At half-past seven in the evening the delegates rea.s.sembled.
General Cilliers (Lichtenburg and Marico) was the first to make a report. "In my division," he said, "things are in a very favourable condition. Yet we are bound to take the other divisions into consideration. My burghers said to me, "Stand firm for independence!"
But when they gave me the order they did not know about the condition of the other districts. Will those other districts--such of them, I mean, as are in a worse predicament than ourselves--be able to co-operate with us in continuing the war? Some of them have already answered my question in the negative. Must we then not ask ourselves, What will be the best for the nation as a whole? Shall we say continue the war, or shall we approach the enemy and make a proposal?
"But are we really justified in prolonging the struggle, and making still further sacrifices? Some will answer, "Yes, for we have a G.o.d in whom we have trusted from the beginning; shall we not continue to trust in Him who has worked such wonders for us already?" But I have heard a brother say, "G.o.d"s hand is against us." It was bitter to hear these words from him, and for myself I will have none of them. My vote is given here and now for a continuance of the war.
"But we must hear what the rest of the delegates have to say, and if they can point out some other way by which we can retain even a portion of our national independence, we must be ready to follow it."
General Froneman next addressed the meeting.
"I fear," he began, "that too much is being made of the condition of my division: things are not so prosperous with us as some here appear to imagine. But for all that, my burghers are for nothing short of absolute independence. They cannot forget the blood which has already been spilt in our cause. They mean to hold out until they are relieved.
"I sympathize deeply with those districts that are less happily circ.u.mstanced than my own, but it pains me to discover that there are some here who doubt that G.o.d is for us. For what has supported us up till now save faith in G.o.d?--the faith of those who first prayed G.o.d to prevent the war, and then, when they saw that this was not His will, fought like men, putting all their trust in Him.
"Up till now the Lord hath been my helper; the enemy has cut us off from everything, and yet we see our two little Republics still full of hope, still holding out."
He concluded his speech by saying that he would like to hear the opinions of Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey. They ought to be able to throw much light upon the matter.
Commandant General Botha then rose, and said:
"I am glad to have an opportunity of giving my views upon the present state of affairs. We know that differences of opinion are to be found everywhere and on every question; when, therefore, a man differs from those who think that this war can and ought to be continued, we must ascribe his opinion to discouragement, weakness, or cowardice. We must acknowledge the truth of the facts from which he draws his conclusions, and which have compelled him to utter it. His object is to make known the true state of the country--which indeed is his plain duty. Were he not to do so on the present occasion he would be accused, later on, of having kept secret what he ought to have revealed. Differences of opinion then need not, and must not, cause a disunion and discord.
Whatever our private opinions may be, yet, as delegates of the burghers, we must speak and act as one man.
"The war has now lasted two years. But the question for us to answer is this: Are we going forwards or backwards? My own conviction--a conviction founded upon the views expressed by my commandos and the speeches which I have listened to at this meeting--is that we are not gaining, but losing ground. There is nothing, in my opinion, more evident than that, during the last six months, the tide has been setting steadily against us, and in favour of the enemy.
"A year ago there were no blockhouses. We could cross and recross the country as we wished, and hara.s.s the enemy at every turn. But now things wear a very different aspect. We can pa.s.s the blockhouses by night indeed, but never by day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandos.
"Then, as regards food. We are told that there is food here, and food there; but how are we to get at it? How are we to transport it from one district to another? Outside the frontiers of our Republics there are plenty of provisions, but it becomes daily more difficult to get them into our hands. The cattle, for instance, that used to be at Ladysmith have now been removed to Estcourt. Even the friendly Kaffirs, from whom we are now able to obtain provisions, may quite possibly soon turn against us. The time is coming when we shall be compelled to say, "Hunger drives us to surrender."
"The horses have been chased about so incessantly, and have suffered so much from want of forage, that their strength is almost exhausted. They are so weak that it is almost impossible to accomplish any long distance with them.
"As to the Cape Colony, I had always understood that the Colonists were going to rise _en bloc_, but General s.m.u.ts has just told us that there is no chance of such a thing happening. And he speaks from personal knowledge, having just returned from paying them a visit. Moreover, he has seen our horses, and says that it is impossible for them to go into the Colony, so it appears that our successes there are over. This is a severe check indeed; but it could not have been otherwise. We have not enough horses to enable us to give the Colonists effectual help, and they themselves have been cowed by the heavy penalties imposed upon all those who did rise. Many of those who are well disposed towards us dare not join us now.
"Again, there is no chance of European intervention: not one of the Powers will do anything for us. To see this it is only necessary to peruse that correspondence between the Netherlands and England, which was the cause of these negotiations. There we shall find that the Dutch Minister says that our deputation is only accredited to Holland, whereas it had been accredited by the two Republics to all the Governments in Europe. Moreover, the correspondence makes it very plain that England will not tolerate the intervention of any foreign Power whatsoever. But the truth is, that no foreign Power wants to help us. When the women were first made prisoners I thought that European intervention might perhaps be attempted, because to make prisoners of women is a thing quite outside the usual methods of warfare. But nothing was done even then. We were told that we had the sympathy of the nations of Europe--their sympathy, and nothing more!
"I have come to a subject that is very near our hearts--our women-folk.
If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every kind of danger.
Throughout this war the presence of the women has caused me anxiety and much distress. At first I managed to get them into the townships, but later on this became impossible, because the English refused to receive them. I then conceived the idea of getting a few of our burghers to surrender, and sending the women in with them. But this plan was not practical, because most of the families were those of prisoners of war, and the men still on commando were not so closely related to these families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them.
"We have heard much talk about fighting "to the bitter end." But what is "the bitter end"? Is it to come when all of us are either banished or in our graves? Or does it mean the time when the nation has fought until it never can fight again? As to myself, personally, I can still continue the struggle. I have horses, my household is well provided for, and as far as my own inclination goes I am all for going on. But am I only to consider myself? Is it not my first duty to look at the interests of my nation? I have always been, and still am, of the opinion that, before letting the nation go to rack and ruin, it is our duty to parley. We must not let the chance for negotiations slip out of our hands. When our numbers have fallen to only four or five thousand men under arms we shall no longer have that chance, and this will undoubtedly happen if we hold out for another year, or even six months.
"There are some who say, "We must trust in G.o.d and keep on fighting,"
and I grant them that miracles are possible at all times. But it is beyond our power to say whether G.o.d will work a miracle for us. We do not know what His will may be. If we continue the war, and if it should afterwards appear that everything has been in vain, our responsibility will be only the heavier, the blinder our confidence now is. And over and over again we shall hear, "He is dead," "and he, and he." Will not this make our remorse all the more bitter? Our commandos are so weak, our country so exhausted, that the loss of one great battle, the surrender of a single strong force, would spell ruin for us.
""But we have managed to hold out for so long." Yes, but there is a natural reason, a military reason, why this has been the case. The fact that our commandos have been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the British, up to the present time, to divide their forces.
But things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory. In other words, the British army can at last concentrate its forces upon us.
"I firmly believe that, under like circ.u.mstances, no other nation in the world would have fought as our nation has done. Shall such a nation perish? No! we must save it. If we delegates are convinced that we can no longer offer resistance to the enemy, it is our plain duty to tell the people so. We must not let them be exterminated for want of timely advice. More than twenty thousand women and children have died in the camps during this one year.
"There are men of our own kith and kin who are helping to bring us to ruin. If we continue the war, it may be that the Afrikanders against us will outnumber our own men.
"What is there left to hope for? Are we to retain our independence by ceding a part of our territories? Most a.s.suredly yes, if such a compromise is feasible. As regards Swaziland, it is of so little importance to us that we can give it up without a thought. Then there are the goldfields--let them go. They are but a cancerous growth, sapping the very life of our country.
"We must face the fact that things are not at a standstill: we are slipping back every moment. We must all pull together, or everything is lost. If our sacrifices will buy our independence, well and good. But suppose that we are compelled to give it up--well, if it even comes to this, we must never do so unconditionally. An unconditional surrender would be well enough if the leaders only had to be considered. But we must think of the interests of the nation. We must say to our people, "We have no thought of ourselves: our only desire is to place ourselves in the breach, if so we may save you.""
General Botha then proceeded to discuss eventualities in the event of independence being lost. Representative government, he said, might perhaps still be retained, and the national language need not necessarily be supplanted. Thus the nation would still retain its old ideals and its old customs. General Roux had been pertinently asked whether it were better to strive for the recuperation of the people now or to wait until they were altogether overpowered and reduced to such straits that it would require some thirty years before they could once more call themselves a nation. He then went into the terms of the proposal by the British Government, and repeated that there must be no idea of unconditional surrender.
The General concluded in the following words:
"Although we do not _wish_ to accept terms, we have no right to refuse them altogether. On the other hand we must not say to the English, "Do with us as you like." For then our descendants would eternally reproach us. We should have lost the privilege of looking after our own wives and children. They would be handed over to strangers. No! we must secure by some means or other that we ourselves shall be able to provide for them.
The fate of our country is in the hands of the men in this tent. It has been bitter, indeed, for me to have to speak as I have done. But if I have not spoken the truth, convince me of my error, and I will be the first to own it. But do not condemn me, for I have had no other object than to tell you what I believe to be the truth."
General De la Rey spoke.
"I will not detain you long," he began, "but there are a few points to which I wish to draw attention. In regard to the districts under my command, every one will understand that my burghers, after their recent brilliant successes, are firmly resolved not to sacrifice their independence. If I allude to the battles which I have just fought it is with no thought of boasting, but only that you may picture to yourselves the effect which they must have had upon the enemy; and that no one may be angry with myself and my burghers for standing firm when our feet are on such solid ground.
"But since my arrival at Vereeniging I have heard about our districts where matters are in a far less favourable condition than in my own. So far as I myself am concerned, I cannot think of laying down my arms. Yet it appears to me that some parts of the country will be compelled by starvation to give up the struggle. It is well that those who represent these parts have spoken openly, and not left this meeting in ignorance of the state of affairs only to go and lay down their arms.
"I myself have never thought intervention possible. Even before the war broke out I said that nothing would come of it. I saw that South Africa was divided between Germany and England. And that if only the Republics could be extinguished, then England and Germany would be the only Powers left, and Germany would be safe. But if the Republics were victorious, then Germany would be in danger. Why then should Germany interfere in favour of the Republics, when she has everything to lose by such a course of action? No! intervention was entirely out of the question.
"There has been talk about fighting to the bitter end; but has not the bitter end already come? Each man must answer that question for himself.
"You must remember that everything has been sacrificed--cattle, goods, money, wife, and child. Our men are going about naked, and some of our women have nothing but clothes made of skins to wear. Is not this the bitter end?
"I believe that the time has now come to negotiate. England will never again give us the chance of doing so, should we allow this opportunity to slip by. But how shall we negotiate? I must leave it to this meeting to answer that question. If we do not obtain what we ask for, we shall at least stand or fall together. Yet let us act with reason.
"I cannot agree with one of the opinions expressed by Commandant-General Botha and States-Secretary Reitz. They have stated that they are against surrendering the goldfields to England; firstly, because England would never accept such a proposal, for by doing so she would declare to the whole world that she had only been fighting for the goldfields; and, secondly, because if we gave up the goldfields we should lose a source of revenue, without the aid of which we could not repair the damages which the war has wrought."
Commandant-in-Chief de Wet spoke as follows:
"I am of opinion that the circ.u.mstances in the Orange Free State are no less critical than those in the Transvaal. Nine districts were entirely ruined; but these, though at one time abandoned by the burghers, have now been reoccupied.
"If I now differ from those who are of opinion that it is useless to prolong the war, it must not be thought that I am lacking in respect for their judgment. By no means. I know that what has been said about the wretched plight of the people is only too true; but they must not take it amiss if I point out that the same condition of affairs was described in the correspondence from the Transvaal which fell into the hands of the English at Reitz. But, granting that the facts have been correctly stated, even then the Orange Free State will refuse to give in. Let me be candid with you, and say frankly that, in my opinion, this is virtually the Transvaal"s war. This, however, makes no difference to me.
For me the barrier of the Vaal River has never existed. I have always endeavoured to maintain the Nauwere-Vereeniging,[112] and I feel strongly the obligation which the union of the two States casts on each one of us. They are two nations, but their cause is one.
"What, then, is the prevailing feeling in the Orange Free State? Of the six thousand burghers who have been attending meetings, I myself have been in command of five thousand, and I can confidently say that never were five thousand men more unanimous in their opinion than were those I led when they cried, as with one voice, "Persevere; we have everything to lose, but we have not yet lost it." What, then, is the answer to be?
I am firmly persuaded that we have only one course before us. If we are unable to obtain what we are asking for, then it only remains for us to alleviate as best we may the lot of those who cannot help themselves. I do not as yet clearly see how this is going to be done, but, at all costs, let us continue fighting. What was our total strength when we began this war? Sixty thousand men all told. Against this the English had a standing army of seven hundred and fifty thousand troops. Of these two hundred and fifty thousand, or one-third, are now in South Africa.
We know from experience that they are unable to send more than one-third. And we? Have we not also one-third of our army left?
"I do not wish to imply that I am not prepared to concede something, but nothing will induce me to consent to any part of the country in _our_ territory being given up. It will never do to have an English colony planted in our midst, for England then would have far too firm a hold upon our country.
"It is said, and with some truth, that the goldfields have been a curse to us, but surely there is no reason why they should continue to be so.
I fail to see how, without retaining possession of these goldfields, the Republics are to be saved. Swaziland perhaps could be ceded, but never the goldfields. I feel that any intervention is out of the question; but is not the very fact that it has not taken place a sure proof that it was not the will of G.o.d? Does it not show that He is minded to form us, by this war, into a nation worthy of the name? Let us then bow to the will of the Almighty.
"My people will perhaps say, "Our Generals see only the religious side of the question." They will be right. Without faith we should have been foolish indeed to have embarked on this war and to continue it for so many months. Indeed, it _must_ be a matter of faith, for the future is hidden from us. What _has been_ is within our ken, but what is before is beyond the knowledge of the wisest man.
"Cape Colony is a great disappointment to me. I do not refer so much to what we have learnt about it from the reports as to the fact that no general uprising can be expected in that quarter. So much we have heard from General s.m.u.ts. But though there is to be no uprising, we have no reason to think that there has been any falling off in the number of our adherents in the Colony. The little contingent there has been of great help to us: they have kept fifty thousand troops occupied, with which otherwise we should have had to reckon.