[127] Pretyman MSS.
[128] "F. O.," France, 40. For Grenville"s account of the interview, see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[129] Miles, "Correspondence," ii, 46; see, too, Ernouf, "Maret," 89, 95. This corrects the mis-statement of Lecky (vi, 94) on this topic.
[130] Ernouf, "Maret," 90.
[131] "Ann. Reg." (1792), 190-3; Ernouf, "Maret," 94-8.
[132] "F. O.," Holland, 41; B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to Auckland, 4th December.
[133] "F. O.," Holland, 42. Auckland to Grenville, 7th and 8th December 1792. See, too, Miles, "Correspondence," i, 382; Sorel, iii, 224.
[134] Sorel, iii, 204, 224.
[135] Vivenot, ii, 393.
[136] Sorel, iii, 225, 226.
[137] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 388, 389.
CHAPTER IV
THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE
La guerre aux rois etait la consequence naturelle du proces fait au roi de France; la propagande conquerante devait etre liee au regicide.--SOREL.
The opening of Parliament on 13th December 1792 took place amidst circ.u.mstances that were depressing to friends of peace. Affairs were gyrating in a vicious circle. Diplomacy, as we have seen, had come to a deadlock; but more threatening even than the dispute between Pitt and Lebrun were the rising pa.s.sions of the two peoples. The republican ferment at Paris had worked all the more strongly since 20th November, the date of the discovery of the iron chest containing proofs of the anti-national intrigues of the King and Queen. Hence the decree (3rd December) for the trial of Louis XVI at the bar of the Convention with its inevitable sequel, the heating of royalist pa.s.sion in all neighbouring lands. It is one of the many mishaps of the revolutionary movement that its enthusiasm finally aroused an opposite enthusiasm, its fury begot fury, and thus set in a series of cyclones which scarcely spent their force even at Waterloo.
An essentially philosophic movement at the outset, the French Revolution was now guided by demagogues and adventurers, whose only hope of keeping erect lay in constant and convulsive efforts forwards. Worst symptom of all, its armies already bade fair to play the part of the Praetorians of the later Roman Empire. Nothing is more singular at this time than the fear of the troops. Amidst the distress prevalent at Paris, much apprehension was felt at the return of the armies of Custine and Dumouriez. In part, of course, this uneasiness arose from a suspicion that these men, especially the latter, might take up the _role_ of Monk and save Louis. But a member of the French Convention a.s.sured Miles that the disbanding of those tumultuary forces would bring on a social crisis.
War, [he wrote on 9th December] is to a certain extent inevitable, not so much for the purpose of opening the Scheldt, for that is rather a pretext in order to animate the people and preserve their enthusiasm, but to get rid of 300,000 armed vagabonds, who can never be allowed to return without evident risk to the Convention and Executive Council.... It is her opinion [Madame Roland"s] and mine that we cannot make peace with the Emperor without danger to the Republic, and that it would be hazardous to recall an army, flushed with victory and impatient to gather fresh laurels, into the heart of a country whose commerce and manufactures have lost their activity, and which would leave the disbanded mult.i.tude without resources or employment.[138]
These words are noteworthy; for they show that prudential or party motives led some at least of the Girondins, formerly friends of England, to desire an extension of the war.
In England, too, the war spirit was rising. The traditional loyalty of the land had been strengthened by the tactful behaviour of George III since Pitt"s accession to power. These feelings warmed to a steady glow at the time of the King"s illness in 1788-9; and now the trial of Louis XVI, albeit on grounds which Britons could not understand, seemed an act of contemptible cruelty. To bring Louis from Versailles to Paris, to load him with indignities at the Tuileries, to stop his despairing bolt for freedom, to compa.s.s his downfall, to attack him in his palace and ma.s.sacre his defenders, to depose him, and now to try him for his life for the crime of helping on his would-be deliverers, appeared to a nation of sportsmen a series of odious outrages on the laws of fair play. The action of certain Radical Clubs in sending addresses of congratulation to the National Convention also aroused deep disgust; and (as Bland Burges wrote to Auckland on 18th December) Loyal a.s.sociations sprang up on all sides.[139] A typical address was sent by the Dover a.s.sociation to Pitt, as Lord Warden, on 19th December, asking for permission to take arms in defence of King and Const.i.tution against invaders from without or levellers within.[140] The example was widely followed; and thus, as usually happens in this land, the puny preparations of Government were helped on by the eager exertions of the people.
The revulsion in public opinion early in December was so marked as to impress even Chauvelin. He warned Lebrun that within a month the English had so changed as scarcely to be recognizable; but he added: "Pitt seems to have killed public opinion in England." A conversation which Sheridan had with him on 7th December ought to have disproved this fable. The Whig orator sternly reprobated the French decree of 19th November, offering aid to malcontents, and stated that the Opposition desired peace with France, but not if she attacked Holland. Nine-tenths of the people would resent any attempt to interfere with England or her Allies.
This patriotic utterance of Sheridan expressed the feelings of a large part of the Whig Opposition. Parliament on 13th December showed marked approval of the King"s Speech, which, while affirming his peaceful intentions, a.s.serted his resolve to strengthen the forces. Lansdowne and Stanhope struck a few jarring notes; but in the Commons the Opposition was almost paralysed by a split between the New and Old Whigs. At a meeting of the party, held on 11th December at Burlington House, the majority decided to support the Government. Indeed Parliament would probably have presented a united front but for the action of Lansdowne, Stanhope, and Fox. Much depended on the conduct of the great orator at this crisis. A warning uttered by him to French Republicans might have had the most salutary effect. Unfortunately his conduct was such as to impair the unity of English sentiment and thereby to encourage the delusions of the men in power at Paris. In the meeting on 11th December he a.s.serted that there was no fear of a revolt (in which he was doubtless correct) and that the calling out of the Militia was a mere trick, which he would strenuously oppose. He admitted that we must support the Dutch if they were attacked, and disapproved of the French decree respecting the Scheldt, but strongly deprecated war on that account. On the 12th he threw caution to the winds, and stated with an oath that there was no address that Pitt could frame on which he would not propose an amendment and divide the House.[141] This is party spirit run mad; but it was in that spirit that Fox went to the House on the 13th.
There he made one of his finest flights of oratory. None of his speeches excels it in beauty of diction and matchless energy of thought. Most forcible was the pa.s.sage in which he derided the ministerial maxim that the canon of English laws and liberties was complete; that we might thenceforth stand still, and call upon a wondering world to admire it as a model of human perfection. Even more biting were his taunts at Ministers for seeking to stamp out the discontent which their injustice and violence had created.
You have gone upon the principles of slavery in all your proceedings; you neglect in your conduct the foundation of all legitimate government, the rights of the people; and, setting up this bugbear, you spread a panic for the very purpose of sanctifying this infringement, while again the very infringement engenders the evil which you dread. One extreme naturally leads to another. Those who dread republicanism fly for shelter to the Crown. Those who desire Reform and are calumniated are driven by despair to republicanism. And this is the evil that I dread.
These are the extremes into which these violent agitations hurry the people, to the decrease of that middle order of men who shudder as much at republicanism on the one hand as they do at despotism on the other.[142]
He then taunted Ministers with abandoning Poland and not opposing the coalition of Austria and Prussia, and a.s.serted that the Cabinet refused to negotiate with France because she was a Republic, and her Ministers had not been anointed with the holy oil of Rheims. The weakest part of the speech was that which dealt with the existing crisis. For of what use was it to point out where Ministers had gone astray months and years before, if he did not now mark out for them a practicable course? In truth, though the prince of debaters, Fox lacked self-restraint, balance of judgement, and practical sagacity. The sole important issue was the encouraging of the peace party at Paris, with a view to the revocation of the aggressive decrees of the Convention. In private, Fox had admitted that they were wholly indefensible; and yet, in order to s.n.a.t.c.h an oratorical triumph, he fired off a diatribe which could not but stiffen the necks of the French Jacobins. At such a crisis the true statesman merges the partisan in the patriot and says not a word to weaken his own Government and hearten its opponents. To this height of self-denial Fox rarely rose; and the judgement alike of his fellows and of posterity has p.r.o.nounced this speech a masterpiece of partisan invective and of political fatuity.
For how was it possible to recognize the French Republic until it had withdrawn its threats to existing Governments? Pitt had reason to believe that a firm protest against the aggressive decrees of November was the only means of averting an overturn of international law. He took the proper means of protesting against them, and his protest was disregarded. In such a case, to recognize a revolutionary Government which had just proclaimed its sympathy with malcontents and its resolve to dictate terms to our Dutch allies, would have been a sign of weakness. There was but one chance of peace, namely, that Parliament should give so overwhelming a support to Pitt and Grenville as to convince the tyros at Paris that they had to do, not with a clique, but a nation. This unanimity the efforts of Fox impaired. Some of his friends voted with him from a sense of personal regard; but the greater number pa.s.sed over to the Government or did not vote. Consequently the Foxites mustered 50 votes against 290.
Equally inopportune was his motion of 15th December, for sending a Minister to Paris to treat with that Government. His knowledge of all that went on at the French Emba.s.sy in Portman Square was so exact (witness his repet.i.tion publicly on the 13th of the very words of one of Lebrun"s despatches to Chauvelin),[143] that he must have known of the informal communications between Pitt and Maret, and of the arrival on the 14th of despatches from Paris, which negatived the requests of the Prime Minister. Doubtless it was this last circ.u.mstance which curtailed and weakened Fox"s second speech. Grey, Erskine, and Whitbread vigorously supported the motion; but there was a general feeling that the despatch of an amba.s.sador to Paris would be a weak acquiescence in the French claims. The motion was therefore negatived. Pitt was not present at these first debates, not having yet been re-elected by the University of Cambridge after his recent acceptance of the Lord Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. The defence of the Government therefore devolved chiefly upon Dundas, Windham, and Burke--a significant conjunction of names. On 16th December Burke for the first time took his seat on the Treasury Bench.
A national party might now have been formed but for the inaction of the Duke of Portland. During the meetings at his mansion, Burlington House, he evinced strong disapproval of the views of Fox; and, as official leader of the Whigs, he had it in his power to bring nearly the whole of the party over to the Government side. From this course, which would have placed country above party, the Duke shrank; and his followers were left to sort themselves at will. There was a general expectation that Portland would publicly declare against Fox; but friendship or timidity held him tongue-tied. Malmesbury sought to waken him from his "trance,"
but in vain.[144] He lay under "the wand of the magician" (Pitt"s phrase for the witchery that Fox exerted), even when so staunch a Whig as Sir Gilbert Elliot saw that the wizard"s enchantments were working infinite mischief.[145]
Owing to the wrong-headedness of Fox and the timidity of Portland, Pitt"s triumph in the Commons was not decisive enough to tear the veil away from the eyes of the French Jacobins. Nothing short of unanimity at Westminster could have worked that miracle. Surely not even that novice in diplomacy, Lebrun, would have threatened to appeal from the British Government to the British nation, had he not believed the Government to be without support.
This delusion appears in the memorable decree of 15th December. The French Convention thereby a.s.serts its resolve to revolutionize all countries where its armies are or shall come. It will recognize no inst.i.tutions alien to the principles of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. All feudal dues, customs, and privileges are to be annulled, and the liberated people will meet in primary a.s.semblies to organize an Administration. Arrangements will be made for defraying the expenses of the liberating army, and for maintaining it while it remains.[146]
Finally France declares that she will treat as an enemy the people which refuses to accept Liberty and Equality, and tolerates its prince and privileged castes. The decree is at once followed by a proclamation drawn up for the benefit of the subject peoples whom it may concern.
Finally, the Convention decides that the course of rivers must everywhere be free, and directs its generals to enforce that principle with respect to the Scheldt.
In view of this stern reiteration of the right to overturn all Governments that conflict with revolutionary principles, it is impossible to consider the decree of 19th November, offering a.s.sistance to malcontent peoples, as a meaningless display of emotion. Subsequent events threw a sinister light on it. The annexation of Savoy on 27th November was not a convincing proof of altruism; and the refusal of the Executive Council, on 8th and 9th December, to reconsider its decision on the Scheldt, marked a firm resolve to carry out French policy in the Pays Bas, even if it led to war with England. Now there came, as a d.a.m.ning corollary, the decree of 15th December, which flung defiance at all Governments of the old type. Like Mohammed, Lebrun stood forth with the "Contrat Social" in one hand, the sword in the other, and bade the world take its choice.
For England there could be no doubt. Pitt and Grenville had decided that the only chance of peace lay in offering a firm front to every act of aggression. In this they had general support. Fox might choose to distort facts by declaring that Ministers were about to plunge the country into war on a matter of form[147] (the refusal to treat officially with the French Republic); but everyone knew that the first aggressive action was that of France, directed against the Anglo-Dutch alliance. The firmness of Ministers gained them support in unexpected quarters. On 20th December, when they asked for a vote for 25,000 seamen, including 5,000 marines, Sheridan heartily declared that he would have supported a vote for 40,000 seamen if that number had been deemed necessary. He also made a suggestion that the British Parliament or people should appeal to the generous instincts of Frenchmen to spare the life of Louis XVI. The proposal came somewhat oddly in a debate for increasing our forces against France; and it brought up Burke in one of his most acrid moods. Such an appeal, he said, was futile, for Louis was in the custody of a.s.sa.s.sins who were both accusers and judges: his death was inevitable. Sheridan and Fox heartily reprobated this recklessly vindictive language.
Pitt then pointed out that on 17th August George III had expressed an earnest desire for the safety of Louis and the Royal Family of France in terms which were then read out. The same was the desire of every Briton; and the sentiments now expressed in that House would be heard and noted at Paris. If any more formal measure were to be adopted, he suggested the entering a protest in the Journals of the House; but any public representation, he said, must be couched in terms of indignation which must tend to defeat its own object. With this method of procedure Fox and Sheridan expressed their entire concurrence.[148] It is therefore a malicious falsehood to say that Pitt opposed their suggestion.[149]
Burke certainly did so, and in the worst possible taste; but Pitt carried it out so far as was deemed desirable. If Sheridan and Fox wished for a public appeal, it was for them to set it on foot.
I must here notice the vague and misleading statements in G.o.doy"s Memoirs (written a generation later) that Spain made strenuous efforts to save the life of Louis XVI and opened "an unlimited credit" at Paris with the view of bribing members of the Convention to secure his acquittal. Further, that he, G.o.doy, secretly approached Pitt in order to secure his financial aid, which that statesman obstinately refused.[150]
The story does not hang well together; for if Spain had already opened an unlimited credit at Paris, why did she want pecuniary help from Pitt?
Further, the opening of unlimited credit, presumably with a Parisian bank, did not consort well with the secret methods which were essential to the success of the plan.
In order to probe this matter to the bottom, I have examined the British Foreign Office archives relating to Spain for the months of December and January. They are detailed and apparently complete. F. J. Jackson, our _charge d"affaires_ at Madrid, wrote to Lord Grenville every three or four days, as the relations of the two States had been far from cordial owing to friction caused by the cession of Nootka Sound, Captain Vancouver having been employed to settle the boundaries and fix a neutral zone between the two Empires. Grenville also wrote three times to Jackson to express his apprehension that the timidity and poverty of Spain would cause her to yield to the French Republic in the matter of some demonstrations on the frontier. But there is no word implying that Spain requested help from England, either pecuniary or diplomatic, in order to save Louis. Early in January Charles IV made such an appeal to the French Convention, but it was treated with contemptuous indifference. At that time the Courts of London and Madrid were beginning to draw closer together in order to withstand the demands of France; but nothing pa.s.sed between them officially respecting the saving of Louis. Now, where the life of a King was at stake, any communication must have been official, and if it were made through the Spanish amba.s.sador in London, Grenville would certainly have referred to it in his despatches to Madrid.[151] We may therefore dismiss G.o.doy"s story as a cruel and baseless slander, due to the spiteful desire of a discredited politician to drag down a great name nearer to his own level.
It is also worth noting that Malouet, who was then in close touch with Grenville on San Domingo affairs, does not mention in his Memoirs any attempt to involve the Cabinet in a scheme for bribing the Convention--an action which the French exiles in England and Holland were perfectly able to carry out themselves had they been so minded. The only doc.u.ment bearing on this question is a Memorial drawn up on 7th December by Malouet, Lally-Tollendal, and Gillier, stating their horror at the King"s trial, and their belief that his life might be spared if George III and the British Government issued a Declaration stating their lively interest in Louis XVI and his family, their resolve for ever to refuse an asylum to all regicides, and to cut off all supplies of food from France if the crime were committed.[152] The Memorial was probably presented to Lord Grenville; but its inutility, or danger, in the proud and exacting mood then prevalent at Paris, is obvious. The confidential reports sent by "M. S." from Paris to Lord Grenville do not refer to any such overture to the Cabinet.[153]
Lastly, there is the curious fact that the ex-abbe Noel, one of Chauvelin"s "advisers," came to Miles late on 18th December, and affected much concern at the prospect of the execution of Louis. He then suggested that Pitt should confer with a M. Talon, residing in Sloane Street, who had immense resources and stood well with all parties in France, in order to devise some means for saving the life of that monarch. When Miles asked Noel how Pitt was to a.s.sist in this laudable project, no answer was forthcoming. We must commend Noel"s prudence; for he had already stated that Talon was under impeachment in France. How a man accused of treason could help his King, save by secretly using some of his immense resources to bribe the deputies, is no more apparent to us than it was to Miles. In fact he detected a snare in this effort to a.s.sociate Pitt with a wealthy French exile in what must evidently be merely an affair of bribery. He therefore declined to bring the matter before Pitt, whereupon Noel betrayed signs of satisfaction at finding that the Minister really was neutral on French internal affairs.[154]
This little episode should open the eyes of detractors of Pitt to the extraordinary difficulty of his position. Of one thing we may be certain. The readiest way of a.s.suring the doom of the hapless monarch was to take up some one of the silly or guileful schemes then mooted for pressing the British Government to take sides in the trial. Pitt"s rigorous neutrality was the best means of helping the advocates of Louis in their uphill fight with the hostile Convention.
Reverting to events at Westminster, we note that Ministers, on 21st December, introduced into the Upper House an Aliens Bill for subjecting to supervision the many thousands of foreigners who had flocked to these sh.o.r.es. The debates on this measure showed some approach to unanimity, though Lansdowne and Lauderdale in the Lords, and Fox in the Commons opposed it as a breach of the hospitable traditions of this land. On the 28th Burke spoke in its support with his usual pa.s.sion, flinging down a Birmingham dagger as a sign of the French fraternity now introduced into these happy islands.[155] After a few alterations in committee, the Bill pa.s.sed on the last day of the year.
Meanwhile, on 18th December, Lebrun had sent to the Convention a report on the negotiations, which was not adapted to soften the pa.s.sions of the time, being merely a piece of parliamentary declamation; but, as declamation rather than reason held sway at Paris, some of its phrases must be quoted. After citing with approval pa.s.sages from the recent speech of Fox, Lebrun referred to the eager interest taken by the British nation in the triumphs of the French arms. "But," he continued, "these glorious events have a quite contrary effect upon the English Minister. In a moment, the dread and jealousy of our victories, the entreaties of cowardly rebels [the French _emigres_], the vile intrigues of hostile Courts, and the secret suspicions that the numerous addresses from all parts of England excited, determined him to more decisive military preparations and to an immediate a.s.sembling of Parliament."
Lebrun then accused Pitt of seeking to stir up public opinion against France, and of exciting, "by the most corrupt means, distrusts, doubts, and disorders." A still more extraordinary charge followed, namely, that Pitt and Grenville, while refusing to acknowledge the French diplomatic agents, had "requested to see them confidentially, to hold communications with them, and to grant them secret conferences."[156]
Lebrun then referred in contemptuous terms to the British naval preparations, and stated that he had firmly maintained the decree respecting the Scheldt. He then affirmed the reasonableness of the decree of 19th November; and scouted the notion that France harboured designs against Holland. In answer to this last he had said in effect: "That it was much to be wished that the British Ministry had never meddled more with the internal government of that Republic than we ourselves wish to meddle." Finally, if these disputes led to a rupture, "the war will be only the war of the British Minister against us; and we will not fail to make a solemn appeal to the English nation." ... "In short, we will leave it to the English nation to judge between us, and the issue of this contest may lead to consequences which he [Pitt] did not expect."
In the sordid annals of party strife this report of Lebrun holds a high place. In order to furbish up the dulled prestige of the Gironde he sought to excite national animosity, and to revive the former hatred of the name of Pitt. What could be more criminal than to sneer at the smallness of England"s naval preparations? What more false than to charge Pitt and Grenville with secretly begging for interviews with agents whom outwardly they scorned? It is by acts like these that nations are set by the ears; and generally they are at one another"s throats before the lie can be exposed. Lebrun"s report was received with loud applause. No one questioned the accuracy of its details; and these blind followers of a blind guide unanimously voted that it should be printed and widely circulated. On 20th December Lebrun sent a copy of it to Chauvelin, along with instructions which lost none of their emphasis in the note drawn up at Portman Square. He forwarded another copy of the report to Noel, with this significant explanation: "This doc.u.ment will keep you in touch with the ideas of this country and will show you that I scarcely have this affair in my hands any longer."[157]
This admission is illuminating. The trial of Louis XVI had, as the men of the Mountain foresaw, placed the Girondin Ministry and its followers in a most embarra.s.sing position. Many of them inclined to mercy or to compromises which found little favour with the populace. Accordingly, the procedure at the trial, as also the final verdict, turned largely on the desperate efforts of the Jacobins to discredit their rivals, who sought by all means to keep their foothold in the revolutionary torrent.
One of the most obvious devices was to represent the Executive Council as the champion of ultra-democratic ideas as against envious and reactionary England. If this notion gained currency, Lebrun and his colleagues might hope still to ride on the crest of the wave.
Historical students will remember another occasion when a tottering Ministry sought to keep pace with public opinion at Paris. The Duc de Gramont on 12th July 1870 instructed the French amba.s.sador, Benedetti, to insist on obtaining from King William of Prussia an immediate answer to a demand that was certain to arouse angry feelings; and he sent to Benedetti the explanation that public opinion was _outflanking_ the Ministry, and that "the effervescence of spirits is such that we do not know whether we shall succeed in mastering it." Thus, twice within eighty years France was hurried towards the brink of the precipice because her Foreign Minister could not control an effervescence of spirits which he himself had helped to excite.
Lebrun"s missives of 20th December bore fruit seven days later in Chauvelin"s despatch to Grenville. As this doc.u.ment has often been printed, only a brief summary need be given here. The French envoy insisted that the conduct of France towards England had throughout been correct and conciliatory; but the Executive Council had long observed with concern the unfriendliness of the British Ministers, and now pressed its envoy to demand definitely whether they held the position of a neutral or an enemy. The only possible cause of enmity could be a misinterpretation of the decree of 19th November, which obviously applied merely to peoples that demanded the fraternal aid of Frenchmen.
As France wished to respect the independence of England and her allies, she would not attack the Dutch. The opening of the Scheldt, however, was a question decided irrevocably by reason and justice, besides being a matter of small moment; and the British Ministers could not venture to make it a cause of war. If they did, they would not be supported by the British people. Chauvelin then demanded an official reply, and expressed the hope that the British Cabinet would not engage in a war for which it alone would be responsible and to which the people would not accord its support.[158]