The executive Raad now consisted of the President, as chairman, with T.
Brain, Secretary of State, W.J.C. Brebner, Secretary of State, A.P.
Cronje, Jan Meijer and myself as members. Mr. Rocco De Villiers was Secretary of the War Council, and Mr. Gordon Fraser, Private Secretary to the States President.
No States-Procureur had been appointed since Mr. Jacob De Villiers had been taken prisoner at Bothaville; but the Council appointed Mr. Hendrik Potgieter, Landdrost of Kroonstad, as Public Prosecutor.
Various causes had made it impossible for a legally const.i.tuted Volksraad to sit. Some members had, as we called it, "hands-upped"; others had thought that they had done quite enough when they had voted for the war. I would be the last to a.s.sert that they had done wrong in voting thus. The whole world is convinced that, whatever the Boers might have done, England was determined to colour the map of South Africa red!
And England succeeded beyond her expectations! For South Africa was stained with the blood of burghers and defenceless women and children, and with the blood of English soldiers who had died in a quarrel for which they were not responsible, and which could have been avoided!
There were other members--and I had no patience with them--who had said: "We will give our last drop of blood for our country," and then had taken good care that no one should have a chance of getting even the first drop! They preferred to remain quietly at home, and wait for the English to come and make them prisoners of war!
Only a minority of the members had remained faithful to our cause, and these did not const.i.tute a quorum; and so no sitting could take place.
This small party, as far as I can recollect, consisted of the following ten members: C.H. Wessels Bishop, Chairman; Wessel Wessels (Vrede); J.B.
Wessels (Winburg); A.P. Cronje (Winburg); Jan Steijl (Bloemfontein); Jan Meijer (Harrismith); J.J. Van Niekerk (Fauresmith); Daniel Steyn (Heilbron); Hendrik Ecksteen (Vrede); and Hendrik Serfontein (Kroonstad).
We marched from Doornberg on the 26th of January to Commandant Sarel Hasebroek"s farm, which is eight miles to the north of Winburg.
There was a strong English force seven or eight miles to the east of Winburg, and another body of the enemy eleven or twelve miles still further to the east. In addition, a column was marching northwards from Ventersburg, west of our position.
It was perfectly plain that the enemy were aware of our intentions; but this, as I have already said, could not be helped. Our army was so const.i.tuted that no secret could be kept; and I decided for the future to tell no one of any further plans I might form.
On the 27th of January I reconnoitred to the east of Winburg, and took care to let myself be seen, for I wished to make it appear that it was my intention to proceed in that direction in the evening. Meanwhile I secretly sent my scouts to the west.
That night I marched to the west of Winburg, crossing the branch railway without meeting with any opposition, and arrived on the following morning at the Vet River--to the south of the town. We did not advance very fast,[81] as we expected that we should soon once more have to face the difficulty of marching with exhausted horses.
In the afternoon we continued our way till we had pa.s.sed Tabaksberg. The following morning, January 28th, I received a report that the English were advancing in two divisions. I ordered my burghers to up-saddle and to occupy positions to the east of Takasberg.
The enemy"s right wing was to the east, and we stationed ourselves on some ridges that lay in front of them, but were unable to deliver an attack. We charged their left wing, however, and captured a Maxim-Nordenfeldt, which was in perfect order, at the cost of one killed and three wounded. Our other losses amounted to a very small number.
As to the enemy"s losses, they took some of their dead and wounded away, but they left behind them several of their dead at the spot where we had captured the gun.
To remain there and continue the fighting the next day could not even be thought of; for if we had waited the English would have had time to bring up reinforcements, and my plan of entering Cape Colony would have been rendered impossible.
Our position was difficult enough. The enemy were at our heels, and we had to get away as best we could. In front of us there was the line of fortifications from Bloemfontein to Ladybrand, which had been greatly strengthened since we had forced our way through it at Springhaansnek.
It was impossible to get through at Springhaansnek now.
I decided to march towards Thaba"Nchu. But in order to deceive the English I sent a strong patrol on the following day in the direction of Springhaansnek, ordering them to make no attempt to conceal their movements.
I could advance for eight miles without attracting the enemy"s notice; but if I had gone further I should have been seen from the forts. I need scarcely say that it was greatly to my advantage not to give the English a chance of seeing me. And so when we had covered eight miles we off-saddled. If I had allowed the English to discover what I was doing they would have brought up troops from Thaba"Nchu, Sanna"s Post and Bloemfontein; and these troops in combination with the force behind me might have put me into a very awkward position.
My old friend, General Knox, whose duty it had been to prevent me entering Cape Colony on a previous occasion, was again entrusted with the same task. Any person who has had dealings with this General will acknowledge that he is apt to be rather a troublesome friend; for not only does he understand the art of marching by night, but he is also rather inclined to be overbearing when he measures his strength with that of his opponents.
And now, as we were in camp, congratulating ourselves that we were safe for the time being, my scouts reported that this same General Knox was approaching. I at once ordered the burghers to up-saddle, and to inspan the ten waggons we had with us laden with ammunition and flour.
I left behind me a portion of my commando under General Fourie, whose duty it was to check General Knox, whilst I myself was going forward to clear a road through the enemy"s forts.
It was lucky for us that General Knox had been deceived by the strong patrol I had sent in the direction of Springhaansnek, and that he had come to the conclusion that my commando was marching to the same place.
He therefore started off in that direction and continued until he discovered his mistake. Then he turned aside and came in contact with General Fourie. Our men held him back for a few hours, and lost two men, very badly wounded in the engagement.
Whilst this was occurring I had reached the forts between Thaba"Nchu and Sanna"s Post. When I was there a reinforcement of cavalry approached from the direction of Bloemfontein.
I immediately opened fire (with a gun and a Maxim-Nordenfeldt at a range of 4,000 paces) on the fort, which obstructed my road. After we had fired a few shots the English abandoned that fort and fled to the nearest fort to the east. Shortly afterwards this fort was also abandoned.
The fort to the west was captured by Commandant Steenekamp and the Heilbron burghers. They succeeded in taking a few prisoners; but most of the enemy fled to Sanna"s Post. Only one of the Heilbron burghers was wounded--Piet Steenekamp, the son of the Commandant.
And now our road was clear; and we pa.s.sed through! General Fourie joined us two hours after sunset. Then we marched on to Dewetsdorp[82] where we arrived on January 31st.
General Knox, I heard, proceeded to Bloemfontein; thence he sent his troops to the railway bridge across the Orange River, near Bethulie. He was now aware that we were determined to enter the Colony at all costs, and so he stationed troops everywhere to turn us back. He placed forces not only at Bethulie railway bridge, but also at Springfontein, and Norvalspont. Thus he could easily prevent us crossing at the fords.
I had now to find some trump card which would spoil the game he was playing!
I ordered General Froneman to proceed from the source of the Kaffir River in the direction of Jagersfontein Road Station, to the west of Dewetsdorp: General Fourie I despatched in the direction of Odendaalsstroom, on the Orange River, to the farm of Klein Kinderfontein, to the west of Smithfield.
I then sent scouts to the neighbourhood of Odendaalsdrift. They told me that there was an English patrol at the drift, and that they had heard that the enemy expected that we should try and cross into Cape Colony at that spot.
The following day I ordered a patrol to ride up and down the river; and I caused a report to be spread to the effect that I considered it too dangerous to cross the Orange River below its junction with the Caledon, owing to the river being already very full and quite unfordable if there was any rain at all; and that I had for this reason decided to recall General Froneman, and to take Odendaalsstroom by force, or else to attack the enemy at the Aliwal-north Bridge.
I felt quite sure that this rumour would reach General Knox that very day, for he had plenty of friends in the neighbourhood of the Caledon and the Orange River.
General Froneman had orders to march in the direction of Zanddrift, which is about half-way between Norvals Pont railway bridge and that of Hopetown. He succeeded in capturing a train close to Jagersfontein Road Station, by the simple device of blowing up the line both in front of it and behind it. In this train the burghers found a great quant.i.ty of things they greatly needed.
It should not be forgotten that there were scarcely any factories in South Africa, and this was more especially the case in the two Republics. And, as all imports had been stopped for some considerable time, it was natural that any booty which consisted of such things as saddles, blankets and ammunition was very acceptable.
When the burghers had helped themselves to what they wanted, the train was burnt.
For the s.p.a.ce of a day I remained quiet, so that I might be quite sure that the English had received the report I had spread.
I soon discovered that my plan had been quite successful. The English marched off in the direction I wished, believing, no doubt, that the rumours they had heard were true; whilst I, on the evening of the 5th of February, 1901, took some of the burghers, with the guns and waggons, to a spot between the stations of Springfontein and Jagersfontein, and the following day remained in hiding.
I left General Fourie behind me with a horse-commando, with orders to remain there for two days, and to carry on manoeuvres in the direction of Odendaalsstroom.
I crossed the railway line that evening without any mishap to my force, but to my great sorrow the valiant Lieutenant Banie[83] Enslin, one of the best of my scouts, was severely wounded the same night, and fell into the hands of the English. He had ridden in advance with one of Theron"s Scouting Corps, with the object of finding a favourable spot where he could lead us across the railway. The night was very dark, and he had lost his way. We crossed, as I have already said, without hindrance; but he and his companions rode into an outpost of the enemy a few miles to the north. The English opened fire on them, with the unhappy result that the estimable Banie was so seriously wounded that he had to be left behind. His comrades joined us the following morning, bringing the sad news with them.
We now continued our march at as rapid a pace as was possible; but the road was so soaked by rain that it was difficult for the oxen and the mules to draw the waggons and the guns.
On the 8th of February we overtook General Froneman at Lubbesdrift, six miles to the north of Philippolis. We pushed on that evening towards Zanddrift, which we reached on the 10th of February. Then we crossed over into Cape Colony.
When we had crossed the river, I received a report from my scouts that there were about twenty of the enemy in a strong _schanze_ on a kopje, which was about half an hour"s march further up stream. I gave orders that a veldtcornet and twenty-five men, among whom was one of my staff, Willem Pretorius, should go and capture the _schanze_.
The veldtcornet preferred not to approach beyond a certain distance, and consequently Willem Pretorius and four other men were left to do the work.
Willem climbed the hill from one side, and the others, dividing into two, climbed it from the other side at two different points. They were met by a severe fire from the fort, but when they got to close quarters up went the white flag, and the English shouted "We surrender!"
Thus Willem Pretorius and four burghers captured twenty prisoners and a like number of horses, saddles, bridles, rifles and bandoliers, not to mention some three thousand cartridges.
When the veldtcornet at last arrived with his twenty men, he certainly proved himself very useful in carrying away the booty!
This veldtcornet was shortly afterwards "Stellenbosched."[84] I then nominated in his place Willem Pretorius[85] as veldtcornet.
We left the river that afternoon behind us, and marched south to Mr.