[Ill.u.s.tration: British Residency, Baghdad.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: Hotel Maude, Baghdad.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: The Bridge At Baghdad.]
On the 20th it was definitely decided that the situation demanded an immediate advance, and a direct frontal attack was ordered to take place at dawn on the following morning. One force were to lead the attack at 5 a.m. on the east of the Dujail, the Highlanders to advance along the east bank of that ca.n.a.l, and one Company of the Punjabis on the west bank. On the right of the Highlanders a battalion of Gurkhas were to advance from the right strong point with a battalion of Indian Infantry in echelon on their right near the Tigris, another battalion being held in reserve. When this attack had gained ground a second force was to advance over the bare plain on the west of the Dujail, and their right to gain touch with the left of the Company of Punjabis on the Dujail bank. The objectives of the main attack were the redoubt, and the two bridges which crossed the Dujail immediately above it. A third force was held back in reserve.
The orders were thus very clear, and the plan simple; the main difficulty was to ensure effective artillery co-operation, since to come within effective range of the Redoubt our batteries would be forced to move forward over very open ground, and counter-battery work would be obviously hard to arrange.
The frontage of broken ground open to the Highlanders was but little over 150 yards; the Commanding Officer therefore wisely determined to attack on a narrow frontage of two platoons rather than expose his men on the bare plain, and with the Dujail giving the direction to his left, trust to the impetus of eight lines to force the enemy"s position.
Precisely at 5 a.m., the covering batteries opened fire on the enemy outposts, the leading platoons charged forward and, without pausing to fire, but advancing by a series of swift rushes drove back the Turkish advanced troops about a thousand yards from our strong points. A few Turks were bayonetted, a number more shot by the fire of a well-placed Lewis gun, but the surprise of the attack and the rapidity of its execution saved our men from any severe loss during this first advance. But as our leading platoons drew near to the enemy main positions, they came under an enfilade fire from the west bank of the Dujail, and a number of men had to swing round to the left, and, from the crest of the wall, reply to the enemy not two hundred yards distant on the opposite bank. The succeeding lines, however, pressed forward, section after section rushed on to the help of their comrades, every rise and every knoll along the river was held by snipers and the battle developed into a fierce contest between skirmishers. But it was not of long duration. Shortly after 6 o"clock nearly two miles of country had been cleared of the enemy, our men were not to be denied, and the leading section of Highlanders made a gallant charge and rushed the main redoubt, killing a certain number of its defenders and driving out the remainder. The success of the attack was greatly due to the rapidity, but its very rapidity had led to considerable intervals occurring between the eight lines that had originally advanced to the a.s.sault. Some platoons had been forced to engage the enemy on the opposite bank, others with Lewis guns were keeping down the fire of the enemy who were holding several small trenches ahead, and a number of men had fallen, never to rise again; consequently for the first few minutes there were less than a hundred men in the redoubt, and these were subject to a heavy fire from their front, and enfilading fire from their left.
[Ill.u.s.tration: The Quartermaster, a.s.sistant Adjutant, Transport Officer, 2nd In Command, And The Colonel Watching The Regimental Sports At The Front.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: Captain T. W. STEWART, Captain W. A. YOUNG And The PADRE.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: The Mesopotamian Railway.]
Now was the moment when artillery support was most needed. But as before explained, this, owing to the nature of the ground, had been most difficult to arrange. The batteries posted under cover of the Median Wall, soon found themselves, as the enemy retired, at extreme range, had been obliged in consequence to advance to new positions.
This is a matter which takes longer than the actual bringing up of the guns; fresh observations must be made by artillery officers, new telephone wires must be made, new communications established, and correct ranges ascertained of the new targets before effective support can be given. This was all being done, but under great difficulties, because the enemy had established a strong barrage in rear of the a.s.saulting troops. Many of our gunners were hit, especially among the telephone operators; consequently, just at this critical time, there was little or no artillery support to be had.
Now the Turk is a stubborn fighter. His men on the west bank of the Dujail had not yet been driven so far back as those opposing the Highlanders, and they now opened a very galling fire from the west bank at a range of only two to four hundred yards. The Redoubt had been taken at 6-15 a.m. Within ten minutes the Turks on the east bank had organised a strong body to make a counter attack, and these headed by parties of bombers, rushed the Redoubt, drove the few defenders back, and held its front and side faces. But their triumph was short lived. It was a proud boast of the Highlanders that of all the miles of entrenchments that had at one time or another been entrusted to them not one yard had even been surrendered to the enemy; it was their stern resolve that no Highlander should lie unavenged, that no man who wore the Red Haeckle should give his life in vain. The Redoubt had once been theirs, and in its trenches lay the bodies of their comrades who had died to hold it. It was the Redoubt they had set forth to capture; now more than ever they were determined that not a live Turk should dispute possession. The platoons that had originally formed the rear waves were now fast coming up, bombs and bombers were called for, and an immediate counter-attack organised. But the losses were now very heavy. Within a minute, one Captain and two Subalterns were killed, two Captains and two Subalterns wounded, and a heavy proportion among the rank and file also fell. The smallest hesitation, the slightest wavering, and the Turks had made good their success. But there was no hesitation and, though only one unwounded officer remained, there was no wavering. The bombers dashed forward, every available man followed, and within fifteen minutes of its loss, the entire Redoubt was recaptured and its forward trenches rapidly consolidated. The Highlanders" boast still held true, the Red Haeckle was again victorious.
Many were the dead, many the wounded to testify to the gallant deeds that led to this success. An Artillery Officer, who witnessed the a.s.sault, wrote:--
"That day the Highlanders without help won a victory that only those who saw it can realise was among the most gallant fought in this war."
[Ill.u.s.tration: The Colonel.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: The Adjutant.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: The Mosques Of Baghdad.]
What is the secret, whence comes this spirit, of the wave of bravery that seizes soldiers at these great moments? Many of the very men who charged forward had, but ten minutes before, been driven back, many of their comrades lay dead beside them, they had lost their accustomed leaders, shrapnel and heavy sh.e.l.l were bursting among them, and when the cry for bombs and bombers was given, it must have seemed to many to be but the prelude to disaster, the vain cry for further and useless sacrifice. What is it then that stops the individual from hanging back, from letting others lead, from justifying himself to himself by continuing to fire in comparative safety at longer ranges?
Who would detect him? Might he not argue plausibly enough, that his covering fire would be of more a.s.sistance to his comrades than his rushing uselessly forward at their head? The secret of it lies in _esprit de corps_, in the willing surrender by the individual of his freedom of action, by the voluntary sacrifice of the individual for the good of all. And greater love hath no man than this:--that he giveth his life for his friend.
The gallantry of those who lie dead, whether British, or Indian, or Turk cannot be told, but one incident that was witnessed by several is worthy of record. The Redoubt measured several hundred yards on its front and side faces, and the attackers were few in number. One of these, Private Melvin had by some chance so damaged his bayonet that he could not fix it on his rifle. Throwing that weapon aside, he rushed forward where his comrades were scarce, and the enemy in plenty, and encountered a group of Turks single handed. With bayonet and fist he brought three to the ground, the remaining six, stunned by the violence of his attack, surrendered, and were brought back by this brave old soldier in triumph to his Company. For this deed Private Melvin was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Samarra.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: Wireless Station, Baghdad. Destroyed by the Huns.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: Samarra Railway Station.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: Resting After The Battle Of Istabulat.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: No. 4 Company Before Istabulat Under The Median Wall.
P. SMYTH, A. E. BARISTOW, R. WALKER, and G. V. STEWART in Foreground.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: Ground Over Which The Regiment Advanced To Attack The Turkish Strong Point Beneath The +.]
Battalion Headquarters now moved up close in rear of the Redoubt, the telephonic communication was established with the Brigade, and Companies reorganised according to their losses. And fortunate it was that this was done with no loss of time. For the Turk had intended to hold this line of entrenchments, of which the Redoubt was the key, and the main defence of the two bridges, throughout the summer, and he was not going to surrender the position without further struggle. Two counter-attacks formed up and advanced against the front face of the Redoubt, a few Turks got within fifty or a hundred yards of the Redoubt, but each attack was broken up by steady rifle fire and Lewis gun fire, and our position made more secure. A little nullah ran from the Turks" second position to within fifty yards of the Redoubt, and up this channel from time to time he sent parties of bombers, but these were easily held in check. A group of machine guns from further up the Dujail swept the crest of the hard-won parapet, and men less experienced in war had suffered more than did those who bore the Red Haeckle. But no experience of war could save men from the high explosive sh.e.l.l which burst throughout the day among the trenches, destroying indiscriminately parapet and defenders. These 5.9 sh.e.l.l the Highlanders had known all too well in France, and the number of bursts reminded our men rather of a bombardment in the trenches of Flanders than the sh.e.l.l fire ordinary to Mesopotamia. And to this bombardment the defenders of the Redoubt were subject from time to time throughout that long day. It is a constant puzzle, why in this life so many things that are at first merely disagreeable are allowed to make so great a noise and to continue for so long a time that they become almost unbearable. It is a question that often confronts one at a comic opera, always in the near neighbourhood of a gramophone, but never with such persistent irritation as when undergoing a bombardment from high explosive sh.e.l.l. Nothing is more trying to the nerves, for and from it there is no escape. This war has been defined as a war, not of infantry, nor of artillery, but of effective co-operation between the two. The nature of the ground, and the skill with which the enemy had chosen his positions had prevented this co-operation from being as effective as is usual in our army, and this in spite of every effort being made by our Artillery Officers, and in spite of many casualties among their batteries. In consequence, the enemy"s batteries were never silenced, and kept up a heavy fire throughout the day, and our losses were heavy. On our right the Gurkhas had advanced in gallant style at the same time as the Highlanders, and in spite of a stubborn resistance had pushed the enemy back along the line of the old ca.n.a.l, and kept up with our advance. Then with the sand dunes dipped to the level of the plain and the salient bend of the Tigris narrowed their front, the Gurkhas swung round to their left in a most soldierly fashion, and, despite, heavy losses, joined the Highlanders on the Dujail, and for the rest of the day shared the honours and the dangers of the defence of the Redoubt and the trenches near it. The Indian Regiment advancing still further on the right had met with misfortune, for, on reaching a small rise in the ground, their lines had been suddenly swept with machine gun fire at a range of three hundred yards. Many men fell within the s.p.a.ce of a few minutes, and it became necessary to bring up the Reserve Battalion to their a.s.sistance. Consequently no further advance was possible on this flank, nor on the west flank did the situation offer any greater promise. The Punjabi Regiment on the immediate left of the Highlanders had fought under great difficulties, but with such determination that they eventually dug themselves in opposite the Redoubt on the west bank of the Dujail, though half their men were killed or wounded. On their left again, another Highland Battalion, old friends of ours, both in peace and war, had pressed the enemy back, and occupied some eight hundred yards of an old irrigation channel that ran westward from the Dujail towards the railway. Further to the west, this dry channel remained in the hands of the Turks, and bombing attacks were carried on throughout the day. Another battalion had also suffered considerably from sh.e.l.l fire, and was posted in echelon on the left rear.
It was evident that without a renewed bombardment and strong reinforcements, no further advance was possible on either side. We had advanced a couple of miles, driven the enemy from his strongest positions, and gained our immediate objectives. It was evident, that to the day following must be left the final advance and capture of Samarrah.
This account of the fighting near Samarrah purports to give no general view of the whole action. Enough, if something clear is shown of the part played by one Regiment, and of the fighting by its immediate neighbours. The Highlanders had had some tough battles during the past few months, and during this day"s fighting had lost over a third of their total strength in killed and wounded.
On the next morning it was found that the Turks had retired several miles on to the ruins of the ancient city of Istabulat, but it was not until the afternoon that the battle was continued. Then it was fought with the same violence, and with equal stubbornness as on the day before. Again the Turk was driven out of his positions, and again, like the gallant fighter he is, he held on till nightfall. Orders were given to renew the attack at dawn on the third day of the battle, but as day broke the patrols of Highlanders sent back word that the enemy had evacuated his forward positions, and we advanced in attack formation straight on Samarrah. The Highlanders were leading, and pa.s.sed through the ancient ruins and the several lines of enemy trenches; those trenches held so stubbornly by the Turk, empty now, save for groups of dead bodies and a few of unhappy wounded who had not been moved during the night. Surely the world offers no scene more pitiful than that of a battlefield after action. I know, by personal experience, the suffering entailed in lying day and night untended with broken limbs, the utter weariness from wounds, and the exhaustion after conflict, the tragedy of all surroundings, the cries of those who cry for help that never comes, a pa.s.sionate longing for death alternating with a craven fear of foe and wandering marauder, and above all, the horror of the great vultures swinging round and round in ever closer circles. Little of the pomp or ceremony of war was seen by the Highlanders as they marched that morning through the Turkish entrenchments at the head of the British troops, the first regiment to enter Samarrah as they had marched some six weeks earlier the first to enter Baghdad.
Such is the story of the part played by the Highland Regiment in this hard-fought battle, but though I have told the tale from the point of view of a Regimental Officer, I am not forgetful of the deeds of others. My endeavour has been to give a picture of events as one man meets them in a course of a day"s fighting, not to give a narrative of deeds of which I know little and saw nothing. But of the gallant help given by the Gurkhas I have spoken and, after some experience of war both in France and in Mesopotamia, I add my testimony to the value of the loyal services rendered by so many of our Indian Regiments; it will stand to their honour for all time that they have fought throughout these years so bravely and so faithfully. War is a n.o.ble comradeship, and the ties that now bind the Indian and British troops will not easily be severed.
The relationship between British and Indian officers is invariably happy; difficulties of language, however, sometimes give a little humour to a long campaign. When I was first given command of a Brigade formed of both British and Indian Battalions I made a point of speaking to each Indian officer, and saying something in appreciation of his services. To this the senior Indian officer replied with the usual Eastern compliments, and then added:--
"Many Generals have come to see us, but each usually spares us but a couple of minutes; you, in your kindness, have spoken to each of us for half an hour and we shall indeed fight bravely for you, for of all Generals, you, O Brigadier, are the most long minded."
[Ill.u.s.tration: At The Front. The Regiment In The San-i-yat Trenches.
Sergeant BISSET and Sergeant MURDOCH both killed in action.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: That Able Administrator General Sir PERCY L. c.o.x And An Influential Arab Sheikh.]
CHAPTER IX.
On April 20th, Colonel J. Stewart took over the command of the Regiment, and Colonel A. G. Wauchope became a Brigadier.
It was a great blow to the Regiment to lose their Colonel, and very difficult for any other man coming after him; but the new Colonel proved a worthy successor to the old and the Regiment was fortunate in having two such men in succession to guard its interests and its honour. Months later when I congratulated the General on the successes of his old Regiment and on his promotion, he said, "Yes, yes, B., the Regiment was splendid, but I am not too sure that the other matter is altogether a matter for congratulation." I felt certain that had it been left to his own choice he would have preferred to remain with his Highlanders than accept any higher command.
With the capture of Samarrah it can be said that the winter campaign of 1916-1917 came to an end. We held the rail head of the Baghdad railway and had captured sixteen locomotives, 224 trucks and two barges of ammunition. Already at the end of April, the heat of the coming summer which was to prove the hottest on record could be felt, and the thermometer in that month reached 114 in the shade.
The actual fighting was for the time being practically over, and it was decided that Samarrah should be our advanced position on the Tigris. Preparations were at once commenced to make the position a strong one, and sufficient to hold up any attack which the enemy might have in view; but the summer coming on the Turks were not anxious to be aggressive and took up their most advanced positions some five or six miles further up the Tigris.
The summer was consequently pa.s.sed under much more pleasant conditions than in 1916. The Turks being far distant a number of officers and men were granted a month"s leave to India; tents, rations and comforts were plentiful. The Regiment was at full strength and, despite the heat, the men maintained their health throughout the summer. The main task was the digging of several lines of trenches in front of the old city of Samarrah, but training was carried on continuously so that the Regiment might be ready as always for whatever operations were to take place in the coming cold weather. The Battalion had now spent nearly two years in Mesopotamia, and of the thousand who landed not two hundred remained, and of these many had been wounded. What contrasts the two years offer. In the first period one effort succeeded another, but neither training nor valour were sufficient to redress the balance of the scales, and despite every sacrifice Kut fell. Then came the months when we held San-i-yat, when there were few men and arduous duties, intolerable heat and no comfort.
The spring of the second year was marked by a succession of victories, and achievements for all time memorable; the forcing of San-i-yat, the entry to Baghdad, the battles of Mushaidie and Istabulat; and finally the last few months of comparative peace and plenty.
Throughout the two years the indomitable spirit of the Battalion showed itself true to the finest traditions of the Regiment, and it is open to question whether memory of the hundred survivors fighting their way back from the Turkish trenches on the 21st of January, does not extort as much admiration as the memory of the three companies, after 30 hours of continuous marching and successful fighting, charging at midnight into the station at Mushaidie.
SUMMARY OF OFFICER CASUALTIES suffered by the 2nd Bn. during its service in Mesopotamia,
July 1916 to May 1917.
Killed in Action | 16 | Includes Captain Duncan, R.A.M.C., | | and 2/Lieut. A. E. Sinclair Died from wounds | 8 | ...
Died from disease | 1 | ...
Missing | 2 | Captain D. C. Hamilton Johnstone | | and 2/Lieut. H. F. Forrester.