In this transition President Wilson played a part of the first importance.
His role was not so much that of the executive leader as of the prophet.
He was not the first to catch the significance of the transition, nor did he possess the executive qualities which would enable him to break down all obstacles and translate ideals into facts. But he alone of the notable statesmen of the world was able to express adequately the ill-defined hopes of the peoples of all nations. He gave utterance to the words which the world had been waiting for, and they carried weight because of his position. Alone of the great powers the United States had no selfish designs to hide behind fair promises of a better future. As President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson might look for the confidence of Europe; there was no European Government which could arouse similar trust. So long as the war lasted, the President"s success as a prophet of the ideal was a.s.sured, alike by his ability to voice inarticulate hopes and by reason of his position as chief of the most powerful and most disinterested nation of the world.
But with the end of the war he faced a new task and one which was infinitely more difficult. The flush of victory obliterated from the minds of many in the Allied countries the high ideals which they had nourished during the bitterness of the struggle. The moment had arrived when practical advantage might be taken from the defeat of the enemy, and it seemed madness to surrender such advantage for the sake of quixotic ideals. The statesmen of Europe once more viewed affairs through the colored prism of national selfishness. In America, where Wilsonian ideals had at best been imperfectly appreciated, men were wearied by international problems and longed for a return to the simple complexity of the business life which they understood. The President was confronted by a double problem. He must win from Europe acceptance of his programme, crystallized in the League of Nations; from his fellow countrymen he must secure the support necessary if the United States were to continue to play the role in world affairs which she had undertaken during the war, and which alone would make possible an effective League of Nations. To meet the difficulties of the task, President Wilson was imperfectly equipped.
He lacked the dynamic qualities of a Roosevelt, which might have enabled him to carry his opponents off their feet by an overwhelming rush; he was not endowed with the tactical genius of a skillful negotiator; he was, above all, handicapped by the personal hostilities which he had aroused at home.
In Europe the President achieved at least partial success. He proved unable to marshal the forces of liberalism in such a way as to carry his complete programme to victory, and the sacrifices which he made to the spirit of selfish nationalism cost him the support and the confidence of many progressive elements, while they did not placate the hostility of the reactionaries. But he secured the League of Nations, the symbol and the instrument of the new international organization which he sought.
Thereby at least a beginning was made in concrete form, which might later be developed, when the force of the post-bellum reaction had wasted itself.
At home, however, the forces of opposition proved strong enough to rob the President of what might have been a triumph. He lacked the capacity to reconcile his personal and political opponents, as well as the ability to compromise with the elements that were inclined to meet him half-way.
In accordance with his basic principles he appealed from the politicians to the people. But here again he failed, whether because of personal unpopularity, or because of the poor publicity which had been given his efforts at Paris, or because of the physical breakdown which shattered his persuasive powers and finally led to his retirement from the struggle. The vindication which he sought in the presidential election of 1920 was denied him. The country was tired of a Democratic Administration and gave to the Republican candidate an overwhelming plurality. The sole comfort that Wilson could take, in the face of the election returns, was that both candidates had declared for the principle of international organization and that the most distinguished supporters of the successful Republican candidate had pledged themselves to a League of Nations.
The months that followed the President"s return from Paris until the close of his administration thus form a period of personal tragedy. He had achieved a broad measure of success in Europe, where the difficulties appeared stupendous, only to have the cup dashed from his lips at the last moment in his own country. The bitterness of the experience was intensified by his physical helplessness. But we should lack perspective if we made the mistake of confusing personal tragedy with failure. His work remained uncrowned, but there was much that could never be undone.
The articulate expression of the hopes of the world, which President Wilson voiced during the war, remains imperishable as a guide to this and future generations. The League of Nations, weakened by the absence of the United States but actually organized and in operation, was the President"s work. Whatever the fortunes of this particular League the steps taken toward international cooperation by its foundation can never be completely retraced.
Woodrow Wilson, however, is not to be a.s.sessed by his accomplishment. It is as prophet and not as man of action that he will be regarded by history. Like the prophets of old, like Luther or Mazzini, he lacked the capacity for carrying to practical success the ideal which he preached.
But to a.s.sume that he must accordingly be adjudged a failure is to ignore the significance of the ideals to which he awakened the world. Much there was that was unattainable and intangible, but its value to mankind in the development of international relations may be inestimable.
Not on the vulgar ma.s.s Called "work" must sentence pa.s.s Things done, that took the eye and had the price....
But all, the world"s coa.r.s.e thumb And finger failed to plumb, So pa.s.sed in making up the main account; All instincts immature, All purposes unsure, That weighed not as his work, yet swelled the man"s amount.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Thus far no adequate biography of President Wilson, covering his career through the Peace Conference, has been published. The most suggestive is Henry Jones Ford"s _Woodrow Wilson: The Man and His Work_ (1916) which stops with the close of the first term. The author, a Princeton professor, is a warm personal and political admirer of the President, but he makes a definite attempt at critical appreciation. W. E. Dodd"s _Woodrow Wilson and His Work_ (1920) is comprehensive and brings the story to the end of the Peace Conference, but it is marred by eulogistic interpretation and anti-capitalistic bias. An interesting effort to interpret the President to British readers in the form of biography has been made by H. W. Harris in _President Wilson: His Problems and His Policy_ (1917). W. B. Hale, in _The Story of a Style_ (1920), attempts to a.n.a.lyze the motives by which the President is inspired. But the best material to serve this end is to be found in the President"s writings, especially _Congressional Government_ (1885), _An Old Master and Other Political Essays_ (1893), _Const.i.tutional Government in the United States_ (1908), _The New Freedom_ (1913), _International Ideals_ (1919). The two last-named are collections of addresses made in explanation and advocacy of his plans of domestic and international reform. The most convenient edition of the President"s official writings and speeches is Albert Shaw"s _President Wilson"s State Papers and Addresses_ (1918), edited with an a.n.a.lytical index.
For the period of neutrality a storehouse of facts is to be found in _The New York Times Current History_, published monthly. The _American Year Book_ contains a succinct narrative of the events of each year, which may be supplemented by that in the _Annual Register_ which is written from the British point of view. A brief resume of Wilson"s first term is contained in F. A. Ogg"s _National Progress_ (1918). More detailed is the first volume of J. B. McMaster"s _The United States in the World War_ (1918), which is based upon the newspapers and necessarily lacks perspective, but is comprehensive and extremely useful for purposes of reference. The clearest outline of President Wilson"s treatment of foreign affairs is to be found in E. E. Robinson and V. J. West"s _The Foreign Policy of President Wilson, 1913-1917_ (1917). The narrative is brief but interpretative and is followed by numerous excerpts from the President"s speeches and state papers. The tone of the narrative is extremely favorable and President Wilson is credited with consistency rather than capacity for development, but the arrangement is excellent. More comprehensive is the edition by J. B. Scott, ent.i.tled _President Wilson"s Foreign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers_ (1918). Johann von Bernstorff"s _My Three Years in America_ (1920) is a well-reasoned apologia by the German Amba.s.sador, which contains information of much value; it is not impossible for the critically minded to distinguish the true from the false. The description of German criminal activities contained in Horst von der Goltz"s _My Adventures as a German Secret Agent_ (1917), should be checked up with the report of the Senate Committee of Inquiry into the German propaganda. _The Real Colonel House_, by A. D. Howden-Smith (1918), throws useful sidelights on Wilson and contains valuable material on the activities of Colonel House as negotiator before the entrance into the war of the United States.
The best general narrative of America"s war effort is J. S. Ba.s.sett"s _Our War with Germany_ (1919); it is clear and succinct, beginning with the early effects of the war on the United States in 1914, and ending with the Peace Conference. An interesting, but irritating, account is to be found in George Creel"s _The War, the World and Wilson_ (1920), which is pa.s.sionate in its defense of the President, and blurs truth with inaccuracy on almost every page. F. F. Kelly"s _What America Did_ (1919) is a brief popular account of the building of the army at home and abroad and the organization of industry: clear, inaccurate, uncritical. The most convenient summary of the organization of national resources is F. L.
Paxson"s "The American War Government," in _The American Historical Review_, October, 1920, which should be supplemented by the _Handbook of Economic Agencies for the War of 1917_, monograph No. 3 of the Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff (1919). The former contains many references in footnotes, of which the most important are the _Report of the Chief of Staff_ (1919) and the _Report of the Provost Marshal General_ (1919). The published _Investigation of the War Department, Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs_ (1918) is invaluable The most complete information on ordnance is to be found in the report of General Benedict Crowell, _America"s Munitions, 1917-1918_ (1919); it is an official defense and should be read critically. A graphic picture of American accomplishments is given in L. P. Ayres"s _The War with Germany; A Statistical Summary_ (1919). The best account of operations in France is still General Pershing"s _Report to the Secretary of War_, which is printed in _New York Times Current History_, January and February, 1920.
It may be supplemented by Shipley Thomas"s _The History of the A. E. F._ (1920).
The American point of view on the Peace Conference is set forth authoritatively in _What Really Happened at Paris_ (1921), a collection of lectures delivered by members of the American Peace Commission and edited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour. _Some Problems of the Peace Conference_ (1920), by C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, is an accurate and comprehensive a.n.a.lysis of the territorial questions settled at Paris.
The British point of view and the most important doc.u.ments are given in _A History of the Peace Conference of Paris_ (1920), written chiefly by British delegates and edited by H. W. V. Temperley. The French point of view is admirably presented in Andre Tardieu"s _The Truth about the Treaty_ (1921). An excellent picture of the conflict of interests and the manner in which they were decided is to be found in C. T. Thompson"s _The Peace Conference Day by Day_ (1920). Robert Lansing"s _The Peace Negotiations_ (1921) is interesting as giving the opinions of an American Commissioner who disagreed with Mr. Wilson"s methods at Paris. J. M.
Keynes"s _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_ (1920) contains an economic a.n.a.lysis which is more trustworthy than his brilliant, but misleading, picture of the Conference. It should not be read except in company with the authoritative and accurate _The Making of the Reparation and Economic Clauses_ (1920), by B. M. Baruch. A clever but superficial criticism of President Wilson"s peace policies is to be found in J. M.
Beck"s _The Pa.s.sing of the Freedom_ (1920).