To reduce France within her ancient limits is an object of evident and pressing interest to the future tranquillity and independence of Europe.--_Foreign Office Despatch of 16th November 1798_.
It is difficult to realize that the independence of Europe was endangered by the French Republic. We a.s.sociate the ascendancy of France in Spain, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and Holland with the personality of Napoleon; and by contrasting him with the pygmies who strutted on the stage after the death of Pitt we find the collapse of Europe intelligible. But a backward glance of one decade more shows France dominating the Continent. True, it was Bonaparte"s genius which brought Austria to the humiliating Peace of Campo Formio (October 1797); but his triumphs in Italy merely crowned the efforts of France in 1793-5. After the close of his Italian campaigns a touch of her little finger unseated the Pope. At the Congress of Rastatt her envoys disposed of German duchies and bishoprics in the lordliest way. Switzerland she overran, plundered, and unified. Ferdinand IV of Naples and his consort, Maria Carolina, quaked and fumed at her threats. Prussia was her henchman. And in the first months of his reign Paul I of Russia courted her favour.
French policy controlled Europe from the Niemen to the Tagus, from the Zuyder Zee to the Campagna.
Yet this supremacy was in reality unsound. So fitful a ruler as the Czar Paul was certain to weary of his peaceful mood. He had good ground for intervention. By the Treaty of Teschen (1779) Russia became one of the guarantors of the Germanic System which the French now set at naught.
Moreover his chivalrous instincts, inherited from his mother, Catharine, were chafed by the news of French depredations in Rome and Switzerland.
The growth of indignation at St. Petersburg begot new hopes at Vienna.
In truth Francis II, despite his timidity, could not acquiesce in French ascendancy. How could his motley States cohere, if from Swabia, Switzerland, and Italy there dropped on them the corrosive acid of democracy? The appeals from his father-in-law, Ferdinand of Naples, also had some weight. In fine the Court of Vienna decided to make overtures to London. On 17th March 1798 the Chancellor, Thugut, urged his amba.s.sador, Stahremberg, to find out whether England would help Austria against "a fierce nation irrevocably determined on the total subversion of Europe, and rapidly marching to that end"; also whether Pitt would send a fleet to the Mediterranean, and, if necessary, prolong the struggle into the year 1799.[502] The entreaties from Naples were still more urgent.
Pitt resolved to stretch out a helping hand. Early in April he sought to induce Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, to send to that sea a strong squadron detached from Earl St. Vincent"s force blockading Cadiz.
His letter asking for information on several topics is missing; but Spencer"s letter to Grenville throws so much light on the situation that I quote parts of it, summarizing the remainder:[503]
Admiralty, _April 6, 1798_.
"I send you by Mr. Pitt"s desire a sketch I have made out of answers to the queries he put down upon paper yesterday in Downing Street. The result is to my mind a decision which I fear will not tally very well with our wishes and the views you have formed as the groundwork of the communication at present proposed with Vienna." He then states that, even if a Russian squadron appears in the North Sea, yet we cannot keep a permanent squadron in the Mediterranean. "For that purpose we should at least have 70 sail, as the Channel cannot be trusted with safety with less than 35, including the coast of Ireland, and the remaining 35 would be but barely enough to watch Cadiz and command the Mediterranean. Our best plan appears to me to be to maintain as long as we can a position between Lisbon and Cadiz, and when we are excluded (which I conclude we soon shall be) from the Tagus, to send Lord St. Vincent with the fleet he now has to take a sweep round the Mediterranean and do all the mischief he can to the French navy." If, he adds, the Spaniards come northward, our home fleet can deal with them: if they go to the Mediterranean and join the French there will not be much danger from so ill-combined a force when opposed to St.
Vincent"s fleet, "which I consider as being the best formed to act together that perhaps ever existed." If Austria would be satisfied with our sweeping round the Mediterranean, Spencer advocates that plan, but not that of keeping a fleet there, "because, exclusive of the great expense, it would leave the Spaniards too much at liberty."
In answer to Pitt"s questions Spencer states the force disposable for the Channel and the coast of Ireland as 34, for the Mediterranean 24; 3 more were fitting for sea, and 8 others were nearing completion; but the chief deficiency was in men, 8,000 more being needed. He adds that the Neapolitans have 4 sail-of-the-line and 7 frigates: the French have 6 sail at Corfu; but he thinks not more than 10 sail can be equipped at Toulon. He regards the Venetian fleet as valueless.
Clearly Spencer underrated the force at Toulon and in the ports of North Italy. But, even so, the position was critical. To send an undermanned fleet into the Mediterranean, while France was preparing a blow at Ireland, seemed almost foolhardy. Nevertheless, Pitt resolved to do so.
For, as he stated to Grenville on 7th April, they must encourage Austria to play a decisive part in resisting French aggression; and, in view of the revival of the old English spirit, he was prepared to brave the risks of invasion, deeming even that event preferable to a lingering and indecisive war. As usual, Pitt"s view prevailed; and a few days later orders went forth to St. Vincent to despatch a squadron under Nelson to the Mediterranean, Austria being also apprised of this decision, in terms which implied the formation of a league against France. While Russia and, if possible, Prussia defended Germany, Austria was to expel the French from Italy.[504] Here again Pitt"s hopeful nature led him to antedate the course of events. The new Coalition came about very slowly.
England and Austria were held apart by disputes respecting the repayment of the last loan, on which Pitt and Grenville insisted, perhaps with undue rigour. Distrust of Prussia paralysed the Court of Vienna, and some time elapsed before it came to terms with Russia. But in the midst of the haggling came news which brought new vigour to the old monarchies.
On 1st August 1798 Nelson destroyed the French fleet in Aboukir Bay; and thus, at one blow, naval supremacy in the Mediterranean pa.s.sed from the tricolour to the Union Jack. This momentous change resulted primarily from the bold resolve of Pitt to encounter even a French descent on our coasts, provided that he could strike at France in the Mediterranean. Thus he exchanged the defensive for the offensive in a way no less bewildering to the French than rea.s.suring to friendly Powers; and it is noteworthy that he adopted the same course in 1805, in sending Craig"s expedition into that sea, thereby replacing Addington"s tame acceptance of events by a vigorous policy which heartened Austria and Naples for the struggle against Napoleon. On both occasions he ran great risks, but his audacity proved to be the highest prudence. The results of the Battle of the Nile were immeasurably great. Bonaparte and his 30,000 veterans were cooped up in Egypt. The Maltese rose against the French garrison of Valetta two days after the arrival of the glad tidings from the Nile. At Naples the news aroused a delirium of joy, and filled Queen Maria Carolina with a resolve to drive the French force from the Roman States.
To Pitt also the news of Nelson"s triumph brought intense relief. The disappearance of Bonaparte"s armada after the capture of Malta had caused much concern. True, Naples, which was thought to be his objective, was safe; but Ireland and Portugal were deemed in jeopardy.
No one at Whitehall antic.i.p.ated the seizure of Malta and Egypt, still less the emergence of plans for a French conquest of India. A tone of anxiety pervades Pitt"s letter of 22nd August to his mother: "The account of Bonaparte"s arrival at Alexandria is, I am afraid, true; but it gives us no particulars, and leaves us in entire suspense as to Nelson."[505] All the greater, then, was the relief on 2nd October, when tidings of Aboukir at last arrived.
Further, there were signs of a Russo-French war. The romantic nature of the Czar was fired by the hope of acquiring Malta. At Ancona, early in 1797, Bonaparte had intercepted a Russian envoy bearing offers of alliance to the Knights of the Order of St. John; and their expulsion by the French at Midsummer 1798 seemed to Paul a personal affront. Some of the Knights proceeded to St. Petersburg and claimed his protection. The affairs of the Order became his most cherished concern; and on 24th July Sir Charles Whitworth, British amba.s.sador at that Court, reported that Russia would now become a princ.i.p.al in the war against France, her aim being the re-establishment of peace on safe and honourable terms, but not the restoration of the French monarchy, on which Catharine had insisted. With this declaration the British and Austrian Cabinets were in full accord; and thus at last there was a hope of framing a compact Coalition. Fortunate was it that Bonaparte"s seizure of Malta incensed Paul against France; for, early in August, the Swiss thinker, Laharpe, tutor of the future Czar Alexander I, brought tempting offers from Paris, with a view to the part.i.tion of the Turkish Empire.[506] That glittering prize was finally to captivate the fancy of Paul; but for the present he spurned the offer as degrading.
Nevertheless, the news of Aboukir did not wholly please him. For, while rejoicing at the discomfiture of the French atheists, he saw in Nelson"s victory a sign of England"s appropriation of Malta. In truth, that island now became the central knot of far-reaching complications.
Formerly the bulwark of Christendom against the infidels, it now sundered European States.[507] So doubtful was the att.i.tude of Paul and Francis that Pitt, in October 1798, twice wrote despondingly as to any definite decision on their part. All that was clear was their inordinate appet.i.te for subsidies. These he of course withheld, knowing full well that neither would Paul tolerate for long the presence of the French at Malta, nor Francis their occupation of Switzerland. In any case he resolved not to give more than 2,000,000 to the two Empires for the year 1799.[508] For the time his hope lay only in the exertions of England, Europe being meantime "left to its fate." In order to humour the Czar, who was about to become Grand Master of the Knights of St.
John, Grenville, on 23rd November, wrote to a.s.sure his Government that England renounced all aims of conquest in the Adriatic, or of the possession of Malta.
At the close of the year Pitt proudly displayed the inexhaustible resources of Great Britain. His Budget speech of 3rd December 1798 marks an epoch in economic history, alike for the boldness of the underlying conception and the statesmanlike a.s.sessment of the national resources.
Well might Mallet du Pan declare that the speech surpa.s.sed all previous efforts in its illuminating exposition of a nation"s finance. As appeared in our survey of the Budget of 1797, Pitt then sought to meet the year"s expenses within the year. To a generation accustomed to shift present burdens on to its successors the proposal seemed Quixotic; and Fox blamed him for not adopting this device. Pitt held to his plan, and outlined a ten per cent. tax upon income. Having failed to gain the requisite tenth by means of the a.s.sessed Taxes, he proposed to raise it by methods which even the shirkers could with difficulty circ.u.mvent.
In order to lay a first rough actuarial basis for his Income Tax, he made a careful study of the nation"s resources in the autumn of 1798.
The results he summarized in an interesting statement. There were available at that time only rough estimates, even as to the area of cultivated land and its average rental. Relying upon Davenant, King, Adam Smith, Arthur Young, and Middleton, he estimated the area at 40,000,000 acres, and the average rental at 15_s._ an acre. He prudently fixed the taxable value at 12_s._ 6_d._ an acre. The yearly produce of mines, timber, and ca.n.a.l shares he a.s.sessed at 3,000,000. He reckoned house rent at double that sum, and the earnings of the legal profession at one half of it. Half a million he deemed well within the total of doctors" fees. He a.s.sessed the incomes derived from the British West Indies at 4,000,000, and those from the rest of the world at 1,000,000, a highly suggestive estimate. t.i.thes were reckoned at 4,000,000; annuities from the public funds at 12,000,000; the same sum for profits derived from foreign commerce; and 28,000,000 for the profits of internal trade, whether wholesale or retail. Fixing the rental of land at 6,000,000, he computed the total national income as 102,000,000, which should therefore yield not less than 10,000,000 a year. He proposed to safeguard the collection by imposing an oath at the declaration of income, and enjoining absolute secrecy on the Crown commissioners. The new tax, beginning from April 1799, would take the place of the a.s.sessed Taxes. As will appear in a later chapter, the new impost did not yield the amount which Pitt expected; but the failure was probably due to defects in the methods of collection. Pitt further proposed to set aside 1,200,000 for the Sinking Fund.
His purpose in making this prodigious effort was to inspirit other nations to similar patriotic exertions. He pointed out with pride that after nearly six years of war British exports and imports exceeded those of any year of peace. Thus, far from declining in strength and prowess, as croakers averred, England had never shone so transcendently in the arts of peace and the exploits of war, a prodigality of power which presaged the vindication of her own rights and of the liberties of Europe.
What was the new Europe which Pitt sought to call to being? The question is of deep interest, not only as a psychological study, but as revealing glimpses of British policy in the years 1814-15. The old order having been rudely shaken in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy, Pitt sought to effect a compromise between the claims of tradition and those of expediency. It being of paramount importance to safeguard Europe against France, Pitt and Grenville insisted on the limitation of that Power within its old boundaries, and the complete independence of Switzerland and Holland. That of the Kingdom of Sardinia afterwards figured in their stipulations. But one significant change now appears.
The restoration of Austrian rule at Brussels being impracticable, it was suggested that the Belgic Provinces should go to the Prince of Orange when restored to his rights at The Hague. In the desperate crisis of 1805, as we shall see, Pitt sought to allure Prussia by offering Belgium to her; but that was a pa.s.sing thought soon given up. The other solution of the Netherlands Question finally prevailed, thanks to the efforts of Pitt"s pupil, Castlereagh, in 1814. The Foreign Office did not as yet aim at the retention of the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon as a set off to British efforts for the Dutch and their acquisition of Belgium; but this thought was already taking shape. The barrier against French aggressions in the south-east was to be found in the reconst.i.tuted Kingdom of Sardinia, the House of Savoy rendering in that quarter services similar to the House of Orange in Flanders and Brabant. In other respects the British Cabinet favoured Austria"s plans of aggrandis.e.m.e.nt in Italy as enhancing her power in a sphere which could not arouse the jealousy of Prussia. The aims of Berlin not being known, except that the restoration of the House of Orange was desired, Pitt and Grenville remained silent on that topic.[509]
The question whether the peoples concerned would submit to this under-girding of the European fabric did not trouble them. They saw only the statics of territories; they had no conception of the dynamics of nations. A future in which Nationality, triumphant in Italy and Germany, would bring about a Balance of Power far more solid than any which their flying b.u.t.tresses could a.s.sure, was of course entirely hidden from them.
But they failed to read the signs of the times. The last despairing efforts of the Poles, and the _levee en ma.s.se_ of the French people, now systematized in the Conscription Law of 5th September 1798, did not open their eyes to the future. For they were essentially men of the Eighteenth Century; and herein lay the chief cause of their failure against Revolutionary France. They dealt with lands as with blocks. She infused new energy into peoples.
Meanwhile the return of Nelson to the Neapolitan coast intoxicated that Court with joy. Queen Maria Carolina, ever the moving spirit at Naples, now laid her plans for the expulsion of the French from Italy. Trusting to her influence over her son-in-law, Francis II, and to a defensive compact which the Courts of Vienna and Naples had framed on 20th May 1798, she sought to incite him to take the offensive. Her close friendship with Lady Hamilton, wife of the British amba.s.sador at Naples, also enabled her to gain complete ascendancy over Nelson, who, with his usual hatred of "the French villains," counselled open and immediate war. For abetting this design, Sir William Hamilton received a sharp rebuke from Downing Street. Francis II and Thugut were even more annoyed. They repulsed the Neapolitan emissary who begged for help, and roundly accused the Pitt Ministry of inciting Naples to war in order to drag in Austria. Their anger was not appeased by the successes of the Neapolitans near Rome, which the French evacuated on 29th November. The counter-stroke soon fell. The French, rallying in force, pushed the Bourbon columns southwards; and the early days of 1799 witnessed in swift succession the surrender of Naples, the flight of its Court and the Hamiltons to Palermo on Nelson"s fleet, the foundation of the Parthenopean Republic, and the liquefaction of the blood of St.
Januarius in sign of divine benediction on the new _regime_.[510]
Nevertheless, Nelson and the royal fugitives had set in motion forces which elsewhere made for triumph. Paul, re-a.s.sured as to England"s desire to re-establish the Order of St. John at Malta, entered into an alliance with her on 29th December 1798, whereby the two Powers agreed to reduce France within her old boundaries, Russia furnishing to England an army of 45,000 men, mainly with a view to the support of Prussia, on condition of receiving 75,000 per month and three months" subsidies in advance. She also promised to send 3,000 men to help in the siege of the French garrison at Malta and others to a.s.sist England in the defence of the Neapolitan lands. Austria, resentful towards Pitt and fearful of Prussia"s designs, still held back, though the events in Italy, especially the dethronement of Charles Emmanuel IV of the House of Savoy by the French should have spurred her to action. Probably she waited until the needs of England and Russia should enable her to dictate her terms. The cupidity of Thugut had been whetted by Pitt"s speech as to the wealth of England; and the efforts of Cobenzl at St. Petersburg led Whitworth to sign a compact on terms so onerous to the British Treasury as to draw on him a sharp disclaimer and reprimand from London.[511] So matters dragged on far into the year 1799, when plans for the ensuing campaign ought to have been matured.
Still more luckless were the dealings of the British Cabinet with Prussia. In the hope of winning over Frederick William III, Grenville in November 1798 despatched his brother Thomas on a mission to Berlin. His journey thither was one of the longest and most eventful on record. At Yarmouth he was detained by easterly gales; and when at last the packet boat made the mouth of the Elbe it was wrecked. The pa.s.sengers and crew succeeded in making their way to sh.o.r.e over the pack-ice, Grenville saving his papers, except the "full-power" needful for signing a treaty.
He reached Cuxhaven in great exhaustion; and arrived at Berlin on 17th March, only to find that the French by daring and intrigue had cowed the North German States into subservience. The terrible winter of 1798-9 largely accounts for the delays which ruined the subsequent campaign.
Whitworth remained long without news from Downing Street; and at last, on 12th February, announced that he had received nine posts at once.
Meanwhile France, controlling all the coasts from Bremen to Genoa, not only excluded British messengers, but carried on her diplomatic bargaining in Germany without let or hindrance. For all his trouble, Thomas Grenville could get no firm footing amidst the shifting sands of Prussian diplomacy. So nervous were the Austrian Ministers as to Prussia"s future conduct that they seemed about to come to terms with France and join in the plunder of the smaller German States. This might have been the upshot had not French armies crossed the Rhine (1st March 1799), and shortly afterwards invaded the Grisons Canton.[512] Goaded to action, Francis II declared war eleven days later. On 28th April Austrian hussars seized the French envoys withdrawing from Rastatt, murdering two of the four and seizing the papers of all.
Thus began the war of the Second Coalition. Bonaparte"s seizure of Malta and Egypt without a declaration of war, and the unbearable aggressions of the French in Switzerland, Italy, and on the Rhine, stirred to action States which the diplomatic efforts of Pitt and Grenville had left unmoved. For none of the wars of that period was France so largely responsible. Even now, when the inroad of the French into Germany threatened the ascendancy of Prussia, Frederick William declined to join the Allies; and his unstatesmanlike refusal thwarted the plans of Pitt for the march of the subsidized Muscovite force through Prussia for the recovery of Holland.
Another essential point was Switzerland. Like a bastion frowning over converging valleys, that Alpine tract dominates the basins of the Po, the Inn, the Upper Rhine, and the Upper Rhone. He who holds it, if strong and resolute, can determine the fortunes of North Italy, Eastern France, South Germany, and the West of the Hapsburg domains. Further, by closing the pa.s.ses over the Alps he can derange the commerce of Europe; and the st.u.r.dy mountaineers will either overbear the plain-dwellers, or will serve as mercenaries in their forces. Accordingly Switzerland, like her Asiatic counterpart, Afghanistan, has either controlled her neighbours, or has been fought for by them. As commerce-controller, provider of troops, and warden of the pa.s.ses, she holds a most important position. Fortunate it is that the Swiss have loved freedom, or money, more than dominion. For so soon as a great State possesses their land, the Balance of Power becomes a fiction.
Pitt evinced sure insight in his resolve to free the Switzers from the Jacobin yoke. To it the men of the Forest Cantons succ.u.mbed only after desperate struggles, which inspired Wordsworth with one of the n.o.blest of his sonnets. There is no sign that Pitt set much store on winning over the public opinion of Europe by siding with the oppressed against the oppressor, as his disciple, Canning, did during the Spanish National Rising; but help from the Swiss was certainly hoped for. So early as August 1798 Pitt proposed to allot 500,000 for a.s.sistance to them, and, but for the delays at St. Petersburg and Vienna, the Allies might have rescued that brave people before it fell beneath the weight of numbers.
Even in March 1799, when the rising against the French had scarcely begun, he set apart 31,000 per month for the purpose of equipping a corps of 20,000 Swiss. On 15th March, after hearing of the outbreak of war on the Rhine, Grenville urged that the Russian force subsidized by England should march towards Switzerland, now that Prussia"s doubtful behaviour prevented a conquest of Holland by land. He also insisted that this addition to the allied forces destined for Switzerland must not be allowed to lessen the number of Austrians operating there.[513]
The Court of Vienna at once saw in the subsidized Russian army a tool useful for its own plans, and requested that it should serve with the Austrians in Swabia. The answer to this singular request can be imagined. For a day or two Whitworth was also disturbed by a belated effort of the French Directory to restore peace. It offered Poland to the Elector of Saxony, and Saxony to Prussia for her friendly services, Austria being led to expect Bavaria, if she would keep Russia "within her ancient limits." Whitworth mentioned this overture to Cobenzl, and saw him blush for the first time on record.[514] Probably, then, the scheme had some powerful backing; but now Austria had crossed the Rubicon.
At first all went well. The French had played a game of bluff which they could not sustain. On all sides they were worsted in a way which suggests how decisive the campaign might have been had the Allies heartily seconded the salutary plans of Pitt. Unfortunately, despite his efforts, no compact came about between Great Britain and Austria.
Russia and the Hapsburg State were but loosely connected; and, owing to a long delay in the arrival of the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Treaty, Paul did not until the beginning of May send forward the subsidized army under the command of Korsakoff.
On the other hand, the auxiliary Russian force sent forward to the help of Austria had by that time helped the white-coats to win notable triumphs in North Italy. In the months of April and May, Melas and the Imperialists, powerfully backed by Suvoroff"s Muscovites, carried all before them, and drove the enemy from Milan. Soon afterwards the Allies entered Turin; and only by hard fighting and heavy losses did Moreau with the chief French army cut his way through to the Genoese coast.
Meanwhile General Macdonald, retiring with a French corps from Naples, left that city to the vengeance of Nelson and Maria Carolina with results that are notorious. The French general made a brave stand in North Italy, only to fall before the onsets of the Allies at the Trebbia (17th-19th June). He, too, barely escaped to Genoa, where the relics of the two French armies faced about. These successes aroused the highest hopes at Westminster. Canning, who resigned his Under-Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs in March 1799, wrote that he cared not whether the Austrians were beaten; for their failure would serve as a good example to Europe. But in June, after their brilliant successes, he expressed a confident hope of the collapse of "the monstrous fabrick of crimes and cruelties and abominations" known as French policy; he added that Prussia could not be so stupid as to hold aloof from the Coalition; and that Pitt, again vigorous in mind and body, would carry through the war to the end.
But now in the train of victory there appeared its parasite, discord.
The re-conquest of Italy was so brilliant and easy as to arouse disputes about the spoils; and when the Imperialists began to treat Suvoroff and his heroes cavalierly, the feud became acute. His complaints to his Sovereign that the Austrians thwarted him at every turn threw the irascible Czar into a rage, and he inveighed against the insolence of the Court of Vienna and its minions. Finally, in order to end these disputes, the British Ministry proposed the departure of Suvoroff to Switzerland in order to take command of Korsakoff"s subsidized force.
In the third week of June Grenville urged this plan on the Russian Court as securing concentration of force and unity of command, the result in all probability being the liberation of Switzerland, whereupon the Allies could prepare for an invasion of France on her undefended flank, Franche Comte. England (added Grenville) disapproved of the presence of "Louis XVIII" at the Russian headquarters; and if Monsieur, his brother, issued a declaration, it must be drafted with care. The need of caution appears in Monsieur"s offer of pardon and clemency to the misguided French, provided that they joined his standard.[515]
The Allies, it will be seen, built their hopes on a revolt of the royalists of the East of France. In fact, widespread risings were expected. Bordeaux had been the centre of a conspiracy for leaguing together the malcontents of la Vendee with those of the South, these again being in touch with the royalists of the Lyonnais and Franche Comte. Wickham, who was sent as British agent to Switzerland in June 1799, opened up an extensive correspondence which promised to lead to a formidable revolt whenever the Allies invaded Franche Comte and Nice.
The malcontents had as leaders Generals Precy, Pichegru, and Willot. In due course the Comte d"Artois ("Monsieur") was to appear and put himself at their head. Accordingly, in August 1799, he left Holyrood, came to London, and dined at Grenville"s house with him and Pitt. The Prime Minister afterwards paid him a private visit: but the details of their conference are not known. It is certain, however, that the Cabinet accorded large sums of money to Wickham for use in the East of France.
Even after the failure in Switzerland, he pressed for the payment of 365,000 in order to maintain the royalist movement.[516]
Pitt, then, was bent on using all possible means for humbling France; and, in view of her disasters in the field, the discontent at home, and the absence of Bonaparte"s army in Egypt, the triumph of the Allies seemed to depend solely on their unanimity. Much can be said in favour of the British plan of uniting the two Russian armies in Switzerland to act with that of the Archduke Charles, in order to strike at Franche Comte in overwhelming force, while the Austrians in Italy invaded Nice.
If all the moves had taken place betimes, formidable forces would have been ma.s.sed for an attack upon the weakest parts of the French frontier.
The Czar agreed to the plan on 9th July; but the Emperor Francis withheld his sanction for a suspiciously long time. Here again, as in 1794-6, the men of the pen interfered with the men of the sword.
Immersed in plans for a vast extension of Austria"s domains in Italy, Thugut turned a deaf ear to the demands of Russia and England for the restoration of the House of Savoy to the throne of Turin. He declared that, as Austria had recovered the continental domains of that dynasty, she could therefore dispose of them. It soon appeared that she sought to appropriate Piedmont, as well as Venetia, Lombardy, Parma, Modena, and the northern part of the Papal States in place of her troublesome Belgic domains, thus liberally fulfilling Pitt"s suggestion that her chief gains should be on the side of Italy.
On this question Pitt and Grenville differed. The latter, sympathizing with Russia, strongly objected to Austria annexing Piedmont. Pitt, however, maintained that such an acquisition would not resemble the part.i.tion of Poland or of Venetia; for Charles Emmanuel had lost his lands through his own weakness, and now did nothing towards recovering them. Further, it was to the advantage of Europe that the rescuing Power, Austria, should hold them as a barrier against France. If the Czar Paul could not be induced to take this view we might leave the two Empires to settle the matter; but, at present this solution offered the best chance of arriving at a compact with Austria so much to be desired.
Thus, in order to strengthen the Barrier System against France, Pitt was prepared to sacrifice legal rights to expediency, while Grenville upheld the claims of justice.
Limits of s.p.a.ce preclude an investigation of the causes of the humiliating failure of the campaign in Switzerland. Suffice it to say that, when Korsakoff"s army finally entered the north-east of Switzerland, the Archduke Charles was compelled by imperious mandates from Vienna to withdraw into Swabia. He foresaw disaster; and it soon came. While Suvoroff"s army was toiling down the northern defiles of the St. Gotthard, Ma.s.sena, after receiving strong reinforcements, overwhelmed Korsakoff at Zurich (25th-26th September). That Pitt expected defeat after the withdrawal of the Archduke Charles appears from his letter to Windham:
Downing Street, _30th August 1799_.[517]
I should gladly accept your proposal to join the water-party today, but I came to town to meet Lord Grenville; and, having seen him, I am preparing to return part of the way to Walmer in the course of the evening. I was brought to town by the vexatious accounts from Vienna, which give too great a chance of our being disappointed in our best hopes by the blind and perverse selfishness of Austria"s counsels.