[Transcriber"s Note: Corrected a typo in the table: "Sundry Loans"
line should have a minus(-) instead of a plus(+) as printed.]
Actual. Estimated. Difference.
Customs 71,261,000 70,750,000 + 511,000 Excise 38,772,000 34,950,000 + 3,822,000 Estate Duties 31,674,000 29,000,000 + 2,674,000 Stamps 8,300,000 8,000,000 + 300,000 Land Tax and House Duty 2,625,000 2,600,000 + 25,000 Income Tax and Super Tax 239,509,000 224,000,000 + 15,509,000 Excess Profits Tax 220,214,000 200,000,000 + 20,214,000 Land Value Duties 685,000 400,000 + 285,000 Postal Services 35,300,000 33,700,000 + 1,600,000 Crown Lands 690,000 600,000 + 90,000 Sundry Loans, etc. 6,056,000 7,500,000 - 1,444,000 Miscellaneous 52,148,000 27,100,000 + 25,048,000
Certainly, the country is ent.i.tled to congratulate itself on this tremendous evidence of elasticity of revenue, and to a certain extent on the effort that it has made in providing this enormous sum of money from the proceeds of taxation and State services. But when this much has been admitted we have to hasten to add that the figures are not nearly so big as they look, and that there is much less "to write home about," as the schoolboy said, than there appears to be at first sight. Those champions of the Government methods of war finance who maintain that we have, during the past year, multiplied the pre-war revenue, of roughly, 200 millions by more than 3-1/2, so arriving at the present revenue of over 700 millions, are not comparing like with like. The statement is perfectly true on paper, and expressed in pounds sterling, but then the pound sterling of to-day is an entirely different article from the pre-war pound sterling. Owing to the system of finance pursued by our Government, and by every other Government now engaged in the war, of providing for a large part of the country"s goods by the mere manufacture of new currency and credit, the buying power of the pound sterling has been greatly depreciated.
By multiplying the amount of legal tender currency in the shape of Treasury notes, of token currency in the shape of silver and bronze coinage, and of banking currency through the bank deposits which are swollen by the banks" investments in Government securities, the Government has increased the amount of currency pa.s.sing from hand to hand in the community while, at the same time, the volume of goods to be purchased has not been increased with anything like the same rapidity, and may, in fact, have been, actually decreased. The inevitable result has been a great flood of new money with a greatly depreciated value. Index numbers show a rise of over 100 per cent.
in the average prices of commodities during the war. It is, however, perhaps unfair to a.s.sume that the buying power of the pound has actually been reduced by a half, but it is certainly safe to say that it has been reduced by a third. Therefore, the revenue raised by the Government during the past year has to be reduced by at least a third before we are justified in comparing our war achievements with the Government"s pre-war revenue. If we take one-third off 707 millions it reduces the total raised during the past year by revenue to about 470 millions, less than two and a half times the pre-war revenue.
From another point of view our satisfaction with the tremendous figures of the past year"s revenue has to be to some extent qualified.
The great elasticity shown by the big increase of actual achievement over the Budget estimate has been almost entirely in revenue items which cannot be expected to continue to serve us when the war is over. The total increase in the receipts over estimate amounts to 69 millions, and of this 20 millions was provided by the Excess Profits Duty, a fiscal weapon which was invented during the war, and for the purpose of the war. It has always been a.s.sumed that it would be discontinued as soon as the war was over, and if it should not be discontinued its after-war effect is likely to be very unfortunate at a time when our industrial effort requires all the encouragement that it can get. Another 25 millions was provided by miscellaneous revenue, and this windfall again must be largely due to operations connected with the war. Finally, the 15-1/2 millions by which the income tax exceeded the estimate must again be largely due to inflation and extravagance on the part of the Government, which, by manufacturing money, and then spending it recklessly, puts big profits and big incomes into the hands of those who have stocks of goods to sell or who are in a position to produce them.
If, therefore, the satisfaction with which we regard the big total of the Government"s revenue receipts has to be considerably modified in the cold light of close observation, the enormous increase on the expenditure side gives us very little comfort and calls for the most determined and continued criticism if our reckless Government is to be made to turn over a new leaf. In the early days of the war there was much excuse for wasting money. We had to improvise a great Army, and a great organisation for equipping it; there was no time then to look too closely into the way the money was being spent, but this excuse is long obsolete. It is not possible to waste money without also wasting the energy and working power of the nation; on this energy and working power the staying power of the country depends in its struggle to avert the greatest disaster that can be imagined for civilisation, that is, the victory of the German military power. Seeing that for many months past we have no longer been obliged to finance Russia, and to provide Russia with the ma.s.s of materials and the equipment that she required, the way in which our expenditure has mounted up during the course of the year is a very serious blot on the year"s balance-sheet. We spent during the year ending March 31st, 2696 millions against 2198 millions in the previous year, an increase of close upon 500 millions; 63 millions of this increase were due to interest on war debt, the rest of it was due to increased cost of the war, and few business men will deny that very many of these extra millions might have been saved if our rulers and our bureaucratic tyrants had been imbued with any real sense of the need for conserving the energy of the nation.
Much has been done by the Committee on National Expenditure to bring home to the Government opportunities for economy, and methods by which it can be secured. Can we be equally confident that much has been done by the Government to carry out the advice that has been given by this Committee? The Treasury is frequently blamed for its inability to check the rapacity and extravagance of the spending Departments. It is very likely that the Treasury might have done more if it had not been led by its own desire for a short-sighted economy into economising on its own staff, the activity and efficiency of which was so absolutely essential to the proper spending of the nation"s money. But when this has been admitted, the fact remains that the Treasury cannot, or can only with great difficulty, be stronger on the side of economy than the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that the task of the Chancellor of the Exchequer of imposing economy on a spendthrift War Cabinet is one of extreme difficulty. I hope it is not necessary to say that I do not urge economy from any sordid desire to save the nation"s money if, by its spending, victory could be secured or brought a day nearer. I only urge it because I believe that the conservation of our resources is absolutely necessary to maintain our staying power, and that these resources are at present being scandalously wasted by the Government.
Inter-departmental compet.i.tion is still complained of in the latest report of the National Committee on Expenditure, and there seems to be still very little evidence that the Government Departments have yet possessed themselves of the simple fact that it is only out of these resources that victory can be secured, and that any waste of them is therefore a crime against the cause of liberty and progress.
It is possible that before these lines are in print the Chancellor will have brought in his new Budget, and therefore any attempt to forecast the measures by which he will meet next year"s revenue would be even more futile than most other endeavours at prophecy. But from the figures of last year as they are before us we see once more that the proportion of expenditure raised by revenue still leaves very much to be desired; 707 millions out of, roughly, 2700 millions is not nearly enough. It is true that on the expenditure side large sums have been put into a.s.sets which may some day or other be recoverable, and it is therefore impossible to a.s.sume with any approach to accuracy what the actual cost of the war has been for us during the past year.
We have made, for instance, very large advances to our Allies and Dominions, and it need not be said that our advances to our own Dominions may be regarded as quite as good as if they were still in our own pockets; but in the case of our Allies, our loans to Russia are a somewhat questionable a.s.set, and our loans to our other brothers-in-arms cannot be regarded as likely to be recoverable for some time to come, owing to the severity with which the war"s pressure has been laid upon them. With regard to the other a.s.sets in which the Government has invested our money, such as factories, machinery, ships, supplies and food, etc., it is at least possible that considerable loss may be involved in the realisation of some of them.
It is, however, possible that the actual cost of the war to us during the year that is past may turn out some day to have been in the neighbourhood of 2000 millions. If, on the other hand, we deduct from the 700 millions raised by revenue the 200 millions which represent the normal pre-war cost of Government to this country we find that the proportion of war"s cost raised out of revenue is slightly over 25 per cent. This proportion must be taken with all reserve for the reasons given above, but in any case it is very far below the 47 per cent. of the war"s cost raised out of revenue by our ancestors in the course of the Napoleonic wars.
It seems to me that this policy of raising so large a proportion of the war"s cost by borrowing is one that commends itself to short-sighted politicians, but is by no means in the interests of the country as a whole, or of the taxpayers who now and hereafter have to find the money for paying for the war. In so far as the war"s needs have to be met abroad, borrowing abroad is to some extent inevitable if the borrowing nation has not the necessary resources and labour available to turn out goods for export to exchange against those which have to be purchased abroad, but in so far as the war"s needs are financed at home, the policy of borrowing is one that should only be used within the narrowest possible limits. By its means the Government, instead of making the citizens pay by taxation for the war as it goes on, hires a certain number of them to pay for it by promising them a rate of interest, and their money back some day.
The interest and the sinking fund for redemption have to be found by taxation, and so the borrowing process merely postpones taxation from the war period to the peace period. During the war period taxation can be raised comparatively easily owing to the patriotic stimulus and the simplification of the industrial problem which is provided by the Government"s insatiable demand for commodities. When the days of peace return, however, there will be very grave disturbance and dislocation in industry, and it will have once more to face the problem of providing goods, not for a Government which will take all that it can get, but for a public, the demands of which will be uncertain, and whose buying power will be unevenly distributed, and difficult to calculate. The process, therefore, which postpones taxation during the war period to the peace period seems to be extraordinarily short-sighted from the point of view of the nation"s economic progress. Recovery after the war may be astonishingly rapid if all goes well, but this can only happen if every opportunity is given to industry to get back to peace work with the least possible friction, and a heavy burden of after-war taxation, such as we shall inevitably have to face if our Chancellors of the Exchequer continue to pile up the debt charge as they have done in the past, will be anything but helpful to those whose business it will be to set the machinery of industry going under peace conditions.
As things are, if we continue to add anything like 2000 millions a year to the National Debt, it will not be possible to balance the after-war Budget without taxation on a heavier scale than is now imposed, or without retaining the Excess Profit Duty, and so stifling industry at a time when it will need all the fresh air that it can get. Apart from this expedient, which would seem to be disastrous from the point of view of its effect upon fresh industry, the most widely advertised alternative is the capital levy, the objections to which are patent to all business men. It would involve an enormously costly and tedious process of valuation, its yield would be problematical, and it might easily deal a blow at the incentive to save on which the supply of capital after the war entirely depends. A much higher rate of income tax, especially on large incomes, is another solution of the problem, and it also might obviously have most unfortunate effects upon the elasticity of industry. A tax on retail purchases has much to be said in its favour, but against it is the inequity inseparable from the impossibility of graduating it according to the ability of the taxpayer to bear the burden; and a general tariff on imported goods, though it would be welcomed by the many Protectionists in our midst, can hardly be considered as a practical fiscal weapon at a time when the need for food, raw material, and all the equipment of industry will make it necessary to import as rapidly and as cheaply as possible in order to promote our after-war recovery.
Apart from these purely economic arguments against the high proportion of the war"s costs that we are meeting by borrowing, there is the much more important fact of its bad effect on the minds of our soldiers, and of those members of the civilian population who draw mistaken inferences from its effects. From the point of view of our soldiers, who have to go and fight for their country at a time when those who are left at home are earning high wages and making big profits, it is evidently highly unfair that the war should be financed by a method which postpones taxation. The civilian population left at home, earning high profits and high wages, should clearly pay as much as possible during the war by immediate taxation, so that the burden of taxation may be relieved for our soldiers when they return to civil life. In view of the hardships and dangers which our soldiers have to face, and the heroism with which they are facing them, this argument should be of overwhelming strength in the eyes of every citizen who has imagination enough to conceive what our fighting men are doing for us and how supreme is our duty to do everything to relieve them from any other burden except those which the war compels them to face.
There is also the fact that many members of our uninstructed industrial population believe that the richer cla.s.ses are growing richer owing to the war, and battening on the proceeds of the loans.
I do not think that this is true; on the contrary, I believe that the war has brought a considerable shifting of buying power from the well-to-do cla.s.ses to the manual workers. Nevertheless, in these times misconceptions are awkwardly active for evil. The well-to-do cla.s.ses as a whole are not really benefited by having their future incomes pledged in order to meet the future debt charge, and if, at the same time, they are believed to be acquiring the right to wealth, which wealth they will have themselves to provide, the fatuity of the borrowing policy becomes more manifest. For these reasons it is sincerely to be hoped that our next fiscal year will be marked by a much higher revenue from taxation, a considerable decrease in expenditure, and a consequently great improvement in the proportion of war"s cost met out of revenue, on what has been done in the past year.
At our present rate of taxation we are not nearly meeting, out of permanent taxes, the sum which will be needed when the war is over for peace expenditure on the inevitably higher scale, pensions, and interest and sinking fund on war debt.
IX
COMPARATIVE WAR FINANCE
_May_, 1918
The New Budget--Our own and Germany"s Balance-sheets--The Enemy"s Difficulties--Mr Bonar Law"s Optimism--Special Advantages which Peace will bring to Germany--A Comparison with American Finance--How much have we raised from Revenue?--The Value of the Pound To-day--The 1918 Budget an Improvement on its Predecessors--But Direct Taxation still too Low--Deductions from the Chancellor"s Estimates.
One of the most interesting pa.s.sages in a Budget speech of unusual interest was that in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer compared the financial methods of Germany and of this country, as shown by their systems of war finance. He began by admitting that it is difficult to make any accurate calculation on this subject, owing to the very thick mist of obscurity which envelops Germany"s actual performance in the matter of finance since the war began. As the Chancellor says, our figures throughout have been presented with the object of showing quite clearly what is our financial position. Most of the people who are obliged to study the figures of Government finance would feel inclined to reply that, if this is really so, the Chancellor and the Treasury seem to have curiously narrow limitations in their capacity for clearness. Very few accountants, I imagine, consider the official figures, as periodically published, as models of lucidity. Nevertheless, we can at least claim that in this respect the figures furnished to us by the Government during the war have been quite as lucid as those which used to be presented in time of peace, and it is greatly to the credit of the Treasury that, in spite of the enormous figures now involved by Government expenditure, the financial statements have been published week by week, quarter by quarter, and year by year, with the same prompt.i.tude and punctuality that marked their appearance in peace-time. In Germany, the Chancellor says, it has not been the object of German financial statements to show the financial position quite clearly. It is, therefore, difficult to make an exact statement, but he was able to provide the House with a series of very interesting figures, taken from the statements of the German Finance Ministers themselves.
His first point is with regard to the increase of expenditure. The alarming rate with which our expenditure has so steadily grown appears to be paralleled also in Germany. Up to June, 1916, Germany"s monthly expenditure was 100 millions. It has now risen to over 187 millions.
That means to say that their expenditure per diem is 6-1/4 millions, almost the same as ours, although our expenditure includes items such as separation allowances and other matters of that kind, borne by the States and munic.i.p.alities in Germany, and so not appearing in the German imperial figures.
As to the precise extent of the German war debt, there is no certainty, but the Chancellor was able to tell the House that the last German Vote of Credit, which was estimated to carry them on to June or July, brings the total amount of all their Votes of Credit to 6200 millions, and that it is at least certain that that amount has been added to their War Debt, because their taxation during the war has not covered peace expenditure plus debt charge. Up to 1916 they imposed no new taxation. In 1916 they imposed a war increment tax, something in the nature of a capital levy, which is stated to have brought in 275 millions. They added also that year 25 millions nominally to their permanent revenue. In 1917 they added in addition 40 millions to their permanent revenue, "a.s.suming, therefore, that their estimates were realised, the total amount of new taxation levied by them since the beginning of the war comes to 365 millions, as against our 1044 millions. This 365 millions is not enough to pay the interest upon the War Debt which had been acc.u.mulated up to the end of the year."
Mr Bonar Law then proceeded to give an estimate of what the German balance-sheet will be a year hence on the same basis on which he had calculated ours. With regard to our position, he had calculated that on the present basis of taxation we shall have a margin of four millions at the end of the present year if peace should then break out. As will be shown later, this estimate of his is somewhat optimistic, but at any rate our position, compared with that of Germany, may be described as on velvet. A year hence the German War Debt will be not less than 8000 millions. The interest on that will be at least 400 millions, a sinking fund at 1/2 per cent. will be 40 millions. Their pension engagements, which will be much higher than ours owing to their far heavier casualties, have been estimated at amounts ranging as high as 200 millions. The Chancellor was sure that he was within the mark in saying that it will be at least 150 millions. Their normal pre-war expenditure was 130 millions, so that they will have to face a total expenditure at the end of the war of 720 millions. On the other side of the account their pre-war revenue was 150 millions. They have announced their intention of this year raising additional permanent Imperial revenue amounting to 120 millions. From the nature of the taxes the Chancellor considers it very difficult to believe that this amount will be realised, but, a.s.suming that it is, it will make their total additional revenue 185 millions. That, added to the pre-war revenue, gives a total of 335 millions, showing "a deficit at the end of this year, comparing the revenue with the expenditure, of 385 millions at least." The Chancellor added that if that were our position he would certainly think that bankruptcy was not far from the British Government.
Another point that the Chancellor was able to make effectively, in comparing our war revenue with Germany"s, was the fact that, with the exception of the war increment tax, scarcely any of the additional revenue has been obtained from the wealthier cla.s.ses in Germany.
Taxation has been indirect and on commodities which are paid for by the ma.s.ses of the people. "The lesson to be drawn from these facts is not difficult to see. The rulers of Germany, in spite of their hopes of indemnity, must realise that financial stability is one of the elements of national strength. They have not added to their financial stability." The reason for this failure the Chancellor considers to be largely psychological. It is, in the first place, because they do not care to add to discontent by increased taxation all over the country, but "it is still more due to this, that in Germany the cla.s.ses which have any influence on or control of the Government are the wealthier cla.s.ses, and the Government have been absolutely afraid to force taxation upon them."
It is certainly very pleasant to be able to contemplate the financial blunders by which Germany is so greatly increasing the difficulties that it will have to face before the war is over. On the other hand, we have to recognise that the Chancellor, with that incorrigible optimism of his, has committed the common but serious error of over-stating his case by leaving out factors which are in Germany"s favour, as, for instance, that Germany"s debt is to a larger extent than ours held at home. Since the war began we have raised over 1000 millions by borrowing abroad. Our public accounts show that the item of "Other Debt," which is generally believed to refer to debt raised abroad, now amounts to 958 millions, while one of our loans in America, which is separately stated in the account because it was raised under a special Act, amounted to 51-1/2 millions. It is also quite possible that fair amounts of our Treasury bills, perhaps also of our Temporary Advances and of our other war securities, have been taken up by foreigners; but quite apart from that the two items already referred to now amount to more than 1000 millions, though at the end of March last their amount was only 988 millions. It is also well known that we have during the course of the war realised abroad the cream of our foreign investments, American Railroad Bonds, Munic.i.p.al and Government holdings in Scandinavia, Argentina, and elsewhere, to an amount concerning which no accurate estimate can be made, except by those who have access to the Arcana of the Treasury.
It may, however, be taken as roughly true that so far the extent of our total borrowings and realisation of securities abroad has been balanced by our loans to our Allies and Dominions, which amounted at the end of March last to 1526 millions. We have thus entered into an enormous liability on foreign debts and sold a batch of very excellent securities on which we used to receive interest from abroad in the shape of goods and services, against which we now hold claims upon our Allies and Dominions, in respect to the greater part of which it would be absurd to pretend that we can rely on receiving interest for some years after the war, in view of the much greater economic strain imposed by the war upon our Allies.
Germany, of course, has been doing these things also. Germany has parted with her foreign securities. She was selling them in blocks for some weeks before the war, and Germany, of course, has done everything that she could in order to induce neutrals, during the course of the war, to buy securities from her and to subscribe to her War Loans.
Nevertheless, it cannot have been possible for Germany to carry out these operations to anything like the extent that we have, partly because her credit has not been nearly so good, partly because her ruthless and brutal conduct of the war has turned the sentiment of the world against her, and partly because the measures that we have taken to check remittances and transfers of money have not been altogether ineffective. On this side of the problem Germany has therefore an advantage over us, that her war finance, pitiful a$ it has been, has, not owing to any virtue of hers, but owing to force of circ.u.mstances, raised her a problem which is to a great extent internal, and will not have altered her relation to the finance of other countries so much as has been the case with regard to ourselves. We also have to remember that the process of demobilisation will be far simpler, quicker, and cheaper for Germany than for us. Even if the war ended to-morrow the German Army would not have far to go in order to get home, and we hope that by the time the war ends the German Army will all have been driven back into its own country and so will be on its own soil, only requiring to be redistributed to its peace occupations. Our Army will have to be fetched home, firstly, over Continental railways, probably battered into a condition of much inefficiency, and then in ships, of which the supply will be very short. The process will be very slow and very costly. Our Overseas Army will have to be sent back to distant Dominions, and the Army of our American Allies will have to be ferried back over the Atlantic. Consequently if Germany is able to obtain anything like the supply of raw material that she requires she will be able to get back to peace business much more quickly than any of her Anglo-Saxon enemies, and this is an advantage on her side which it would be unwise to ignore in considering the bad effects on her after-war activities of the very questionable methods by which she has financed and is financing the war.
Since we are indulging in these comparisons, it may be interesting to consider how our American Allies are showing in this matter of war finance. The _Times_, in its "City Notes" of April 15th, observed, in connection with the unexpectedly small amount of the third Liberty Loan, that the reason why the smaller figure was adopted for the issue was that it seems quite certain now that the original estimate for the expenditure in the fiscal year ending June 30th next was much too high. This estimate was 18,775 million dollars. The _Times_ stated that the realised amount is likely to be hardly more than 12,000 million dollars, of which about 4500 million dollars will represent loans to Allies, and that the estimate for the year"s largely increased tax revenue was 3886 million dollars, which now seems likely to be exceeded by the receipts. If this be so, out of a total expenditure of 2400 millions, of which 900 millions will be lent to the Allies, the Americans are apparently raising nearly 800 millions out of revenue. Therefore if we deduct from both sides of the account the pre-war expenditure of about 215 millions and deduct also the loans to Allies from the expenditure, it leaves the cost of the war to America 1285 millions for this year and the war revenue 562 millions. If these figures are correct it would thus appear that America is raising nearly half its actual war cost out of revenue as the war goes on.
On the other hand, in the New York _Commercial Chronicle_ of April 6th the total estimated disburs.e.m.e.nts for the year are still stated at over 16,000 million dollars, that is to say, 3200 millions roughly, so that there seems to be considerable uncertainty as to what the actual amount of the expenditure of the United States will be during the year ending on June 30th. In any case, there can be no question that if the very high proportion of war cost paid out of revenue shown by the _Times_ figures proves to be correct, it will be largely owing to accident or misfortune; if America"s war expenditure has not proceeded nearly as fast as was expected, it will be, no doubt, owing not to economies but to shortcomings in the matter of delivery of war goods which the Government had expected to pay for in the course of the fiscal year. It certainly would have been expected that the Americans would in this matter of war finance be in a position to set a very much higher standard than any of the European belligerents owing to the enormous wealth that the country has acquired during the two and a half years in which it, in the position of a neutral, was able to sell its produce at highly satisfactory prices to the warring Powers without itself having to incur any of the expenses of war. On the other hand, its great distance from the actual seat of operations will naturally make it difficult for the American Government to impose taxation as freely as might have been done in the case of peoples which are actually on the scene of warfare; so that it is hardly safe to count on American example to improve the standard of war finance which has been so lamentably low in Europe in the course of the present war. According to their original estimates the proportion of war cost borne out of taxation seems to have been on very much the same level as ours, and this has all through the war been very much lower than the results achieved by our ancestors at the time of the Napoleonic and Crimean wars.
On this point the proportion of our expenditure, which has been borne out of revenue, the Chancellor stated that up to the end of last financial year, March 31, 1918, the proportion of total expenditure borne out of revenue was 26.3 per cent. On the estimates which he submitted to the House in his Budget speech on April 22nd, the proportion of total expenditure met out of revenue during the current financial year will be 28.3 per cent., and the proportion calculated over the whole period to the end of the current year will be 26.9 per cent. These proportions, however, are between total revenue and total expenditure during the war period. The proportion, of course, is not so high when we try to calculate actual war revenue and war expenditure by deducting on each side at a rate of 200 millions a year as representing normal expenditure and revenue and leaving out advances to Allies and Dominions. On this basis the proportion of war expenditure met out of war revenue up to March 31, 1918, was, the Chancellor stated, 21.7 per cent. For the year 1917-18 it was 25.3 per cent., for the current year it will be 26.5 per cent., and for the whole period up to the end of the current year 23.3 per cent. The corresponding figures for the Napoleonic and Crimean wars are given by Sir Bernard Mallet in his book on British Budgets as 47 per cent. and 47.4 per cent. So that it will be seen that, judged by this test, our war finance, though very much better than Germany"s, is not on so high a standard as that set by previous wars. It is true, of course, that the rate of expenditure during the present war has been on a scale which altogether dwarfs the outgoing in any previous struggle. The Napoleonic War is calculated to have cost some 800 millions, having lasted some twenty-three years. Last year we spent 2696 millions, of which near 2000 millions may be taken as war cost, after deducting normal expenditure and loans to Allies.
Nevertheless, this argument of the enormous cost of the present war does not seem to me to be a good reason why the war should be financed badly, but rather a reason for making every possible effort to finance it well Are we doing so? At first sight it is a great achievement to have increased our total revenue from 200 millions before the war to 842 millions, the amount which we are expected to receive during the current year on the basis of the proposed additions to taxation, without taking into account any revenue from the suggested luxury tax.
But, as I have already pointed out, the comparison of war pounds with pre-war pounds is in itself deceptive. The pounds that we are paying to-day in taxation are by no means the pounds that we paid before the war; their value in effective buying power has been diminished by something like one half. So that even with the proposed additions to taxation we shall not have much more than doubled the revenue of the country from taxation and State services as calculated in effective buying power. When we consider how much is at stake, that the very existence, not only of the country but of civilisation, is endangered by German aggression, it cannot be said that in the matter of taxation the country is doing anything like what it ought to have done or anything like what it would have done, willingly and readily, if a proper example had been set by the leading men among us, and if the right kind of financial lead had been given to the country by its rulers.
When we look at the details of the Budget, it will be seen that the Chancellor has made a considerable advance upon his achievement of a year ago, when he imposed fresh taxation amounting to 26 millions, twenty of which came from excess profits duty, and could therefore not be counted upon as permanent, in his Budget for a year which was expected to add over 1600 millions to the country"s debt, and actually added nearly 2000 millions. For the present year he antic.i.p.ates an expenditure of 2972 millions, and he is imposing fresh taxation which will realise 68 millions in the current year and 114-1/2 millions in a full year. On the basis of taxation at which it stood last year he estimates for an increase of 67 millions, income tax and super-tax on the old basis being expected to bring in 28 millions more, and excess profits duty 80 millions more, against which decreases were estimated at 3-1/2 millions in Excise and 37 millions in miscellaneous. He thus expects to get a total increase on the last year"s figures of 135 millions, making for the current year a total revenue of 842 millions, and leaving a total deficit of 2130 millions to be provided by borrowing. Increases in taxation on spirits, beer, tobacco, and sugar bring in a total of nearly 41 millions. An increase of a penny in the stamp duty on cheques is estimated to bring in 750,000 this year and a million in a full year, and the increases in the income tax and the super-tax will bring in 23 millions in the present year and 61 millions in a full year.
Increases in postal charges will bring in 3-1/2 millions this year and 4 millions in a full year.
There has been little serious criticism of these changes in taxation except that many people, who seem to regard the penny post as a kind of fetish, have expressed regret that the postal rate of the letter should be raised to 1-1/2 d. This addition seems to me to be merely an inadequate recognition of the depreciation of the buying power of the penny and to be fully warranted by the country"s circ.u.mstances. Either it will bring in revenue or it will save the Post Office labour, and whichever of these objects is achieved will increase the country"s power to continue the war. The extra penny stamp on cheques has been rather absurdly objected to as being likely to increase inflation.
Since the effect of it is likely to be that people will draw a smaller number of small cheques, and will make a larger number of their purchases by means of Treasury notes, the tax will merely result in the subst.i.tution of one form of currency for another, and it is difficult to see how this process will in any way increase inflation.
Other arguments might be adduced, which make it undesirable to increase the outstanding amounts of Treasury notes, but in the matter of inflation through addition to paper currency, it seems to me that the proposed tax is entirely blameless. The increase of a shilling in income tax and super-tax produced a feeling of relief in the City, being considerably lower than had been antic.i.p.ated. It is hardly the business of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this most serious crisis to produce feelings of relief among the taxpayers, and it seems to me a great pity that he did not make much freer use of these most equitable forms of taxation, having first made arrangements (which could easily have been done) by which their very severe pressure would have been relieved upon those who have families to bring up. Death duties, again, he altogether omitted as a source of extra revenue. His proposed luxury tax he has left to be evolved by the wisdom of a House of Commons Committee, and has thereby given plenty of time to extravagantly minded people to lay in a store of stuff before the tax is brought into being.
s.p.a.ce will not allow me to deal fully with the Chancellor"s very interesting a.n.a.lysis of our position as he expects it to be at the end of the financial year on the supposition that the war was then over.
He expects a revenue then of 540 millions on the present basis, making, with the yield of the new taxes in a full year, 654 millions in all, without including the excess profits duty, and he expects an after-war expenditure of 650 millions, including 50 millions for pensions and 380 millions for debt charge. It seems to me that his expectation of after-war revenue is too high, and of after-war expenditure is too low. He says that the estimates have been carefully made, but that they include "a recovery from the absence of war conditions," but surely the absence of war conditions is much more likely to produce a diminution than a recovery in taxation. Under the present circ.u.mstances, with prices continually rising, the profits of those who grow or hold stocks of goods of any kind automatically swell The rise in prices has only to cease, to say nothing of its being turned into a fall, to produce at once a big check in those profits, and when we consider the enormous dislocation likely to be produced by the beginning of the peace period expectations of an elastic revenue when the war is over seem to be almost criminally optimistic.
The Chancellor arrived at his after-war debt charge of 380 millions by estimating for a gross debt on March 31, 1919, of 7980 millions, which he reduces to a net debt of 6856 millions by deducting half the expected face value of loans to Allies, 816 millions, and 308 millions for loans to Dominions and India"s obligation. But is he, in fact, ent.i.tled to count on receiving any interest at all from our Allies for some years to come after the war? If not, then on that portion of our debt which is represented by loans to Allies we shall have to meet interest for ourselves. He also gave an imposing list of a.s.sets in the shape of balances in hand, foodstuffs, land, securities, building ships, stores in munitions department, and arrears of taxation, amounting in all to nearly 1200 millions. It is certainly very pleasant to consider that we shall have all these valuable a.s.sets in hand; but against them we have to allow, which the Chancellor altogether omitted to do, for the big arrears of expenditure and the huge cost of demobilisation, which is at least likely to absorb the whole of them. On the whole, therefore, although we can claim that our war finance is very much better than that of our enemies, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it might have been very much better than it is, and that it is not nearly as good as it is represented to be by the optimistic fancy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
X
INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY
_June_, 1918
An Inopportune Proposal--What is Currency?--The Primitive System of Barter--The Advantages possessed by the Precious Metals--Gold as a Standard of Value--Its Failure to remain Constant--Currency and Prices--The Complication of other Instruments of Credit--No Subst.i.tute for Gold in Sight--Its Acceptability not shaken by the War--A Fluctuating Standard not wholly Disadvantageous--An International Currency fatal to the Task of Reconstruction--Stability and Certainty the Great Needs.
As if mankind had not enough on its hands at the present moment, a number of well-meaning people seem to think that this is an opportune time for raising obscure questions of currency, and trying to make the public take an interest in schemes for bettering man"s lot by improving the arrangements under which international payments are carried out. n.o.body can deny that some improvement is possible in this respect, but it may very well be doubted whether, at the present moment, when very serious problems of rebuilding have inevitably to be faced and solved, it is advisable to complicate them by introducing this difficult question which, whenever it is raised, will require the most careful and earnest consideration.
Since, however, the question is in the air, it may be as well to consider what is wrong with our present methods, and what sort of improvements are suggested by the reformers. At present, as every one knows, international payments are in normal times ultimately settled by shipments from one country to another of gold. Gold has achieved this position for reasons which have been described in all the currency text-books. Mankind proceeded from a state of barter to a condition in which one particular commodity was used as the chief means of payment simply because this process was found to be much more convenient. Under a system of barter an exchange could only be effected between two people who happened to be possessed each of them of the thing which the other one wanted, and also at the same time to want the thing which the other one possessed, and the extent of their mutual wants had to lit so exactly that they were able to carry out the desired exchange. It must obviously have been rare that things happened so fortunately that mutually advantageous exchanges were possible, and the text-books invariably call attention to the difficulties of the baker who wanted a hat, but was unable to supply his need because the hatter did not want bread but fish or some other commodity.