THE RIVALRY OF THE RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH IN CENTRAL ASIA.
ATt.i.tUDE OF RUSSIA AND ENGLAND TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA PROGRESS OF RUSSIA ON THE JAXARTES.
Rivalry between England and Russia in Central Asia I heard in England, on my return, affirmed to be an absurdity. "Let us," it was said, "hear no more of a question so long ago worn out and out of fashion.
The tribes of Turkestan are wild, rude, and barbarous; and it is a matter upon which we congratulate ourselves, if Russia takes upon herself the onerous and meritorious task of civilisation in those regions. England has not the slightest cause to watch such a policy with envy or jealousy."
Full of horror at the scenes of cruelty witnessed by me in Turkestan, of which I have endeavoured to give a faint sketch in the preceding pages, I long argued over the question with myself, whether these political views which men sought to instill into me were really in every respect well founded. It is clear, and, indeed, has long been so, to my mind, that Christian civilisation, incontestably the n.o.blest and most glorious attribute that ever graced human society, would be a benefit to Central Asia. The part, however, of {440} the question that has a political bearing I could not so easily dispose of; for although I regard the subject in all its different points of view, and drive my conjectures ever so far, I can never entirely realise the idea that England can behold with indifference any approach of Russia to her Indian dominions.
The epoch of political Utopias is past. We are far from being so inspired with a Russophobia as to regard the time as at hand when the Russian Cossack and the English Sepoy shall knock their noses together while acting as sentinels upon their respective frontiers. The drama of a collision of the two great colossi in Central Asia, which political dreamers imagined years ago, continues still far from actual performance. The question moves, it is true, slowly, but still always in a forward direction. Let me, following the natural course of events, without undue warmth endeavour to acquaint the reader with the motives that influence me when I disapprove of the indifference of the English to the Russian policy in Central Asia.
In the first place, let us enquire whether Russia is really pressing on towards the south; and if so, what, up to the present moment, has been the extent of her actual advance. Until twenty-five years ago, very little attention had been devoted to Russian policy in Central Asia. The occupation of Afghanistan by the English, and the Russo-Persian alliance and expedition against Khiva, were the causes that first led to the subject of Turkestan being touched upon in the diplomatic correspondence between the cabinets of St. Petersburg and London. Since that time a tolerable calm has ensued. England, discouraged by {441} the failure of her plans, withdrew at once, but Russia still keeps silently advancing, and essential changes have taken place with respect to her frontiers on the side of Turkestan. On the western part of Central Asia--for instance, on the Sea of Aral and its sh.o.r.es--Russian influence has considerably increased. With the exception of the mouth of the Oxus, the entire west of the Aral Sea is recognised Russian territory. Upon that sea itself there are, at this day, three steamers to which the Khan of Khiva has given permission to advance as far as Kungrat. [Footnote 160] It is given out that they are there to protect their fisheries; but they may probably have another destination, and every one in Khiva knows that the recent revolutions in Kungrat, as well as other frequent skirmishes between Kasaks and ozbegs, have a certain connection with these fishing boats.
But these are only secondary plans. The real line of operations is rather to be sought along the left bank of the Jaxartes. Here we find the Russian outposts supported by an uninterrupted chain of forts and walls, pushed on as far as Kale Rehim, distant thirty-two miles from Tashkend, which city may, as I have remarked, be regarded as a key to all conquests in Central Asia. This route, which traverses fewer deserts than any other, is also in different respects {442} well chosen. An army would be here exposed, indeed, to more surprises; but these can be resisted more easily than the fury of the elements. On the eastern frontiers of Khokand also, beyond Namengan, the Russians continue to move nearer and nearer; and in the time of Khudayar Khan many collisions had already taken place there between the Khokandi and the Russians.
[Footnote 160: That the Russian vessels do not pa.s.s higher up the Oxus is alone attributable to the numerous sandbanks in that river, which rapidly shift their places. I am astonished that Barnes expresses himself so lightly respecting its navigability. Boatmen who have pa.s.sed all their lives on the Oxus a.s.sured me that the sandbanks change position so often that the experience and observation of one day are useless for the day that follows.]
The continued progress of the Russian designs in Central Asia is then beyond all doubt. As I before said, the interests of civilisation make us wish the most entire success to the Russian arms; but still the remote consequences of an acquisition once made suggest a highly important and complicated enquiry. The question whether Russia will content herself even with Bokhara, or will allow the Oxus to become the final boundary of her influence and of her designs, is difficult to answer. Without plunging into any deep considerations of policy, I may remark that it seems very probable that the court of St.
Petersburg, in return for her persevering policy of sacrifices pursued across deserts for years and years, at great expense and labour, will seek some richer compensation than is to be found in the oases of Turkestan. I should like, indeed, to see the politician who would venture to affirm that Russia, once in possession of Turkestan, would be able to withstand the temptation of advancing, either personally or by her representatives, into Afghanistan and Northern India, where political intrigues are said to find always a fruitful soil. At the time when the Russian columns, under the orders of Peroffsky, threw their ominous shadow from the west sh.o.r.e of the Aral Sea as far as Kabul--at the {443} time when the spectre of Vitkovitsh [Footnote 161] appeared in that city and in Kandahar, the possibility of such complications as those alluded to was foreseen. And cannot that which has once occurred, when the necessity arises, occur a second time?
[Footnote 162]
[Footnote 161: This was the name of the Russian agent sent by the court of St. Petersburg to Afghanistan in 1838, with large sums of money to be employed in intrigues against England.]
[Footnote 162: Whilst I write the above, a St. Petersburg correspondent of the _Daily Telegraph_ (10th October 1864) sends the intelligence that the Russians have already taken Tashkend. The authenticity of the statement may perhaps be doubted, but that the Russians are in movement in that quarter is certain.]
Without, therefore, lending to the question the foul colouring of envy or jealousy, I consider myself justified in disapproving of England"s indifference to the plans of Russia in Central Asia. Such is my humble opinion; but whether the British Lion is to come in direct hostile collision with the Russian Bear in those regions, or in brotherly fashion they are to share and share alike, is a question which, in accordance with the precept, "Ne sutor ultra crepidam," I in my character of a Dervish, devoted to philological studies, will not venture nearer to approach.