Indeed, as late as May 4, 1916, Germany did not dispute the applicability of the rule, as is evidenced by the note written to our Government by von Jagow of the German Foreign Office, an extract of which has been quoted supra.
Further, Section 116 of the German Prize Code, (Huberich and Kind translation, p. 68,) in force at the date of the _Lusitania"s_ destruction, conformed with the American rule. It provided:
[Sidenote: Safety of pa.s.sengers necessary.]
"Before proceeding to a destruction of the vessel the safety of all persons on board, and, so far as possible, their effects, is to be provided for, and all ship"s papers and other evidentiary material which, according to the views of the persons at interest, is of value for the formulation of the judgment of the prize court, are to be taken over by the commander."
Thus, when the _Lusitania_ sailed from New York, her owner and master were justified in believing that, whatever else and theretofore happened, this simple, humane and universally accepted principle would not be violated. Few, at that time, would be likely to construe the warning advertis.e.m.e.nt as calling attention to more than the perils to be expected from quick disembarkation and the possible rigors of the sea after the proper safeguarding of the lives of pa.s.sengers by at least full opportunity to take to the boats.
It is, of course, easy now in the light of many later events, added to preceding acts, to look back and say that the Cunard Line and its Captain should have known that the German Government would authorize or permit so shocking a breach of international law and so foul an offense, not only against an enemy, but as well against peaceful citizens of a then friendly nation.
But the unexpected character of the act was best evidenced by the horror which it excited in the minds and hearts of the American people.
[Sidenote: Fault with the Imperial German Government.]
[Sidenote: Those who plotted the crime.]
The fault, therefore, must be laid upon those who are responsible for the sinking of the vessel, in the legal as well as moral sense. It is, therefore, not the Cunard Line, pet.i.tioner, which must be held liable for the loss of life and property. The cause of the sinking of the _Lusitania_ was the illegal act of the Imperial German Government, acting through its instrument, the submarine commander, and violating a cherished and humane rule observed, until this war, by even the bitterest antagonists. As Lord Mersey said, "The whole blame for the cruel destruction of life in this catastrophe must rest solely with those who plotted and with those who committed the crime."
Italy, bound at the outbreak of the war to Germany and Austria by a treaty which formed the so-called Triple Alliance, was in a most difficult position. Her people, however, were strongly convinced of the aggressive intentions of Germany, and, after careful consideration, the Government and the people alike decided to cast their lot with the Allies. Active operations were at once begun along the border between Italy and Austria, and in this difficult terrain the events which are described in the following chapter occurred.
MOUNTAIN WARFARE
HOWARD C. FELTON
Copyright, Munsey"s Magazine, May, 1916.
[Sidenote: New style of warfare.]
At the outbreak of the great war huge and well-equipped bodies of men, led by highly trained officers, rich in the strategic lore of centuries, set out to demonstrate the value of the theories that they had learned in time of peace. In a few months an entirely new style of warfare developed, and most of the military learning of the past was interesting chiefly because of its antiquity.
[Sidenote: Italy and Austria fight in the Alps.]
After the tremendous conflict at the Marne and the German rush for Calais, which was halted on the line of the Yser, there were on the western front no more battles in the old sense of the word. From the North Sea to the Swiss frontier, the fighting was just a novel and gigantic form of siege warfare. Cavalry became an obsolete arm. Battle tactics, in the old sense, ceased to have any meaning. Of strategy nothing much remained save the dictionary definition.
And now, since Italy and Austria have locked horns above the clouds, among the glaciers and snow-faced slopes of the Alps, even the old text-books on mountain warfare have lost their significance. In the Trentino and along the Isonzo we see the consummation of a new style of mountain fighting, which grew out of the old methods in the struggle for the Carpathian pa.s.ses during the first winter and spring of the war.
In the old days, during a campaign in a mountain region, most of the battles were fought on the level--in the literal, not the colloquial sense of the word. There was a deal of marching and scouting among crags and precipices, but all with the object of obtaining the best position in an open valley or upland plain where the real fighting must take place. Now the smooth floors of the valleys are comparatively deserted, while whole armies are spread out over great peaks and dizzy snow-fields thousands of feet above sea-level, chopping trenches in the ice and sparring for some vantage-point on a crag that in peace times might tax the strength and skill of the amateur mountain-climber.
[Sidenote: Bourcet"s "Principles of Mountain Warfare."]
Some time between 1764 and 1770, Pierre de Bourcet wrote a treatise ent.i.tled "The Principles of Mountain Warfare." This may seem to be going a long way back, but Bourcet"s volume and that of the young Comte de Guilbert on general tactics have historical interest and importance because, according to Spenser Wilkinson, they show where some of Napoleon"s strategic "miracles" were born. Bourcet"s observations are as vital as if they had been written in 1910, but, as will be seen, many of them are somewhat musty in 1916.
[Sidenote: Pa.s.ses and defiles once the strong positions.]
Bourcet, without the slightest idea of a battle-line extending from frontier to sea, lays down as the first principle of mountain warfare that when the enemy holds a strong position, the a.s.sailant should force him to leave it by turning it. These strong positions in the mountains were, until this war, the pa.s.ses and defiles.
"These contracted places," he explains, "as they generally const.i.tute the princ.i.p.al objects of the defense, must compel the general who is taking the offensive to seek every possible means of turning them, or of misleading the enemy by diversions which will weaken him and facilitate access to them.
"Suppose, for example, that the general on the defensive should be entrenched at all points surrounding his position in such a way as to be able to resist any direct attack that might be attempted against him, it would be necessary to attempt to turn him by some more distant point, choosing positions that would facilitate the scheme, and which, by suggesting some different object, could not raise the suspicion that the troops there collected were destined for the purpose really in view.
[Sidenote: Unlike modern warfare.]
"It often happens in the mountains that the only pa.s.sages favorable to our plans are interrupted by narrow defiles. In such cases we must avoid letting the enemy know our real purpose, and must undertake diversions, dividing our forces into small bodies. This method, which would be dangerous in any other sort of country, is indispensable in the mountains, and is the whole science of this kind of warfare, provided that the general who uses it always has the means to reconcentrate his forces when necessary."
Bourcet"s conclusion is that in such a campaign the offensive has great advantages over the defensive. It will always possess the initiative; and if it prepares its blow with sufficient secrecy and strikes swiftly, the enemy, whose troops are necessarily scattered along the whole line menaced, can never be ready to meet the attack.
[Sidenote: Generals understand each other"s strategy.]
To-day, the only trouble about this beautifully tricky system of strategy is that the defending general would pay no attention to it. The Austrian general staff, for instance, knew that the Italians would try to smash through the frontier defenses of the Dual Empire, and that the natural avenues of attack were up the valley of the Adige, along the railway through Pontebba and Malborghetto, or between Malborghetto and the sea. The Austrians have enough men and guns to defend all these routes and all the tortuous pathways in between. So all they had to do was plant themselves on their chosen ground along the whole carefully fortified mountain line, and wait for the Italians to attack wherever they pleased.
"It is only by marching and countermarching," Bourcet said, "that we can hope to deceive the enemy and induce him to weaken himself in certain positions in order to strengthen himself in others."
[Sidenote: The enemy cannot be outflanked.]
But this cannot be done in the mountain fighting in the Alps to-day. The Italians might march and countermarch as much as they pleased, but there is no possible way of turning the enemy out of his position by outflanking him. It is a case of frontal attack, with every valley blocked and every peak a fortress.
[Sidenote: Italy"s great objectives.]
The Italians campaign has two princ.i.p.al objectives--Trent and Gorizia.
These two lovely cities of Italia Irrendenta are respectively the keys to the right and left flank of the Austrian frontier. Trent guards the valley of the Adige, one of the few natural highways from Italy into Austrian territory. Bourcet himself, in 1735, designed the defense of this pathway at Rivoli, just inside the Italian boundary, where he laid out what were considered impregnable positions. To the north; where Trent lies, the country becomes more and more difficult for an invader, and up to this time the Italians have not been able to come within striking distance of the great Austrian fortress, though they hold Rovereto, and have cut the direct line of communication between Trent and Toblach.
[Sidenote: Italian game on the Gorizia front.]
On the Gorizia front they have made what in this war may be considered as important gains. Gorizia stands watch over the valley of the Isonzo and Austria"s Adriatic littoral. Besides occupying Grado and Monfalcone in the coastlands, General Cadorna"s forces have crossed the Isonzo at several points, have smashed through to the north, and now threaten to envelop Gorizia. Indeed, many observers believe that Cadorna could at any time take the place by a grand a.s.sault if he were willing to pay the cost in blood.
Despite the very unfavorable character of the country, the Italians have gained more ground here in the same period than either the Germans or the Anglo-French forces in the flat or rolling plains of Flanders and northern France. But the outflanking tactics of Bourcet, with feints and swift maneuvering, have had little to do with it. The a.s.sailants have had to fight their way step by step.
The Austrians had prepared all sorts of disagreeable surprises. They had hewn gun-positions out of solid cliffs, skilfully placed so as to cover the routes of approach, and had cemented up the embrasures. It was merely necessary to knock the cement out and pour sh.e.l.ls upon the advancing Italians at a range of several miles. The batteries were inaccessible to storming parties, and the Italians had to drag up guns of equal caliber to put them out of business.
[Sidenote: Ancient methods employed.]
In some places rocks and ma.s.ses of ice were rolled down the slopes, as in the brave old days of the Helvetians; and in this line the Austrians introduced an innovation. When the Italians began driving their trenches up the steep slopes of Podgora--the Gibraltar of Gorizia--the defenders rolled down barrels of kerosene and set them alight with artillery fire.
This enterprise throve joyously until the Italian gunners got the range of the launching-point and succeeded in exploding a few barrels among the Austrians themselves.
[Sidenote: Austria had possession of the heights.]
The writer does not mean to give the impression that Italy"s job in the Alps is all but finished. A glance at the map of the frontier will cure any one of such a notion. The Italians were forced to start this campaign under every strategic disadvantage. By the frontier delimited in 1866, they were left without natural defenses on the north and east.
All along the Austrian boundary the heights remained in the hands of the Hapsburgs as natural menaces to Venetia and Lombardy. Italy received the plains, but Austria held the mountain fastnesses that hung above them.
This is so much the case that when Italy declared war, the Austrian general orders reminded the troops that they were in the position of men on the top floor of a six-story house, defending it from attackers who must mount from the street under a plunging fire.
[Sidenote: Cha.s.seurs Alpins in the Vosges.]