The only case in which one can use this word, is when one civilized nation has so completely vanquished another, that not only is the capital taken, but also the country from border to border is so completely conquered that any resistance is out of the question.
But that nothing like this had happened in South Africa is clear to every one who recalls the names of Lindley,[94] Roodewal, Dewetsdorp, Vlakfontein, Tafelkop[95] and Tweefontein, not to speak of many other glorious battle-fields on which we fought _after_ the so-called annexation.
Nor must we forget to mention the defeat that Lord Methuen received at the hands of General De la Rey immediately before the conclusion of peace; a defeat which put the crown on all our victories.
But, as I have already said, it very soon appeared that when England stamped us as "Guerillas," they really did not mean to use the word at all.
[Footnote 91: Veldtcornet Franz Jacobsz was afterwards appointed in the place of this Commandant, who resigned.]
[Footnote 92: When this Commandant resigned, Veldtcornet J.J. Van Niekerk was appointed in his place.]
[Footnote 93: When, at a later period, Commandant Theunissen was put in command of the burghers of Fauresmith, Commandant Mijburg was appointed in his place. This latter Commandant was afterwards killed.]
[Footnote 94: Where the yeomanry were captured.]
[Footnote 95: (District Vrede)--encounter with Brabant"s Horse.]
CHAPTER XXVIII
Negotiations with the Enemy
It was the intention of President Steyn to remain for some time in the division of Vice-Commander-in-Chief Judge Hertzog. Meanwhile, I went to the northern commandos, in order to keep in touch with Generals Louis Botha and De la Rey and our Government. When I was about twelve miles to the south of Petrusburg, I received a letter from General Botha, informing me that Lord Kitchener desired to have a conference held, at Middelburg, in the middle of February, as the English Government wanted to make a Peace Proposal. General Botha asked the President and myself to come yet nearer, so that, in case we might be wanted, we should be within reach.
I sent on his letter to President Steyn, giving him my opinion of it, and asking if he would come. The President, who was always ready to do anything for his country or people, did not lose one moment, but came at once. Meanwhile, I went on ahead with my staff, taking with me also Captain Louis Wessels, and five of his men.
About the 15th of March I crossed the railway line, ten miles to the north of Brandfort, during the night. There we placed some charges of dynamite under the rails, but before we had completed our work, a train came up so quietly that one might call it a "scouting train." It was a dark night, and there was no lantern at the head of the engine, so that we did not see it until it was close upon us. We had, therefore, no chance to ignite the fuse. We retired to a distance of about one hundred paces from the line, when a fierce fire was opened upon us from the train. We replied to this as the train went past, to be succeeded immediately afterwards by a second one. As soon as this also had pa.s.sed us, we fired the fuses and blew up the railway line at different places close to each other.
Immediately after this two trains came up, stopping close to the place where the explosions had occurred, and fired on us for about ten minutes without intermission. We paid them back in their own coin, and then each train went its way, leaving the repairing of the line to the following day.
From there we marched on, without accident, except that a German received a slight wound, and one horse was killed. We soon reached Senekal (which had been abandoned by the English), where for the first time I met Dr. Reich and his wife. The doctor received us very heartily; although he did not belong to our Field Ambulance, he did everything that he could for our wounded, as he had done for those of the enemy.
From Senekal I went on to pay a visit to the Heilbron commando, after which I proceeded to Vrede, arriving there on the 24th of February.
It was at Vrede that I had asked Louis Botha to meet me, if he could manage it, and the day after my arrival this meeting took place. The General told me that the negotiations between him and Lord Kitchener had resulted in nothing.
Although this was not very satisfactory, still it was just as well that I should meet the Commandant-General of the Transvaal. We had much to discuss and, after a long talk, we parted with the firm determination that, whatever happened, we would continue the war.
On the 27th General Botha returned to the Transvaal, and I to the Heilbron commando. After a few days President Steyn came from the south of the Free State, in order to meet the Transvaal Government at Vrede.
After this meeting had taken place he went off to a camp of his own, for it was thought better that he should not remain with the commandos any longer. I gave him fifty burghers, under the command of Commandant Davel, to serve as a bodyguard.
I had but just returned from my meeting with General Botha when a serious matter arose at Petrusburg, demanding my immediate presence there. It was three hundred and sixty miles there and back, and the journey promised to be anything but a pleasure trip--far less a safe excursion--for me; but the country"s interest requiring it, I started on the 8th of April, although much fatigued by my inroad into Cape Colony.
My staff succeeded in capturing an outpost of sixteen men on the railway line near Vredefort, the English losing one killed and two wounded.
I visited the commando at Vredefort, arranged everything at Petrusburg, and started on my return journey on the 17th. I crossed the railway line between Smaldeel and Ventersburg Road Station, and after paying Commandant Hasebroek a short visit, I came back to the Heilbron commando.
Our tactics of dividing our commandos, and thus keeping the English busy in every part of the Free State, or, where they were too numerous for us, of refusing to allow them to give us battle, so enraged them that they no longer spared the farmhouses in the north and north-western districts. Even in the south and south-west many of the houses were wrecked, but the work of destruction was not carried out with the same completeness as in the afore-mentioned districts. The enemy, moreover, did not spare our cattle, but either drove them off or killed them for food. As for our women-folk--any of them who fell into the hands of the enemy were sent off to the concentration camps.
I have no s.p.a.ce here, however, to write about the treatment of the women; it is such a serious matter that it would require whole chapters to deal with it adequately. Abler pens than mine will deal with it in full detail. I will only remark here that the Boer women were shamefully treated, and that if England wishes to efface the impression which these cruelties have left upon the hearts of our people, she will have to act as every great conquering race must act, if it is ever to be reconciled with the nations it has vanquished.
Our winter season had now begun. We had no provisions except meat, bread and maize. Even these were rather scarce, but we could not yet say that we were altogether dest.i.tute. Coffee and sugar--except when we had an opportunity of helping ourselves from the enemy"s stores--were unknown to us. With regard to the first-named commodity, however, the reader must know that in the district of Boshof there grows a wild tree, whose roots make an excellent subst.i.tute for coffee. Broken up into small pieces and roasted, they supplied us with a delicious beverage. The only pity was that the tree was so scarce that the demand for this concoction very greatly exceeded the supply. We therefore invented another drink--which we also called coffee--and which was composed of corn, barley, maize, dried peaches, sweet potatoes, and miscellaneous ingredients. My own favourite beverage was abundant--especially after heavy rain!
The question of clothing was now beginning to be a very serious one. We were reduced to mending our trousers, and even our jackets with leather.
For the tanning of this leather the old and feeble were employed, who, as soon as the enemy approached, fled, and as soon as they had pa.s.sed, returned to their tanning. At a later period the English had a trick of taking the hides out of the tanning tubs and cutting them to pieces, in the hope, I suppose, that we should then be compelled to go barefoot and unclothed.
It was to obviate such a catastrophe as this that the custom of _Uitschudden_[96] now came into force. The burghers, although against orders, stripped every prisoner. The English had begun by taking away, or burning, the clothes which the burghers had left in their houses--that was bad enough. But that they should cut up the hides, which they found in the tanning tubs, was still worse; and--the burghers paid them back in the same coin by stripping the troops.
Towards the end of May I crossed the railway line to Parijs and Vredefort, intending to go on from there to see General De la Rey, and discuss our affairs with him. I had come to the conclusion that it would be good policy to send small commandos into Cape Colony; for small bodies of men can move rapidly, and are thus able to get out of the way if they are threatened by overpowering numbers. Moreover, such small detachments would compel the English to divide their forces.
When I reached Vredefort I received a despatch from President Steyn, summoning me to him. I had thus to abandon my idea of visiting General De la Rey; instead of this, I wrote him a letter requesting him to come to the President. I also sent for Judge Hertzog.
De la Rey was the first to arrive, and, without waiting for Judge Hertzog, we at once proceeded to take into consideration the following letter from the Government of the South African Republic.
GOVERNMENT OFFICES, IN THE FIELD, District Ermelo, South African Republic, _May 10th, 1901_.
TO THE GOVERNMENT SECRETARY, O.F.S.
SIR,--
I have the honour to report to you that to-day the following officers met the Government, namely, the Commandant-General, General B. Viljoen, General J.C. s.m.u.ts (Staats-Procureur), the last-named representing the western districts. Our situation was seriously discussed, and, among others, the following facts were pointed out:--
1. That small parties of burghers are still continually laying down their arms, and that the danger arising from this is becoming every day more threatening, namely, that we are exposed to the risk of our campaign ending in disgrace, as the consequence of these surrenders may be that the Government and the officers will be left in the field without any burghers, and that, therefore, heavy responsibility rests upon the Government and War Officers, as they represent the nation and not themselves only.
2. That our ammunition is so exhausted that no battle of any importance can be fought, and that this lack of ammunition will soon bring us to the necessity of flying helplessly before the enemy. And that through this same lack it has become impossible for us to afford adequate protection to our people and their cattle, with the result that the general population is being reduced to poverty and despair, and that even the troops will soon be unable to be supplied with provisions.
3. That through the above-mentioned conditions the authority of the Government is becoming more and more weakened, and that thus the danger arises of the people losing all respect and reverence for lawful authority, and falling into a condition of lawlessness. And that to prolong the war can only lead to hastening the ruin of the people, and making it clear to them that the only authority in the country is that of the enemy.
4. That not only is our nation becoming disorganized in the manner above referred to, but that it will also most certainly happen that the leaders of the nation, whose personal influence has. .h.i.therto kept it together, will fall into utter contempt, and lose that influence which is our only hope for reviving the national spirit in the future.
5. That the people are constantly demanding to be told what hope still exists of successfully prosecuting the war, and that they have the right to expect to be informed in an honest and straightforward manner that their cause is hopeless, whenever this has become evident to the Government and the Leaders.
Up to the present time the Government and the nation have been expecting that, with the co-operation of their Deputation and by the aid of European complications, there would be some hope for the success of their cause, and the Government feels strongly that before taking any decisive step, an attempt should again be made to arrive with certainty at the results of the Deputation and the political situation in Europe.
Having taken all the facts into consideration, the Government, acting in conjunction with the above-mentioned officers, have arrived at the following decision:
Firstly, that a request should be addressed this very day to Lord Kitchener, asking that through the intervention of amba.s.sadors sent by us to Europe, the condition of our country may be allowed to be placed before President Kruger, which amba.s.sadors are to return with all possible speed.
Secondly, that should this request be refused, or lead to no results, an armistice should be asked for, by which the opportunity should be given us of finally deciding in consultation with your Government, and the people of the two States, what we must do.
This second proposal is, however, subject to any solution which your Government, taking into consideration the above-mentioned grievances, may be able to suggest.
The Government feels very keenly that it would no longer be right to allow things to go on as they have been going on, and that the time has arrived for taking some definite steps; it will, therefore, be glad to receive an answer from your Government as soon as possible.
I have the honour to be, Yours, etc., F.W. REITZ, _Secretary of State._