In view of the facts now set forth, can we blame Pitt and Grenville for declining to treat with Maret? He brought with him no proof that he had any other function than that of taking over the archives of the French emba.s.sy. Grenville stated to Auckland that Maret"s presence caused much dabbling in the funds, and that his presence was most undesirable if Dumouriez really intended to treat for peace. Pitt afterwards a.s.sured the House of Commons that Maret had not made the smallest communication to Ministers.[189] Evidently they looked on him as an unofficial emissary, to which level Chauvelin had persistently endeavoured to degrade him.
Finally, on 4th February, Grenville ordered Maret to leave the country.
By this time news had arrived from Paris that France had laid an embargo on British ships in her ports; and this portended more serious news. By that time the die was cast. On 31st January Danton carried the Convention with him in a fiery speech, crowned with that gigantic phrase--"Let us fling down to the Kings the head of a King as gage of battle"; then, in defiance of the well-known facts of the case, he urged the deputies to decree an act of political union with the Belgians, who were already one at heart with them. On the following day the Convention confirmed this aggressive action by unanimously decreeing war against Great Britain and Holland. By so doing the deputies of France merely endorsed the decision formed by the Executive Council on 10th January.
The outbreak of war between France and England is an event so fraught with momentous issues to Pitt, to the two Powers, and to the whole world, that I have striven to set forth as fully as possible every incident, every misunderstanding, every collision of interests or feelings, that brought it to pa.s.s. No episode in the development of the nations of Europe is so tragic as this. That two peoples should, within the s.p.a.ce of nine months, abjure their friendly relations and furiously grapple in a life and death struggle over questions of secondary importance leads the dazed beholder at first to grope after the old Greek idea of +ate+ or Nemesis. In reality the case does not call for supernatural agency. The story is pitiably human, if the student will but master its complex details. It may be well to close our study with a few general observations, though they almost necessarily involve the risk of over-statement.
Firstly, the position of absolute neutrality which Pitt took up from the beginning of the troubles in France was extremely difficult to maintain amidst the rising pa.s.sions of the year 1792. The Franco-Austrian war soon led to a situation in which the future conduct of the neutral aroused far more suspicion, and scarcely less hatred, than that of the enemy himself. When brains reeled with rage against tyrants; when cheeks flushed at the thought of the woes of Marie Antoinette, correct neutrality seemed inhuman. In an age that vibrated to the appeals of Madame Roland and Burke, cold pa.s.sivity aroused doubt or contempt. Yet it is certain that Pitt and Grenville clung to that position, even when its difficulties increased tenfold with the fall of the monarchy and the September ma.s.sacres. Lebrun, on coming into office after the former of those events, was careful to inform his countrymen that the withdrawal of the British amba.s.sador was not an unfriendly act, and that England was making no preparations for war. Later on he chose to represent Pitt"s conduct as persistently unfriendly; but his earlier words prove the contrary.
Again, was it practicable (as Fox claimed) for Pitt to forbid Austria and Prussia to coalesce against France? Probably it was not possible, without bringing Russia and Sweden into the field on the royalist side.
In the excited state of men"s minds, an act so annoying as that of armed mediation would have widened the circle of war; and, as we have seen, it was the belief of Pitt and Grenville, in August-September 1792, that the continental war might probably end from the inability of the combatants to continue it. No one at that time foresaw the easy conquest of Savoy and the Low Countries by the French troops. In one of the few references to foreign affairs in Pitt"s letters of the month following, we find him stating that if France conquers and keeps Savoy, a new situation will arise.[190] But he remained pa.s.sive while the French drove the Sardinian troops from Savoy; and his whole conduct at this time moved Burke to indignation, if not despair. So late as 6th November Grenville expressed to Auckland his firm belief in the policy of strict neutrality.[191]
What was it, then, that blighted these hopes? The answer must be that the French victory of Jemappes (6th November) and the phenomenally easy conquest of the Austrian Netherlands speedily brought about a new and most threatening situation. It has been usual to say, with Goethe, that Valmy was the birth of a new age. Far more truly may we say so of Jemappes and its immediate results. That decisive triumph and the welcome accorded by the liberated Belgians opened up vistas of beneficent triumph that set the brain of France in a whirl. Hence the decrees of 16th November-15th December, which tear to pieces the old diplomacy, and apply to astonished Europe the gospel of Rousseau. In place of musty treaties there will be Social Contracts; instead of States there will be nations that will speak straight to one another"s heart. They do speak: English Radical Clubs speak to the heart of France, the Convention; and Gregoire, President of that body, makes answer that if the rulers of England threaten the delegates and their comrades, Frenchmen will cross the Straits and fly to their help--"Come, generous Britons," he cries, "let us all confederate for the welfare of Humanity."[192] In the new age, then, political life will be a series of _tableaux_ from the gospel of Rousseau. To the true believer there can be no compromise. Relics of old-world customs, such as the closing of the Scheldt by the Dutch, must vanish. Here, as elsewhere, Nature will infallibly guide men aright.
It was the application of these principles to our ally, the Dutch Republic, which Pitt refused to accept, especially as their corollary made for the aggrandis.e.m.e.nt of France. In his eyes international law imposed stringent obligations, which no one State, or nation, had the right to revoke. Old world theories of life, when rudely a.s.sailed at Paris, moved their champions to an enthusiasm scarcely less keen than that of the Jacobins. Britons who fraternized with the new hierophants were counted traitors to their King. Moreover, by a most unfortunate coincidence, the British Government publicly announced its resolve to support the Dutch Republic on the very day when the French Convention pa.s.sed the first of its subversive decrees. Thus, national pride came sharply into conflict. Neither side could give way without seeming to betray alike its principles and its honour.
Personal questions played a baneful part in embittering the feud. Pitt and Grenville shrouded themselves in their insular and innate austerity.
They judged the English Radical clubs too harshly; they ascribed to those who congratulated the Convention on 28th November treasonable aims which can scarcely have arisen in England when the addresses were drawn up. Apart from frothy republican talk, which should have been treated with quiet contempt, those congratulations contained no sign of consciousness that France was about to challenge us to conflict. We may admit that Frost and Barlow showed great tactlessness in presenting those addresses when friction between the two nations had already begun; for the incident, besides stiffening the necks of Frenchmen, gave the Reform movement an appearance of disloyalty to England which worked infinite harm. Nevertheless, on reviewing these questions, we see that Pitt treated the foolish ebullitions of youth as though they implied malice.
Surely, too, he, and still more Grenville, were unwise in placing Chauvelin under a political and social ban, which naturally led him to consort with the bitterest enemies of Government in order to annoy Ministers here and please his employers at Paris. A touchy and sensitive nature like Chauvelin"s is usually open to the soothing influences of flattery. Grenville, however, drove him to open enmity, which finally wreaked its revenge;[193] for it was Chauvelin"s report on the readiness of Britons to revolt which finally decided the Convention to declare war on 1st February. We may also inquire why the Court of St. James"s did not make clear the course of conduct which it proposed to take in the future respecting France.[194] As outlined in the despatch of 29th December to Whitworth, it formed the basis of a practicable compromise.
If it could be stated confidentially to Russia, Austria, and Prussia, why not to France? Probably the objections of George III to the faintest sign of recognition of the French Republic[195] account for the fact that these enlightened intentions remained, down to the year 1800, secret except to those Powers. But statesmen err when they bury their good intentions in the secrecy of archives and allow public opinion to sympathize with the enemy. Here was Pitt"s most serious blunder. At the outset of the struggle, and throughout its course, he scorned those tactful arts and melodramatic ways which win over waverers and inspire the fainthearted. Here he showed himself not a son of Chatham, but a Grenville. The results of this frigidity were disastrous. All Frenchmen and many Britons believed that he went out of his way to a.s.sail a peaceful Republic in order to crush liberty abroad and at home. History has exposed the falseness of the slander; but a statesman ought not to owe his vindication to research in archives. He needs whole-hearted support in the present more than justification by students.
In this respect Pitt showed less of worldly wisdom than the journalists and barristers who leaped to power at Paris. Their chief source of strength lay in skilful appeals to popular pa.s.sion. In reality their case was untenable before any calm and judicial tribunal. But the France of that age was anything but calm and judicial. It lived on enthusiasm and sensation; and the Girondins and Jacobins fed it almost to repletion. Unfortunately Danton, the only man who combined strength with some insight into statecraft, was away in Belgium while the crisis developed; and the conduct of affairs rested mainly with Lebrun and his envoy Chauvelin. It is only fair to remember that they were thirty and twenty-seven years of age respectively, and had had just four months and eight months of official experience. In such a case pity must blend with censure. The frightful loss of experienced men and the giddy preference for new-comers were among the most fatal characteristics of the revolutionary movement. Needing natures that were able, yet self-restrained, bold, but cautiously bold, it now found as leaders calculating fanatics like Robespierre, headstrong orators and wire-pullers like the Girondin leaders, or lucky journalists like Lebrun. To play to the gallery was his first instinct; and the tottering fortunes of the Gironde made it almost a necessity. Hence his refusal and that of his colleagues to draw back a hair"s breadth from the unjustifiable position which they had taken up. Behind them loomed the September ma.s.sacres, fatal to two Foreign Ministers of France; before them shone the splendours of a liberating crusade. We can scarcely blame men so ardent, so hard pressed.
But there are some rules of the game which even the most irresponsible of Ministers must observe. Here both Chauvelin and Lebrun went fatally astray. Chauvelin"s _pique_ at the interview which Pitt had with Maret on 2nd December led him flagrantly to misrepresent that incident, and Lebrun, as we have seen, reported it to the Convention in such a way as to impute to Pitt a discreditable and cowardly intrigue. This is the climax of malice. An envoy and a Minister who scatter such insinuations are the most reckless of firebrands. By this conduct both Lebrun and Chauvelin inflamed the pa.s.sions of their countrymen. In truth, it was pa.s.sion, not policy, that made the war. The charges which they brought against England were of secondary importance--her demand for the revocation of the decrees concerning the Scheldt and the encouragement offered to malcontents, together with her stoppage of corn ships lading for France, and her Aliens Bill. Such were the pretexts for the recall of Chauvelin, which, as we have seen, was decided at Paris before the Court of St. James"s determined to dismiss him.
Another fact comes out clearly from a survey of the evidence given above, namely, that the execution of Louis XVI was in no sense the cause of the war. The question turned essentially on the conduct of France towards our Dutch Allies. Before Louis was put on his trial Pitt and Grenville had decided that the French must retract their aggressive decree against Holland, backed up as it was by a claim to support malcontents in any land. Failing this, war would have ensued, even if Louis had not been condemned to death. The tragedy of 21st January made no difference to the issue; for, as we have seen, the French Government by 10th January decided to push on its plans against the Dutch Republic.
It is also impossible to attach any importance to the vague offers of Dumouriez and Maret, at which Lebrun connived probably so as to be able to say, without committing himself in the least, that he had done all he could for peace.
We may therefore conclude that the wealth and defencelessness of the Dutch Netherlands lured on the enthusiasts and intriguers of Paris to an enterprise the terrible results of which were unsuspected by them.
Nothing is more remarkable than the full a.s.surance of victory which breathes in the letters of Dumouriez, the despatches of Lebrun, and the speeches of the French deputies. Experienced statesmen were soon to stand aghast at the triumph of the Republican arms; but it fell short of the hopes of the French politicians. In this boundless self-confidence, sublime were it not so disastrous, is to be found the chief cause of war in 1793.
FOOTNOTES:
[138] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 385-7.
[139] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[140] Pitt MSS., 245. Published in "Napoleon and the Invasion of England," by H. E. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, ii, App.
[141] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 475.
[142] "Parl. Hist.," x.x.x, 19-21.
[143] Miles ("Corresp.," i, 391), who also a.s.serts that Sheridan echoed words used by the French agent, Noel.
[144] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 478-81.
[145] "Life and Letters of Earl Minto," ii, 82.
[146] Chuquet, "Jemappes," 196-7, shows that the urgent needs of the army in Belgium were the _raison d"etre_ of the decree.
[147] "Dropmore P.," ii, 359-62; "Parl. Hist.," x.x.x, 126.
[148] "Parl. Hist.," x.x.x, 137-46.
[149] "Mems. tires des Papiers d"un homme d"Etat," ii, 100. This false a.s.sertion was adopted by Malouet ("Mems.," ii, 201), whence it has been copied largely, without examination of the debate itself.
[150] G.o.doy, "Mems.," i, ch. vi.
[151] "F. O.," Spain, 25, 26.
[152] "F. O.," France, 40.
[153] "F. O.," France, 40, 41.
[154] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 398-400. Unfortunately, Lord Acton ("Lects.
on the French Rev.," 253) accepted the stories against Pitt. He states that Danton secretly offered to save Louis for 40,000; that Lansdowne, Sheridan, and Fox urged Pitt to interpose; and that Pitt informed Maret that he did not do so because the execution of Louis would ruin the Whigs. I must reply that Lord Fitzmaurice a.s.sures me there is no sign that the first Lord Lansdowne urged Pitt to bribe the Convention, though in the debate of 21st December 1792 he suggested the sending an amba.s.sador to Paris to improve the relations of the two lands, and a.s.suage the hostility to Louis. Further, Danton could scarcely have made that offer; for he left Paris for Belgium on 1st December, and did not return till 14th January, after which he was engrossed in the last illness of his wife. Danton"s name was dragged into the affair probably by mistake for Dannon (see Belloc, "Danton," 200). Lastly, as Maret left London on 19th December, and did not return until 30th January, he did not see Pitt at the crucial time of the trial. And would Pitt have made so damaging a remark to a Frenchman? Is it not obviously a Whig slander?
[155] "Parl. Hist.," x.x.x, 189. See ch. iii of this work.
[156] See ch. iii for a refutation of this.
[157] Sorel, iii, 241. So, too, Gouverneur Morris, then in Paris, thought the French Ministers, despite their bl.u.s.ter, wished to avoid war "if the people will let them." (Quoted by Lecky, vi, 114.)
[158] "Parl. Hist.," x.x.x, 250-3; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 114-16.
[159] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[160] _Ibid._, and "Dropmore P.," ii, 361.
[161] "Parl. Hist.," x.x.x, 253-6; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 116-9.
[162] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 351.
[163] "Dropmore P.," ii, 363.
[164] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[165] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to Whitworth, 29th December.
[166] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 441.
[167] _Ibid._, i, 439.
[168] I published it in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for April 1906; see, too, Fitzmaurice, "Shelburne," iii, 515. Bulwer Lytton, "Hist. Characters"
(Talleyrand), wrongly states that he was at once expelled.