Montgomery Martin at a late "China dinner" in London, wherein he stated that the officer in question had done more _for_ the "civil cause" in China than all the bishops, merchants, and military put together--is not only negatived, but quite reversed.
Soon after the capture of Chang-chow-foo, Colonel Gordon was compelled to withdraw from active military operations by the Order in Council, prohibiting further aid to the Manchoo. He managed, however, to continue acting contrary to the ordinance, by organizing camps of instruction and proceeding to Nankin in person, there to advise the besieging forces commanded by Tseng-kwo-fan.
About the time the events noticed in this chapter were taking place in China, in England the energetic opposition of such men as Lord Naas, Colonel Sykes, Hon. Mr. Liddell, Mr. White, Messrs. Bright, Cobden, &c., from their places in the House of Commons, drew attention to the subject, and will ever stand as a memorable protest against the criminal policy of the Government.
During the second debate of the session on "British relations with China" (May 20, 1864), Mr. Baxter, M.P., very happily termed the policy of the Government "not a comedy of errors, but a tragedy of errors."
Lord Palmerston, in this case, defended his policy by a very extraordinary argument, which it is singular that his opponents did not use to his confusion. Coming out as the advocate of intervention in foreign affairs, he stated, as a justification of his war against the Ti-pings:--
"We have interfered in other countries, and with great benefit to those countries.... We interfered in the case of Greece, and established the independence of the Greek state. We interfered in the affairs of Belgium, and established it as an independent state. We interfered in the case of Portugal, and enabled the people of that country to obtain a free and parliamentary const.i.tution. (Hear, hear.) We interfered in the affairs of Spain with equal success, and a similar result.... We interfered in a great measure in those events which led to the Crimean war.... We interfered in the affairs of China; and why? Because our treaty rights _were_ endangered, and our national interests _were_ at stake."
Now, the n.o.ble Premier here cites a number of precedent cases; unfortunately, however, for his argument and ac.u.men, on each occasion referred to, England, as worthily became her, interfered in the cause of an oppressed people; whereas, in the present case, he had been the active originator of an intervention diametrically the very opposite--a military interference _against_ the oppressed natives of China, who were striving to liberate _and Christianize_ their unfortunate country. If Lord Palmerston had interfered in the spirit of the cases which came so glibly to his voluble tongue, he would have interfered to support the Ti-pings--not to slaughter them.
After striving to justify his policy by precedents which should have entirely reversed it, Lord Palmerston was equally unhappy in his faulty explanation of the reasons "why" he interfered in China. As the Hon. Mr.
Liddell, M.P., well said in his speech after the Premier, "The n.o.ble Viscount said that the Government interfered because the treaty rights were in danger. He wanted to know in what single instance had our treaty rights or our trade been in danger? He had asked that question before, and he now repeated it. (Hear, hear.) He wished to know any instance in which either the property or the life of a British subject had been placed in danger?"
Every member of the British Parliament, who questioned the China policy of the Government, has asked the same question. It has never been answered, because there is really not a single fact on which to base an answer. Colonel Sykes, M.P., has frequently defied and challenged the Government to cite one act ever committed by the Ti-pings prejudicial to British interests, and they have been quite unable to do so; for none are upon record.
Those who have been interested enough to wade through the compiled portion of this work will, no doubt, at once perceive the truthlessness of Lord Palmerston"s charge against the Ti-pings, viz., that they endangered the treaty rights and national interests of England. No particle of truth mingles with the unfounded charge; no t.i.ttle of proof has ever been produced to justify the undeclared hostilities perpetrated against a friendly people which were consequent on it.
Besides this, the venerable Premier was no less unfortunate with each proposition he chose to base his arguments upon. To prove the cruelty of the Ti-pings, he stated:--
"A steamer, called the _Firefly_, was carried off, and four or five men, who were upon the vessel, were roasted to death.
"Colonel Sykes.--"By whom?"
"Lord Palmerston.--"The Taepings."
"Colonel Sykes.-"No, no!""
Now, by the above extract from the _Standard"s_ report of the debate, we find that the Prime Minister"s vivid imagination positively roasted the men whose fate has never yet been ascertained even in China. They are referred to in Chapter XXIV. of this work, but whether they are living or dead, and, if dead, how they were killed, are questions which have never yet been satisfactorily answered; and, from the mystery in which the fate of the unfortunate men is involved, probably never will be.
Again, in a feeble effort to vaunt the duration and existence of the Manchoo dynasty, and, consequently, to make it appear that the Ti-pings were not striving to expel a foreign rule of comparatively modern establishment (which has never been entirely acknowledged nor submitted to, which has always been rebelled against, and which is still foreign to and hated by the Chinese), but, on the contrary, were simply rebels against an ancient and legitimate throne, Lord Palmerston made another very singular and important _mistake_. He tried to be satirical in commenting upon the excellent speech made by Mr. Baxter, M.P., who brought on the debate, by stating:--
"My hon. friend says he has studied the Blue Books, but I apprehend that he has not equally studied the history of China.
He talks of the Imperial dynasty as having been recently established over a conquered country; and, if I am not misinformed, I think it has existed for nearly 500 years."
Well, the n.o.ble Premier was misinformed, and very much so, too. The Manchoo Tartars invaded China A.D. 1644; they had not established themselves as its masters before the year 1683. It was, doubtless, very funny and gratifying to chaff a troublesome member out of countenance, but still there must be some people who expect the Chief Minister of the British Government to be pretty accurate in the statements he makes from his place in the House of Parliament.
We will now notice a few incidents of the next, and last, debate on China; when the late Mr. Cobden, on the evening of May 31, 1864, rose to move in the House of Commons:--
"That, in the opinion of this House, the policy of non-intervention, by force of arms, in the internal political affairs of foreign countries, which we profess to observe in our relations with the states of Europe and America, should be observed in our intercourse with the Empire of China."
Mr. Cobden, after making a truly magnificent and exhaustive speech, was replied to by Mr. Layard, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Out of the many distinguished Members who followed, only one, Mr. Gregson, supported the policy of the Government; and he, by faintest praise and three minutes" unmeaning talk, proved but a poor champion, if he did not make a worse case for his superiors.
At the termination of the debate, Mr. Cobden withdrew his motion because Lord Palmerston distinctly avowed the failure and abandonment of his policy of intervention in China, and declared his intention to preserve an entirely neutral, defensive att.i.tude in future.
The faithlessness and falsehood induced by the evil course adopted by the British Government in persistently endeavouring to carry out Lord Palmerston"s pertinacious, crotchety, unrighteous policy to force British trade upon China (which involved the necessity of crushing the Imperial power, and then that of the Ti-ping revolution which would have succeeded it, so that, in fact, the British Government could dictate its whims without fear of refusal or opposition) were singularly exemplified during the debate referred to.
We have seen that in the preceding debate Lord Palmerston plainly and frankly declared:--
"We interfered in the affairs of China; and why?"
Now, Mr. Layard, when replying to Mr. Cobden"s speech, stated:--
"Her Majesty"s Government had been accused of supporting the Chinese" (Manchoo) "government against the Taipings. [Cries of hear, hear!] _He had pointed out that such was not the case._"--He then qualified this sentence by saying,--"Beyond our preventing the Taepings entering the treaty ports FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM, a course which we were compelled to take."
First, Mr. Layard denies the interference declared by Lord Palmerston, and then he admits it, attempting to justify the policy by the sweeping a.s.sertion in capitals. Now, if the ministers were "compelled" to prevent the Ti-pings entering the treaty ports, how is it that they were allowed to capture and occupy the treaty port of Ningpo? And now, to impugn Mr.
Layard"s veracity, if the Ti-pings endeavoured to enter the treaty ports "FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM," how is it that they held the city of Ningpo for many months and did not destroy the least particle of property within its walls?
Mr. Layard"s fault is a common one, only in an uncommon position. He knew that the policy of the Government was wrong, he knew that he was wrong himself, and besides occupying the pugnacious position of buffer or breakwater to the Foreign Office, he did not like to admit it. Poor Mr. Layard"s situation must be an unpleasant one sometimes. He has unpleasant work to do. Undoubtedly he has an irritable temper and a sharp tongue, but it is rather unfortunate that he has a bad memory.
After stating that her Majesty"s Government had not been interfering, "such was not the case," beyond preventing the destruction of the treaty ports, and affirming, "the hon. gentleman the member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), the other evening, after condemning the policy of the Government, concluded by expressing a wish, that the Government would continue to defend the treaty ports and protect British interests in China. _That was what the Government had been doing all along._" After thus expressing himself, Mr. Layard declared, "His hon. friend had really condemned a state of things in China _which no longer existed_."
That is to say, Mr. Layard firstly stated that the hostilities waged against the Ti-pings were only to protect British interests; in fact, simply a defensive policy; and, secondly, he stated that such policy "no longer existed." Therefore, the natural deduction is that the British Government ceased to protect British interests at the treaty ports; such, however, was not and is not the case. The change that took place was the abandonment of the policy "of supporting the Chinese (Manchoo) Government against the Taepings," and the cessation of further aggressive military and naval operations against them. This was satisfactorily proved by the Premier"s speech, who sadly contradicted his subordinate"s defensive theory, as the following extracts from it will show:--
"Now, it is almost unnecessary, I think, for them" (the members who had spoken against his policy) "to have expressed their opinion with regard to the expedition of Captain Osborn, and the employment of Major Gordon and others, because we have stated on former occasions that those Orders in Council under which those officers _were employed_" (by the Manchoo Government; how about Mr. Layard"s "such was not the case"?) "have been revoked....
Therefore that policy is at an end." (Now the following is a plain avowal of what Mr. Cobden brought his motion against.) "I think that we were perfectly justified in the steps we took, because it is evident that the more we can contribute to the _internal cla.s.sification_ of China, the more the trade, which everybody agrees is the main and princ.i.p.al object of our going to China, the more that trade would flourish....
"If, by allowing a British subject _to enter into the service of the Emperor_ _of China_,[77] we have been the means of strengthening the hands of the Chinese Government, and enabling them to put down in any degree or diminish the scope of that rebellion, I say we should have been rendering not only a service to China, but promoting those objects to which alone our intercourse with China ought to be confined.[78] THOSE MEASURES HAVE FAILED, and I am sorry for it."
After this expression of opinion it is by no means surprising to find the Premier declaring a little further on, in the same speech: "I say it is the duty of this country to endeavour by _all the means_ in her power to extend her commerce." Under _these_ circ.u.mstances it is not difficult to account for the intervention in China, and while Englishmen, who have any respect for the principles of right and justice, may regret their late lamented statesman did not say, "by all the" righteous or legitimate "means in her power," they cannot fail to feel gratified that "those measures have failed," even though the originator of the measures, their late popular and jaunty minister, was "sorry for it."
Those measures have failed! it is true. They have failed miserably; they have failed to work good, but not to do harm. England has derived no benefit from them, China has received much evil. The schemes to Anglicise the Chinese army, navy, and civil service have failed; the efforts to extinguish rebellion against the Manchoo allies of the British Government (after the last war had rendered them quite powerless and docile _for the time being_) have likewise signally failed, for rebellion is more rife than ever: but "those measures" have been famously successful in causing an enormous sacrifice of life, in injuring the cause of Christianity and civilization, and obstructing its progress in China for the present.
The failure of Lord Palmerston"s policy came all too late for rectifying the evil already perpetrated. Within two months of his public announcement that the measures of his administration had failed, Nankin, the capital and the political strength of the Ti-pings, fell into the hands of the Imperialists. a.s.sisted, as we have described, by the powerful, though underhanded, British alliance, the Manchoo forces were enabled to capture or isolate every city beyond the capital. When Chang-chow-foo was taken by the Englishman Gordon, the neighbouring cities of Tan-yang, Kin-tang, &c., became untenable, and were consequently evacuated by their garrisons. Under command of Le-shih-seen, the Shi-w.a.n.g (the Chung-w.a.n.g"s cousin, sometimes figuratively referred to as his "brother"), were also the troops from Hang-chow (capital of Che-kiang), Kar-sing-foo, Yih-shing, Li-yang, and many smaller places. Between these forces and Nankin the vast army commanded by the Imperialist Le-Futai now intervened, but their communication with the great city of Hoo-chow-foo, at the south of the Ta-hoo lake, and strongly garrisoned by several w.a.n.gs, was still intact.
Unable to advance against the superior forces of the enemy, much less to reach Nankin and endeavour to rescue it from the besieging army of Imperialists under Tseng-kwo-fan, at least 80,000 to 100,000 strong, the Shi-w.a.n.g commenced what seems to have been a preconcerted retreat to the south. This occurred during the month of June.
Shortly afterwards, on the 19th of July, 1864, Nankin reverted to Manchoo authority. Thus the city which had been the capital of the great Ti-ping revolution and the head-quarters of its Government during more than eleven years, and which throughout that period had defied the strongest efforts of the rulers of the greatest and most populous empire in the world, succ.u.mbed at last through the unjustifiable hostilities and crotchety, bullying, meddlesomeness of the British Government or some of its members.
Again, soon after this overwhelming disaster, the Ti-ping forces at Hoo-chow-foo, after soundly beating their immediate adversaries, evacuated that city, and followed in the rear of the Shi-w.a.n.g"s army, if they did not join it during the nearly simultaneous retrograde movement.
During the months of May, June, July, and August, 1864, the remnants of Ti-pingdom continued retreating to the southern provinces.
We must now consider for a moment the loss of Nankin. Of the two other events--the retreat of the Shi-w.a.n.g"s army and the retreat from Hoo-chow--it is needless to say much, as these fugitives are well known to be safe, and at present advantageously disputing the enemy in the south of China.
The only records of the fall of the Ti-ping capital are those of Imperialist origin, and the lying proclivities of the whole body of Manchoo officials are too well known to need comment.
The following particulars are condensed from the Mandarin reports; they cannot be depended upon except to a very limited extent, and are, therefore, succeeded by a version I have deduced from almost every source of European information in China, comprising the Shanghae and Hong-kong press, and intelligence gathered for me by friends on the spot. Besides this, I have carefully traced the progress of events since the fall of Nankin till the present moment, and have found my former experience of much value in disentangling contradictory and confused statements.
The Imperialist accounts of the capture of Nankin are to the following effect:--
On the 17th of August news reached the besieging army that the Tien-w.a.n.g had committed suicide by swallowing gold-leaf. The Imperialists now pushed on their works more rapidly than before, and on the 19th of the same month, having run an enormous mine under the north-east gate, they fired it, and completely destroyed a portion of the wall, about one hundred and twenty feet in length. It is also reported that 68,000 pounds of powder were used in the explosion.
The Imperialists stated that they lost 5,000 killed and wounded in the breach, but, as the _North China Market Report_ observed, "for this a.s.sertion there is not the slightest foundation, as on the day following the a.s.sault there remained no trace of a struggle." In similar style they declared that their losses while storming the Tien-w.a.n.g"s palace were immense, but, as the European journals say, "This a.s.sertion is in like manner utterly false. The gate must have been forced with little or no difficulty, or quietly given up, and the very citadel of Taepingdom was in the hands of the enemy."
Now, after having poisoned the Ti-ping king with gold-leaf, the enemy very curiously burned him to death.
Immediately after the capture of Nankin, Mr. Adkins, H.M. Consul at Chin-kiang, proceeded to the city on board M.M.S. _Slaney_, in order, as he expresses himself in his despatch to Earl Russell on the subject, "to congratulate the Chinese (Manchoo) Commander-in-Chief on the auspicious termination of his two years" siege." Well, the commander, or some of his followers, told the officious Mr. Adkins that when they made good their entrance into the city, "they found that the palace of the Tien-w.a.n.g _had been burnt to the ground_."
What about the "immense loss" of the other version, in which they do such heroic deeds to capture the palace?