Grenville was equally indignant and accused Austria of treachery.[518]
Much can be said in support of that charge. Whatever may have been her motive, her conduct ruined the campaign. South-east of Zurich, Soult routed Hotze"s Austrian corps, which might have linked the movements of Suvoroff with those of Korsakoff, and Suvoroff on arriving at Altorff found no other course practicable than to strike away eastwards over the Panixer Pa.s.s to Coire in the Grisons. There he arrived after severe hardships on 8th October, and swore never again to act with the Austrians. Paul, on hearing these dire tidings, registered the same vow, and informed the Viennese Court that thenceforth he separated his interests entirely from hers. Thus was it that Pitt"s plans miscarried.
Thus was it that British subsidies were flung away into the limbo strewn with tokens of Hapsburg fatuity.
The Anglo-Russian effort against the Batavian Republic is often referred to as if it were the princ.i.p.al event of the year 1799. On the contrary, it was little more than a diversion intended to help the chief enterprise in Switzerland and Franche Comte. The Czar Paul and Pitt probably did not intend to hold the Dutch Provinces unless the Allies pressed France hard on the Swiss frontier and the Orange party rose in force. If these contingencies held good, then Holland might be held as far as the River Waal. If not, then the effort must be temporary. Even so, its advantages were great. The seizure of the Dutch fleet at the Texel and Helder would end all chance of invasion from that quarter.
Fears of such an attempt had prompted a counter-stroke dealt by General Coote"s force in the spring of 1798 at the sluice-gates near Ostend. Its surrender under untoward circ.u.mstances was, perhaps, nearly counterbalanced by the destruction of ca.n.a.l works necessary for the a.s.sembly of the flat-bottomed boats at Ostend.
For a brief s.p.a.ce the doubtful att.i.tude of Prussia led Pitt and Grenville to concert a larger scheme. They hoped to form a great array of Prussians, Russians, Britons, and Hanoverians which would sweep the French out of Holland; but obviously such a plan depended on the support of the Berlin Cabinet. If it were hostile, or even unfriendly, no force could advance through Hanover for the delivery of Holland; for it would be at the mercy of Prussia. In order to bring her into the league, Pitt and Grenville held out the promise of gains near the Dutch frontier; but she held coyly aloof, doubtless from a conviction that Austria would oppose her aggrandis.e.m.e.nt. So at least Thugut declared to Eden on his departure from Vienna. Well might his successor, Lord Minto, remark that the Allies spent as much time in watching each other"s moves as those of the enemy.
Prussia being immovable, England and Russia laid their plans for a naval expedition to Holland. By a Convention signed at midsummer 1799 at St Petersburg, Russia agreed to send a squadron of 11 ships, convoying an expeditionary force of 17,500 men to the Dutch coast, England paying 44,000 per month for their services after embarkation. The Czar hoped that England would send some 6,000 men. The help of 8,000 Swedes was also expected; but the King of Sweden, annoyed at England"s seizure of Swedish merchantmen, refused all a.s.sistance. For a time Pitt desired both to attack the Island of Voorn below Rotterdam, and to effect a landing in the estuary of the Ems, provided that 25,000 British, 18,000 Russians, and 8,000 Swedes were available. Here, as so often, Pitt"s hopes outran the actuality. Windham believed that he wished to conquer Flanders. But Windham"s moods were so various and perverse that he can scarcely be trusted. In his view every effort not directed towards Brittany was wasted; and certainly feints against the coasts of Brittany and Spain promised to further the Dutch expedition.[519]
Early in August Pitt and his colleagues finally resolved to send the expedition to the Dutch coast; but they had not decided as to the length or extent of the occupation. So, at least, it appears from a letter of Pitt to Sir Charles Grey:
Downing Street, _Aug. 23, 1799_.[520]
You will not wonder that the circ.u.mstances of the present moment have strongly recalled to Mr. Dundas"s mind and mine the conversations which we have at different times had with you respecting the possibility of a successful stroke against Brest.
The a.s.semblage of the combined fleets[521] in that port renders such an object more tempting than ever. We have a prospect, if the expedition in Holland should terminate speedily, of having a large army of 30,000 men at least, and a large body of marines, with any number of sail-of-the-line that may be thought necessary, applicable to such a service by the month of October; and if the Allies continue to push their operations on the other side of France, the bulk of the French force will find sufficient occupation at a distance from their coast. In all these respects the time seems as favourable as it can ever be expected to be to such an enterprise; and if it is to be undertaken, we shall derive the greatest confidence of success from seeing the execution of it placed in your hands. Many circ.u.mstances may undoubtedly arise in the course of the next six weeks which may oblige us to abandon the idea....
This letter proves that Pitt did not expect a prolonged occupation of Holland, at least by British troops; but the notions of Ministers on this topic were singularly hazy. All things considered, the expedition at first fared well. Sir Ralph Abercromby, the leader of the first detachment of some 12,000 British troops, effected a landing near the forts at the Helder, and on 27th August speedily captured them. Three days later Admiral Mitch.e.l.l captured a squadron of 10 sail-of-the-line and several frigates anch.o.r.ed behind the Texel. Pitt was elated by these successes, and wrote from Walmer Castle on 5th September: "We are impatiently waiting till this east wind brings our transports in sight to carry the remainder of our troops, in order to compleat speedily what has been so gloriously begun." He adds that in a short autumn session he hopes speedily to pa.s.s by acclamation a Bill ensuring the doubling of the regular army by another levy from the militia.[522] Other letters bespeak his anxiety as to the safety of his brother, the Earl of Chatham, who served on the Council of War directing the operations of the Duke of York.
Abercromby"s first successes were for a time maintained. At dawn of 10th September the British force beat off a sharp attack by Vandamme at the Zuype Ca.n.a.l on the way southwards to Alkmaar. Three days later the Duke of York arrived and took the command, including that of a Russian corps under General Hermann. Moving forwards with some 30,000 men, the Duke attacked a Franco-Dutch force somewhat inferior in numbers but very strongly posted at and around the village of Bergen. The onset failed, mainly owing to the fierce but premature and disorderly onset of the Russians on the right wing, which ended in a rout. Abercromby"s flanking movement came too late to restore the fight, which cost the British 1,000 men and the Russians more than double as many (19th September).
Hermann was taken prisoner.[523]
On 2nd October the Allies compelled the enemy to retreat from Bergen; but the success was of little service. The defenders, now strongly reinforced, held several good positions between Alkmaar and Amsterdam.
Meanwhile the Orange party did not stir. Torrents of rain day after day impaired the health of the troops and filled the d.y.k.es. An advance being impossible in these circ.u.mstances, the Duke of York retreated to the line of the Zuype (8th to 9th October). There he could have held his own; but, in view of the disasters in Switzerland, Ministers decided to evacuate Holland (15th October). Accordingly, by the Convention of Alkmaar, on the 18th, the Duke of York agreed to evacuate the Dutch Netherlands by the end of November, 8,000 of the prisoners of war then in England being restored. Most questionable was the decision of Ministers to evacuate the Helder and the Texel. Grenville desired to hold those posts as bases for a second attempt in 1800; but this was not done. The only result, then, was the capture of the Dutch fleet, a prize gained without loss by the end of September.
The censures bestowed on this undertaking are very natural. Success was scarcely possible in the narrow, marshy strip of land north of Amsterdam. In such a district victory must be costly, while defeat spelt disaster. The whole enterprise was unwarrantable, unless the Orange party was about to rise; but on this subject Ministers were deceived.
The Prince of Orange and his son a.s.sured them that it was necessary even to hold back the loyalists until armed help appeared, so eager were they to expel the French.[524] Not a sign of this eagerness appeared.
Undaunted by this failure, which Sheridan wittily called nibbling at the French rind, Pitt sought to utilize the Russian force withdrawn from Holland for the projected blow at Brest. It was therefore taken to the Channel Islands, greatly to the hurt of the inhabitants. Pitt and Grenville also concerted plans with the Austrian Court, which, chastened by the disasters in Switzerland, now displayed less truculence. It agreed to repay the loan of May 1797, to restore Piedmont to the House of Savoy, and to give back to France any provinces conquered in the war, on condition of the re-establishment of monarchy. Thus, a friendly understanding was at last arrived at; and on 24th December 1799 Grenville empowered Minto to prepare a treaty, adding that on the first opportunity the French Government should be informed of this engagement.
The occasion occurred at once. Bonaparte, having become master of France by the _coup d"etat_ of Brumaire (10th November), wrote on Christmas Day to Francis II and George III proposing terms of peace. The statesmanlike tone of that offer has been deservedly admired; but his motives in making it do not concern us here.[525] Suffice it to say that Pitt and Thugut saw in it a clever device for sundering the Anglo-Austrian compact. As appears from a letter of Canning, Pitt looked on the new Consular Government as a make-shift. Writing early in December to Canning, Pitt stated that the new French const.i.tution might prove to be of a moderate American kind. To this Canning answered on the 7th that it might perhaps last long enough to admit of Bonaparte sending off a courier to London and receiving the reply if he were kicked back. Or more probably, France would fall under a military despotism, "of the actual and manifest instability of which you seem to entertain no doubt." In answer to Pitt"s statement "that we ought not to commit ourselves by any declaration that the restoration of royalty is the _sine qua non_ condition of peace," Canning advised him to issue a declaration "that you would treat with a monarchy; that to the monarchy restored to its rightful owner you would give not only peace, but peace on the most liberal terms."
Clearly, then, Pitt was less royalist than Canning; but he decided to repel all overtures from Paris (so he wrote to Dundas on 31st December), because the condition of France did not provide a solid security for a peace. He added that he desired "to express strongly the eagerness with which we should embrace any opening for general peace whenever such solid security should be attainable. This may, I think, be so expressed as to convey to the people of France that the shortest road to peace is by effecting the restoration of Royalty, and thereby to increase the chance of that most desirable of all issues to the war." As Grenville and Dundas concurred in this view, the Foreign Office sent off a reply stating that the usual diplomatic forms would be observed; that His Majesty sought only to maintain the rights of his subjects against a war of aggression; and that the present time was unsuitable for negotiations with persons recently placed in power by a Revolution, until they should disclaim the restless and subversive schemes which threatened the framework of society. His Majesty, however, would welcome peace when it could be attained with security, the best pledge of which would be the restoration of Royalty.
This reply ranks among the greatest mistakes of the time. It made the name of the Bourbons odious and that of Bonaparte popular throughout France; and the scornful references to the First Consul"s insecurity must have re-doubled the zeal of Frenchmen for the erection of a truly national and monarchical system under his auspices. In truth, it is difficult to see why Pitt, who held out the olive-branch to the newly-established Directory in the autumn of 1795, should have repelled the proffered hand of Bonaparte. The probable explanation is that he thought more of the effect of the reply at Vienna than at Paris. On 6th January Grenville forwarded a copy to Minto, expressing also the hope that it would be regarded as a sign of the fidelity of England to the Emperor. Further, Pitt"s oration on 3rd February 1800 on this topic was marked by extreme acerbity against Bonaparte. He descanted on his perfidy and rapacity at the expense of Venice and the Sultan"s dominions, and deprecated a compact with "this last adventurer in the lottery of Revolutions.... As a sincere lover of peace," he added, "I will not sacrifice it by grasping at the shadow, when the reality is not substantially within my reach. _Cur igitur pacem nolo? Quia infida est, quia periculosa, quia esse non potest._"[526] In reply to a verbal challenge from Tierney a fortnight later, he fired off an harangue which ranks among the ablest and most fervid of improvisations. The Whig leader having defied him to state in one sentence without _ifs_ and _buts_ the object of the war, Pitt flung back the retort:
... I know not whether I can do it in one sentence, but in one word I can tell him that it is security; security against a danger the greatest that ever threatened the world; ... against a danger which has been resisted by all the nations of Europe, and resisted by none with so much success as by this nation, because by none has it been resisted so uniformly and with so much energy.... How or where did the honourable gentleman discover that the Jacobinism of Robespierre, of Barere, of the Triumvirate, of the Five Directors, which he acknowledged to be real, has vanished and disappeared because it has all been centred and condensed into one man, who was reared and nursed in its bosom, whose celebrity was gained under its auspices, who was at once the child and champion of all its atrocities and horrors? Our security in negotiation is to be this Buonaparte, who is now the sole organ of all that was formerly dangerous and pestiferous in the Revolution.... _If_ peace afford no prospect of security; _if_ it threaten all the evils which we have been struggling to avert; _if_ the prosecution of the war afford the prospect of attaining complete security; and _if_ it may be prosecuted with increasing commerce, with increasing means, and with increasing prosperity, except what may result from the visitations of the seasons; then I say it is prudent in us not to negotiate at the present moment. These are my _buts_ and my _ifs_. This is my plea, and on no other do I wish to be tried by G.o.d and my country.
One who heard that spirited retort left on record the profound impression which it produced on the House.[527]
Seeing that Bonaparte was then known merely as an able _condottiere_, not as the re-organizer of French society, Pitt"s haughty att.i.tude, though deplorable, is intelligible. The prospects of the war were not unfavourable. He hoped that Austria, now about to invade Nice and Savoy, would be able by her own efforts to reduce France within her old limits, England"s duty being to offer help on the Riviera, to make a dash at Brest, and to seize Belleisle as a base of supplies for the Breton royalists, now once more in revolt. It is significant that Dundas wrote to Pitt on 4th January expressing his belief that Bonaparte must be serious in his desire for peace because he had no other game to play.[528]
Many influences conspired to mar these hopes. The enterprises against Brest and Belleisle proved to be impracticable, and a landing at Quiberon failed because the Breton rising occurred too soon. The royalists of Provence did not rise at all. An attempt by Sir James Pulteney and a small force upon Ferrol was an utter failure. All the operations were paralysed by uncertainty as to the future conduct of Russia. The indignation of the Czar against Austria extended to England after the failure of the joint expedition to Holland; and his testiness increased owing to maritime disputes and the friction caused by the outrages of his troops in the Channel Islands. In the Riviera the Austrians continued their successes, and finally shut up Ma.s.sena in Genoa, where the British fleet rendered valuable service. But it is not surprising to find Grenville writing on 10th April to Dundas: "For G.o.d"s sake, for your own honour, and for the cause in which we are engaged, do not let us, after having by immense exertions collected a fine army, leave it unemployed, gaping after messengers from Genoa, Augsburg, and Vienna till the moment for acting is irrecoverably pa.s.sed by."
This, however, was the outcome of events. The French, acting on interior lines, and propelled by the will of Bonaparte, utterly crushed these sporadic efforts. The Royalists were quelled or pacified, the coasts were well guarded, while the First Consul, crossing the Great St.
Bernard, overthrew the Austrians at Marengo (14th June). Before long Naples made peace with the conqueror. Meanwhile the Sea Power, operating on diverse coasts, delayed, but did not reverse, the progress of the French arms. British forces for a time defended Portugal and held Minorca and the citadel of Messina, but without any appreciable effect on Spain or Italy. The fleet played an important part in starving out the French garrisons of Genoa and Valetta. But elsewhere the action, or inaction, of the British forces was discreditable. True, the conditions were adverse, but an army numbering more than 80,000 men, and costing nearly 10,000,000 sterling, should have accomplished something in Europe.
Only at one point did the British arms win a decisive success. The French occupation of Egypt had aroused the apprehensions of Dundas for India; and throughout the year 1800 he continued to urge an expedition to Egypt, though other Ministers inclined to put it off. Finally, when Bonaparte"s triumph at Marengo shattered all hopes of an Austrian invasion of Provence, and the surrender of Valetta, early in September, set free the British squadron long blockading that port, Dundas pressed the Egyptian project in a letter to Pitt, dated Wimbledon, 19th September 1800. The gist of it is as follows:[529]
On reconsidering the discussion on Egypt at the Cabinet meeting of yesterday, I am impressed by the danger of delaying action.
The importance of expelling the French from Egypt is obvious; for it is clear that Bonaparte will subordinate every object to the retention of that colony. The danger to India may not be immediate, but it must be faced. Besides, our sacrifice of Turkish interests to those of Austria [that is, by refusing to ratify the Franco-Turkish Convention of El Arish] may induce the Sultan to bargain with France on terms very unfavourable to us.
Or, again, France and Russia may plan a part.i.tion of the Ottoman Empire. The objections, that we are pledged to do what we can for Portugal and Austria, are not vital. For Portugal is safe while the Viennese Court opposes France; and by our subsidies and naval help we have borne our fair share in the Coalition.
Further efforts in that direction will be fruitless. We must now see to our own interests. By occupying all the posts of Egypt, we can coop up the French and force them to capitulate. Action must not be postponed for any consideration whatever.
The opinion of Dundas soon prevailed; for, on 6th October, Grenville wrote that the Egyptian Expedition was decided on. As is well known, the joint efforts of forces from England, India, and the Cape of Good Hope brought about the surrender of the French garrisons, and the acquisition for the British Museum of the treasures designed for the Louvre. This brilliant result was in the last instance due to Abercromby, Hutchinson, Popham, and their coadjutors. But the enterprise resulted from the untiring championship of the interests of India by Dundas. Long afterwards at Perthshire dinner-tables he used to tell with pride how George III once proposed a toast to the Minister who planned the expedition to Egypt and in doing so had the courage to oppose not only his colleagues but his King.
As the year 1800 drew to its close, the opposition of the Baltic Powers to the British maritime code became most threatening. The questions at issue are too technical to be discussed here. Pitt and his colleagues believed the maintenance of the rights of search and of the seizure of an enemy"s goods on neutral ships to be essential to the existence of England. For this view of the case much was to be said. In every war France used neutral ships in order to get supplies; and the neutrals themselves sought to filch trade from British merchants. Now, to hinder or destroy the commerce of the enemy, and to prevent neutrals from bringing naval stores to his ports, were the only means of bringing pressure from the sea upon the dominant Land Power. In a strife for life or death Pitt and his colleagues perforce made use of every weapon, even to the detriment of non-combatants. This stiff att.i.tude, however, contrasted with that of Bonaparte, who, in July 1800 flattered the Czar by sending back Russian prisoners and by offering to cede Malta to him.
Paul, not knowing that the fall of Valetta was imminent, was duped by this device; and, a few weeks later, occurred the rupture between Russia and England.
Thus, within a year, the Second Coalition against France went to pieces, and was succeeded by a league against England. Thanks to the victory of Nelson at Copenhagen and the murder of the Czar Paul in the spring of 1801, that unnatural alliance speedily collapsed. These events, however, belong to a time subsequent to Pitt"s resignation of office, after the completion of the union with Ireland, to which we must now return.
Enough has been said to show the statesmanlike nature of his plans for the vindication of European independence. The intrigues of Thugut, the selfish isolation of Prussia, and the mad oscillations of Paul marred those plans and left the Continent a prey to the unbridled ambition of Bonaparte, from which it was to be saved only after a decade of exhausting wars.
FOOTNOTES:
[502] "F. O.," Austria, 51; "Dropmore P.," iv, 170. The French took nearly 33,000,000 francs from the Swiss cantonal treasuries.
[503] Pitt MSS., 108.
[504] "Dropmore P.," iv, 166, 172; "F. O.," Austria, 51. Grenville to Eden, 20th April.
[505] The Earl of Crawford"s MSS.
[506] "F. O.," Russia, 40. Whitworth to Grenville, 6th August 1798.
[507] See my Introduction to "The History of Malta, 1798-1815," by the late W. Hardman.
[508] "Dropmore P.," iv, 344, 355.
[509] See Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," 54-8, for this despatch of 16th November 1798.
[510] For a fuller account see "Camb. Mod. Hist.," viii, ch. xxi, by the present writer.
[511] "F. O.," Russia, 42. Despatches of 2nd, 8th and 25th January 1799.
[512] Huffer, "Quellen," i, 23-9.
[513] "Dropmore P.," iv, 297, 338, 505; "F. O.," Russia, 42.
[514] "F. O.," Russia, 42. Whitworth to Grenville, 29th March.
[515] "F. O.," Russia, 43. Grenville to Whitworth, 23rd June.
[516] G. Caudrillier, "L"a.s.sociation royaliste ... et la Conspiration anglaise en France" (Paris, 1908); Wickham, "Corresp.," ii, _pa.s.sim_.
[517] B.M. Add. MSS., 37844.