I do not see that we can go on secure grounds if we treat with any separate districts or bodies of men [in France] who stop short of some declaration in favour of monarchy: nor do I see any way so likely to unite considerable numbers in one vigorous effort as by specifying monarchy as the only system in the re-establishment of which we are disposed to concur. This idea by no means precludes us from treating with any other form of regular Government, if, in the end, any other should be solidly established; but it holds out monarchy as the only one from which we expect any good, and in favour of which we are disposed to enter into concert.[273]
These words are remarkable. Clearly, in Pitt"s view of things, "security" for England and Holland was the paramount aim; but he was beginning to feel that the Republican groups which scrambled to power at Paris over the headless trunks of their enemies, could offer no adequate security. When the Revolution began to solidify, as it seemed about to do in 1795-7, he was willing to treat with its chiefs; but already he was feeling the horns of the dilemma, which may be described in words adapted from Talleyrand"s famous _mot_ of the year 1814: "Either the Bourbons or the Republic: everything else is an intrigue."
The Toulon episode, more than anything else, bound France to the regicide cause, and Pitt, albeit unwillingly, to the irreconcilable Royalists. Thus the event which brought Bonaparte to the front, shattered the aim of the Prime Minister to effect merely the restoration of the Balance of Power.
FOOTNOTES:
[238] "F. O.," Austria, 33, Grenville to Eden, 11th June; Eden to Grenville, 26th June.
[239] "Dropmore P.," ii, 392, 399, 407, 412. Spain hoped to find her "indemnity" in Corsica. See too Fortescue, iv, 116, 117.
[240] See "Eng. Hist. Rev." for October 1909, p. 748.
[241] Pitt MSS., 196.
[242] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1793.
[243] _Ibid._
[244] "F. O.," Spain, 28. St. Helens to Grenville, 4th and 11th September.
[245] "W. O.," 6 (10). See Fortescue (iv, pt. i, chs. vi, vii) for criticisms of these measures.
[246] The arguments of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in "Owens College Essays,"
do not convince me that Napoleon alone devised that plan. Chuquet"s conclusion ("Toulon," 176), "Bonaparte partageait l"avis des representants," seems to me thoroughly sound. So, too, Cottin, "Toulon et les Anglais," ch. xi.
[247] "F. O.," Spain, 28.
[248] "H. O." (Adm. Medit., 1793). Nevertheless Hood sent off a small squadron to offer help to Paoli in Corsica, but with very disappointing results. On 7th October he writes: "Paoli is a composition of art and deceipt [_sic_]." He also dwells on the hostile conduct of Genoa and Tuscany.
[249] Martens, v, 473-83. In "H. O.," Secrs. of State, 4, is a despatch of General Acton of 30th October 1793 to Sir W. Hamilton, stating that when transports reach Naples, they will take off 1,200 more troops for Toulon, making a total of 6,300. But ships and supplies of food were wanting. The troops must be commanded by a Neapolitan, Marshal Fortiquerri, whom Hood had censured for incompetence!
[250] On 15th September Pitt wrote to the Earl of Westmorland, Viceroy of Ireland, asking him to send the flank companies (the best men) of the regiments then in Ireland. Westmorland agreed on 18th September, but said they could not sail in less than three weeks. As the crisis at Toulon deepened, Pitt, about the middle of November, begged the Lord Lieutenant to send the 35th, 41st, and 42nd regiments from Ireland to Toulon. On 20th November Westmorland agreed (though pointing out the danger of an Irish rising). On the 30th he said the two latter regiments were ready to sail from Cork whenever the transports should arrive; but the delays in the arrival and sailing of transports had always been serious--a prophetic remark (Pitt MSS., 331).
[251] "Dropmore P.," ii, 471. Thugut took no interest whatever in Toulon (see Vivenot, iii, 324, 327, 362, 363). Other proofs follow (pp. 381, 384) of the pressing demands which Grenville, also Mr. Trevor at Turin, made for the fulfilment of the Emperor"s promise. Some difficulties supervened as to the provisioning of the 5,000 Austrian troops on the march and the place of embarkation; but these were far from insuperable.
Clearly the operating cause was Thugut"s conviction that there was at Toulon a number of troops "excedant ce que toute place quelconque peut exiger pour sa defense" (_ibid._, 385).
[252] "H. O." (Adm. Medit, 1793), Hood to Dundas, 24th November.
[253] _Ibid._ O"Hara to Hood. This reached London on 8th December; but, as we have seen, Ministers up to 22nd December continued to rely on the arrival of the Austrians as providing a sufficient reinforcement.
[254] "Dropmore P.," ii, 447; "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 190, _et seq._
[255] "F. O.," Spain, 28.
[256] Even by M. Cottin in his works, "Toulon et les Anglais,"
"L"Angleterre et les Princes."
[257] "F. O.," Austria, 34. Grenville to Eden, 7th September. So in his letter of 4th October to Pitt he refers to "such other towns or districts [in S. France] as may become objects of indemnity." See, too, "Dropmore P.," ii, 412, 438; Vivenot, iii, 326.
[258] "Dropmore P.," iii, 487.
[259] "H. O.," 455, _ad fin._
[260] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 33.
[261] "F. O.," Spain, 28. Grenville to St. Helens, 22nd October 1793.
Cottin omits this despatch, which is essential to the understanding of British policy. See for further details C. J. Fox, "Bonaparte at the Siege of Toulon," bk. ii, ch. ii.
[262] "F. O.," Spain, 28. On 30th November Grenville instructed St.
Helens to express regret that Spain seemed to retract her wish, previously expressed, that Corsica should go to England; and also to advise that Spain should take her indemnity from France on the Pyrenean frontier.
[263] Fortescue, iv, 172.
[264] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1793.
[265] "H. O.," Mil., 455. Fortescue (iv, 175) vehemently censures Henry Dundas, but I think without sufficient ground. The letters of David Dundas called for reproof. See Mr. Oscar Browning"s "Youth of Napoleon"
(App. iv).
[266] Pitt MSS., 331; "H. O.," Mil., 455.
[267] "Dropmore P.," ii, 476, 477; "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 198.
[268] Admiralty. Out Letters, xiii.
[269] "H. O.," Mil., 455.
[270] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1794.
[271] "F. O.," Austria, 36. Grenville to Eden, 3rd January 1794.
[272] Pellew, "Sidmouth," i, 112.
[273] "Dropmore P.," ii, 438.
CHAPTER VII
THE BRITISH JACOBINS
The much better way doubtless will be, in this wavering condition of our affairs, to defer the changing or circ.u.mscribing of our Senate more than may be done with ease till the Commonwealth be thoroughly settled in peace and safety.--MILTON, _A Free Commonwealth_.
But cease, ye fleecing Senators Your country to undo, Or know, we British _sans-culottes_ Hereafter may fleece you.
THELWALL, _A Shearing Song_.
The outbreak of hostilities often tends to embitter the strife of parties. Those who oppose war find abundant cause for criticism in the conduct of Ministers, who in their turn perforce adopt measures alien to the traditions of Westminster. A system founded on compromise cannot suddenly take on the ways of a military State; and efforts in this direction generally produce more friction than activity. At such times John Bull, flurried and angry, short-sighted but opinionated, bewildered but dogged as ever, is a sight to move the G.o.ds to laughter and his counsellors to despair.
The events of the session of 1793 ill.u.s.trate my meaning. In view of the notorious sympathy of the Radical Clubs with France, Pitt proposed a Bill against Traitorous Correspondence with the enemy. Both he and Burke proved that the measure, far from being an insidious attack on the liberties of the subject, merely aimed at enforcing "the police of war."