Harman Capian, a civil engineer of Wasmes; Mrs. Ada Bodart of Brussels; Albert Libiez, a lawyer of Wasmes; and Georges Derveau, a pharmacist of Paturages, were sentenced each to fifteen years" penal servitude at hard labor.
The Princess Maria de Croy was sentenced to ten years" penal servitude at hard labor.
Seventeen others were sentenced to hard labor or to terms of imprisonment of from two to five years. The eight remaining were acquitted.
[Sidenote: The people horrified at Miss Cavell"s execution.]
All day long sad and solemn groups stood under the trees in the boulevards amid the falling leaves discussing the crime in horrified tones. The horror of it pervaded the house. I found my wife weeping at evening; no need to ask what was the matter; the wife of the chaplain had been there, with some detail of Miss Cavell"s last hours: how she had arisen wearily from her cot at the coming of the clergyman, drawing her dressing-gown about her thin throat.
[Sidenote: The body not given to friends.]
I sent a note to Baron von der Lancken asking that the Governor-General permit the body of Miss Cavell to be buried by the American Legation and the friends of the dead girl. In reply he came himself to see me in the afternoon. He was very solemn, and said that he wished to express his regret in the circ.u.mstances, but that he had done all he could. The body, he said, had already been interred, with respect and with religious rites, in a quiet place, and under the law it could not be exhumed without an order from the Imperial Government. The Governor-General himself had gone to Berlin.
[Sidenote: Whitlock and Villalobar.]
And then came Villalobar, and I thanked him for what he had done. He told me much, and described the scene the night before in that anteroom with Lancken. The Marquis was much concerned about the Countess Jeanne de Belleville and Madame Thuiliez, both French, and hence protegees of his, condemned to die within eight days; but I told him not to be concerned; that the effect of Miss Cavell"s martyrdom did not end with her death; it would procure other liberations, this among them; the thirst for blood had been slaked and there would be no more executions in that group; it was the way of the law of blood vengeance. We talked a long time about the tragedy and about the even larger tragedy of the war.
"We are getting old," he said. "Life is going; and after the war, if we live in that new world, we shall be of the old--the new generation will push us aside."
[Sidenote: Miss Cavell"s death wins mercy for others.]
Gibson and de Leval prepared reports of the whole matter, and I sent them by the next courier to our Emba.s.sy at London. But somehow that very day the news got into Holland and shocked the world. Richards, of the C. R. B., just back from The Hague, said that they had already heard of it there and were filled with horror. And even the Germans, who seemed always to do a deed and to consider its effect afterward, knew that they had another Louvain, another _Lusitania_, for which to answer before the bar of civilization. The lives of the three others remaining, of the five condemned to death, were ultimately spared, as I had told Villalobar they would be. The King of Spain and the President of the United States made representations at Berlin in behalf of the Countess de Belleville and Madame Thuiliez, and their sentences were commuted to imprisonment, as was that of Louis Severin, the Brussels druggist. The storm of universal loathing and reprobation for the deed was too much even for the Germans.
In an earlier chapter we have read of the beginning of the attempt to cross the Dardanelles and to capture the Peninsula of Gallipoli. After great losses and terrible suffering had been endured in these attempts, it was decided in December, 1915, by the British war authorities that further sacrifices were not justified. Preparations were accordingly made to abandon the enterprise. How these plans were carried out is told in the chapter following.
GALLIPOLI ABANDONED
GENERAL SIR CHARLES C. MONRO
On October 20, 1915, in London, I received instructions to proceed as soon as possible to the Near East and take over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
[Sidenote: General Monro"s orders on arrival.]
My duty on arrival was in broad outline:
(a) To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
(b) To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the Peninsula should be evacuated or another attempt made to carry it.
(c) The number of troops that would be required--
(1) To carry the Peninsula.
(2) To keep the strait open, and
(3) To take Constantinople.
[Sidenote: Military defects in positions occupied.]
The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured.
The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our intrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks.
The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect.
The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather.
No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive--while the Turks enjoyed full powers of observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer.
[Sidenote: Disease, loss of competent officers, make-shift organization.]
Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the Peninsula had suffered much from various causes--exposure to sh.e.l.l fire, disease, the dearth of competent officers owing to earlier losses, and "make-shifts" due to the attachment of Yeomanry and Mounted Brigades to the Territorial Divisions. Other arguments, irrefutable in their conclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wise course to pursue.
[Sidenote: Consequences of unusual storms.]
On November 21, 1915 the Peninsula was visited by a storm said to be nearly unprecedented for the time of the year. The storm was accompanied by torrential rain, which lasted for twenty-four hours. This was followed by hard frost and a heavy blizzard. In the areas of the Eighth Corps and the Anzac Corps the effects were not felt to a very marked degree owing to the protection offered by the surrounding hills. The Ninth Corps was less favorably situated, the water courses in this area became converted into surging rivers, which carried all before them. The water rose in many places to the height of the parapets and all means of communications were prevented.
The men, drenched as they were by the rain, suffered from the subsequent blizzard most severely. Large numbers collapsed from exposure and exhaustion, and in spite of untiring efforts that were made to mitigate the suffering I regret to announce that there were 200 deaths from exposure and over 10,000 sick evacuated during the first few days of December.
From reports given by deserters it is probable that the Turks suffered even to a greater degree.
[Sidenote: Difficulties pertaining to withdrawal.]
The problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yards from the enemy"s trenches, and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which was within effective range of Turkish guns, and from which in winds from the south or southwest, the withdrawal of troops was not possible.
I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which did not fully fulfill its purpose would have been worse than useless, and there was the obvious danger that the suspicions of the Turks would be aroused by our adoption of a course the real purport of which could not have been long disguised.
[Sidenote: Unsettled weather a menace.]
Rapidity of action was imperative, having in view the unsettled weather which might be expected in the aegean. The success of our operations was entirely dependent on weather conditions. Even a mild wind from the south or southwest was found to raise such a ground swell as to greatly impede communication with the beaches, while anything in the nature of a gale from this direction could not fail to break up the piers, wreck the small craft, and thus definitely prevent any steps being taken toward withdrawal.
[Sidenote: Evacuation of supplies continues satisfactorily.]
Throughout the period December 10 to 18, 1915 the withdrawal proceeded under the most auspicious conditions, and the morning of December 18, 1915, found the positions both at Anzac and Suvla reduced to the numbers determined, while the evacuation of guns, animals, stores, and supplies had continued most satisfactorily.
It was imperative, of course, that the front-line trenches should be held, however lightly, until the very last moment and that the withdrawal from these trenches should be simultaneous throughout the line.
The good fortune which had attended the evacuation continued during the night of the 19th-20th. The night was perfectly calm with a slight haze over the moon, an additional stroke of good luck, as there was a full moon on that night.
[Sidenote: Final withdrawals from Anzac and Suvla.]
Soon after dark the covering ships were all in position, and the final withdrawal began. At 1:30 A. M. the withdrawal of the rear parties commenced from the front trenches at Suvla and the left of Anzac. Those on the right of Anzac who were nearer the beach remained in position until 2 A. M. By 5:30 A. M. the last man had quit the trenches.
At Anzac, four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4.7 naval gun, one anti-air craft, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns were left, but they were destroyed before the troops finally embarked. In addition, fifty-six mules, a certain number of carts, mostly stripped of their wheels, and some supplies which were set on fire, were also abandoned.
[Sidenote: A few supplies destroyed.]