"3. Commandant A. Bester.
"It thus appears that all my generals and chief commanding officers are chosen as Representatives to attend at the Meeting of Vereeniging, on the 15th inst., and according to our mutual agreement at Pretoria, an armistice will be given from to-day (11th May, 1902) in all districts of the Orange Free State up to a date which shall be agreed upon after the close of the Meeting at Vereeniging. Any answer, previous to noon of the 11th inst., will reach me at Brandfort.
"Commander-in-Chief, Orange Free State Armies."
In answer to this I received the following telegram:--
"IMPERIAL RESIDENCY, PRETORIA, _May 12th_.
"TO GENERAL DE WET, BRANDFORT.
"I have given orders, according to our Agreement, that from to-morrow, the 13th inst., all commandos, whose leaders or chief officers have been chosen to attend the Meeting at Vereeniging, shall be exempted from being attacked by my columns during the absence of their leaders, in so far as such commandos withhold from offensive operations. But that does not imply that outposts cannot be taken prisoner in case they should approach our lines.
"KITCHENER."
It was rather surprising to me that Lord Kitchener, in this telegram, spoke only of an armistice beginning on the 13th of May, because in his telegram of the 25th he had agreed that there should be an armistice from the 11th of May. I heard also from officers of Heilbron, Vrede, and Bethlehem, whom I met, on the evening of the 14th of May, at Wolvehoek Station, that the English columns had operated in their districts on the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th. My order was that my officers should not operate, but should retreat, if the enemy should unexpectedly operate on the 11th. On the above-mentioned dates houses were burnt down, cattle carried away, maize and other grain destroyed, burghers taken prisoner, and (in one instance) shot.
Such a misunderstanding was very regrettable, and all the more so because we were never indemnified for the damage thus done.
CHAPTER x.x.xVII
The End of the War
On the morning of the 15th of May, I arrived at Vereeniging with some of the Free State delegates. The others were already there, together with the thirty Transvaal delegates, Commandant-General Louis Botha and General De la Rey. In addition to the above, the following had also arrived: Vice-State President Burger, States-President Steyn, the members of the two Governments, and General J.C. s.m.u.ts (from Cape Colony).
I was exceedingly sorry to find that President Steyn was seriously ill.
For the last six weeks he had been in the doctor"s hands; and, since his arrival at Pretoria, had been under the care of Dr. Van der Merwe, of Krugersdorp. This physician said that serious consequences might ensue if his patient were to attend our meetings, and advised him to go to his home at Krugersdorp, where he could be properly nursed. It was sad for us to receive this news immediately we arrived. We asked ourselves what we should do without the President at our meetings? At this moment he seemed more indispensable to us than ever before.
President Steyn was a statesman in the best sense of the word. He had gained the respect and even the affection of us all. Of him, if of any man, it may be said that he never swerved from his duty to his country.
No task was too great for him, no burden too heavy, if thereby he could serve his people. Whatever hardships he had endured, he had never been known to complain--he would endure anything for us. He had fought in our cause until he could fight no longer, until sickness laid him low; and he was worn out, and weak as a child. _Weak_, did I say? Yes! but only in the body--his mind was still as strong, as brave, as clear as ever.
And thus it was that President Steyn was only able to be present on two occasions at our meetings; for, on the 29th of May--before the National Representatives had come to any decision--he went with Dr. Van der Merwe to Krugersdorp.
As I write these lines--six months after the meetings at Vereeniging--and think that during all the intervening time he has been lying on a bed of sickness--I am cheered by the news which I received in Holland that hopes are now entertained of his ultimate recovery.
The National Representatives began their important deliberations on the morning of the 13th of May, 1902.
For three days we discussed the condition of our country, and then proceeded with Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner to Pretoria. This Commission was composed of Commandant-General L. Botha, Commander-in-Chief C.R. de Wet, Vice-Commandant-General J.H. De la Rey, Vice-Commander-in-Chief Judge J.B.M. Hertzog, and States-Procureur J.C.
s.m.u.ts.
The negotiations with the representatives of the British Government continued from the 18th to the 29th of May; and upon their conclusion the Commission communicated to the National Representatives the terms on which England was prepared to conclude peace.
On May the 31st we decided to accept the proposals of the English Government.[110] The Independence of the two Republics was at an end!
I will not attempt to describe the struggle it cost us to accept these proposals. Suffice it to say that when it was over, it had left its mark on every face.
There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes or No. It was an ultimatum--this proposal of England"s.
What were we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination.
Already our women and children were dying by the thousand, and starvation was knocking at the door--and knocking loudly!
In certain districts, such as Boshof and Hoopstad, it was still possible to prolong the war, as was also the case in the districts of Generals Brand and Nieuwouwdt, where the sheep and oxen, which had been captured from the enemy, provided an ample supply of food. But from the last-named districts all the women and children had departed, leaving the burghers free to wander at will in search of food--to Boshof, to Hoopstad, and even into the Colony.
In other parts of the Free State things were very different. In the north-eastern and northern districts--for instance, in Ladybrand, Winburg, Kroonstad, Heilbron, Bethlehem, Harrismith and Vrede--there were still many families, and these could not be sent to Boshof or to Hoopstad or to the Colony. And when, reduced to dire want, the commandos should be obliged to abandon these districts, their wives and families would have to be left behind--to starve!
The condition of affairs in the Transvaal was no better. We Free-Staters had thought--and I, for one, had supported the view at Vereeniging--that, before sacrificing our independence, we ought to tell the owners of these farms, where there were still women and children, to go and surrender with their families, and thus save them from starvation. But we soon realized that such a course was not practicable--it would involve the loss of too many burghers.
Moreover, even if, by some such scheme as this, we had succeeded in saving the women, we, who remained in the field, would still have been exposed to the dangers of starvation, for many of us, having no horses, could not have left want behind us, by removing to Cape Colony or some other equally prosperous region.
In the large eastern divisions of the Transvaal also, there were many burghers without horses, while the poor jaded creatures that remained were far too feeble and exhausted to carry their masters into Cape Colony, without the certainty of being captured by the enemy.
Our forces were now only twenty thousand in all, of which the Transvaal supplied ten thousand, the Free State six thousand, while the remainder came from Cape Colony. But our numerical weakness would not in itself have caused us to abandon the struggle had we but received encouraging news from the Colony. But alas! reports which we received from there left us no room for hope.
No room for hope! that was the message of Vereeniging--a message which struck a chill in every heart. One after another we painted the dest.i.tution, the misery of our districts, and each picture was more gloomy than the last. At length the moment of decision came, and what course remained open to us? This only--to resign ourselves to our fate, intolerable though it appeared, to accept the British proposal, and to lay down our arms.
Most bitter of all was the thought that we must abandon our brethren in Cape Colony and in Natal, who had thrown in their lot with ours. And many a sleepless night has this caused me. But we could not help ourselves. There was nothing else to do.
And as things have turned out, may we not hope that the Cape and Natal Governments, following in the wake of the British Nation, will soon understand that the wiser course is to forgive and forget, and to grant as comprehensive an amnesty as possible? It is surely not unjust to expect this of these Governments, when one remembers that whatever the Colonists may have done, must be ascribed to the tie that binds them to us--the closest of all ties--that of blood.
It is now for the two Governments to strive to realize the situation, and then, by granting a general amnesty, to promote, as far as in them lies, the true progress of South Africa.
On the evening of the 31st of May, 1902, the members of the Government of both Republics met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, in the former"s house, at Pretoria.
It was there that the Treaty of Peace--the British Proposal which the National Representatives had accepted--was now to be signed.
It was a never-to-be-forgotten evening. In the s.p.a.ce of a few short minutes that was done which could never be undone. A decision arrived at in a meeting could always be taken into reconsideration, but a doc.u.ment solemnly signed, as on that night, by two parties, bound them both for ever.
Every one of us who put his name to that doc.u.ment knew that he was in honour bound to act in accordance with it. It was a bitter moment, but not so bitter as when, earlier on the same day, the National Representatives had come to the decision that the fatal step must be taken.
On the 2nd June, 1902, the Representatives left Vereeniging, and returned every man to his own commando. It was now their sad duty to tell their brave and patient burghers that the independence which they cherished so dearly was gone, and to prepare them to surrender their arms at the appointed places.
I left Pretoria on the 3rd of June with General Elliott, who had to accompany me to the various centres to receive the burghers" arms.
On the 5th of June the first commando laid down their weapons near Vredefort. To every man there, as to myself, this surrender was no more and no less than the sacrifice of our independence. I have often been present at the death-bed and at the burial of those who have been nearest to my heart--father, mother, brother and friend--but the grief which I felt on those occasions was not to be compared with what I now underwent at the burial of my Nation!
It was at Reitz that the commandos of Vrede, Harrismith, Heilbron and Bethlehem laid down their arms. Accordingly I went there on the 7th of June, and again had to be a spectator of what I fain would never have witnessed. Had I then to go on from commando to commando, to undergo everywhere the martyrdom of beholding ceaseless surrenders? No! I had had enough, and could bear no more. I decided, therefore, to visit all the other commandos, in order to acquaint the burghers with what had taken place, and to explain to them why we, however unsatisfactory the Peace Proposal was, had felt bound to accept it, and then to leave each commando before the men handed over their arms to General Elliott.
Everywhere I found the men utterly despondent and dissatisfied.
The whole miserable business came to an end on the 16th of June, when the burghers who had fought under Generals Nieuwouwdt and Brand, laid down their arms--the Nation had submitted to its fate!
There was nothing left for us now but to hope that the Power which had conquered us, the Power to which we were compelled to submit, though it cut us to the heart to do so, and which, by the surrender of our arms, we had accepted as our Ruler, would draw us nearer and ever nearer by the strong cords of love.