My force numbered two thousand five hundred men.
On the afternoon when I received the above-mentioned letter, there was still a way of escape open to me, through Parijs[64] to Potchefstroom.
This road crossed the Vaal River at Schoemansdrift, and then followed the course of the stream between Parijs and Vanvurenskloof. It was now, however, somewhat unsafe, for that same afternoon a large force of the enemy was marching along the Vaal River from Vredefort to Parijs. These troops would be able to reach Vanvurenskloof early the following morning; whilst the force at Potchefstroom, which I have already mentioned in this chapter, would also be able to arrive there at the same hour.
I led my burghers that evening across the Vaal River to Venterskroon, which lies six miles from Schoemansdrift. The following morning my scouts reported that the English were rapidly approaching from Potchefstroom in two divisions; one was at Zandnek: the other had already reached Roodekraal on its way to Schoemansdrift. One of these divisions, my scouts told me, might be turning aside to Vanvurenskloof.
Now the road from Venterskroon pa.s.sed between two mountain chains to the north of Vanvurenskloof; and I feared that the English would block the way there. I had to avoid this at all costs, but I had hardly a man available for the purpose. The greater part of my burghers were still to the south-east and south-west of the Vaal River.
There was nothing left for me to do except to take the burghers who remained with me, and, whilst the laager followed us as quickly as possible, to advance and prevent the enemy from occupying the kloof.
This I did, and took a part of my men to Vanvurenskloof, whilst I sent another body of burghers to Zandnek.
Everything went smoothly. The enemy did not appear and the laager escaped without let or hindrance--and so we camped at Vanvurenskloof.
I must have misled the English, for they certainly would have thought that I would come out by the road near Roodekraal. But I cannot understand why the force in our rear, which had arrived at Parijs the previous evening, remained there overnight, nor why, when they did move on the following morning, they marched to Lindequesdrift, eight miles up the Vaal River, and not, as might well have been expected, to Vanvurenskloof.
The burghers whom I sent in the direction of Roodekraal had a fight with the enemy at Tijgerfontein. A heavy bombardment took place; and my men told me afterwards that the baboons, of which there were a large number in these mountains, sprang from cliff to cliff screaming with fright--poor creatures--as the rocks were split on every side by the lyddite sh.e.l.ls.
The burghers came to close quarters with the enemy, and a fierce engagement with small arms took place.
It appeared later that the enemy"s casualties amounted to more than a hundred dead and wounded. Our loss was only two men.
As I have already stated, we camped at Vanvurenskloof. The next morning, while we were still there, we were surprised by the enemy--an unpleasant thing for men with empty stomachs.
I did not receive any report from my scouts[65] until the English were not more than three thousand paces from us, and had already opened fire on the laager, not only with their guns, but also with their rifles. We at once took the best positions we could find; and meanwhile the waggons got away as quickly as possible. They succeeded in getting over the first ridge, and thus gained a certain amount of shelter, whilst we kept the English busy.
The enemy approached nearer and nearer to us with overpowering forces.
Then they charged, and I saw man after man fall, struck down by our merciless fire. We were quite unable to hold the enemy back, and so we had to leave our positions, having lost one dead and one wounded.
That night we marched ten miles to the east of Gatsrand, on the road to Frederiksstad Station, and the following morning we arrived at the foot of the mountain. Here we outspanned for a short time, but we could not wait long, for our pursuers were following us at a great pace. It was not only the force from the other side of Vanvurenskloof with which we had to deal. The united forces of the English had now concentrated from different points with the purpose of working our ruin.
The English were exceedingly angry that we had escaped from them on the Vaal River, for they had thought that they had us safely in their hands.
That we should have succeeded in eluding them was quite beyond their calculations; and in order to free themselves from any blame in the matter, they reported that we had crossed the river at a place where there was no ford, but this was not true; we had crossed by the waggon and post ford--the well-known Schoemansdrift.
But whether the enemy were angry or not, there was no doubt that they were pursuing us in very large numbers, and that we had to escape from them. That evening, the 7th of August, we went to the north of Frederiksstad Station, and blew up a bridge with two spans and wrecked the line with dynamite.
The following day we arrived at the Mooi River. This river is never dry winter or summer, but always flows with a stream as clear as crystal. It affords an inexhaustible supply of water to the rich land that lies along its bank. It is a fitting name for it--the name of Mooi.[66]
At the other side of this river we found General Liebenberg"s commando, which, like ourselves, was in the trap.
The General joined us on our march, and the following day we were nine miles from Ventersdorp.
Early that morning a report came that the English were approaching and were extended right across the country.
"Inspan!"
No man uttered a word of complaint; each man did his work so quickly that one could hardly believe that a laager could be put on the move in so short a time. And away the waggons and carts skurried, steering their course to Ventersdorp.
It was impossible to think of fighting--the enemy"s numbers were far too great. Our only safety lay in flight.
We knew very well that an Englishman cannot keep up with a Boer on the march, and that if he tries to do so, he soon finds that his horses and oxen can go no further. Our intention was then to march at the very best pace we could, so that the enemy might be forced to stop from sheer exhaustion. And as the reader will soon see, our plan was successful.
Nevertheless we had to do some fighting, to protect our laager from a force of cavalry that was rapidly coming up with us.
They wanted to make an end of this small body of Boers, which was always retreating, but yet, now and again, offering some slight resistance--this tiny force that was always teaching them unpleasant lessons; first at Retiefsnek, then to the north of Lindley, then on the railway line, then near Vredefort, then at Rhenosterpoort, and then again at Tijgerfontein. Yes; this sort of thing must come to an end once for all!
We attacked the approaching troops, and succeeded in checking their advance. But our resistance could not last long, and soon we had to retreat and leave one of our Krupps behind us.
Had I not continued firing with my Krupp until it was impossible to save it, then, in all probability, the laager would have been taken. But with the loss of this Krupp we saved the laager.
I withdrew my burghers; I released the prisoners whom I had with me.
And now it was my task to make it as difficult as possible for my pursuers. The winter gra.s.s on the veldt was dry and very inflammable, and I decided to set fire to it, in order that the English might find it impossible to obtain pasture for their oxen and cattle. I accordingly set it alight, and very soon the country behind was black.
We hurried on until we reached Mr. Smit"s farm, which is one hour on horseback from the southern slopes of the Wit.w.a.tersrand--the great dividing chain of mountains that runs in the direction of Marico.
Crossing this range, we continued on the march the whole night until, on the morning of the 11th of August, we arrived at the southern side of the Magaliesberg.
In the afternoon we went over the saddle of the mountain and across the Krokodil River.
My idea was to remain here and give our horses and oxen a rest, for the veldt was in good condition, and we could, if it were necessary, occupy the shoulder of the mountain behind us.
General Liebenberg took possession of the position to the west, near Rustenburg; but hardly had he done so, before the English made their appearance, coming over another part of the mountain. He sent me a report to this effect, adding that he was unable to remain where he was stationed.
Thus again we had to retreat, and I was unable to give my animals the rest I had intended to give them.
We now took the road from Rustenburg to Pretoria, and arrived the following evening close to Commandonek, which we soon found was held by an English force.
I left the laager behind and rode on in advance with a horse-commando.
When I was a short distance from the enemy, I sent a letter to the officer in command, telling him that, if he did not surrender, I would attack him. I did this in order to discover the strength of the English force, and to find out if it were possible to attack the enemy at once, and forcing our way through the Nek, get to the east of the forces that were pursuing me.
My despatch rider succeeded in getting into the English camp before he could be blindfolded. He came back with the customary refusal, and reported that although the enemy"s force was not very large, still the positions held were so strong that I could not hope to be able to capture them before the English behind me arrived.
I had therefore to give up the thought of breaking through these and flanking the English. Thus, instead of attacking the enemy, we went in the direction of Zoutpan, and arrived a few hours later at the Krokodil River.
I had now left the English a considerable distance behind me; and so at last--we were able to give ourselves a little rest.
[Footnote 62: I put down here the very words I used, for any other course would not be honest.]
[Footnote 63: Kaallaagte--a barren hollow.]
[Footnote 64: Parijs is situated on the Vaal River.]
[Footnote 65: The reason why Captain Scheepers was so late in sending his report was because he himself was engaging the enemy with six of his men near Zandnek. He had come across a convoy of fourteen waggons and thirty men, and had, after an hour"s fight, nearly brought them to the point of surrendering, when reinforcements arrived. He was thus forced to retire, and then discovered that the enemy were approaching our laager; and he had a hair"s breadth escape from capture in bringing me the report.]
[Footnote 66: "Mooi" means beautiful in the Taal language.]