Only the transmitting to Germany of the threatening notes of President Wilson, when he inveighed against my submarine campaign during the latter stages of the war, prevented j.a.pan from coming to us in a great Germano-j.a.panese alliance, which would have ended the war at once.
The overtures of the Pope, in August, 1917, were rejected and again the attention of the world was arrested by the masterly leadership of the American President. On August 16, 1917, I addressed the following letter to the President with reference to the offers of peace made by His Holiness Pope Benedict XV:
The White House, Washington, 16 August, 1917.
DEAR GOVERNOR:
I do not believe that the proposals the Pope has submitted should lead us into a statement as to the terms of peace beyond that which the President has already given expression to in his address in the Senate and in his Russian note. In these two doc.u.ments are discussed the fundamentals of international peace. Some of these fundamentals the Pope recognizes in his statement to the belligerents. To go beyond a discussion of these now might lead to a conflict of opinion even among our own allies (for instance, France hopes for the return of Alsace Lorraine; Russia, for Constantinople, etc.).
When the President said in his address of April second, last, that we were not making war on the German people, I believe he set the stage for the abdication of the Kaiser. And I think our whole note in reply to the Pope should be so framed that this idea would always be kept in the forefront of our discussion so as to bring home to the people of Germany the distrust and utter contempt in which the ruling powers of Germany are held by the peoples of the world.
Our note in reply to the Pope should, I believe, embody the following ideas:
"First--More important now than the terms of peace are the spirit and character of the nations who wish to end the war.
"Second--How can any international agreement to bring an end to the conflict be discussed until those who brought it about can be made to realize the inviolability of treaty obligations?
"Third--Attack the good faith of the ruling powers of Germany, calling attention to the fact that Germany brought on the war; that Germany invaded Belgium; that Germany ravished France, sank the _Lusitania_, ravished the women and children of the conquered territories; that Germany decreed submarine warfare, and "erected barbarism into a religion.
"Fourth--And the democratic nations of the world are asked to confide their future and the future of the world to a nation that believes that force of arms should be subst.i.tuted for the moral force of right.
In other words, the ruling powers of Germany must purge themselves of contempt before they shall be given the hearing that the Pope feels they are ent.i.tled to."
This form of reply will, I am sure, rouse the people of Germany to a realization of the situation which confronts them, for there is abundant evidence that they are gradually arriving at the conclusion that the Kaiser no longer represents them or their ideals.
In other words, what I should like to see the President do is not to discuss in extenso our terms of peace but rather confine himself to a general attack upon the lack of good faith on the part of Germany in all of her dealings with us.
TUMULTY.
On August 27, 1917, the President, through, his Secretary of State, addressed the following reply to the Pope:
TO HIS HOLINESS BENEDICTUS XV, POPE:
In acknowledgment of the communication of Your Holiness to the belligerent peoples, dated August 1, 1917, the President of the United States requests me to transmit the following reply:
Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of His Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires: it is a stable and enduring peace.
This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it.
His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the _status quo ante bellum_, and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration; that by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan States, and the rest.i.tution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved.
It is manifest that no part of this programme can be carried out successfully unless the rest.i.tution of the _status quo ante_ furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long- cherished principles of international action and honour; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood--not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose: but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling.
To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by His Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the newborn Russia to intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a rest.i.tution of its power or upon any word of honour it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?
Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or, embarra.s.s others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people who have themselves suffered all things in this war which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments --the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful--their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a partic.i.p.ation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination.
The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government on the one hand and of a group of free peoples on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied.
The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world, to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come.
They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people--rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.
We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guaranty of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guaranties treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconst.i.tutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. G.o.d grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace.
ROBERT LANSING, Secretary of State of the United States.
CHAPTER x.x.xII
COLONEL ROOSEVELT AND GENERAL WOOD
It will be recalled that early in the war Colonel Roosevelt called at the White House to confer with the President regarding his desire to lead a brigade to the other side. I recall distinctly every fact of that meeting.
I was seated a few feet away in the Red Room of the White House at the time these two men were conferring. Nothing could have been pleasanter or more agreeable than this meeting. They had not met since they were political opponents in 1912, but prior to that they had had two or three friendly visits with each other. Mr. Wilson had once lunched with Colonel Roosevelt at Sagamore Hill, and when the Colonel was President, he and his party had been luncheon guests of President and Mrs. Wilson of Princeton University on the occasion of an Army and Navy game played on the Princeton gridiron.
They met in the White House in the most friendly fashion, told each other anecdotes, and seemed to enjoy together what the Colonel was accustomed to call a "bully time."
The object of the Colonel"s call was discussed without heat or bitterness.
The President placed before the Colonel his own ideas regarding Mr.
Roosevelt"s desire to serve, and the att.i.tude of the General Staff toward the volunteer system, a system that would have to be recognized if the Colonel"s ambition was to be realized. As a matter of fact, instead of being moved by any ill will toward the Colonel, the inclination of the President was to overrule the recommendation of the General Staff and urge that the Colonel be granted permission to go over seas. The salutations at the end of the conference were most friendly and the Colonel, on his way out, stopped in to see me. He slapped me on the back in the most friendly way, and said: "By Jove, Tumulty, you are a man after my own heart! Six children, eh? Well now, you get me across and I will put you on my staff, and you may tell Mrs. Tumulty that I will not allow them to place you at any point of danger."
Some weeks later, I received the following letter from Colonel Roosevelt:
Oyster Bay, Long Island, N. Y.
April 12, 1917.
MY DEAR MR. TUMULTY:
That was a fine speech of Williams. I shall write him and congratulate him.
Now, don"t forget that it might be a very good thing to have you as one of my commissioned officers at Headquarters. You could do really important work there, and tell Mrs. Tumulty and the six children, that this particular service would probably not be dangerous. Come, sure!
Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
MR. JOSEPH P. TUMULTY, Secretary to the President, Washington, D.C.
After the Colonel departed, the President in a boyish way said: "Well, and how did the Colonel impress you?" I told the President of the very favourable impression the Colonel had made upon me by his buoyancy, charm of manner, and his great good nature. The President replied by saying: "Yes, he is a great big boy. I was, as formerly, charmed by his personality. There is a sweetness about him that is very compelling. You can"t resist the man. I can easily understand why his followers are so fond of him."
[Ill.u.s.tration: Colonel Roosevelt sent this letter to Mr. Tumulty shortly after his one and only call upon President Wilson at the White House.
[Transcriber"s note: contains a reproduction of the letter from Roosevelt quoted above.]]
It was, therefore, with real pain that the President read the account of this interview as contained in John J. Leary"s book ent.i.tled "Talks with T. R.," containing many slighting references made by the Colonel to the President. It appears that Mr. Leary accompanied the Colonel to the White House and immediately upon the conclusion of the conference was the recipient of a confidential statement of the Colonel"s impression of the President. The account in Mr. Leary"s book is as follows:
I found that, though I had written plainly enough, there was confusion in his [Wilson"s] mind as to what I wanted to do. I explained everything to him. He seemed to take it well, but--remember I was talking to Mr. Wilson.
Tumulty, by way of a half joke, said he might go to France with me. I said: "By Jove, you come right along! I"ll have a place for you." I would, too, but it wouldn"t be the place he thinks. It is possible he might be sent along as sort of a watchdog to keep Mr. Wilson informed as to what was being done. He wouldn"t be, though. He"d keep his distance from headquarters except when he was sent for.