Jacobsdal was represented by Commandant Pretorius (who had succeeded Commandant Lubbe, after the latter had been wounded and taken prisoner at Tabaksberg), and forty men.
In the district of Fauresmith, Commandant Visser and some seventy men had remained faithful.
In Bethulie, Commandant Du Plooij, with nearly a hundred men, were still in arms.
Bloemfontein was represented by Commandant Piet Fourie and two hundred burghers.
The commandos of Rouxville, Smithfield, Wepener and Ladybrand, fell far short of their full complement of men, as a great number had remained behind at home.
Of the burghers from Winburg, Kroonstad and Heilbron, many had already laid down their arms, and the drain upon our troops in these districts was still continuing.
None of the burghers belonging to the districts of Ficksburg, Bethlehem,[44] Harrismith and Vrede had yet surrendered--their turn was to come.
All told, we were 8,000 burghers.
After my men had gone northwards, those burghers of Hoopstad, Jacobsdal, Fauresmith, Philippolis, Bethulie, Smithfield, Rouxville, Wepener, Bloemfontein and the southern part of Ladybrand, who had laid down their arms and remained at home between the beginning of March and the end of May, were left undisturbed by Lord Roberts--so far as their private liberty was concerned.
I was now camped at Frankfort, waiting for the ammunition, which ought to have already arrived from Greylingstad Station. It was about this time that the Government decided, on the recommendation of some of the officers, that the rank of Vechtgeneraal should be abolished. In consequence of this decision all the officers of that rank resigned. I did not approve of this course of action, and obtained from the Government the rank of a.s.sistant Commander-in-Chief. I was thus able to re-appoint the old Vechtgeneraals, Piet de Wet, C.C. Froneman, Philip Botha and Paul Roux, and I at once proceeded to do so.
[Footnote 43: Afterwards Commandant, and, still later, a.s.sistant Commander-in-Chief.]
[Footnote 44: At the conclusion of peace it was the Bethlehem commando which had the greatest number of burghers under arms.]
CHAPTER XIV
Roodewal
The ammunition arrived safely, and towards the end of May I made my way to a certain hill, some twelve miles from Heilbron, to which we had given the name of Presidentskopje, and where Commandants Steenekamp and J.H. Olivier were posted.
Here I left the greater part of my commandos. But I myself, on the 2nd of June, set out in the direction of Roodewal Station, taking with me six hundred burghers, mounted on the best horses that were to be obtained. I reached the farm of Leeuwfontein the same night, and found it an excellent place in which to hide my men out of sight of the Heilbron garrison. The farm stood about nine miles to the south of that town.
The following evening we moved on as far as Smithsdrift, which is a drift on the road from Heilbron to Kroonstad. There again I concealed my men.
On the afternoon of the next day, June the 4th, news was brought me that a convoy was on its way to Heilbron from Rhenoster River. This convoy encamped that evening at the distance of a mile from the farm of Zwavelkrans; the spot chosen was about five hundred paces from the Rhenoster River, and quite unprotected.
Before sunrise I sent a party of burghers down to the river, some five hundred paces from where the convoy was encamped, and by daybreak we had entirely surrounded the enemy.
No sooner had the sun appeared than I despatched a burgher with a white flag to the English officer in command. I ordered my messenger to inform the officer that he was surrounded, that escape was out of the question, and that if he wished to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, his only course was to surrender.
[Ill.u.s.tration: ROODEWAL.
FROM A SKETCH BY THE AUTHOR.]
On hearing this one of their men came to me with the object of demanding certain conditions. It goes without saying that my answer was--"Unconditional surrender!"
He asked for time to communicate this to the officer in command. I granted this request, and he returned to the convoy.
We were not left in suspense for long. The white flag was hoisted almost immediately, and two hundred _Bergschotten_,[45] with fifty-six heavily laden waggons, fell into our hands.
Fortunately, all this occurred out of sight of Roodewal Station and Heilbron, and, as not a single shot had been fired, I had no reason so far to fear that there was any obstacle in the way of my main project--the capture of the valuable booty at Roodewal.
I at once returned with my capture to the spot where we had been the previous night. General Philip Botha conducted the prisoners and the booty to the President"s camp, returning to our laager on the following morning.
On the evening of the 6th of June I started on my road to Roodewal. At Walfontein I divided my troops into three parties. The first party, consisting of three hundred men with one Krupp, I despatched under Commandant Steenekamp to Vredefort Road Station, with orders to attack it the following day at sunrise. General Froneman, with Commandants Nel and Du Plooij, were in command of the second party, which consisted of three hundred burghers, with two Krupps and one quick-firing gun. My orders were that, at daybreak, they were to attack an English camp which was lying a mile to the north of the railway station at Rhenoster River, and close to some brick-coloured ridges. The third party I commanded myself. It consisted of Commandant Fourie and eighty burghers, with one Krupp; and with this force I pushed on to Roodewal Station.
At Doorndraai I left behind me a few waggons, with twenty men to guard them. I had previously stationed a hundred burghers there, with the object of keeping in touch with the enemy.
The information which Captain Scheepers had gained while scouting was amply sufficient to show me how the land lay.
Although I had heard that there were not more than fifty of the enemy at Vredefort Road Station, I had nevertheless sent three hundred burghers there. This was because I was aware that the main English force lay to the north of the station, so that these fifty men might be reinforced at the shortest possible notice. The numbers which General Froneman had to encounter were much greater, and the enemy held safe positions. But as General Froneman was himself able to take quite as good positions, I only gave him the same number of troops as I had a.s.signed to Commandant Steenekamp. I also gave orders that two guns should proceed with him.
I was informed that there were only one hundred of the English at Roodewal, but that these hundred were very securely entrenched. My information was, however, at fault, for I discovered later on that there were at least double that number.
I arrived at Roodewal very early in the morning of the 7th of June. I brought my men up to within eight hundred paces of the station, and ordered them to unharness the horses which were attached to the Krupp, and to place it in position.
But listen! There is the crack of rifles in the distance! That must be the sound of the enemy"s fire on General Froneman. Again, and yet again, the sound meets my ears. Then all is quiet once more.
It was still two hours before the sun would rise, and I took full advantage of the opportunities which the darkness gave me. I ordered four of my burghers to approach as close to the station as was possible, and to find out everything they could about the enemy"s position.
Following my directions, they crept with extreme caution towards the English lines, until only a hundred paces separated them from the station. They returned before it was light, and brought back word that unless the enemy had thrown up unusually high _schanzes_, there must be an untold quant.i.ty of provisions piled up there. Everything had been very quiet, and they had seen no one stirring.
The day now began to dawn, and as soon as it was light I sent a message to the enemy demanding their surrender. The answer came back at once. On the back of my note these words had been written:
"We refuse to surrender."
I instantly opened a hot fire upon them, bringing the Krupp as well as the Mausers into action. But the reply of the enemy was no less severe.
We had no cover. There was only a shallow _pan_[46]--so shallow that it scarcely afforded protection to the horses" hoofs! A thousand paces to the north-west of the railway I had observed a deep _pan_ where the horses would have had better cover, but even there our men would have been just as exposed as they now were. I had decided against taking up my position in this _pan_, because I should have been obliged to cross the line to reach it, and in doing so should have run the risk of being observed by the English.
Thus it was that the burghers were compelled to lie flat down in order to afford as little mark as possible to the enemy. But the men who served the Krupp were naturally unable to do this; and, seeing that the gun must be moved, I gave this order: "Inspan the gun, gallop it three thousand paces back; then blaze away again as fiercely as you can!"
Under a hail of bullets the horses were attached to the gun. Whilst this was being done, I ordered my men to fire upon the English entrenchments with redoubled energy, and thus, if possible, prevent the enemy from taking careful aim.
Incredible though it may appear, Captain Muller got the gun away without a single man or horse being hit. When he had covered three thousand paces, he halted, and turning the Krupp on the enemy, he sh.e.l.led them with good effect.
At about ten o"clock, General Froneman succeeded in forcing the English troops which he had attacked to surrender. I therefore ordered the two Krupps which he had with him to be brought up with the utmost despatch.
At half-past seven they arrived, and immediately opened fire on the English.
When the enemy had been under the fire of three guns and eighty Mausers for an hour, they thought it best to hoist the white flag. We accordingly ceased firing, and I rode out towards the station. Before I had reached it, I was met by two of the officers. They told me that they were willing to surrender, on condition that they were allowed to retain their private property and the mail bags, for it appeared that there were two English mails under their charge.
I replied that so far as their private belongings were concerned, they were welcome to keep them, as I never allowed the personal property of my prisoners to be tampered with in my presence.[47] But I told them that the letters were a different matter, and that I could not allow them to reach their destination--unless they were directed to a bonfire!
There was nothing left for the officers to do, except to agree to my terms then and there; for had they hesitated even for a moment, I should certainly have stormed the station.