and when the servicing units are ready for their reception.Pray let me know at our meeting tonight what you propose.
Prime Minister to S. of S. for Air and C.A.S.
6.VI.40.
It is of the highest importance that we should strike at Italy the moment war breaks out, or an overbearing ultimatum is received. Please let me know the exact position of the servicing units which are on their way to the southern aerodromes in France.
An early Italian plan, favoured particularly by Ciano, had been that Italian action in Europe should be confined to the launching of an attack on Yugoslavia, thus consolidating Italy"s power in Eastern Europe and strengthening her potential economic position. Mussolini himself was for a time won over to this idea. Graziani records that at the end of April the Duce told him, "We must bring Yugoslavia to her knees; we have need of raw materials and it is in her mines that we must find them. In consequence my strategic directive is defensive in the west (France) and offensive in the east (Yugoslavia). Prepare a study of the problem." 3 3 Graziani claims that he advised strongly against committing the Italian armies, short as they were of equipment, particularly of artillery, to a repet.i.tion of the Isonzo campaign of 1915. There were also political arguments against the Yugoslav plan. The Germans were anxious at this moment to avoid disturbing Eastern Europe. They feared it would provoke British action in the Balkans and might inadvertently tempt Russia to further activity in the East. I was not aware of this aspect of Italian policy. Graziani claims that he advised strongly against committing the Italian armies, short as they were of equipment, particularly of artillery, to a repet.i.tion of the Isonzo campaign of 1915. There were also political arguments against the Yugoslav plan. The Germans were anxious at this moment to avoid disturbing Eastern Europe. They feared it would provoke British action in the Balkans and might inadvertently tempt Russia to further activity in the East. I was not aware of this aspect of Italian policy.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
6.VI.40.
I have hitherto argued against going to war with Italy because she attacked [i.e., if she were to attack] Yugoslavia, and have wished to see whether it was a serious attack upon Yugoslavian independence or merely taking some naval bases in the Adriatic. However, this situation has changed. Italy is continually threatening to go to war with England and France, and not by "the back door." We are so near a break with Italy on grounds which have nothing to do with Yugoslavia, that it would seem that our main aim might well be now to procure this Balkan mobilisation. Will you think this over?
In spite of the extreme efforts made by the United States, of which Mr. Hull has given an impressive account in his memoirs,4 nothing could turn Mussolini from his course. Our preparations to meet the new a.s.sault and complication were well advanced when the moment came. On June 10 at 4.45 nothing could turn Mussolini from his course. Our preparations to meet the new a.s.sault and complication were well advanced when the moment came. On June 10 at 4.45 P.M. P.M. the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Amba.s.sador that Italy would consider herself at war with the United Kingdom from 1 the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Amba.s.sador that Italy would consider herself at war with the United Kingdom from 1 P.M. P.M. the next day. A similar communication was made to the French Government. When Ciano delivered his note to the French Amba.s.sador, M. Francois-Poncet remarked as he reached the door: "You too will find the Germans are hard masters." The British Amba.s.sador, Sir Percy Loraine, received the announcement with perfect composure and apparent indifference. He asked only one question: Was Ciano"s statement early news or was it in fact the declaration of war? Ciano replied it was the latter. Loraine then made a formal bow and left the room without another word. the next day. A similar communication was made to the French Government. When Ciano delivered his note to the French Amba.s.sador, M. Francois-Poncet remarked as he reached the door: "You too will find the Germans are hard masters." The British Amba.s.sador, Sir Percy Loraine, received the announcement with perfect composure and apparent indifference. He asked only one question: Was Ciano"s statement early news or was it in fact the declaration of war? Ciano replied it was the latter. Loraine then made a formal bow and left the room without another word.5 From his balcony in Rome Mussolini announced to well-organised crowds that Italy was at war with France and Britain. It was, as Ciano is said to have apologetically remarked later on, "A chance which comes only once in five thousand years." Such chances, though rare, are not necessarily good. From his balcony in Rome Mussolini announced to well-organised crowds that Italy was at war with France and Britain. It was, as Ciano is said to have apologetically remarked later on, "A chance which comes only once in five thousand years." Such chances, though rare, are not necessarily good.
Forthwith the Italians attacked the French troops on the Alpine front and Great Britain reciprocally declared war on Italy. The five Italian ships detained at Gibraltar were seized and orders were given to the Navy to intercept and bring into controlled ports all Italian vessels at sea. On the night of the 12th our bomber squadrons, after a long flight from England which meant light loads, dropped their first bombs, upon Turin and Milan. We looked forward, however, to a much heavier delivery as soon as we could use the French airfields at Ma.r.s.eilles.
It may be convenient at this point to dispose of the brief Franco-Italian campaign. The French could only muster three divisions with fortress troops equivalent to three more to meet invasion over the Alpine pa.s.ses and along the Riviera coast by the western group of Italian armies. These comprised thirty-two divisions under Prince Umberto. Moreover, strong German armour, rapidly descending the Rhone Valley, soon began to traverse the French rear. Nevertheless the Italians were still confronted and even pinned down at every point on the new front by the French Alpine units, even after Paris had fallen and Lyons was in German hands. When on June 18, Hitler and Mussolini met at Munich the Duce had little cause to boast. A new Italian offensive was therefore launched on June 21. The French Alpine positions, however, proved impregnable, and the major Italian effort towards Nice was halted in the suburbs of Mentone. But although the French army on the southeastern borders saved its honour, the German march to the south behind them made further fighting impossible, and the conclusion of the armistice with Germany was linked with a French request to Italy for the cessation of hostilities.
My account of this Italian tragedy may fittingly be closed here by the letter which the unlucky Ciano wrote me shortly before his execution at the orders of his father-in-law.
Verona, December 23, 1943.Signer Churchill.You will not be surprised that as I approach the hour of my death I should turn to you whom I profoundly admire as the champion of a crusade, though you did at one time make an unjust statement against me.I was never Mussolini"s accomplice in that crime against our country and humanity, that of fighting side by side with the Germans. Indeed the opposite is the truth, and if last August I vanished from Rome it was because the Germans had convinced me that my children were in imminent danger. After they had pledged themselves to take me to Spain, they deported me and my family, against my will, to Bavaria. Now, I have been nearly three months in the prisons of Verona abandoned to the barbarous treatment of the S.S. My end is near, and I have been told that in a few days my death will be decided, which to me will be no more nor less [than] a release from this daily martyrdom. And I prefer death to witnessing the shame and irreparable damage of an Italy which has been under Hun domination.The crime which I am now about to expiate is that of having witnessed and been disgusted by the cold, cruel, and cynical preparation for this war by Hitler and the Germans. I was the only foreigner to see at close quarters this loathsome clique of bandits preparing to plunge the world into a b.l.o.o.d.y war. Now, in accordance with gangster rule, they are planning to suppress a dangerous witness. But they have miscalculated, for already a long time ago I put a diary of mine and various doc.u.ments in a safe place which will prove, more than I myself could, the crimes committed by those people with whom later that tragic and vile puppet Mussolini a.s.sociated himself through his vanity and disregard of moral values.I have made arrangements that as soon as possible after my death these doc.u.ments, of the existence of which Sir Percy Loraine was aware at the time of his Mission in Rome, should be put at the disposal of the Allied Press.Perhaps what I am offering you today is but little, but that and my life are all I can offer to the cause of liberty and justice, in the triumph of which I fanatically believe.This testimony of mine should be brought to light so that the world may know, may hate and may remember, and that those who will have to judge the future should not be ignorant of the fact that the misfortune of Italy was not the fault of her people but due to the shameful behaviour of one man.Yours sincerelyG. CLANO * * * * *
A speech from President Roosevelt had been announced for the night of the 10th. About midnight I listened to it with a group of officers in the Admiralty War Room, where I still worked. When he uttered the scathing words about Italy, "On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor," there was a deep growl of satisfaction. I wondered about the Italian vote in the approaching presidential election; but I knew that Roosevelt was a most experienced American party politician, although never afraid to run risks for the sake of his resolves. It was a magnificent speech, instinct with pa.s.sion and carrying to us a message of hope. While the impression was strong upon me, and before going to bed, I expressed my grat.i.tude.
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
11.VI.40.
We all listened to you last night and were fortified by the grand scope of your declaration. Your statement that the material aid of the United States will be given to the Allies in their struggle is a strong encouragement in a dark but not unhopeful hour. Everything must be done to keep France in the fight and to prevent any idea of the fall of Paris, should it occur, becoming the occasion of any kind of parley. The hope with which you inspire them may give them the strength to persevere. They should continue to defend every yard of their soil and use the full fighting force of their Army. Hitler, thus baffled of quick results, will turn upon us, and we are preparing ourselves to resist his fury and defend our island. Having saved the B.E.F., we do not lack troops at home, and as soon as divisions can be equipped on the much higher scale needed for Continental service they will be despatched to France. Our intention is to have a strong army fighting in France for the campaign of 1941. I have already cabled you about aeroplanes, including flying-boats, which are so needful to us in the impending struggle for the life of Great Britain. But even more pressing is the need for destroyers. The Italian outrage makes it necessary for us to cope with a much larger number of submarines which may come out into the Atlantic and perhaps be based on Spanish ports. To this the only counter is destroyers. Nothing is so important as for us to have the thirty or forty old destroyers you have already had reconditioned. We can fit them very rapidly with our Asdics, and they will bridge the gap of six months before our wartime new construction comes into play. We will return them or their equivalents to you, without fail, at six months" notice if at any time you need them. The next six months are vital. If while we have to guard the East Coast against invasion a new heavy German-Italian submarine attack is launched against our commerce, the strain may be beyond our resources, and the ocean traffic by which we live may be strangled. Not a day should be lost. I send you my heartfelt thanks and those of my colleagues for all you are doing and seeking to do for what we may now, indeed, call the Common Cause.
The rush for the spoils had begun. But Mussolini was not the only hungry animal seeking prey. To join the Jackal came the Bear.
I have recorded in the previous volume the course of Anglo-Soviet relations up till the outbreak of war and the hostility, verging upon an actual breach with Britain and France, which arose during the Russian invasion of Finland. Germany and Russia now worked together as closely as their deep divergences of interest permitted. Hitler and Stalin had much in common as totalitarians, and their systems of government were akin. M. Molotov beamed on the German Amba.s.sador, Count Schulenburg, on every important occasion, and was forward and fulsome in his approval of German policy and praise for Hitler"s military measures. When the German a.s.sault had been made upon Norway he had said (April 7) that "the Soviet Government understood the measures which were forced upon Germany. The English had certainly gone much too far. They had disregarded completely the rights of neutral nations.... We wish Germany complete success in her defensive measures." We wish Germany complete success in her defensive measures." 6 6 Hitler had taken pains to inform Stalin on the morning of May 10 of the onslaught he had begun upon France and the neutral Low Countries. "I called on Molotov," wrote Schulenburg. "He appreciated the news, and added that he understood that Germany had to protect herself against Anglo-French attack. He had no doubt of our success." Hitler had taken pains to inform Stalin on the morning of May 10 of the onslaught he had begun upon France and the neutral Low Countries. "I called on Molotov," wrote Schulenburg. "He appreciated the news, and added that he understood that Germany had to protect herself against Anglo-French attack. He had no doubt of our success." 7 7 Although these expressions of their opinion were of course unknown till after the war, we were under no illusions about the Russian att.i.tude. We nonetheless pursued a patient policy of trying to re-establish relations of a confidential character with Russia, trusting to the march of events and to their fundamental antagonisms to Germany. It was thought wise to use the abilities of Sir Stafford Cripps as Amba.s.sador to Moscow. He willingly accepted this bleak and unpromising task. We did not at that time realise sufficiently that Soviet Communists hate extreme left-wing politicians even more than they do Tories or Liberals. The nearer a man is to Communism in sentiment, the more obnoxious he is to the Soviets unless he joins the party. The Soviet Government agreed to receive Cripps as Amba.s.sador, and explained this step to their n.a.z.i confederates. "The Soviet Union," wrote Schulenburg to Berlin on May 29, "is interested in obtaining rubber and tin from England in exchange for lumber. There is no reason for apprehension concerning Cripps"s mission, since there is no reason to doubt the loyal att.i.tude of the Soviet Union towards us, and since the unchanged direction of Soviet policy towards England precludes damage to Germany or vital German interests. There are no indications of any kind here for belief that the latest German successes cause alarm or fear of Germany in the Soviet Government." 8 8 The collapse of France and the destruction of the French armies and of all counter-poise in the West ought to have produced some reaction in Stalin"s mind, but nothing seemed to warn the Soviet leaders of the gravity of their own peril. On June 18, when the French defeat was total, Schulenburg reported, "Molotov summoned me this evening to his office and expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success the splendid success of the German armed forces." of the German armed forces." 9 9 This was almost exactly a year from the date when these same armed forces, taking the Soviet Government by complete surprise, fell upon Russia in cataracts of fire and steel. We now know that only four months later in 1940 Hitler definitely decided upon a war of extermination against the Soviets, and began the long, vast, stealthy movement of these much-congratulated German armies to the East. No recollection of their miscalculation and former conduct ever prevented the Soviet Government and its Communist agents and a.s.sociates all over the world from screaming for a Second Front, in which Britain, whom they had consigned to ruin and servitude, was to play a leading part. This was almost exactly a year from the date when these same armed forces, taking the Soviet Government by complete surprise, fell upon Russia in cataracts of fire and steel. We now know that only four months later in 1940 Hitler definitely decided upon a war of extermination against the Soviets, and began the long, vast, stealthy movement of these much-congratulated German armies to the East. No recollection of their miscalculation and former conduct ever prevented the Soviet Government and its Communist agents and a.s.sociates all over the world from screaming for a Second Front, in which Britain, whom they had consigned to ruin and servitude, was to play a leading part.
However, we comprehended the future more truly than these cold-blooded calculators, and understood their dangers and their interest better than they did themselves. I now addressed myself for the first time to Stalin.
Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin.
25.VI.40.
At this time, when the face of Europe is changing hourly, I should like to take the opportunity of your receiving His Majesty"s new Amba.s.sador to ask the latter to convey to you a message from myself.Geographically our two countries lie at the opposite extremities of Europe, and from the point of view of systems of government it may be said that they stand for widely differing systems of political thought. But I trust that these facts need not prevent the relations between our two countries in the international sphere from being harmonious and mutually beneficial.In the past indeed in the recent past our relations have, it must be acknowledged, been hampered by mutual suspicions; and last August the Soviet Government decided that the interests of the Soviet Union required that they should break off negotiations with us and enter into a close relation with Germany. Thus Germany became your friend almost at the same moment as she became our enemy.But since then a new factor has arisen which I venture to think makes it desirable that both our countries should re-establish our previous contact, so that if necessary we may be able to consult together as regards those affairs in Europe which must necessarily interest us both. At the present moment the problem before all Europe our two countries included is how the States and peoples of Europe are going to react towards the prospect of Germany establishing a hegemony over the Continent.The fact that both our countries lie not in Europe but on her extremities puts them in a special position. We are better enabled than others less fortunately placed to resist Germany"s hegemony, and as you know the British Government certainly intend to use their geographical position and their great resources to this end.In fact, Great Britain"s policy is concentrated on two objects one, to save herself from German domination, which the n.a.z.i Government wishes to impose, and the other, to free the rest of Europe from the domination which Germany is now in process of imposing on it.The Soviet Union is alone in a position to judge whether Germany"s present bid for the hegemony of Europe threatens the interests of the Soviet Union, and if so how best these interests can be safeguarded. But I have felt that the crisis through which Europe, and indeed the world, is pa.s.sing is so grave as to warrant my laying before you frankly the position as it presents itself to the British Government. This, I hope, will ensure that in any discussion that the Soviet Government may have with Sir S. Cripps there should be no misunderstanding as to the policy of His Majesty"s Government or of their readiness to discuss fully with the Soviet Government any of the vast problems created by Germany"s present attempt to pursue in Europe a methodical process by successive stages of conquest and absorption.
There was, of course, no answer. I did not expect one. Sir Stafford Cripps reached Moscow safely, and even had an interview of a formal and frigid character with M. Stalin.
Meanwhile the Soviet Government was busy collecting its spoils. On June 14, the day Paris fell, Moscow had sent an ultimatum to Lithuania accusing her and the other Baltic States of military conspiracy against the U.S.S.R. and demanding radical changes of government and military concessions. On June 15, Red Army troops invaded the country and the President, Smetona, fled into East Prussia. Latvia and Estonia were exposed to the same treatment. Pro-Soviet Governments must be set up forthwith and Soviet garrisons admitted into these small countries. Resistance was out of the question. The President of Latvia was deported to Russia, and Mr. Vyshinsky arrived to nominate a Provisional Government to manage new elections. In Estonia the pattern was identical. On June 19, Zhdanov arrived in Tallinn to instal a similar regime. On August 3/6, the pretense of pro-Soviet friendly and democratic Governments was swept away, and the Kremlin annexed the Baltic States to the Soviet Union.
The Russian ultimatum to Rumania was delivered to the Rumanian Minister in Moscow at 10 P.M. P.M. on June 26. The cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of the province of Bukovina was demanded, and an immediate reply requested by the following day. Germany, though annoyed by this precipitate action of Russia, which threatened her economic interests in Rumania, was bound by the terms of the German-Soviet pact of August, 1939, which recognised the exclusive political interest of Russia in these areas of Southeast Europe. The German Government, therefore, counselled Rumania to yield. on June 26. The cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of the province of Bukovina was demanded, and an immediate reply requested by the following day. Germany, though annoyed by this precipitate action of Russia, which threatened her economic interests in Rumania, was bound by the terms of the German-Soviet pact of August, 1939, which recognised the exclusive political interest of Russia in these areas of Southeast Europe. The German Government, therefore, counselled Rumania to yield.
7.
Back to France June 4 to June 12
High Morale of the Army - My First Thoughts and Directive, June 2, 1940 - The Lost Equipment - The President, General Marshall, and Mr. Stettinius - An Act of Faith - The Double Tensions of June - Reconst.i.tution of the British Army - Its Fearful Lack of Modern Weapons - Decision to Send Our Only Two Well-Armed Divisions to France - The Battle of France: Final Phase - Destruction of the Fifty-First Highland Division, June 11/12 - "Auld Scotland Stands for Something Still" - My Fourth Visit to France: Briare - Weygand and Petain - General Georges Summoned - Mussolini Strikes - My Discussion with Weygand - The French Prevent the Royal Air Force from Bombing Milan and Turin - The Germans Enter Paris - Renewed Conference Next Morning - Admiral Darlan"s Promise - Farewell to G.Q.G. - Our Journey Home - My Report to the War Cabinet of the Conference.
WHEN IT WAS KNOWN how many men had been rescued from Dunkirk, a sense of deliverance spread in the island and throughout the Empire. There was a feeling of intense relief, melting almost into triumph. The safe home-coming of a quarter of a million men, the flower of our Army, was a milestone in our pilgrimage through years of defeat. The achievement of the Southern Railway and the Movements Branch of the War Office, of the staffs at the ports in the Thames Estuary, and above all at Dover, where over two hundred thousand men were handled and rapidly distributed throughout the country, is worthy of the highest praise. The troops returned with nothing but rifles and bayonets and a few hundred machine guns, and were forthwith sent to their homes for seven days" leave. Their joy at being once again united with their families did not overcome a stern desire to engage the enemy at the earliest moment. Those who had actually fought the Germans in the field had the belief that, given a fair chance, they could beat them. Their morale was high, and they rejoined their regiments and batteries with alacrity. how many men had been rescued from Dunkirk, a sense of deliverance spread in the island and throughout the Empire. There was a feeling of intense relief, melting almost into triumph. The safe home-coming of a quarter of a million men, the flower of our Army, was a milestone in our pilgrimage through years of defeat. The achievement of the Southern Railway and the Movements Branch of the War Office, of the staffs at the ports in the Thames Estuary, and above all at Dover, where over two hundred thousand men were handled and rapidly distributed throughout the country, is worthy of the highest praise. The troops returned with nothing but rifles and bayonets and a few hundred machine guns, and were forthwith sent to their homes for seven days" leave. Their joy at being once again united with their families did not overcome a stern desire to engage the enemy at the earliest moment. Those who had actually fought the Germans in the field had the belief that, given a fair chance, they could beat them. Their morale was high, and they rejoined their regiments and batteries with alacrity.
All the Ministers and departmental officers, permanent or newly chosen, acted with confidence and vigour night and day, and there are many tales to be told besides this one. Personally I felt uplifted, and my mind drew easily and freely from the knowledge I had gathered in my life. I was exhilarated by the salvation of the Army. I present, for what they are worth, the directives to the Departments and submissions to the War Cabinet which I issued day by day. Ismay carried them to the Chiefs of Staff, and Bridges to the War Cabinet and the Departments. Mistakes were corrected and gaps filled. Amendments and improvements were often made, but in the main, to the degree perhaps of ninety per cent, action was taken, and with a speed and effectiveness which no dictatorship could rival.
Here were my first thoughts at the moment when it became certain that the Army had escaped.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
2.VI.40.
Notes for C.O.S., etc., by the Minister of Defence.The successful evacuation of the B.E.F. has revolutionised the Home Defence position. As soon as the B.E.F. units can be reformed on a Home Defence basis we have a ma.s.s of trained troops in the country which would require a raid to be executed on a prohibitively large scale. Even 200,000 men would not be beyond our compa.s.s. The difficulties of a descent and its risks and losses increase with every addition to the first 10,000. We must at once take a new view of the situation. Certain questions must be considered, chiefly by the War Office, but also by the Joint Staffs:1. What is the shortest time in which the B.E.F. can be given a new fighting value?2. Upon what scheme would they be organised? Will it be for service at Home in the first instance and only secondarily despatch to France? On the whole, I prefer this.3. The B.E.F. in France must immediately be reconst.i.tuted, otherwise the French will not continue in the war. Even if Paris is lost, they must be adjured to continue a gigantic guerrilla. A scheme should be considered for a bridgehead and area of disembarkation in Brittany, where a large army can be developed. We must have plans worked out which will show the French that there is a way through if they will only be steadfast.4. As soon as the B.E.F. is reconst.i.tuted for Home Defence, three divisions should be sent to join our two divisions south of the Somme, or wherever the French left may be by then. It is for consideration whether the Canadian Division should not go at once. Pray let me have a scheme.5. Had we known a week ago what we now know about the Dunkirk evacuation, Narvik would have presented itself in a different light. Even now the question of maintaining a garrison there for some weeks on a self-contained basis should be reconsidered. I am deeply impressed with the vice and peril of chopping and changing. The letter of the Minister of Economic Warfare as well as the telegram of some days ago from the C.-in-C. must, however, receive one final weighing.6. Ask Admiralty to supply a latest return of the state of the destroyer flotillas, showing what reinforcements have arrived or are expected within the month of June, and how many will come from repair.7. It should now be possible to allow the eight Regular battalions in Palestine to be relieved by the eight native battalions from India before before they are brought home, as brought home they must be, to const.i.tute the cadres of the new B.E.F. they are brought home, as brought home they must be, to const.i.tute the cadres of the new B.E.F.8. As soon as the Australians land, the big ships should be turned round and should carry eight or ten Territorial battalions to Bombay. They should bring back a second eight Regular battalions from India, and afterwards carry to India a second eight or ten Territorial battalions from England. It is for consideration how far the same principle should be applied to batteries in India.9. Our losses in equipment must be expected to delay the fruition of our expansion of the B.E.F. from the twenty divisions formerly aimed at by Zl + 12 months, to no more than fifteen divisions by Z + 18; but we must have a project to put before the French. The essence of this should be the armoured division, the 51st, the Canadians, and two Territorial divisions under Lord Gort by mid-July, and the augmenting of this force by six divisions formed from the twenty-four Regular battalions in conjunction with Territorials, a second Canadian division, an Australian division, and two Territorial divisions by Z + 18. Perhaps we may even be able to improve on this. + 12 months, to no more than fifteen divisions by Z + 18; but we must have a project to put before the French. The essence of this should be the armoured division, the 51st, the Canadians, and two Territorial divisions under Lord Gort by mid-July, and the augmenting of this force by six divisions formed from the twenty-four Regular battalions in conjunction with Territorials, a second Canadian division, an Australian division, and two Territorial divisions by Z + 18. Perhaps we may even be able to improve on this.10. It is of the highest urgency to have at least half a dozen Brigade groups formed from the Regulars of the B.E.F. for Home Defence.11. What air co-operation is arranged to cover the final evacuation tonight? It ought to be possible to reduce the pressure on the rearguard at this critical moment.I close with a general observation. As I have personally felt less afraid of a German attempt at invasion than of the piercing of the French line on the Somme or Aisne and the fall of Paris, I have naturally believed the Germans would choose the latter. This probability is greatly increased by the fact that they will realise that the armed forces in Great Britain are now far stronger than they have ever been, and that their raiding parties would not have to meet half-trained formations, but the men whose mettle they have already tested, and from whom they have recoiled, not daring seriously to molest their departure. The next few days, before the B.E.F. or any substantial portion of it can be reorganised, must be considered as still critical.
There was of course a darker side to Dunkirk. We had lost the whole equipment of the Army to which all the firstfruits of our factories had hitherto been given:
7,000.
tons of ammunition 90,000.
rifles 2,300.
Guns 120,000.
vehicles 8,000.
Bren guns 400.
anti-tank rifles
Many months must elapse, even if the existing programmes were fulfilled without interruption by the enemy, before this loss could be repaired.
However, across the Atlantic in the United States strong emotions were already stirring in the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of its leading men. A precise and excellent account of these events is given by Mr. Stettinius,2 the worthy son of my old Munitions colleague of the First World War, one of our truest friends. It was at once realised that the bulk of the British Army had got away only with the loss of all their equipment. As early as June 1 the President sent out orders to the War and Navy Departments to report what weapons they could spare for Britain and France. At the head of the American Army as Chief of Staff was General Marshall, not only a soldier of proved quality, but a man of commanding vision. He instantly directed his Chief of Ordnance and his a.s.sistant Chief of Staff to survey the entire list of the American reserve ordnance and munitions stocks. In forty-eight hours the answers were given, and on June 3 Marshall approved the lists. The first list comprised half a million .30 calibre rifles out of two million manufactured in 1917 and 1918 and stored in grease for more than twenty years. For these there were about 250 cartridges apiece. There were 900 the worthy son of my old Munitions colleague of the First World War, one of our truest friends. It was at once realised that the bulk of the British Army had got away only with the loss of all their equipment. As early as June 1 the President sent out orders to the War and Navy Departments to report what weapons they could spare for Britain and France. At the head of the American Army as Chief of Staff was General Marshall, not only a soldier of proved quality, but a man of commanding vision. He instantly directed his Chief of Ordnance and his a.s.sistant Chief of Staff to survey the entire list of the American reserve ordnance and munitions stocks. In forty-eight hours the answers were given, and on June 3 Marshall approved the lists. The first list comprised half a million .30 calibre rifles out of two million manufactured in 1917 and 1918 and stored in grease for more than twenty years. For these there were about 250 cartridges apiece. There were 900 soixante-quinze soixante-quinze field guns with a million rounds, 80,000 machine guns, and various other items. In his excellent book about American supplies Mr. Stettinius says: "Since every hour counted, it was decided that the Army should sell (for 37 million dollars) everything on the list to one concern which could in turn resell immediately to the British and French." The Chief of Ordnance, Major-General Wesson, was told to handle the matter, and immediately on June 3 all the American Army depots and a.r.s.enals started packing the material for shipment. By the end of the week more than six hundred heavily loaded freight cars were rolling towards the Army docks at Raritan, New Jersey, up the river from Gravesend Bay. By June 11 a dozen British merchant ships moved into the bay and anch.o.r.ed, and loading from lighters began. field guns with a million rounds, 80,000 machine guns, and various other items. In his excellent book about American supplies Mr. Stettinius says: "Since every hour counted, it was decided that the Army should sell (for 37 million dollars) everything on the list to one concern which could in turn resell immediately to the British and French." The Chief of Ordnance, Major-General Wesson, was told to handle the matter, and immediately on June 3 all the American Army depots and a.r.s.enals started packing the material for shipment. By the end of the week more than six hundred heavily loaded freight cars were rolling towards the Army docks at Raritan, New Jersey, up the river from Gravesend Bay. By June 11 a dozen British merchant ships moved into the bay and anch.o.r.ed, and loading from lighters began.
By these extraordinary measures the United States left themselves with the equipment for only 1,800,000 men, the minimum figure stipulated by the American Army Mobilisation Plan. All this reads easily now, but at that time it was a supreme act of faith and leadership for the United States to deprive themselves of this very considerable ma.s.s of arms for the sake of a country which many deemed already beaten. They never had need to repent of it. As will presently be recounted, we ferried these precious weapons safely across the Atlantic during July, and they formed not only a material gain, but an important factor in all calculations made by friend or foe about invasion.
Mr. Cordell Hull has a pa.s.sage in his memoirs 3 3 which is relevant at this point: which is relevant at this point: In response to Reynaud"s almost pitiful pleas for backing, the President urged Mr. Churchill to send planes to France; but the Prime Minister refused. Bullitt [the United States Amba.s.sador in Paris], outraged by this decision, communicated to the President and me on June 5 his fear that the British might be conserving their Air Force and Fleet so as to use them as bargaining points in negotiations with Hitler. The President and I, however, thought differently. France was finished, but we were convinced that Britain, under Churchill"s indomitable leadership, intended to fight on. There would be no negotiations between London and Berlin. Only the day before Bullitt"s telegram, Churchill had made his magnificent speech in the House of Commons. The President and I believed Mr. Churchill meant what he said. Had we had any doubt of Britain"s determination to keep on fighting, we would not have taken the steps we did to get material aid to her. There would have been no logic in sending arms to Britain if we had thought that, before they arrived there, Churchill"s Government would surrender to Germany.
The month of June was particularly trying to all of us, because of the dual and opposite stresses to which in our naked condition we were subjected by our duty to France on the one hand and the need to create an effective army at home and to fortify the island on the other. The double tension of antagonistic but vital needs was most severe. Nevertheless, we followed a firm and steady policy without undue excitement. First priority continued to be given to sending whatever trained and equipped troops we had, in order to reconst.i.tute the British Expeditionary Force in France. After that our efforts were devoted to the defence of the island; first, by re-forming and re-equipping the Regular Army; secondly, by fortifying the likely landing-places; thirdly, by arming and organising the population, so far as was possible; and of course by bringing home whatever forces could be gathered from the Empire. At this time the most imminent dangers seemed to be the landing of comparatively small but highly mobile German tank forces which would rip us up and disorganise our defence, and also parachute descents. In close contact with the new Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden, I busied myself on all this.
The following scheme was devised by the Secretary of State and the War Office for reconst.i.tuting the Army in accordance with the directives which had been issued. Seven mobile brigade groups were already in existence. The divisions returned from Dunkirk were reconst.i.tuted, re-equipped as fast as possible, and took up their stations. In time the seven brigade groups were absorbed into the re-formed divisions. There were available fourteen Territorial divisions of high-quality men who had been nine months ardently training under war conditions and were partly equipped. One of these, the 52d, was already fit for service overseas. There was a second armoured division and four Army tank brigades in process of formation, but without tanks. There was the 1st Canadian Division fully equipped.
It was not men that were lacking, but arms. Over eighty thousand rifles were retrieved from the communications and bases south of the Seine, and by the middle of June every fighting man in the Regular forces had at least a personal weapon in his hand. We had very little field artillery, even for the Regular Army. Nearly all the new 25-pounders had been lost in France. There remained about five hundred 18-pounders, 4.5-inch and 6-inch howitzers. There were only 103 cruiser, 132 infantry, and 252 light tanks. Fifty of the infantry tanks were at home in a battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment, and the remainder were in training-schools. Never has a great nation been so naked before her foes.
From the beginning I kept in the closest contact with my old friends now at the head of the Governments of Canada and South Africa.
Prime Minister to Mr. Mackenzie King.
5.VI.40.
British situation vastly improved by miraculous evacuation of B.E.F., which gives us an army in the island more than capable, when re-equipped, of coping with any invading force likely to be landed. Also evacuation was a main trial of strength between British and German Air Forces. Germans have been unable to prevent evacuation, though largely superior in numbers, and have suffered at least three times our loss. For technical reasons, British Air Force would have many more advantages in defending the air above the island than in operating overseas. Princ.i.p.al remaining danger is of course air[craft] factories, but if our air defence is so strong that enemy can only come on dark nights precision will not be easy. I therefore feel solid confidence in British ability to continue the war, defend the island and the Empire, and maintain the blockade.I do not know whether it will be possible to keep France in the war or not. I hope they will, even at the worst, maintain a gigantic guerrilla. We are reconst.i.tuting the B.E.F. out of other units.We must be careful not to let Americans view too complacently prospect of a British collapse, out of which they would get the British Fleet and the guardianship of the British Empire, minus Great Britain. If United States were in the war and England [were] conquered locally, it would be natural that events should follow the above course. But if America continued neutral, and we were overpowered, I cannot tell what policy might be adopted by a pro-German administration such as would undoubtedly be set up.Although President is our best friend, no practical help has [reached us] from the United States as yet. We have not expected them to send military aid, but they have not even sent any worthy contribution in destroyers or planes, or by a visit of a squadron of their Fleet to southern Irish ports. Any pressure which you can apply in this direction would be invaluable.We are most deeply grateful to you for all your help and for [the four Canadian] destroyers, which have already gone into action against a U-boat. Kindest regards.
s.m.u.ts, far off in South Africa and without the latest information upon the specialised problems of Insular Air Defence, naturally viewed the tragedy of France according to orthodox principles: "Concentrate everything at the decisive point." I had the advantage of knowing the facts, and of the detailed advice of Air Marshal Dowding, head of Fighter Command. If s.m.u.ts and I had been together for half an hour, and I could have put the data before him, we should have agreed, as we always did on large military issues.
Prime Minister to General s.m.u.ts.
9.VI.40.
We are of course doing all we can both from the air and by sending divisions as fast as they can be equipped to France. It would be wrong to send the bulk of our fighters to this battle, and when it was lost, as is probable, be left with no means of carrying on the war. I think we have a harder, longer, and more hopeful duty to perform. Advantages of resisting German air attack in this island, where we can concentrate very powerful fighter strength, and hope to knock out four or five hostiles to one of ours, are far superior to fighting in France, where we are inevitably outnumbered and rarely exceed two to one ratio of destruction, and where our aircraft are often destroyed at exposed aerodromes. This battle does not turn on the score or so of fighter squadrons we could transport with their plant in the next month. Even if by using them up we held the enemy, Hitler could immediately throw his whole [air] strength against our undefended island and destroy our means of future production by daylight attack. The cla.s.sical principles of war which you mention are in this case modified by the actual quant.i.tative data. I I see only one way through now, to wit, that Hitler should attack this country, and in so doing break his air weapon. see only one way through now, to wit, that Hitler should attack this country, and in so doing break his air weapon. If this happens, he will be left to face the winter with Europe writhing under his heel, and probably with the United States against him after the presidential election is over. If this happens, he will be left to face the winter with Europe writhing under his heel, and probably with the United States against him after the presidential election is over.Am most grateful to you for cable. Please always give me your counsel, my old and valiant friend.
Apart from our last twenty-five Fighter Squadrons, on which we were adamant, we regarded the duty of sending aid to the French Army as paramount. The movement of the 52d Division to France, under previous orders, was due to begin on June 7. These orders were confirmed. The 3d Division, under General Montgomery, was put first in equipment and a.s.signed to France. The leading division of the Canadian Army, which had concentrated in England early in the year and was well armed, was directed, with the full a.s.sent of the Dominion Government, to Brest to begin arriving there on June 11 for what might by this time already be deemed a forlorn hope. The two French light divisions evacuated from Norway were also sent home, together with all the French units and individuals we had carried away from Dunkirk.