I want to call your attention to another thing, as I go along with this line of the argument. I contend that, among the powers which have been delegated to the State governments by the Const.i.tutions of the States, is the power in the executive government of the State, co-ordinately with the General Government, to decide whether itself or the General Government has transcended the line which bounds their respective jurisdictions, upon any case in which a collision may arise between them, which affects the public domain of the State, or the whole State, or its citizens, considered as a body politic. And you will see, in a moment, the reason why I state my proposition in that way.
You have all heard of what, in the history of the country, has been called _nullification_, and you probably all understand very nearly what that is. By _nullification_, as it has been spoken of in the history of our country, was meant the claim on the part of a State, by a convention of its people, or otherwise, to decide that the laws of the United States should not operate within its limits upon its citizens, in cases where the law could legitimately operate upon individual citizens. Because you will all recollect that the laws of the United States, in their operation throughout the Union--their criminal laws, laws for the collection of duties, and similar laws--operate upon individual citizens, without reference to whether they are citizens of one State or another. The law operates upon them as people of the United States. And therefore, if you are carrying on business in the port of New York, and a consignment comes to you, it is a question between you as a citizen of the United States and the Government whether the tariff, under which duties are attempted to be collected is valid, as between you and the Government, or not--whether it was legitimate for Congress to pa.s.s that tariff; and, in all cases arising on these subjects, the Const.i.tution has provided a tribunal, an arbiter, which is supreme and final, without any appeal. For instance, if you deny the validity of the law under which duties are attempted to be collected upon the goods imported by you, and the Collector attempts to collect them, you refuse to pay, or pay under protest,--and the case must come into the District Court of the United States; and if the Court decides that the law was unconst.i.tutional, you get immediate redress; if it decides that it was const.i.tutional, the question can be carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, and there finally settled. And, therefore, I say that in all cases that come within the purview of the judicial department of the Government, the laws of the United States, as administered by the Courts, and their decisions, bind the citizens of the States in every part of the land.
But, gentlemen, there are an immense cla.s.s of cases constantly arising where no opportunity can ever be presented to a Court to pa.s.s upon them, which were never intended to be pa.s.sed upon by a Court, which are cases of collision between the executive department of the General Government and the State government in matters, as I expressed it to you before, affecting the public domain, or the State or its citizens as a body politic. As laid down by the expounders of the Const.i.tution of the United States, that instrument is one to which the States are parties, as well as the people of the United States and people of each State.
Suppose a case of this kind. It is not a case likely to arise; but every case may arise, as we have been sadly admonished by the events of the last few months. Suppose we had a President in the executive chair at Washington who was a citizen of the State of Ma.s.sachusetts, and greatly interested in the prosperity of the commerce of the City of Boston; and suppose that, being a wicked man (for wicked men have been sometimes elected to offices in this and every country), he had conceived the iniquitous design of ruining the commerce of New York, for the purpose of benefiting the commerce of the City of Boston; and suppose, in the prosecution of that wicked design, without the pretense of authority to do so under the Const.i.tution of the United States, without a pretense that Congress had pa.s.sed any law authorizing him to do anything of the kind, he should station a fleet of vessels, by orders to the commander of his squadron, off the harbor of New York, and should say, from this day forward the commerce of the port of New York is hermetically closed, and the commerce which has formerly gone to New York must go to Boston. Is the State of New York, under a condition of things of that kind, to submit to the closing of her commerce, to her ruin and destruction? Can she get before the Courts for redress against such an infringement of the Const.i.tution by the President? How is she to get there? She cannot go to the Supreme Court of the United States, for in the Courts of the United States there is no form of jurisdiction by which the question can be brought before the Courts by any possibility whatever; and New York is a sovereign and independent State, and, so far as she has not conceded jurisdiction to the United States by the Const.i.tution, has a right to exercise every sovereign and independent power that she has. _There_ is a case, therefore, in which the Courts of law can afford no redress,--in which the Const.i.tution has erected no common arbiter between the General Government and the government of the State.
Who, then, is the arbiter in such a case? Why, gentlemen, the books have expressed it. It is the last argument of Kings--it is the law of might; and in case of a collision of that kind, I maintain before you, upon this trial, that the State has a right to redress herself by force against the General Government; that she has a right, if necessary, to commission cruisers, to drive the squadron away from the port of New York; and she has a right, if more effectual, to commission private armed vessels to aid in driving them away, or to capture or subdue them. There being no common arbiter between her and the General Government in a case of that kind, she has a right to use force in redressing herself, and to take the power into her own hands.
And the authorities are uniform upon that subject. I have been obliged to detain you so long that I shall not read them to you; but I have them collected before me, and in the future discussions which may take place before the Court I shall be able to show that that right was maintained by Hamilton, one of the most distinguished members of the Convention who helped to frame the Const.i.tution, and the strongest advocate of placing large powers in the hands of the Federal Government; by Madison, Jefferson, and all the Fathers of the Const.i.tution, and by all who have written upon the subject; that it is a doctrine which has been a.s.serted by the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and, indeed, by the State Legislatures of all the States, pretty much, in which the question has arisen--that the Supreme Court of the United States have themselves over and over again declared that the only safeguard that existed, under the Const.i.tution, against the right of the State to come into collision with the General Government, in all cases whatever, was the existence of the judiciary power, in cases where that was applicable between them, and that in all cases where that judiciary power failed, they were left to the law of nature and the might of Kings to redress themselves.
Now, gentlemen, if I am right in that step in my argument,--if that right would exist at any time or under any circ.u.mstances,--there must be some authority, in the State that has the jurisdiction, to decide for the citizens of the State when that occasion has arisen; and there must be some authority in the United States which has a right to decide for the Government of the United States when that occasion has arisen; whose decision (that is, in the General Government) is binding for the people of all the States, except the State in collision with the Federal Government and which makes a contrary decision; and whose decision, in that State, is an authority and protection for all the citizens of that State.
I say to you, moreover, gentlemen, that that right, under the law of nature, to resist the attempted usurpation of a power which has not been granted by the Const.i.tution, resides, in a State, in the executive government, and necessarily in the Governor of the State; because you will recollect one of the premises upon which we started was, that all the residuary power in the government, beyond what had been expressly ceded to the Government of the United States by the Federal Const.i.tution, is, by the Const.i.tution, reserved to the State; and the Governor of the State is the sentinel upon the watch-tower for the protection of the rights of the State. He is placed in that position to watch the danger from afar. He communicates with the General Government. Any steps taken having reference to the State, pa.s.s under his inspection; and he alone has the materials within his reach for knowing the circ.u.mstances and deciding upon the facts in regard to the question whether the General Government is acting within the const.i.tutional limit of its powers, or whether it is guilty of any usurpation of power, in any claim of authority it makes with reference to the affairs of the State. Because, in the case I have supposed, of a President elected from the State of Ma.s.sachusetts, seeking to destroy the commerce of New York, and stationing a fleet off the harbor, it is not likely that a President who was guilty of such wickedness would avow that he did it for the purpose of building up the commerce of Boston and destroying that of New York. No; he would say that he had notice of a hostile invasion--a fleet leaving the coast of Great Britain or of some other maritime power to make a descent upon New York,--that he had notice of some threatened injury to New York, which would make it necessary to station a fleet there, and to prevent vessels from entering or leaving. The Governor alone would have the means of ascertaining whether there was any foundation in truth for that, or whether it was a mere pretence to cover his iniquitous purpose; and in determining the case whether the Federal Government is exceeding its power or not, or acting within the const.i.tutional limit of its power, the Governor has to deal with a compound question of law and fact. He must first read the Const.i.tution of the United States, and ascertain its grant of power, and then compare that with the facts as presented to him; and upon that comparison the jurisdiction is placed in him to decide whether the act of the General Government is within its power, or a transgression of it.
He decides the question, and what more have we then? He is, by his office, commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the State; for the State can have both military and naval forces. It has its militia at all times. It is authorized expressly by the Const.i.tution to keep ships of war, in time of war. There is, certainly, a prohibition in the Const.i.tution of the United States against a State granting letters of marque; but that is a prohibition against its granting letters of marque in a war against foreign States; it has no reference whatever to any possible collision that may take place between the State and the Federal Government. And that rule is laid down by _Grotius_ and _Vattel_ both; for they both maintain and a.s.sert the right of the people, under every limited Const.i.tution, in the case of a palpable infringement of power by the chief of the State, forcibly to resist it; and GROTIUS puts the case of a State with a limited Const.i.tution, having both a King and a Senate, in which the power of declaring war was in express terms reserved to the King alone, and he says that by no means prevents the Senate, in case of an infringement of the Const.i.tution by the King, from declaring and making war against him; because the phrase is to be understood of a war with foreign nations and not of an internal war. I say, therefore, that in a case of that kind--a palpable infringement by the General Government of the Const.i.tution--the Governor of the State, in the first place, has the only means and the only right of deciding whether that infringement has taken place.
In each State the Governor is commander-in-chief of the naval and military forces; he has a right to give military orders to citizens; he has a right to order them to muster in the service of the State; and if they disobey him they can be punished the same as they can in any civilized country.
And more than that: suppose a case arises of that kind, in which the General and State Governments come into forcible collision, and suppose a citizen should take arms against the State; there is the law of the State which punishes for treason every citizen of the State who adheres to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort; and, under the theory of the prosecution, if he adheres to the State, and the Federal Government should happen to be the victor in the contest, there is the law of the Federal Government which punishes him for adhering to the State. So that the poor citizen of the State, if this theory be correct, is to be punished and hanged, whichever party may succeed in the unhappy contest.
But, gentlemen, the law perpetrates no such absurdity as that; for the very moment the doctrine for which I contend is admitted, the citizen, in a conflict like that between the Federal Government and the State, is not liable to be considered a traitor or punished as such, let him adhere to which of the two parties he pleases, in good faith. The reason of which is clear. He is the subject of two sovereigns,--the one the Federal Government and the other the State in which he lives.
Either of these sovereigns has jurisdiction to decide for him the question whether the other is committing a usurpation of power or not; and it inevitably follows that if these two sovereigns decide that question differently, the citizen is not to be punished as a traitor, let him adhere to which he pleases in good faith. And I submit to you, gentlemen, that is the only doctrine, under the Const.i.tution of the United States, and under our complex system of government, which can be admitted for a moment. I will give you a confirmation of that. I have already stated to you the clause of the Const.i.tution of the United States which defines the punishment of the crime of treason against the United States,--and by looking at the reports of the debates in the Convention which adopted the Const.i.tution, you will find that the clause, as originally reported to the Convention, read: "Treason against the United States shall consist in levying war against the United States _or any of them_, or in adhering to the enemies of the United States, _or any of them_, giving them aid and comfort,"--and the clause, as reported, was amended by striking out the words, "or any of them," and making it read: "Treason against the United States shall consist in levying war against them or in adhering to their enemies,"
&c. Therefore, under our Const.i.tution, treason against the United States must be levying war against all the States of this Confederacy.
It does not mean the Government. The amendment which I have spoken of shows it must be an act of hostility which is, in judgment of law, an act of hostility against all the States of the Union. Therefore I say that a citizen who owes allegiance to a State of the Union, when he acts in good faith, under the jurisdiction of one of the sovereigns to whom he owes allegiance--to wit, the State--does not levy war against the United States. He levies war against the Government which claims to represent him, in that case,--his other sovereign, to whom he equally owes allegiance, deciding that that Government is committing an usurpation of power; and he is acting under the authority of those in whom he rightly and justly reposes faith,--to whom has been delegated the right to decide; and however the Governor of the State may be punished by impeachment, if he has acted in bad faith, the citizen cannot be subject to the halter for doing that which he was under a legal obligation to do.
Then, gentlemen, to show the application of the rule for which I have been contending--and with the necessary details of which I fear I must have wearied you--to the case in hand: The moment it is conceded that any possible case can arise in which a State would have the right to resist by force the General Government,--the moment it is conceded that it is the Governor of the State, who, co-ordinately with the President of the Union, has a right to decide that question for himself,--then I say we have nothing whatever to do with the question, whether, under the unhappy circ.u.mstances which have arisen, the Governor of the State, or of any of the States, decided right or wrong. We know they did claim that the General Government was usurping power which did not belong to it. In fact, I think we have the confession of the President of the United States that, with an honest heart and with honest purposes, which I believe have actuated him all through, he has, as he says, for the preservation of the Union, the hope of humanity in all ages, and the greatest Government, as I shall ever believe, that man has ever created,--that he has been compelled to, and did, usurp power which did not belong to him. President Buchanan, before and after this controversy arose, a.s.serted plainly and unequivocally that he had searched the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States for the purpose of finding any color of authority for the invasion of a State by military force, or the using of force against it; and that he could find no such warrant in the Const.i.tution. He was right. There was nothing of the kind in the Const.i.tution; but he failed to see (in my humble judgment) that the law of nature gave him the power to enforce the legitimate authority of the Union, as it gave to the State government the power to repel usurpation. President Lincoln, when he a.s.sumed the reins of power, admitted that there was a doubt on that subject. He declared at first that it was not expedient to exercise that power, and that he would not exercise it. He changed his mind afterwards, and did exercise it; and on the 13th of April he issued a proclamation calling for 75,000 volunteers, the first duty a.s.signed to whom, as he stated in his proclamation, would be to invade the Southern States, for the purpose of recapturing the forts and retaking the places that had pa.s.sed out of the jurisdiction of the United States.
And in a subsequent proclamation he declared that he had granted to the military commanders of these forces, without the sanction of an Act of Congress, authority to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_, within certain limits and in certain cases, in those States. And he makes the frank admission that, in his own belief at least, some of the powers which he had found himself compelled to exercise were not warranted in the Const.i.tution of the United States.
Now these acts of hostility complained of in the indictment took place long subsequent to that. This proclamation was in the month of April.
These commissions were not issued, and the Act of the Confederate States to authorize their issue was not pa.s.sed, until some time afterwards--after they had learned of this proclamation; and this commission was not granted until the month of June subsequent.
I say, therefore, a case was presented for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States, to decide whether it was exercising its rightful powers, under the Const.i.tution, and for the Governor of the State to decide, for the State, that same question; and that an unhappy case of collision, ever to be regretted and deplored, had arisen between the Government of the United States and the Government of those States; and I say that the citizens of any one of those States owing the duty of allegiance to two sovereigns--to the government of their State and to the Government of the United States--had a right honestly to make their election to which of the two sovereigns they would adhere, and are not to be punished as traitors or pirates if they have decided not wisely, nor as we would have done in the section of the country where we live.
I am sorry, gentlemen, to detain you on the question; but it is a most important one--one that enters into the very marrow of this case; and we do claim that the issuing of this commission, whether on the footing of its having been issued by a _de facto_ Government, or by authority from the State, considering it as remaining under the Const.i.tution, was a commission that forms a protection to the defendants, and one which is not within the purview of the Act of 1790; because it was not, in the language of that section, a commission taken by a citizen of the United States to cruise against other citizens of the United States, either from a _foreign_ Prince or State, or a person merely.
You will observe that if the claim of the Confederate States, that the ordinances of secession are valid, be correct, then it is true that they are foreign States; but their citizens have ceased to be citizens of the United States, and are therefore not within the purview of the ninth section of the Act of 1700.
If, on the contrary, the claim on the part of the Government of the United States, that these ordinances are absolutely void, be correct, then the States are still States of this Union, and the commission, being issued by their authority, is not a commission issued by a _foreign_ State, and therefore the case is not within the purview of the ninth section of the Act of 1790.
I must allude very briefly, before closing, to another ground on which this defence will be placed: and that is, that conceding (if we were obliged to concede) that this was not an authority, such as contemplated, to give protection to cruisers as privateers, there was a state of war existing in which hostile forces were arrayed against each other in this country, and which made this capture of the Joseph a belligerent act, even obliterating State lines altogether, for the purpose of the argument.
But before I pa.s.s from what I have said to you on the subject of the claim of authority of the States of this Union to come into collision with the General Government, allow me to call attention to the forcible precedents shown in the history of our own glorious Revolution, when the thirteen Colonies, numbering little more than three millions, instead of thirty, separated from Great Britain. At the time when that occurred, in 1776, this very statute of 1790 was in force in England, as I have shown you. It was pa.s.sed in England, if I recollect right, in 1694. The position of the thirteen Colonies towards the mother country, at that time, was precisely the position that those States which call themselves the "Confederate States" now occupy towards the General Government of the Union.
Appealing to G.o.d, as the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, for the rect.i.tude of their intentions, and acknowledging their accountability to no other power, they had claimed to resist the usurpation of the King of Great Britain. They had not even claimed, at the time of which I speak--for I speak of the end of the year 1775 and the beginning of 1776--to declare their independence and to throw off their subjection to Great Britain. At that very early day there were very few in these Colonies that contemplated a thing of that kind, or whose minds could be brought to contemplate such an act. They had risen in resistance against what they claimed to be arbitrary power; they claimed that the King of Great Britain had encroached upon their rights and privileges in a manner not warranted by the Const.i.tution of Great Britain. They did not claim to secede from Great Britain; they did not claim to make themselves independent of subjection to her rule; they claimed to stop the course of usurpation which, they held, had been commenced; and they proposed to return under subjection to the British crown the very moment that an accommodation should be made, yielding allegiance to the King of Great Britain as in all time before. And now, gentlemen, on the 23d March, 1776, on a Sat.u.r.day, the little Continental Congress was sitting in the chamber, of which you have often seen the picture, composed of the great, wise, and good men, who sat there in deliberation over the most momentous event that has ever occurred in modern times, if we except that now agitating and convulsing our beloved country. I never heard one of those men stigmatized as a pirate. I never heard one of those men calumniated as an enemy of the human race. I have often heard them called the greatest, wisest, and best men that ever lived on the face of G.o.d"s earth. I will read to you what occurred on the 23d March, 1776;--they being subjects of the King of Great Britain, and having never claimed to throw off allegiance to him, but claiming that he was usurping power which did not belong to him, and that they, as representatives of the thirteen Colonies of America, were the judges of that question and those facts, as we claim that the States are now the judges of this question and these facts.
They adopted the following preamble and resolutions:
"The Congress resumed the consideration of the Declaration, which was agreed to, as follows:
"WHEREAS, The pet.i.tions of the United Colonies to the King for the redress of great and manifold grievances have not only been rejected, but treated with scorn and contempt, and the opposition to designs evidently formed to reduce them to a state of servile subjection, and their necessary defence against hostile forces actually employed to subdue them, declared rebellion;
"AND WHEREAS, An unjust war hath been commenced against them which the commanders of the British fleets and armies have prosecuted and still continue to prosecute with their utmost vigor, in a cruel manner, wasting, spoiling, and destroying the country, burning houses and defenceless towns, and exposing the helpless inhabitants to every misery, from the inclemency of the winter, and not only urging savages to invade the country, but instigating negroes to murder their masters;
"R. TOOMBS, The Parliament of Great Britain hath lately pa.s.sed an Act, affirming these Colonies to be in open rebellion; forbidding all trade and commerce with the inhabitants thereof until they shall accept pardons, and submit to despotic rule; declaring their property wherever found upon the water liable to seizure and confiscation, and enacting that what had been done there by virtue of the royal authority were just and lawful acts, and shall be so deemed; from all which it is manifest that the iniquitous schemes concerted to deprive them of the liberty they have a right to by the laws of nature, and the English Const.i.tution, will be pertinaciously pursued. It being, therefore, necessary to provide for their defence and security, and justifiable to make reprisals upon their enemies and otherwise to annoy them according to the laws and usages of nations; the Congress, trusting that such of their friends in Great Britain (of whom it is confessed there are many ent.i.tled to applause and grat.i.tude for their patriotism and benevolence, and in whose favor a discrimination of property cannot be made) as shall suffer by captures will impute it to the authors of our common calamities, Do Declare and Resolve as follows, to wit:
"_Resolved_, That the Inhabitants of these Colonies be permitted to fit out armed vessels to cruise on the enemies of these United Colonies.
"_Resolved_, That all ships and other vessels, their tackle, apparel and furniture, and all goods, wares and merchandize belonging to any inhabitant of Great Britain, taken on the high seas, or between high and low water-mark, by any armed vessel fitted out by any private person or persons, and to whom commissions shall be granted, and being libelled and prosecuted in any Court erected for the trial of maritime affairs in any of these Colonies, shall be deemed and adjudged to be lawful prize, and after deducting and paying the wages which the seamen and mariners on board of such captures as are merchant ships and vessels shall be ent.i.tled to, according to the terms of their contracts, until the time of their adjudication, shall be condemned to and for the use of the owner or owners, and the officers, marines, and mariners of such armed vessels, according to such rules and proportions as they shall agree on. Provided, always, that this resolution shall not extend to any vessel bringing settlers, arms, ammunition or warlike stores to and for the use of these Colonies, or any of the inhabitants thereof who are friends to the American cause, or to such warlike stores, or to the effects of such settlers.
"_Resolved_, That all ships or vessels, with their tackle, apparel and furniture, goods, wares and merchandize, belonging to any inhabitant of Great Britain, as aforesaid, which shall be taken by any of the vessels of war of these United Colonies, shall be deemed forfeited; one-third, after deducting and paying the wages of seamen and mariners, as aforesaid, to the officers and men on board, and two-thirds to the use of the United Colonies.
"_Resolved_, That all ships or vessels, with their tackle, apparel and goods, wares and merchandizes, belonging to any inhabitant of Great Britain, as aforesaid, which shall be taken by any vessel of war fitted out by and at the expense of any of the United Colonies, shall be deemed forfeited and divided, after deducting and paying the wages of seamen and mariners, as aforesaid, in such manner and proportions as the a.s.sembly or Convention of such Colony shall direct."
There are two or three other resolutions, which it is not necessary for me to trouble you with the reading of. You will bear in mind that there were no two sovereignties over these United Colonies at that time. They had no sovereignty or independence whatever; they were mere Provinces of the British Crown; the Governors derived their appointment from the Crown itself, or from the proprietors of the Colonies; and these wise and good men, on the 23d March, 1776, claimed that the King of Great Britain had usurped powers which did not belong to him under the Const.i.tution of Great Britain, and that they had the right to resist his encroachments; and they authorized letters of marque to cruise against the ships and property of their fellow subjects of Great Britain, because of the state of things which arose from a collision between them and the Crown. They were enemies, and although they regretted that they had to injure in their property men who were their friends, they trusted they would excuse them, owing to the inevitable necessity that existed and the impossibility of discriminating between friends and foes in the case of inhabitants of Great Britain.
And now, gentlemen, to trouble you with one more brief reference, let me show you what took place before that Act of the Provincial Congress was pa.s.sed in the Province of Ma.s.sachusetts. They had already pa.s.sed a Provincial Act of the General a.s.sembly, couched in similar language, authorizing cruisers and privateers against the enemies of that Province; and you will see what occurred. I read again from Cooper"s Naval History, 1st Vol., p. 42. He is speaking of the year 1775:
"The first nautical enterprise that succeeded the battle of Lexington was one purely of private adventure. The intelligence of this conflict was brought to Machias, in Maine, on Sat.u.r.day, the 9th of May, 1775. An armed schooner, in the service of the Crown, called the Margaretta, was lying in port, with two sloops under her convoy, that were loading with lumber on behalf of the King"s Government.
"The bearers of the news were enjoined to be silent,--a plan to capture the Margaretta having been immediately projected among some of the more spirited of the inhabitants. The next day being Sunday, it was hoped that the officers of the schooner might be seized while in church; but the scheme failed, in consequence of the precipitation of some engaged. Captain Moore, who commanded the Margaretta, saw the a.s.sailants, and, with his officers, escaped through the windows of the church to the sh.o.r.e, where they were protected by the guns of their vessel. The alarm was now taken; springs were got on the Margaretta"s cables, and a few harmless shot were fired over the town by way of intimidation. After a little delay, however, the schooner dropped down below the town to a distance exceeding a league. Here she was followed, summoned to surrender, and fired on from a high bank, which her own shot could not reach. The Margaretta again weighed, and running into the bay, at the confluence of the two rivers, anch.o.r.ed. The following morning, which was Monday, the 11th of May, four young men took possession of one of the lumber sloops, and, bringing her alongside of a wharf, they gave three cheers as a signal for volunteers. On explaining that their intentions were to make an attack on the Margaretta, a party of about thirty-five athletic men was soon collected. Arming themselves with firearms, pitchforks, and axes, and throwing a small stock of provisions into the sloop, these spirited freemen made sail on their craft, with a light breeze at northwest. When the Margaretta observed the approach of the sloop, she weighed and crowded sail to avoid a conflict that was every way undesirable,--her commander not yet being apprised of all the facts that had occurred near Boston. In jibing, the schooner carried away her main-boom, but, continuing to stand on, she ran into Holmes"
Bay, and took a spar out of a vessel that was lying there. While these repairs were making, the sloop hove in sight again, and the Margaretta stood out to sea, in the hope of avoiding her. The breeze freshened, and, with the wind on the quarter, the sloop proved to be the better sailer. So anxious was the Margaretta to avoid a collision, that Captain Moore now cut away his boats; but, finding this ineffectual, and that his a.s.sailants were fast closing with him, he opened a fire--the schooner having an armament of four light guns and fourteen swivels. A man was killed on board the sloop, which immediately returned the fire with a wall-piece. This discharge killed the man at the Margaretta"s helm, and cleared her quarter-deck. The schooner broached to, when the sloop gave a general discharge. Almost at the same instant the two vessels came foul of each other. A short conflict now took place with musketry,--Captain Moore throwing hand-grenades, with considerable effect, in person. This officer was immediately afterwards shot down, however, when the people of the sloop boarded and took possession of their prize. The loss of life in this affair was not very great, though twenty men, on both sides, are said to have been killed and wounded. The force of the Margaretta, even in men, was much the most considerable; though the crew of no regular cruiser can ever equal, in spirit and energy, a body of volunteers a.s.sembled on an occasion like this. There was, originally, no commander in the sloop; but, previously to engaging the schooner, Jeremiah O"Brien was selected for that station. This affair was the Lexington of the sea,--for, like that celebrated land conflict, it was a rising of the people against a regular force; was characterized by a long chase, a b.l.o.o.d.y struggle, and a triumph. It was also the first blow struck on the water, after the war of the American Revolution had actually commenced."
And that is the act, gentlemen, which, instead of being the act of desperadoes, pirates, and enemies of the human race, is recorded in history as an act of spirited freemen. You will remember that the act was done without any commission; it was done while these Provinces were Colonies of the British Crown; it was done long before the Declaration of Independence. The Act of the Provincial Congress, so far as that could have any validity, authorizing letters of marque, was not pa.s.sed until afterwards, on the 23d of March. The Declaration of Independence was pa.s.sed on the 4th July, 1776. According to the theory on the other side, call this lawful secession--call it revolution--call it what you please,--these Confederate States, as they are called, are not independent. They have not any Government--they cannot do any thing until their independence is acknowledged by the United States.
Therefore, according to the theory of the other side, no act of the Provincial Congress, no act of any of the United Colonies, had any validity in it until the treaty of peace between them and Great Britain was signed, in 1783. But, I need not tell you, gentlemen, that in this country, in all public doc.u.ments, in all public proceedings, in the decisions of our Courts, the actual establishment of the independence of the United States is dated as having been accomplished on the 4th July, 1776. All the state papers that run in the name and by the authority of the United States of America, run in their name, and by their authority, as of such a year of their independence, dating from the 4th July, 1776. Let me, therefore, show you what was done by the Colonies, in 1776, before and after the date of the Declaration of Independence; and let me show how many piracies our hardy seamen of those days must have committed, on the theory of the prosecution in this case. I read again from Cooper"s Naval History:
"Some of the English accounts of this period state that near a hundred privateers had been fitted out of New England alone, in the two first years of the war; and the number of seamen in the service of the Crown, employed against the new States of America, was computed at 26,000.
"The Colonies obtained many important supplies, colonial as well as military, and even manufactured articles of ordinary use, by means of their captures,--scarce a day pa.s.sing that vessels of greater or less value did not arrive in some one of the ports of their extensive coast. By a list published in the "Remembrancer," an English work of credit, it appears that 342 sail of English vessels had been taken by American cruisers, in 1776; of which number 44 were recaptured, 18 released, and 4 burned."
Well, gentlemen, with these facts staring you in the face, I ask you if it is not flying in the face of history--if it is not rejecting and trampling in the dust the glorious traditions of our own country--to be asked seriously to sit in that jury box and try these men for their lives, as pirates and enemies of the human race, on the state of things existing here? Gentlemen, my mind may be under a strong hallucination on the subject; but I cannot conceive the theory on which the prosecution can come into Court, on the state of things existing, and ask for a conviction. Remember that, in saying that, I am speaking as a Northern man,--for I am a Northern man; I am speaking as a subject and adherent to the Government of the Union; I am speaking as one who loves the flag of this country--as one who was born under it--as one who hopes to be permitted to die under it; and I am speaking with tears in my eyes, because I do not want to see that flag tarnished by a judicial murder, and by an act cowardly and dastardly, as I say it would be, if we are to treat these men as pirates, while we are engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with them with arms in the field, and while they are a.s.serting and maintaining the rights which we claimed for ourselves in former ages. In G.o.d"s name, gentlemen, let us, if necessary, fight them; if we must have civil war, let us convince them, by the argument of arms, and by other arguments that we can bring to bear, that they are in the wrong; let us bring them back into the Union, and show them, when they get back, that they have made a great mistake; but do not let us tarnish the escutcheon of our country, and disgrace ourselves in the eyes of the civilized world, by treating this mighty subject, when States are meeting in mortal shock and conflict, with the ax and the halter. In G.o.d"s name, let us have none of that!
I have but one word more to say, gentlemen, before I close. I have already said that we claim that this commission is an adequate protection, considering that this is an inter-state war. It has been so considered, and is now so considered by the Government of the United States itself, because, after the conflict had commenced and had gone on for some time, it being treated by the Government at Washington as a mere rebellion or insurrection by insurgent and rebellious citizens in some of the Southern States, it was found that it had a.s.sumed too mighty proportions to be treated in that way, and therefore, in the month of July last, the Congress then in session pa.s.sed an Act, one of the recitals of which was that this state of things had broken out and still existed, and that the war was claimed to be waged under the authority of the governments of the States, and that the governments of the States did not repudiate the existence of that authority. Congress then proceeded to legislate upon the a.s.sumption of the fact that the war was carried on under the authority of the governments of the States. There is a distinct recognition by your own Government of the fact that this is an inter-state war, and that the enemies whom our brave troops are encountering in the field are led on under authority emanating from those who are rightfully and lawfully administering the Government of the States.
You will recollect, gentlemen, that in most of those States the State governments are the same as they were before this condition of things broke out. There has been no change in the State const.i.tutions. In a great many of them there has been no change in the personnel of those administering the government. They are the recognized legitimate Governors of the States, whatever may be said of those claiming to administer the Government of the Confederate States.
But, gentlemen, let us pa.s.s from that, and let us suppose it was not a war carried on by authority of the States. It is, then, a civil war, and a civil war of immense and vast proportions; and the authorities are equally clear in that case, that, from the moment that a war of that kind exists, captures on land and at sea are to be treated as prizes of war, and prisoners treated as prisoners of war, and that the vocation of the ax and the halter are gone. I refer you to but a single authority on this subject, because I have already occupied more of your time than I had intended doing, and I have reason to be very grateful to you for the patience and attention with which you have listened to me in the extended remarks that I was obliged to make. I refer to Vattel, Book 3, cap. 18, secs. 287, 292 and 293:
"_Sec. 287._ It is a question very much debated whether a sovereign is bound to observe the common laws of war towards rebellious subjects who have openly taken up arms against him. A flatterer, or a Prince of cruel and arbitrary disposition, will immediately p.r.o.nounce that the laws of war were not made for rebels, for whom no punishment can be too severe. Let us proceed more soberly, and reason from the incontestible principles above laid down."
The author then proceeds to enforce the duty of moderation towards mere rebels, and proceeds:
"_Sec. 292._ When a party is formed in a State who no longer obey the sovereign, and are possessed of sufficient strength to oppose him; or when, in a Republic, the nation is divided into two opposite factions, and both sides take up arms, this is called a civil war. Some writers confine this term to a just insurrection of the subjects against their sovereign to distinguish that lawful resistance from rebellion, which is an open and unjust resistance.
But what appellation will they give to a war which arises in a Republic, torn by two factions, or, in a Monarchy, between two compet.i.tors for the Crown? Custom appropriates the term of civil war to every war between the members of one and the same political society. If it be between part of the citizens on the one side, and the sovereign with those who continue in obedience to him on the other, provided the malcontents have any reason for taking up arms, nothing further is required to ent.i.tle such disturbance to the name of civil war, and not that of rebellion. This latter term is applied only to such an insurrection against lawful authority as is void of all appearance of justice. The sovereign, indeed, never fails to bestow the appellation of rebels on all such of his subjects as openly resist him; but when the latter have acquired sufficient strength to give him effectual opposition, and to oblige him to carry on the war against them according to the established rules, he must necessarily submit to the use of the term civil war.
"_Sec. 293._ It is foreign to our purpose, in this place, to weigh the reasons which may authorize and justify a civil war; we have elsewhere treated of the cases wherein subjects may resist the sovereign. (Book 1, cap. 4.) Setting, therefore, the justice of the cause wholly out of the question, it only remains for us to consider the maxims which ought to be observed in a civil war, and to examine whether the sovereign, in particular, is on such an occasion bound to conform to the established laws of war.
"A civil war breaks the bonds of society and Government, or at least suspends their force and effect; it produces in the nation two independent parties, who consider each other as enemies, and acknowledge no common judge. Those two parties, therefore, must necessarily be considered as thenceforward const.i.tuting, at least for a time, two separate bodies--two distinct societies. Though one of the parties may have been to blame in breaking the unity of the State, and resisting the lawful authority, they are not the less divided in fact. Besides, who shall judge them? Who should p.r.o.nounce on which side the right or the wrong lies? On each they have no common superior. They stand, therefore, in precisely the same predicament as two nations who engage in a contest, and, being unable to come to an agreement, have recourse to arms.
"This being the case, it is very evident that the common laws of war--those maxims of humanity, moderation and honor, which we have already detailed in the course of this work--ought to be observed by both parties in every civil war. For the same reasons which render the observance of those maxims a matter of obligation between State and State, it becomes equally and even more necessary in the unhappy circ.u.mstances of two incensed parties lacerating their common country. Should the sovereign conceive he has a right to hang up his prisoners as rebels, the opposite party will make reprisals; if he does not religiously observe the capitulations, and all other conventions made with his enemies, they will no longer rely on his word; should he burn and ravage, they will follow his example; the war will become cruel, horrible, and every day more destructive to the nation."